



## Over dit boek

Dit is een digitale kopie van een boek dat al generaties lang op bibliotheekplanken heeft gestaan, maar nu zorgvuldig is gescand door Google. Dat doen we omdat we alle boeken ter wereld online beschikbaar willen maken.

Dit boek is zo oud dat het auteursrecht erop is verlopen, zodat het boek nu deel uitmaakt van het publieke domein. Een boek dat tot het publieke domein behoort, is een boek dat nooit onder het auteursrecht is gevallen, of waarvan de wettelijke auteursrechttermijn is verlopen. Het kan per land verschillen of een boek tot het publieke domein behoort. Boeken in het publieke domein zijn een stem uit het verleden. Ze vormen een bron van geschiedenis, cultuur en kennis die anders moeilijk te verkrijgen zou zijn.

Aantekeningen, opmerkingen en andere kanttekeningen die in het origineel stonden, worden weergegeven in dit bestand, als herinnering aan de lange reis die het boek heeft gemaakt van uitgever naar bibliotheek, en uiteindelijk naar u.

## Richtlijnen voor gebruik

Google werkt samen met bibliotheken om materiaal uit het publieke domein te digitaliseren, zodat het voor iedereen beschikbaar wordt. Boeken uit het publieke domein behoren toe aan het publiek; wij bewaren ze alleen. Dit is echter een kostbaar proces. Om deze dienst te kunnen blijven leveren, hebben we maatregelen genomen om misbruik door commerciële partijen te voorkomen, zoals het plaatsen van technische beperkingen op automatisch zoeken.

Verder vragen we u het volgende:

- + *Gebruik de bestanden alleen voor niet-commerciële doeleinden* We hebben Zoeken naar boeken met Google ontworpen voor gebruik door individuen. We vragen u deze bestanden alleen te gebruiken voor persoonlijke en niet-commerciële doeleinden.
- + *Voer geen geautomatiseerde zoekopdrachten uit* Stuur geen geautomatiseerde zoekopdrachten naar het systeem van Google. Als u onderzoek doet naar computervertalingen, optische tekenherkenning of andere wetenschapsgebieden waarbij u toegang nodig heeft tot grote hoeveelheden tekst, kunt u contact met ons opnemen. We raden u aan hiervoor materiaal uit het publieke domein te gebruiken, en kunnen u misschien hiermee van dienst zijn.
- + *Laat de eigendomsverklaring staan* Het “watermerk” van Google dat u onder aan elk bestand ziet, dient om mensen informatie over het project te geven, en ze te helpen extra materiaal te vinden met Zoeken naar boeken met Google. Verwijder dit watermerk niet.
- + *Houd u aan de wet* Wat u ook doet, houd er rekening mee dat u er zelf verantwoordelijk voor bent dat alles wat u doet legaal is. U kunt er niet van uitgaan dat wanneer een werk beschikbaar lijkt te zijn voor het publieke domein in de Verenigde Staten, het ook publiek domein is voor gebruikers in andere landen. Of er nog auteursrecht op een boek rust, verschilt per land. We kunnen u niet vertellen wat u in uw geval met een bepaald boek mag doen. Neem niet zomaar aan dat u een boek overal ter wereld op allerlei manieren kunt gebruiken, wanneer het eenmaal in Zoeken naar boeken met Google staat. De wettelijke aansprakelijkheid voor auteursrechten is behoorlijk streng.

## Informatie over Zoeken naar boeken met Google

Het doel van Google is om alle informatie wereldwijd toegankelijk en bruikbaar te maken. Zoeken naar boeken met Google helpt lezers boeken uit allerlei landen te ontdekken, en helpt auteurs en uitgevers om een nieuw leespubliek te bereiken. U kunt de volledige tekst van dit boek doorzoeken op het web via <http://books.google.com>


---

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

Google<sup>TM</sup> books

<https://books.google.com>






Jan. 1871.

104  $\frac{F}{-}$  - 2

Bonaparte





**<36637022710010**

**<36637022710010**

**Bayer. Staatsbibliothek**



THE  
BONAPARTE LETTERS

AND  
DESPATCHES,


SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, AND OFFICIAL;

FROM THE ORIGINALS

IN HIS PRIVATE CABINET.

VOLUME II.

LONDON:  
SAUNDERS AND OTLEY, CONDUIT STREET.  
1846.



F. SHOBERL, JUNIOR,  
To His Royal Highness  
51, RUPERT STREET,



PRINTER  
Prince Albert,  
HAYMARKET, LONDON.

# CONTENTS

## OF

### THE SECOND VOLUME.

---

<b>PART IV.—(CONTINUED.)</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
FROM THE BATTLE OF ROVEREDO TO THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES BY A NEW AUSTRIAN ARMY . . . . .	1
<b>PART V.</b>	
FROM THE RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM THE TYROL TO THE BATTLE OF RIVOLI . . . . .	98
<b>PART VI.</b>	
FROM THE BATTLE OF RIVOLI TO THE PRELIMINARIES OF LEOBEN . . . . .	228
<b>PART VII.</b>	
CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF CAMPIO FORMIO . . . . .	307

१



## LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.

---

### PART FOURTH.—(*Continued.*)

FROM THE BATTLE OF ROVEREDO TO THE RESUMPTION OF  
HOSTILITIES BY A NEW AUSTRIAN ARMY.

*To His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Hungary  
and Bohemia, Archduke of Austria, &c.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 11 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 2, 1796].

Sire, Europe longs for peace. This disastrous war has lasted too long.

I have the honour to inform your Majesty that, if you do not send plenipotentiaries to Paris to commence negotiations for peace, the Executive Directory orders me to destroy the port of Trieste and to ruin all your Majesty's establishments on the Adriatic. I have been hitherto withheld from the execution of this plan by the hope of not increasing the number of the innocent victims of this war.

I beseech your Majesty to consider the calamities which threaten your subjects, and to restore peace and tranquillity to the world. I am, with respect, your Majesty's &c.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Chief of the Staff.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 11 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 2, 1796].

I learn, citizen-general, that several Genoese merchants have left Genoa with great noise and fled to Milan, affording occasion for the surmise that they had been informed that the French designed to bombard Genoa. You will be pleased to order them to leave Lombardy immediately and to return to Genoa; having it at heart to deprive the ill-affected of the means of disquieting the good people of

VOL. II.

B

Genoa, to whom the army of Italy owes essential obligations, as well for the corn which it has procured for us in moments of distress, as for the friendship which it has at all times testified for the Republic.

Now that they have just closed their port against the English, and expelled the emperor's minister, who had fomented the rebellion of the imperial fiefs, they have more particular claims to the protection of the French Republic.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizen Garrau, Commissioner of the Government.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 13 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 4, 1796].

We are in the greatest need of money both for the army and for France: I think, therefore, that it is necessary for you to take measures this evening for collecting all the sums possible upon the credits of the chamber, the capitals of the archduke, and the credits known by the name of Rivelles: these three objects may be a great resource to us, and you know that we have no need to spare any thing.

BONAPARTE.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Bologna, 13 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 4, 1796].

Citizen Salicetti will inform you in detail of the fermentation which has taken place in the Romagna concerning a proclamation of the court of Rome and the vain hope entertained that the King of Naples is able and willing to assist the pope to keep up the war. This fermentation alarms us much. We are on the borders, and Castel-Bolognese is enclosed in the papal territory: we are threatened, and without arms or any means of defence. In these perplexing circumstances, we can have recourse, we know, to none but you, citizen-general. You have been our deliverer; be also our defender. A single battalion of your brave soldiers would be sufficient to overawe the wretches who might have hostile designs against us, and to inspire us with the courage necessary in case of need. Refuse us not this favour, citizen-general, and you shall daily have fresh proofs of the gratitude and attachment which we owe you on all accounts.

For the senate of Bologna,  
DE BIANCHI.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Leghorn, 13 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 4, 1796].

I have just received, general, positive information of considerable and regular assemblages forming in Tuscany, the inhabitants of which are training in military evolutions. I am also assured that they are most actively engaged in the fabrication of arms and cannon. I have communicated this information to citizen Miot, our ambassador to the Grand-duke.

SERRURIER.

*To Cardinal Mattei.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 14 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 5, 1796].

The circumstances in which you have found yourself, sir, were difficult and new for you : to this I am willing to attribute the essential faults which you have committed. The moral and Christian virtues which all the world agrees to ascribe to you, make me strongly desirous that you should return to your diocese. Assure all the ministers of religion and the religious of the different congregations of the special protection that I shall grant them, whenever they shall abstain from intermeddling in the political affairs of nations.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Sovereign Pontiff.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 15 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 6, 1796].

I have the honour to communicate to your Holiness a manifesto which is circulated in the Romagna, for the purpose of inquiring whether it is official, or whether it is published by the enemies of religion and of your Holiness.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizen Faypoult, Minister of the French Republic at Genoa.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 15 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 6, 1796].

I learn, citizen minister, that citizen Gosselin, *commissaire ordonnateur* of the army, is at Genoa. I beg you to cause him to be apprehended and brought to Milan.

BONAPARTE.

B 2

*Report concerning Brescia.*

Brescia, 15 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 6, 1796].

The city of Brescia affords no means of resistance to the enemy; all therefore that is done is to guard the gates, in order to be forewarned of his arrival and to withdraw to the citadel, where all the artillery has been mounted.

The provision of articles of consumption is inconsiderable, as may be seen by the annexed statement.

The hospitals are not so bad as those of Verona, but, with the exception of the wounded, the others are absolutely destitute of things and medicines.

A wretched, filthy paillasse, swarming with vermin, one coarse sheet for each bed, seldom washed, no blankets, considerable crowding—such is the spectacle presented by the fever hospitals of Brescia: it is heartrending. The soldiers justly complain that, after conquering the wealth of Italy at the expense of their blood, they are debarred not only from the enjoyment of comforts, but from receiving that care and those attentions which their situation requires.

Bread and rice are the only tolerable articles of food; but the meat is hard. I earnestly beseech the general-in-chief to turn his eyes towards the companions of his glory, who are solicitous to recover their health, merely that they may go and gather fresh laurels.

KELLERMANN, Junior.

*Report on the State of the Citadel of Brescia.*

15 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 6, 1796].

The citadel of Brescia is seated on a tolerably lofty knoll. It consists of works raised one above another, most of them surrounded with ruins and partly filled up: yet there is still a portion in a tolerably good state, which is sufficient to secure the place from sudden surprise and even to stand a siege of a few days. That part of the citadel which overlooks the country and the city is, from the depth of the ditches and the steepness of the rocks, secure from escalade; but all that is on the left of the gate and faces the convent of the Capuchins is extremely exposed, because the ditches are filled with rubbish nearly up to the coping,

and you may descend into them without the least obstacle. It is indispensably necessary to station there an officer of engineers with a fixed appointment, to superintend the clearing of the foot of the ramparts and bastions, the repair of the drawbridges, the walling-up of the posterns, which are closed by a mere door easy to be broken open: there is even one, the door of which is broken. I have recommended to the commandant of the place to have four or five walled up, likewise to close and wall up the gates leading to those for sorties, that he may have nothing to guard but his ramparts, and to have embrasures made for the purpose of removing thither, in case of need, small pieces destined for battering the faces of the bastions most exposed to escalade. The interior of the citadel exhibits nothing but ruins: the lodgings of the soldiers are totally out of repair. The most excessive filthiness prevails in the rooms, in the corridors, and in the courts. The soldiers are in want of straw; they have nothing but the refuse of the prisons of the city: the unfortunate sick on their passage are sent to the fort to sleep; they ascend to it, and these hapless conquerors of Italy, in recompense for all their hardships and their wounds, find none but damp, unwholesome lodgings, rotten straw full of devouring insects, no accommodation whatever, not even wood for cooking their meat. These most severe privations, which they endure here, they endured yesterday, and they will again endure to-morrow as they pursue their route: nevertheless, M. le Commissaire will forsooth provide for their wants!

The fort contains a very handsome workshop for arms, and kept in good repair, as well as that for cartridges.

There are ovens for baking six hundred rations at once. The hospital is not prepared for the event of a siege: no locality has been assigned to it; there are no medicines. There are three abundant cisterns.

The artillery of the place consists of thirteen pieces of different calibres; three others are about to be mounted immediately: this number and their distribution appear sufficient for the defence of the place. The weak part alone, which I have mentioned above, needs three pieces to prevent escalade.

The ammunition is not sufficient. The provision for consumption is calculated to supply 1700 men for ten days. The wine, however, is bad. There is no straw, wood, can-

dles, oil, not only for siege provision, but even for daily consumption.

The garrison is weak, but there is a tolerably large number of workmen, who might be armed with muskets, in case of need.

KELLERMANN, Junior.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 15 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 6, 1796].

The different bulletins of Rome, which I send you herewith, might induce a belief that the league between the King of Naples and the pope has been signed, but the cardinal secretary of state has assured me that this affair is not concluded: however, they are evidently agreed.

The pope is sending Monseigneur Albani to Vienna, and it is believed that Cardinal Doria will be sent to Spain.

Means are foolishly employed to inflame the minds of the people against the French: none of them are allowed to remain at Ancona or Civita Vecchia.

M. Grews [? Crewe] agent of England at Rome, demanded permission for the entry of three English ships into the ports of the Ecclesiastical State—refused for the present.

The Neapolitan troops are not yet leaving the frontiers: the court of Naples has not given the least intimation to any one of the treaty proposed by the Directory.

A report is in circulation that I am to be detained as an hostage for whatever may befall Cardinal Mattei.

Accept, citizen-general-in-chief, the assurance of my devoted attachment.

CACAULT.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Genoa, 16 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 7, 1796].

The state in which things are here and the general situation of our affairs determine me, general, to write to you once more on the measure projected concerning Genoa. Perhaps some of the reflections which I am about to submit may have already occurred to you: if that is the case, we are already agreed about our results.



We have recently sustained disasters in Germany, and these reverses have unfortunately had in Italy a moral effect equivalent to a real diminution of our forces. Nay, more—it is known there that our army is not numerous, which it ought to be for guarding one hundred and thirty leagues of country, while Mantua still holds out, while the Barbets are organizing an Italian Vendée, while Rome is preaching up a crusade and withholding the remainder of its contribution, while the successes of the archduke may enable him to pour down a third army into the Tyrol.

The colleges guess very nearly what is our design. At the moment that I am writing to you they are assembled: they are on their guard against a surprise. Ever since the evening of the day before yesterday, they have caused the posts of the Spur and the Diamond on the great wall to be reinforced. The guard at the Lantern Gate has orders to be continually under arms; and the guns which defend it are provided with artillerymen and ammunition.

Thus you will not take them by surprise: they are in expectation of an event. They do not absolutely fear it, because they know the means which you can employ against them, and those which they have to oppose you. They will attempt resistance, and that is a great deal too much at this moment. They are strong by circumstances; you, on the contrary, are weak by circumstances. The French artillery of San Pietro d'Arena is in their power, and you have none to supply its place. Efforts are making to inflame the people; in forty-eight hours they will be led to believe that the French are contemplating a perfidy. They will be against you.

Since I know that they will not suffer themselves to be intimidated by a first proposition, it is my duty to apprise you of it: I owe it to your glory, and above all to that which serves us for a common rule—to the welfare of the Republic which we serve.

In this state of things, when we know, as I have told you, that the minister for foreign affairs is himself negotiating the affair of the Genoese with M. Spinola; when I have informed the Directory of the vigorous manner in which the Genoese government has closed its ports against the English, at the same time apprising it that I was writing to you, and begging it to answer me; when, lastly, the decree of the 29th Messidor is three months old, and

so many more important events have since occurred,—ought we to attempt so hazardous an enterprise without fresh, express, and formal orders? My opinion, general, is for the negative.

It ought to be so, because, considering the present disposition of people's minds at Genoa, considering your inability to save your artillery, I cannot help concluding that this enterprise will miscarry. Citizen Lacheze, whom I send to you, will give you important explanations on the subject, which I may spare myself in this letter.

I shall say nothing about the difficulties of transport and approach which the season already multiplies, and which you might justly have reckoned as nothing in the hypothesis of instantaneous success, which only six days ago I admitted myself, but which no longer exists.

If you persist, you will have Genoa and Mantua to besiege at once. I think it, therefore, indispensable, general, to change the plan. It will be better, taking advantage of the perturbation in which the colleges are, to endeavour to obtain successively some interesting points, than aim at obtaining all and lose all at once.

In short, the Directory or the minister for foreign affairs will answer, and then we shall know what has been done with the envoy Spinola.

Poussielgue will perhaps have set off when you open my letter; but as Lacheze will probably be back in sixty hours, I will await his return before I do anything.

I am not naturally timid, general, and you know that I am more solicitous than any one else that France should obtain from Genoa all the reparations which are due to her; but I have thought that I was rendering a service to the Republic, and I should not have shown that confidence and attachment which you have a right to expect from me, if I had not written you this letter from the point at which I am placed. You know my sentiments for you: they are for life and death.

FAYPOULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 16 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 7, 1796].

The Italian bulletins annexed will make you acquainted with the stupid ideas upon which people feast themselves in

Rome. The fanaticism of the populace of the Ecclesiastical State is fostered every where even to madness.

I have reason to believe, what you ought to know much better than I do, that the treaty with Naples is nearly settled and arranged in Paris with M. de Belmonte. If that is the case, the court of Naples is playing with Rome in a most treacherous and cruel manner, which is not necessary, the Directory giving to the King of Naples all that he can gain by betraying the pope. Is it possible that an idea can have been conceived of setting Ferdinand IV. on the throne of Rome? In making a show of having a formidable army, the court of Naples has had no other view but to obtain better conditions of peace. M. Acton knows what that show is worth. A sentiment of fear has undoubtedly induced him to increase the appearance by a junction with the pope, with which the embassy of M. del Vasto threatens us.

The court of Rome, in despair, would clutch at a red-hot iron: it gives way to the blustering impulsion of the Neapolitans.

I know not what to think, what to conclude, amid such a chaos of complicated affairs.

I beg you, general, to accept the assurance of my attachment.

CACAULT.

*To the Chief of the Staff.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 15 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 6, 1796].

You will cause the commissary of war Flague to be arrested wherever he may be, and brought to Milan. He is accused of having sold a barrel of quinquina. It is presumed that he is at Leghorn.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Commissioner of the Government.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 18 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 9, 1796].

It is expedient, I think, to assemble a congress at Modena and at Bologna, and to compose it of the deputies of the States of Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, and Reggio. The deputies shall be nominated by the different governments, so that the assembly may consist of about a hundred members.

You might make the distribution proportionate to the population, favouring Reggio a little. Care must be taken to have among these deputies, nobles, priests, cardinals, merchants, and persons of all classes, generally reputed to be patriots. This assembly should determine: 1, the organization of the Italian legion; 2, there should be formed a kind of confederation for the defence of the commune; 3, they might send deputies to Paris to demand their liberty and their independence. This congress ought not to be convoked by us, but only by private letters: that would produce a great effect, and be a source of distrust and alarm for the potentates of Europe; and it is indispensable that we neglect no means of replying to the fanaticism of Rome, with a view to make friends for ourselves and to secure our rear and our flanks. I should wish this congress to be held on the 23rd of this month. I beg you to pay particular attention to this point: I will manage to be there at the time. We are here without a sou, and everything is expensive. Procure us some money.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Chief of the Staff.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 10, 1796].

Be pleased, general, to give orders for the arrest of the officer who commanded the post of the Chiusa in the affair of the 11th Thermidor, and bring him before the council of war for trial, as a traitor or coward, for surrendering that post without reason, and without being forced to it.

BONAPARTE.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.*

Paris, 14 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 5, 1796].

It was you, citizen-general, who first called the attention of the government to the monuments with which the conquest of Italy is to enrich the French Museum, and you desired that scientific men and artists should be appointed to collect those precious spoils; it will therefore be gratifying to you to concur in the execution of a measure useful to the commission which we have appointed for that purpose. We are informed that the members who compose it are in

a state of destitution, which the national generosity cannot but be solicitous to relieve, and on the subject of which they have hitherto neglected to interest it from mistaken delicacy.

We request you, in consequence, citizen-general, in concert with our commissioners to the army, to cause the sums necessary for the subsistence of the members of that commission, and which the utility of their services demands, to be delivered to them.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 15 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 6, 1796].

The Directory, interested, citizen-general, in accelerating the moment when the demolition of the Piedmontese fortresses shall be completed, wishes to add to the zeal of the general-in-chief Kellermann, and to the means which he is employing in this important operation for France. It entreats you, in consequence, to comply cheerfully with the application made to you by that general for a company of miners. Your present situation leads us to presume that this succour afforded to the army of the Alps will have no influence on the last efforts that you are about to make to ensure the conquest of Italy to the French Republic, and from which we hope for the most glorious success.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].

Your courier of the 11th Vendemiaire is just arrived, citizen-general, at the moment of the departure of the one whom we detained to be the bearer of the present despatch. In perusing your letters, the circumstance that particularly struck us was the application made by you for reinforcements: we ourselves acknowledge the necessity for them, and we shall immediately give orders for drafting a few more troops from the Coasts of the Ocean and sending them to you. This succour must be distant, notwithstanding the celerity which we shall enjoin in this matter: meanwhile,

the summary of the orders given by the minister of war in the first decade of this month in matters concerning you, in virtue of our preceding arrangements, is as follows:

Four thousand men shall march without delay from the Coasts of the Ocean for Italy; 6000 shall likewise be immediately drafted from the 15th and 17th divisions, for the same destination, with the exception of 2000, who are on march for Toulon, where they will be attached to the navy; 2000, taken from the territorial divisions of the South, are proceeding to the army of the Alps.

Depend upon it, citizen-general, that we shall place at your disposal all the means in our power to repair the losses of the army which you command, and to enable it to finish its glorious campaign with the reduction of Mantua, and the destruction of the new troops which the emperor may have it in his power to send to its relief. We must consolidate at any rate the conquest of Italy, not for the aggrandizement of the Republic, but in favour of peace.

We shall reply forthwith on the other subjects of your despatches.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,  
President.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].

An arrangement had just been concluded with the republic of Genoa, when a despatch relative to the situation of that country arrived from citizen Faypoult. This despatch leading us to presume that you have directed troops upon Genoa, we hasten to apprise you, that our engagements may not be violated. Another consideration not less important is the presumption we entertain that the Austrians will yet march reinforcements to the relief of Mantua, the loss of which must deprive them of all hope respecting Italy; and it is of the utmost importance to us to prevent these designs. Till the fall of snow has closed the pass of the Tyrol, keep yourself constantly in a position to protect in force the siege of that place, the reduction of which involves a decisive success.

The army of the Sambre and Meuse is again become formidable by the reinforcements which it has received



from that of the North; and we are repeating the most urgent orders to set itself in motion. General Moreau, though harassed on his flanks and on his rear, nevertheless keeps up an imposing countenance. He is obliged to fall back to secure his communications, which are much cramped; but his march is conducted with order and safety, and he will resume the offensive as soon as the army of the Sambre and Meuse shall advance upon the Lahn.

If we succeed, as we hope, in fixing ourselves in solid winter quarters on the right bank of the Rhine, this advantage, added to the conquest of Italy, will ensure a most glorious campaign to the armies of the Republic, and we have reason to regard it beforehand as decisive for peace.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 20 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 11, 1796].

The Directory, citizen-general, has caused the letter in which you treat of Lombardy and some other States of Italy to be again submitted to it. It cannot be disadvantageous that the Milanese should declare themselves to a certain extent in favour of republican liberty and government; for, if we are driven out of Italy, this state of people's minds might occupy the enemy in a manner not unserviceable to us; and, while we stay there, it is better to see them disposed in our favour than ready to attack us on the first reverse: but if we were to invite the inhabitants of Lombardy to make themselves free, if we were thus to give them a kind of guarantee, which would bind us in some measure not to separate their interests from ours at the moment of a continental peace, we should act, beyond contradiction, impolitely, and, in acceding to this measure, we should be preparing for ourselves serious obstacles to that peace, which is the object of the wishes of France in general and of the Directory in particular. Policy and our interest, well understood and rightly considered, enjoin us even to set bounds to the enthusiasm of the people of the Milanese, whom it is expedient for us to keep continually in sentiments favourable to us, without running the risk of prolonging the present war by an open protection, and by too strongly encouraging them to mani-

fest their independence. Let it not be forgotten that indemnities will be demanded of us in Italy for the countries which our future security enjoins us to retain on the left bank of the Rhine, and that our ill success in Germany cannot but diminish the desire which we might have cherished to wrest from despotism a part of the peninsula, of which your talents and the bravery of the army that we have placed under your command have made us momentary masters. The restitution of Lombardy, or its cession, may become the pledge of a durable peace; and, though we have come to no decision on the subject, we think that it would be imprudent, under the present circumstances, to deprive ourselves of the means of making it at this price.

We observe with pleasure that you are availing yourself of the moment of leisure which your successes have prepared for you to prosecute with vigour the knaves and speculators, who, by their misdemeanours, throw a cloud over the glory of the army which you command. The war which you are about to make upon them is not less useful than that which you have waged, in such a praiseworthy manner, with the obstinate Austrians; and we hope that it will be equally successful.

One of the principal abuses is the too considerable number of *employés* of all classes in the different military administrations; it would be useful if you were to concert with the commissioners of the government and the *commissaire ordonnateur* in chief a reduction of the number.

The Mantuan seems equally to claim your particular attention, and it is the more urgent to remove from it the robbers of whom you complain, since it is owing to the kind of excesses which they commit that we have principally to attribute our disasters in Germany, and the insurrection, as it were, of that country against the army of the Sambre and Meuse and that of the Rhine and Moselle.

We await the particulars which you promise us respecting the superintendents who are at Bologna and at Ferrara. We have been informed by our commissioners with the army of Italy that some chests have been run away with by *employés* of this kind; and we have desired them to be more scrupulous in the choice which they shall make in future.

What we have said relative to the independence of the Milanese applies to Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and Modena, and to all the other petty States of Italy; and we

must double our circumspection and prudence to avoid compromising, by too great facility, the future interests of the Republic. It is expedient to urge the Duke of Modena to complete the payment of the sums yet due to us in virtue of the armistice concluded with that prince; but we must beware of arming against him the people who were subject to him before our coming to Italy; and our desire is that you keep them in a real dependence, till our political horizon becomes clear and permits us to settle definitively the fate of Italy by means of a general peace.

It is upon the same principles that we think it right to defer for the present the proposal to give the Mantuan to the Duke of Parma: we shall, no doubt, procure great advantages for that prince, if circumstances permit us; but events have not yet brought the proper moment. As for the regiment of Parma, which you appear desirous to see united with your army, we authorize you to treat for it with the duke, as well as for the 800 pioneers, who would be useful, you think, in the siege of Mantua; but these negotiations must not bind us to any cession of territory, nor be accompanied by any formal guarantee of this kind on our part, though we should be disposed to favour to the utmost of our power the interests of the Duke of Parma in Italy. It is evident, as you justly observe, that, if this prince were to join some troops with ours, the consequence would be that his subjects would regard our cause as theirs, and that the establishment of these sentiments in our behalf would prove highly advantageous to us.

We approve the step that you have instructed citizen Poussielgue to take at the court of Turin; we authorize you to support it, or to direct it to be renewed and an indemnity promised to the King of Sardinia. This indemnity might consist of either a small portion of the Milanese, which might be ceded to him, or a part of the imperial fiefs; but it is desirable to make it as inconsiderable as possible, and we ought not upon any pretext to guarantee the cession or indemnity, which might hereafter involve us in serious inconveniences, and retard the epoch of peace, which, as we have observed above, ought to be the object dearest to our hearts, as it is the desire of all true friends of their country.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,  
President.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 19 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 10, 1796].

I never cease acting in the spirit that you have directed me.

The pope's nephew, the person most interested that his Holiness should obtain peace, and who had exerted himself to calm his uncle, is a great friend of a M. Gundi, who signed the treaty of armistice. I purposed to make use of Gundi to represent that an accommodation ought not to be considered as desperate; but Gundi replied that the head of the pope's nephew was as much turned as that of the others, and that it would be of no use to speak to him on the subject.

I have taken all possible roundabout ways with the cardinal secretary of state to insinuate the palpable truth that Rome is throwing herself into the arms of her natural enemies, that she is adopting the worse course in propping herself upon a feeble alliance against France, the natural protectress of the independence of her territory, and against Spain, the only power that is her friend. The language of reason, of sound policy, not only makes no impression, but people are determined not to listen to a word of it: they have even the same horror of it as persons in hydrophobia have of water.

Terror, fear, apprehension, are dispelled: people are persuaded that, with the Romano-Neapolitan army, they shall not only defend themselves but retake Ferrara and Bologna. They depend also a great deal upon the emperor, to whom Monseigneur Albani has just been sent: he set out this morning to embark at Rimini for Trieste.

I send you herewith the printed list of the gratuitous donations for the war, which are commencing here in the same style as in Naples. These people, who know not what war is, nor what is required for waging it, are dazzled, inflamed with fooleries. Sensible men conceal themselves, lest they should be imprisoned or persecuted as Jacobins: so the disease must have its course. They fancy here that they have the secret of the hatred of the Directory for Rome in the proposed treaty, and that what we say to appease is mere gammon.

What we might grant now would be considered as wrung from weakness, and as the effect of a display of courage and

resistance. If we give advantages to such people, their pretensions will but increase : they will become intractable.

Assuredly, not the most trifling condition of the armistice will be fulfilled till the Directory has granted a definitive treaty of peace to their liking. You see how we are put out, and that Mantua must be taken and peace made with the emperor, before hot heads, destitute of understanding and so foolishly excited, can be brought back to reason.

There is no doubt that all the conditions of the alliance between Rome and Naples are arranged and settled, and that the intention is to march an army through the Romagna into the Ferrarese. The plan of our enemies has always been, as I had the honour to tell you at Castiglione, that the King of Naples should send thither 30,000 men. There will be another army, destined to cover the Campagna of Rome towards the Mediterranean, and to undertake the attack of Leghorn in concert with the English.

I send you herewith a statement, as published, of the cordon of the Neapolitan troops placed on the frontier. There is some exaggeration in the number, which must be about 60,000 men ; but it shows correctly their position and distribution. I send you also a note by a Dane, who is just come from Naples : it is true and judicious. I have reason to believe, without being quite certain, that the treaty of alliance between Rome and Naples is not only agreed upon but has been signed.

The Marquis del Vasto has certainly told a person from whom I have it, that the courier from Naples, who passed through the city four days ago on his way to Paris, is carrying to Prince Belmonte an order from his court to notify to the Directory that it must sign, within twenty-four hours, the treaty of peace with Naples, in the precise form which that court demands, and comprehending also the pope, to whom must be restored all that has been taken from him : without which M. de Belmonte was to leave Paris and the armistice to be broken. In case the Directory accepted the said treaty, the court of Rome and the King of Naples engage to maintain perfect neutrality during the present war. This insolence would not surprise me.

If M. Acton were to sign a hard and humiliating treaty, he could not uphold his consequence at Naples. Hence it is that he keeps his masters under the charm of illusion ; he puts off his disgrace as long as possible : there is nothing at

stake but the kingdom, about which he cares little, and the Ecclesiastical State. If your army subdues them, he will betake himself to England, the thanks of which he will have earned for having prolonged the resistance.

Either they are stark mad in Lower Italy, or that haughtiness originates in hopes founded on Germany, or in plots in the interior, which I cannot guess at. All about me is out of its natural state in a most incredible manner. The envoys of France and Spain are shunned as if they had the plague: avoid me they may; they shall not abase me.

I am sending off an intelligent man to follow the border of the Ecclesiastical State next to Naples, and pick up all the information he can concerning the army of Xerxes.

I beg you, general, to accept, &c.

CACAUULT.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Head-quarters, Bassano,

19 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 10, 1796].

I have read your report of the battle of St. George, general, and of the affair of Cerea. It is with the utmost surprise I see that you praise some generals who, so far from having contributed to the success of that glorious action, had well nigh brought destruction upon a column of my division destined for the attack of La Favorita; and you say not a word of me or of Rampon. I have also to complain of your reports of Lonato and Roveredo, in which you have not done me the justice that I deserve. This neglect rends my heart and casts down my spirits. I will remind you, since I am compelled to it, that the battle of St. George was won owing to my military dispositions, to my activity, and to my presence of mind in providing for everything.

Through the fault of General Sahuguet in not having attacked La Favorita, as your orders purported, the principal force of the enemy was directed between St. George and La Favorita; and, but for the order which I gave to the intrepid General Rampon to march upon my right and attack the enemy there, my division would have been turned and the battle lost. The brave 32nd had to maintain a most obstinate conflict of four hours; and you say not a



word either of me or of Rampon, who played the principal parts in that memorable engagement.

Nobody but Chabran marched at the head of the grenadiers; there he kept continually. Marmont and Leclerc did not arrive before the height of the action. Their conduct, it is true, was such as to demand my praise; but that should not make me pass over in silence what is due to Chabran, an officer equally brave and intelligent, for whom I have long solicited of you in vain the rank of general of brigade. My letter is dictated by my usual frankness and sincerity, and it is in opening my heart to you that I flatter myself you will do justice to me as well as to several officers of my staff.

MASSENA.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 20 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 11, 1796].

Here we are still in the same delirium that I described to you in my letter of yesterday; and the Neapolitans assert, as a positive truth, that the King of Naples is sending to the Directory the declaration to which I adverted in my last.

Malignity continues busily at work to oblige me to quit Rome. At the posts nearest to the capital there was circulated a report that Rome was in revolution, and that nobody could get thither, in order to induce the courier from Milan to turn back: he, however, persisted in proceeding. I am complaining of this indignity to the secretary of state in a note, a copy of which I herewith send you. Amid the odious manœuvres of Italian malice, I preserve the coolness and temper which you have recommended to me.

The Marquis del Vasto has frequent interviews with the pope and the secretary, and all Rome is persuaded that the treaty of alliance is signed. I believe it to be arranged and agreed to. The pope, whom the English had led to believe that they would give him Corsica, may also be persuaded that the King of Naples will recover for him Bologna and Ferrara, and perhaps even Avignon. The court of Naples is playing with Rome, if what I have just learned through a channel which I believe to be better than the public echoes is true.

c 2

The squadron has orders from the cabinet of St. James's to retire from the Mediterranean, to take the troops which are in Corsica to Gibraltar, and to proceed into the Ocean for the defence of England and her colonies. This intelligence having reached Naples, has, I am assured, decided the cabinet of his Sicilian Majesty to write to you to send him a minister with whom peace may be negociated and securely made.

These are very different readings; but the usual inconsistencies of Naples render everything possible. That court had at first answered the pope that it could not enter into league with his Holiness, because it was treating efficaciously for peace with France. A few days afterwards, it sent M. del Vasto. It will tell you that it is obliged to take measures to protect itself against the English, that it cannot be free while they hold sway in the Mediterranean; their departure places its capital, and Sicily, and all its immense coast, at the mercy of our fleet. This kingdom, threatened in another quarter by your army, has evidently no resource but in peace.

I have sent a man, the cleverest that I could meet with, towards Sora, to observe the grand army of Naples assembled around that point. The bulletins which I have sent you mark its route as far as Frascati. This grand army, always ready to move, has not yet passed the limits of its frontier. I am told that some corps have advanced into the ecclesiastical territory as far as Ceprano, but I have no certainty that this is the fact.

In another quarter, towards the Adriatic, at Aquila and in the environs, there is an army, which is believed to amount to 18,000 men, 6000 of whom have entered the Ecclesiastical State as far as Ripatransone. If that is so, the Roman government disguises itself artfully: but I cannot arrive at any certainty about it.

There is no doubt that the plan of Naples was to give the hand to the Austrians if you had been beaten. It had provided boats, to be conveyed upon waggons, and abundance of equipage for the passage of the Po.

A serious movement forward of the Neapolitan troops would produce an effect that is not to be denied; and, under the present circumstances, the treaty of alliance ought to appear first. If that happens, I will apprise you of it: I am aware that this would require ulterior measures, to

which I ought not to incite you without being sure of the fact.

If it is true, citizen-general, that the court of Naples desires you to send some one, deliver me from the odious sojourn at Rome, and give me something important to do at Naples, where, for eight years, I was secretary of embassy, and several times chargé d'affaires of France. I have many friends there, who might be serviceable, and will not deceive me. I beg you, general, to accept, &c.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Trent, 20 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 11, 1796].

On the 18th instant I charged one of my trusty men to get by circuitous routes in advance of General Vaubois, with orders to push on to Bolzano, and to send me from each station such intelligence as he had collected. Yesterday I received information from him that the reinforcements posted at Castello are not, so the peasants say, fresh troops, but a change from left to right. I await with impatience the return of this person to know what there is to apprehend for the left: our right must be covered to-day by General Massena's division.

The attention which I was obliged to pay immediately to the safety of the army has not yet allowed me to take serious notice of the conduct of the inhabitants; but I believe, general, that they are too pusillanimous to excite any fears. There are some patriots who dare not speak up: incapable of doing a notorious evil, they will never do any good publicly. They dread the return of the Austrians; and the priests, whom I am going to watch closely, keep them in that persuasion. I shall make myself thoroughly acquainted this week with all their underhand dealings; and, if it is necessary to take precautions against them, the commandant of the place will attend to that.

Roveredo has more French partisans, but they are restrained by the same motives as those of the Trentin. However, the priests have always had less influence there than here.

For these three days past, the language of the agents of Austria leads me to apprehend a general attack. I may be

mistaken, but I imagine that Massena's division will have more to do than we. (This is a point not to be neglected).

The wants of the army are very pressing, as well for shoes as for other articles of the first necessity: the approach of the cold season requires us to think of procuring them. I am afraid that peculations deprive the brave men who compose it of what is their due.

The municipality of the city, ever faithful to its system, ever slow in its progress, is causing it to be represented to the inhabitants of the district of the pretorship, that if the requisitions are burdensome it is because they are not equally assessed upon all the communes, and that, by virtue of your orders, it cannot levy them in the pretorship, to which you have limited it. I have thought it right to inform you of this.

CASTANIER.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan,  
20 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 11, 1796].

Numerous corps of the emperor's are marching into Tyrol. The autumnal rains still continue to give us a great number of sick. No great things are to be expected from the reinforcement of men in the hospitals, since it is to be presumed that within a month great blows will be struck here.

You will find herewith the answer which General Chateauneuf has sent me by an extraordinary courier whom I despatched to him: it follows, therefore, that I am not to expect more than 2000 men, and your order specified 6000. You gave me notice by the last courier that I should soon be joined by 10,000 men, independently of these 2000. You ought to let me know the day and place of their departure, and their state and condition: if 10,000 set out, you must calculate that only 5000 will arrive.

I know not yet whether General Kellermann is marching the 40th from Lyons, and whether General Willot is obeying the order which I have given him to send off the 83rd. On these two demi-brigades, if they arrive in time, depends perhaps the fate of Italy.

I am having Pizzighitone, Reggio, and all the banks of the Adda fortified. I have likewise had the banks of the Adige

fortified : in short, in the uncertainty respecting the kind of warfare that I shall have to wage, and the enemy that may attack me, I neglect no precaution, and shall do, from this moment, all that can favour me. At the same time, I am having the castles of Ferrara and Urbino, near Bologna, put into a state of defence.

We have many officers of artillery and engineers ill. Send half a score of officers of each of these arms, brave and active men : Mantua has ruined both of them for us. I beg you to leave the command of these arms to citizen Chasseloup and General Lespinasse ; they are two very good officers. I have so many generals of brigade wounded and ill, that, notwithstanding those whom you are making every day, I am still in want of some : it is true that there have been sent to me some so incompetent, that I cannot employ them in the active army.

I beg you to send us General Duvigneau, and some others of that kidney. Send us rather generals of brigade than generals of division. All that come to us from La Vendée are not accustomed to war on a great scale ; we find the same fault with the troops, but they get used to it.

Mantua is hermetically blockaded, and that with 7000 infantry and 1500 cavalry.

Send us men who have served in the cavalry to recruit our regiments ; we will find horses for them. Let them come with their dragoon, chasseur, and hussar uniforms, their swords and carabines, excepting the dragoons, who must have muskets like the infantry. There are so many old gendarmes infesting the streets of Paris, that, by means of a few recruiters going about and reminding them that here we pay in money, I do think that it would be possible for you to pick up a good number. We have more than 1200 horse soldiers sick or wounded, and their horses are in the depots doing nothing. Send us some cavalry officers, chiefs of brigade, captains, we will find places for them : let them be fighting men.

I beg you to give a retiring pension to the chiefs of brigade Goudran of the 20th dragoons and citizen Senilhac of the 25th chasseurs : they are men who fall ill the night before an action ; such people are not fond of the sword. I beg you also to give a retiring pension to citizen Gourgonnier, *chef d'escadron* in the first hussars.

The chief of the 7th regiment of hussars, who has been

wounded, is a brave man : but he is too old and should be allowed to retire. Owing to the deficiency of these superior officers, the duty falls heavy upon a small number of brave men, who are at last wounded, taken prisoners, or killed, and the corps are left without chiefs.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 21 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 12, 1796].

You will find herewith a statement of what the army has spent. You will there see that the calumnies which people have been pleased to heap so unseasonably upon the commissary Denni  , cannot affect him. He is a hard-working man and a man of order, though not of transcendent talents.

You will remark that there is a great difference between the account of the paymaster of the army and that of the commissioners of the government ; this amounts to four or five millions. The commissioners of the government allege that they have given five millions more to the paymaster, who on his part is regular, for he says, Produce my drafts : besides, he knows what he has expended. I think that difference arises from this, that the commissioners of the government have themselves applied funds and caused arrears of expenses to be paid, without the money having ever been paid into the chest of the paymaster or an order being given for it by the *ordonnateur* ; which is subversive of accountability and all regularity. It is within my knowledge that three or four adjutants-general, who have been taken prisoners, have had, on their return, gratuities of 3000 livres granted by the commissioners : you are well aware that the *ordonnateur* would not have directed these gratuities to be paid. They were granted to brave officers who deserved them ; but this has produced the bad effect of giving rise to pretensions among all the superior officers who have been made prisoners, and unluckily but too much money has been expended on indemnities for losses. At the slightest check, every one has lost his portmanteau : the councils of administration sign whatever they are asked for, and this has made me resolve not to suffer any more to be granted, not even the campaign gratuity, without the signature of the minister, which will save us a great deal.

You see, then, in the six months that we have been in

the field, all that has been expended is but eleven millions : it remains therefore to be explained how it is that we have spent so little ; it is because, firstly, we have subsisted for a long time on requisitions ; secondly, we have had necessities in kind from Modena, Parma, Ferrara, and Bologna ; thirdly, the Republic has furnished and is still furnishing us with many things ; lastly, we are frequently living upon the enemy's magazines.

I beg you to send us the *commissaire ordonnateur* Naudin ; he is rather old, but I know him to be an upright and strict man ; he might be charged usefully to the Republic with one of the services of this army ; I even think that you would do well to make him *ordonnateur* of the contributions, charged to correspond with the minister of the finances and the treasury : your commissioners might then have merely the superintendence of them, as of the other departments, which would restore them to the passive part that they ought to have according to your instructions, and remedy the numberless abuses which exist.

I cannot, however, disguise from you that there is scarcely any order in the contributions. Your commissioners are not sufficiently habituated to the details of accountability ; there is required, moreover, a spirit of close application which their occupations or the high character with which they are invested allow them not to have.

I think then that a *commissaire ordonnateur* charged in chief with the contributions, independent of the *commissaire ordonnateur* in chief, would be an efficacious check on Flachat and Co., inasmuch as he would have an exact detail, an accurate account of all that he had remitted, and of the bills of exchange that are drawn.

Lastly, your commissioners draw fine pictures, not corresponding either with the paymaster's or with those of Flachat and Co. : why ? Accounts are a science of itself, requiring an operation apart and a persevering attention ; besides, you would perhaps think that it is right not to give an accountability of details to men who have a moral and political responsibility. If, agreeably to the spirit of your instructions, your commissioners are only to superintend, they must never act ; and there is in general an unfavourable presumption against those who have the handling of money.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 21 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 12, 1796].

Ever since I have been at Milan, citizens-directors, I have been engaged in making war upon knaves : I have had several tried and punished ; and I must denounce others to you. In making open war upon them, it is clear that I interest against myself a thousand voices which will not fail to exert themselves to pervert public opinion. I can conceive that, if, two months ago, I aspired to be duke of Milan, I should now want to be king of Italy ; but so long as I have strength and your confidence, I will make merciless war on rogues and Austrians.

Flachat and Co. are but a pack of rogues without real credit, without money, and without morality ; I shall not be suspected on their account, for I believed them to be active, honest, and well-intentioned ; but there is no withstanding evidence.

1stly. They have received fourteen millions ; they have paid but six, and they refuse to discharge the mandates given by the treasury for less than 15 or 20 per cent. These scandalous bargains are transacted openly at Genoa. The company pretends that it has no funds, but, on condition of this honest profit, it consents to pay the mandates.

2ndly. The articles with which they supply the army are not good ; complaints reach me from all quarters : they are even suspected of having made false entries of more than eighty thousand quintals of corn by bribing the storekeepers.

3rdly. Their bargain is onerous to the Republic, since a million, which weighs in money ten thousand pounds, would be conveyed in five or six carriages and by post for five or six thousand francs, whereas, it costs nearly fifty thousand, the treasury having granted them five per cent. in its bargain. Flachat and Laporte have little fortune and no credit ; Peregaldo and Payen are ruined houses and without credit, and yet it is to the union of these four names that the interests of the Republic in Italy are entrusted. They are not merchants but stock-jobbers, like those of the Palais Royal.

4thly. Peregaldo, born in Marseilles, disavows his being a Frenchman, and has made himself Genoese. He does not wear the cockade, and left Genoa with his family, spreading alarm by asserting that we were going to bombard the city. I had him arrested and expelled from Lombardy.



Ought we to suffer that such people, worse disposed and more aristocratic than even the emigrants themselves, should come and serve for spies upon us, should be continually with the minister of Russia at Genoa, and should besides enrich themselves by us?

Citizen Lacheze, consul at Genoa, is a rogue: his conduct at Leghorn, in getting corn sold at a low price to Genoa, is a proof of this.

The goods are not selling at Leghorn. I have just given orders to Flachet to have them sold, but I would wager that, owing to all these united rogues, they will not produce two millions, though they ought to fetch seven at least.

As for the commissaries of war, excepting Denniée *ordonnateur en chef*, Boinod, Mazade, and two or three others, the rest are nothing but rogues: three of them are upon trial: they ought to watch, and they furnish the means of robbing, by signing every thing. You must rid us of them, and send us upright men, if such there be: it would be well to find such as have wherewithal to live upon.

The *commissaire ordonnateur* Gosselin is a rogue: he has made bargains for boots at 36 livres, which have been since renewed at 18 livres.

Lastly, shall I tell you that a commissary of war, Flack, is accused of having sold a chest of quinquina, which the King of Spain was sending us? Others have sold mattresses: but I pause: such horrors make one blush to be a Frenchman. The city of Cremona furnished above 50,000 ells of fine linen cloth for the hospitals, which those rogues sold: they sell every thing.

You have, no doubt, calculated that your administrators would rob, but that they would perform the duty, and have a little shame: they rob in so ridiculous and impudent a manner, that, if I had a month's time, there should not be one of them who would not be liable to be shot. I am continually having them arrested and brought before a council of war; but the judges are bought; there is a fair here; every thing is sold. An *employé*, accused of having laid a contribution of 18,000 francs on Salò, has been sentenced to merely two months' imprisonment. And then how would you set about proving? They all hang together.

Displace the *commissaire ordonnateur* Gosselin, or order

him to be arrested : displace the commissaries, concerning whom I send you the annexed note. It is true that they wish perhaps for nothing better.

Let us come to the agents of the administration.

Thevenin is a robber ; he affects an insulting profusion : he has made me a present of several very fine horses, for which I had occasion, but for which I have not been able to make him accept payment. Let him be arrested and kept six months in prison ; he can pay a war-tax of 500,000 francs in money : this man does not perform his duty. The waggon-train is full of emigrants ; they call themselves *royal* waggon-train, and wear the green collar before my face : as you may suppose, I frequently have them arrested, but in general they are not where I am.

Sonolet, agent of provisions till now, is a rogue : the agency of provisions was right.

Ozon is a rogue and never does his duty.

Colot performs his duty punctually ; he has zeal and more honour than those scoundrels.

The new agent sent by Cerf-Beer appears better than Thevenin : I am adverting here to the great robbers only. Should you suppose that they are endeavouring to seduce my secretaries in my very antechamber ? All the military agents are rogues. One, named Valeri, is on trial at Milan ; the others have run away.

Citizen Faypoult, your minister, Poussielgue, secretary, and Sucy, *commissaire ordonnateur*, honest men, are witnesses of the rogueries committed by Flachat and Co. at Genoa. But I am obliged to set out to-morrow for the army : great joy for all the rascals, whom a glance at the administration has made me acquainted with.

The paymaster of the army is an honest man, not very bright ; the comptroller a rogue—witness his conduct at Bologna.

The denunciations which I make are denunciations in soul and conscience, as if upon a jury. You are aware that it is not in my place and with my character that I should denounce them to you, if I had time to collect material proofs against each of them ; they all cover one another.

Desgranges, agent of the victualling, is intelligent ; but we want here St. Maime, a man of merit and consideration ; the duty would be performed and you would save several millions : I beg you to send him to us. In short, we want

for agents, not the tools of stock-jobbers, but men possessing large fortune and a certain character. I have none but spies. There is not an agent of the army but wishes for our defeat; not one but corresponds with our enemies: almost all have emigrated upon some pretext or other: it is they who make known our number and dissolve the spell: accordingly, I am more upon my guard against them than against Wurmser; I never have any of them with me; I feed my army during its expeditions without them, but that does not prevent them from hatching tales after their manner.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Modena, 26 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 17, 1796].

I have reported to you, citizens-directors, that I had formed a moveable column at Tende against the Barbets: it perfectly fulfils its object. The Barbets are put to the rout in all quarters; several of their chiefs have been shot. General Garnier, who commands this moveable column, displays great zeal and great activity.

Diseases still continue; but, up to the present moment, they have made no great ravages.

I applied to you in my last letter for 25,000 muskets, but, having found 64,000 at Leghorn belonging to the King of Spain, I have directed 20,000 to be taken, and sent off to the army. M. Azara, whose permission I asked, wrote to me that this did not concern him, but that he saw no great inconvenience, as they were to be replaced.

I beg you to make such arrangements as you think proper with the court of Spain. If you let these muskets be returned to it at the Pyrenees, it will be a gainer, because they might have been taken by the English.

The Austrians have at this moment 14,000 men in the Tyrol, and 15,000 on the Piave: they are waiting for further reinforcements. The attack will probably be delayed for some decades. If the 83rd has set out from Marseilles, as I ordered, and the 40th from Lyons as General Kellermann promised me, there is nothing to fear, and we shall again beat the Austrians. If the circumstance of the evacuation of the Mediterranean by the English were to cause you not to wish to make peace with Naples, it would be

necessary to amuse it for some time longer. I do not think that, if we are masters of the sea, it will dare to push forward troops this way.

If we become masters of the Mediterranean, I think that we ought to demand of the Leghorn merchants five or six million francs, instead of the two which they offer as an indemnity for the goods which they have belonging to the English.

Lastly, citizens directors, the more men you send us, not only shall we maintain them the more easily, but the more contributions we shall levy for the profit of the Republic. During the summer campaign, the army of Italy has produced the Republic 20,000,000 francs, exclusively of its pay and its subsistence: it may produce twice as much during the winter campaign, if you send us about 30,000 men in recruits and new corps.

Rome, and all her provinces, Trieste and the Friule, even part of the kingdom of Naples, will become our prey; but, to maintain our ground, we must have men.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Modena, 26 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 17, 1796].

You will find herewith, citizens-directors, a letter which I have just received from General Gentili: from this, it appears that the Mediterranean will soon be free. Corsica, restored to the Republic, will afford resources to our navy, and even means for recruiting our light infantry. The commissioner of the government, Salicetti, sets out this evening for Leghorn to proceed to Corsica. I shall order the 8th division to hold a battalion in readiness to embark at Toulon; I shall likewise despatch a battalion from Leghorn, which, joined to the two corps of gendarmerie, will be sufficient to establish good order there.

General Gentili will command that division *ad interim*; I am giving him the instructions necessary for the organization of the two corps of gendarmerie. I shall authorize him provisionally to put in requisition several moveable columns, in order to be able to give the commissioner of the government force sufficient for occupying the fortresses till the arrival of the French troops. When these troops have arrived in the island, my intention is to send General Ber-

ruyer to command there: I am sending thither an officer of artillery and one of engineers, to organize the direction there: but as that island contains five or six fortresses, as weak as they are useless, I direct them not to incur any expense, but merely to take measures for the defence of the gulf of St. Florent: this is the only point that is essential to the Republic, and where it will thenceforth be expedient to concentrate the whole defence of the island, by establishing there a permanent fortification, and employing for its construction the sums that would be required for the repair and keeping up of the useless fortresses of Bastia, Corte, Calvi, Ajaccio, and Bonifaccio, where it is sufficient merely to keep up coast batteries. If we had had a fortress at St. Florent, and concentrated all our forces there, the English would not have taken the island.

As the establishment of St. Florent is still *in nubibus*, I think that you ought to concentrate the whole military administration at Ajaccio, which, until St. Florent becomes something, is the most interesting point of the island. It would be a great blunder to place at Bastia, as the old administration did, the central point of the administration, since Bastia, being situated opposite to Italy, has considerable difficulty in communicating with France. The expulsion of the English from the Mediterranean has a great influence on the success of our military operations in Italy. We ought to impose more severe conditions on Naples; this would produce the strongest moral effect on the minds of the Italians, ensure our communications, and make Naples tremble even in Sicily itself.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Modena, 26 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 17, 1796].

Bologna, Modena, Reggio, and Ferrara, have met in congress, and sent about a hundred deputies to Modena: the warmest enthusiasm and the purest patriotism animate them. Already they behold ancient Italy revive: their imagination is fired, their patriotism is excited, and the citizens of all classes are embracing one another. I should not be surprised if this country and Lombardy, containing a population of from two to three million souls, were to produce a really powerful shock throughout all Italy. The

revolution has not the same character here as it had among us ; in the first place, because it has not the same obstacles to conquer, and because experience has enlightened the inhabitants : we are very sure, at least, that fanaticism will not do us any harm in this country, and that, let Rome declare a war of religion if she pleases, she will never produce any effect in that conquered country.

A legion of 2500 men is organizing, clothed, paid, and equipped at the expense of this country, and without any interference on our part. Here is the commencement of a military force, which, united to the 3500 furnished by Lombardy, makes about 6000 men. It is very evident that, if these troops, composed of young men who have a desire of liberty, begin to distinguish themselves, this will have very important consequences for the emperor and for Italy. I will send you by the next courier the acts and manifestoes published on this occasion by the congress.

I am waiting with some impatience for the troops of which you have given me notice. I have summoned Wurmser in Mantua : herewith you will find the summons. I have not judged it expedient to make use of the decree which you sent me, since you leave me to act as I please : by the answer that he gives me, I shall find what tone he assumes. The courier whom you ordered me to send to Vienna was despatched long ago : he must have arrived by this time, and I am looking for the answer.

The moment I know positively that the English have passed the Strait, and learn your intentions respecting Naples, and how your negotiations stand, I shall assume the fitting tone with Rome. I hope to compel those fellows to make restitution of the money for the contribution which they sent off, but which they had brought back from Ravenna to Rome.

BONAPARTE.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 21 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 12, 1796].

We are aware as well as you, citizen-general, that it is indispensable to send you strong reinforcements, and we have already sent off considerable numbers of troops for the army of Italy. The minister of war reports to us to-day that orders are given conformably with our intentions,

for the passage of 6000 men, drawn from the 15th and 17th divisions, to the army of Italy; and that the 6000 from the 9th and 10th divisions are on march for the same destination: you will find herewith an extract from that report of the minister's. You are already apprized that 4000 men are to be withdrawn from the Coasts of the Ocean, and placed under your orders: we know not whether their movement has commenced, but we have enjoined the utmost celerity. Besides these reinforcements, we purpose to draw more troops for you from those distributed in the division of the West. The 3rd regiment of dragoons, which is in the 17th, is about to be despatched for Italy, and we are urging the minister of war to comply, as far as it is possible for him, with the different demands which you make.

The siege of Mantua presents too many difficulties to be undertaken; it would be a gulf for the French, and it is expedient to confine ourselves to a blockade, supplied frequently with fresh troops, which will reduce that place, not so soon, indeed, but with less loss than a regular siege.

We did think that the force of the army was more considerable, judging from that of the reinforcements you have received, and the state in which it was when you took the command. But you see, citizen-general, how anxious we are, in the distribution of the reinforcements at our disposal, to uphold the glory of the conquering army which you command; and you will remark that we could not further increase them, after those which we destine for you have arrived, without exhausting the means of the Republic.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,  
President.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 21 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 12, 1796].

You will find herewith, citizen-general, the decree which we have just passed, by which we order the 8th military division to be temporarily separated from the arrondissement of the army of Italy. From that division we separate by the same decree the department of the Maritime Alps and that of the Lower Alps.

We send you at the same time the copy of a letter which we are writing to General Willot, in which we direct him

VOL. II.

D

to retain nothing but what is indispensable for the maintenance of tranquillity in the countries under his command; to send you all the troops that he can spare, and particularly the 10th battalion of the Ain, to be incorporated in the incomplete corps under your command.

General Willot has never ceased to give proofs of his patriotism in the army of the Pyrenees, in which he highly distinguished himself: it was he who partly prepared the real pacification of La Vendée, so gloriously finished by the general-in-chief Hoche; and his conduct in this circumstance is a proof of his republican sentiments, and forbids any kind of suspicion of attachment on his part to royalty and its partisans.

The first courier, whom we shall despatch forthwith, shall bring you answers on the other subjects to which you advert in your letters of the 13th Vendemiaire.

A courier from Strasburg has brought us intelligence that the Austrians were completely beaten on the 10th and 12th in the environs of Biberach, by the army of the Rhine and Moselle: two colours, six pieces of cannon, 3000 prisoners, among whom are 56 officers, had already arrived at the head-quarters at Saulgen; 2000 more prisoners were expected there in the course of the day. The prisoners declare that the emperor has no more forces in the interior of Austria, and that he has sent to the army all those which were hitherto kept in reserve in the garrisons.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,  
President.

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 21 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 16, 1796].

The organization of the moveable columns, citizen-general, was not commanded by the government without giving the persons composing them a special guarantee that they should not leave the canton to be sent against any external enemy, and their principal object is to do the police duty there. It is, no doubt, in virtue of this promise that the departmental administration of the Var refused to order one of those columns to march, as it had been required: we can, in consequence, do no other than approve its refusal.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,  
President.



*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 24 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 15, 1796].

The observations contained, citizen-general, in that despatch of yours of the 11th, which treats of the situation of the different powers of Italy, had already engaged our attention. The peace which we have just concluded with Naples is the result. Not being able to make head at once, and with a constant superiority, against so great a number of enemies, we thought it incumbent on us to put an end to our warfare with Southern Italy.

We can now think with more advantage of chastising the obstinacy of the pope, who has refused the conditions of the peace; but the taking of Rome is a great and delicate operation in the state in which we are at present, and ought not to be undertaken till the most favourable moment. You have seen by one of our late despatches that, to cover our ulterior plans, we have enjoined our commissioners with the army of Italy to spin out the negotiation with the pope; but we request you to inform citizen Cacault that he is exclusively charged with the measures which he has to take, in order to keep up a feeling of security in Rome, and to prevent any suspicion of our designs till you can engage in the execution of them. The number of the troops which you destine for this expedition has appeared to us too small, for it must not be attempted without the certainty of success: on the other hand, the assemblage of the Austrians in the Friule and the investment of Mantua are the two objects which you justly regard as most essential; we therefore think that, in the choice of the moment and the means proper for the operation, you will exercise that superior judgment by which you are distinguished. It does not appear to us that the corps which shall reduce Rome ought to occupy it entirely, considering its immense population: to us it seems preferable to take possession of it by camps pitched outside the walls. The law of war and political circumstances will then decide the fate of the papal power. The arrangement concluded with Genoa fulfils our preceding intentions, and naturally disposes us to conclude a treaty of alliance with that State, if it makes a formal proposal to that effect.

The want of reinforcements experienced, citizen-general, by the army of Italy, according to the account which you

D 2

give us of an assemblage of fresh troops against it, and the sacrifices which it seems the Grand-duke of Tuscany must make, in order to obtain the evacuation of Leghorn, decide us to authorize you to withdraw the troops which compose its garrison ; but that this measure may produce all the fruit that we expect from it, we must let the grand-duke perceive that we might accede to arrangements which would restore to him the free possession of that place, if he were to offer suitable indemnities, or at least a renunciation of his claims. We leave you to judge if, in order to induce him to this, it might not be useful to affect new designs against his territories, and to make some sham movements of troops for this purpose. The hostile treatment experienced by the French republicans at Leghorn, in spite of the neutrality and the open preference granted there to the English and the emigrants, require to be expiated by Tuscany ; and you will make use of this motive to consent with more advantage and more dignity for the government to the withdrawal of the French troops from Leghorn, stipulating, however, that the strictest neutrality shall be observed there.

In adopting this measure, the expedition to Corsica must necessarily be deferred, and this inconvenience appears slight to us, considering the heavy expense which the occupation of that island costs England. It is, nevertheless, necessary to leave her under continual apprehensions on this subject, and to foster an uneasiness which cannot fail to render her dispositions in the Mediterranean more onerous for her.

You confirm us in the idea that it is advisable to reserve till after the reduction of Mantua the treatment merited at our hands by the enmity of Venice ; but it is imperative to oppose her arming, and we request you to enter into an urgent negociation with her on that subject. As for the city of Lucca, our treaty with the King of Naples has made its occupation a matter of no importance.

Be the efforts of the emperor for the recovery of his possessions in Italy what they may, citizen-general, their conquest is of too high a value to the Republic not to exert all the efforts that it can possibly make, without compromising its internal security, for their preservation. The glory of the army of Italy, and of its fortunate and able general, is attached to it.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 24 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 15, 1796].

We have taken into consideration, citizen-general, what you have written to us in one of your last despatches relative to the Barbets. We think, like you, that it will be extremely difficult to exterminate disbanded soldiers, to whom one cannot grant permission to return to the department of the Maritime Alps in which they were born; but, the constitution and the laws being formal on that point, we cannot presume to infringe them, and our first duty is to respect them. As it is, nevertheless, extremely desirable to diminish as much as possible the hordes of the Barbets, which are committing ravages in the environs of the Col de Tende, we have thought that the provisional government of Lombardy might take them into its pay, either by forming distinct corps, or by incorporating them in the Milanese legion. We recommend to you the execution of all the dispositions necessary for attaining this desirable end.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 24 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 15, 1796].

The widow of the unfortunate Basseville, citizen-general, proposes to come to you, that her presence may accelerate as much as possible the payment of the indemnities which are due to her. The Directory requests you, citizen-general, to welcome her with the same interest which you have testified for the memory of her husband, and to furnish her with all the means which shall appear to you expedient for obtaining at least some provisional indemnity, till the fixing of the compensation expressly stipulated in the treaty of armistice concluded with the pope. The Directory begs you to receive with the same kindness citizen Moutte, who will accompany her.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 27 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 18, 1796].

Your despatches of the 17th Vendemiaire, citizen-general, have rendered more serious the attention which we have

never ceased to pay to our military and political situation in Italy, and we shall here add the developments necessary to our letters of the 21st and 24th ult., on the different subjects to which they relate.

We give to you exclusively to negotiate and to conclude a new armistice with the court of Rome, and even to fix the articles of a treaty of peace, which, nevertheless, must be signed by citizen Cavauld alone: this treaty must also be signed by the pope, so that we should have nothing to do but to approve and submit it for ratification to the Legislative Body.

If this negotiation comes to nothing, and if the Pope refuses either peace or armistice, we confirm the authority which we have already given you to act hostilely against him, to force him to an accommodation, or, finally, to march upon Rome, and make yourself master of it; but, in this case, we must be sure of the neutrality of Naples, and await the ratification of the treaty of peace which we have concluded with that power.

In regard to Turin, we are looking out for an ambassador to send thither, and we authorize you provisionally to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the King of Sardinia, but this treaty cannot be definitively concluded but by us: and in the conditions which you will stipulate, bind France to no guarantee of aggrandizement of territory in favour of the king. You are sensible that we must not expose ourselves to the risk of not being able to keep engagements of this nature, either because we might have sustained reverses, or because we might find ourselves in contradiction to the measures that we might have taken to provoke the people to liberty.

It is wise policy to behave kindly to the Duke of Parma, and to contrive an aggrandizement of power for him, but only upon the essential condition of not promising any guarantee.

As for the other States of Italy, our opinion continues to be the same that we have already expressed, and we leave you at liberty to act towards them according to circumstances, in the twofold respect of politics and war. You will take especial care that France is not involved in any guarantee, that she may reserve for herself the utmost latitude of liberty for making peace with the emperor in case of disastrous events.

You will see by one of our late despatches that we deem it advisable to suspend the expedition to Corsica, and to withdraw the troops that are at Leghorn. We have explained the motives to you, and it appears to us that the moment of our peace with Naples might be seized with advantage for treating upon this last subject with Tuscany.

We have given you a statement of the forces which we are sending to Italy, and which comprehend 6000 men of the South, 4000 of the Coasts of the Ocean, and the 3rd regiment of dragoons, 400 strong.

To this reinforcement we shall add fresh troops drawn from the West, to the amount of 8 or 10,000 men; and we have already apprized General Moreau that our intention is to detach a column of 10,000 men from the army of the Rhine and Moselle, where its place is to be supplied by troops of the Sambre and Meuse, and to send it to you; but this movement cannot take place till the operations of the campaign are suspended on the Rhine, or till our superiority there is again decidedly established. We have just learned that the army of the Sambre and Meuse is making a movement upon the right bank of the Rhine.

We insist on the advantages of a blockade for Mantua, and on the preference that we ought to give it over a regular siege, which would require the employment of immense means, and expose us to great losses if we were to meet with a check.

We have terminated here the arrangement with Genoa, and we approve the motives for the delay concerted between you and citizen Faypoult.

The marked enmity and the troublesome conduct of Venice render it urgent to employ all the means proper for paralyzing her intentions: a skilful mixture of threats and address is very necessary in this case.

To the different points of instruction contained in this despatch, we subjoin a new and urgent exhortation to maintain discipline with that steady rigour which is commanded by the laws of the Republic. The firmness of your character affords us a precious guarantee in regard to this point.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,  
President.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 22 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 13, 1796].

I have received the letter which you did me the honour to write on the 17th instant. I immediately sent to the secretary of state your letter for the pope, with a note, a copy of which is annexed.

The idea of demanding, as you do, an explanation concerning the manifesto evidently published by the court of Rome, though without signature, is excellent: you have seized the real point for entering upon the subject. I thought that, by sending your original letter, I should produce a stronger effect than by writing the same thing myself. I will transmit the answer to you the moment that it reaches me.

Monseigneur Galeppi has just arrived from Florence: he will probably be sent to me. You have seen, by my preceding letters, that I am aware of the necessity of sticking close to Rome; I shall certainly not leave it without orders from you or from the pope.

In my intercourse, I keep upon fair and civil terms, but without allowing those sophistical and passionate minds to acquire any advantage over me. I thank you, general, for having given me the cue of the affair.

Nothing is so difficult as now to persuade the pope, before he has the assurance of a definitive treaty that suits him, to pay you sixteen millions left in arrear, besides the productions of art: he would be afraid of falling out of Charybdis into Scylla, especially as the last expressions of Salicetti the commissioner, at Florence, were very threatening.

The two millions of livres tournois, which I had despatched, and which the pope ordered to be stopped at Rimini, entered Rome yesterday in a sort of triumph. Efforts are making to excite the people to resistance.

They will conclude here that we are retracing our steps, because the want of money obliges us to do so, on account of the situation of the army, after we had appeared to slight this succour while it was in train to be despatched. Do not forget that it is Naples which has upset the armistice with Rome for us.

I am going to work assiduously in the direction that you give me; but with these people it is important to keep

them always beneath you. You see with what elasticity compressed pride springs back ; it is necessary that I should bring it gently to me to ask my advice, otherwise we shall do nothing : those hot heads pass easily from one extreme to another ; it is there that I must wait for them, or we shall do no good.

The armies of Naples have not passed the frontier. M. del Vasto has frequent interviews with the pope, and yet the treaty of alliance is not signed. I am assured at present that the court of Naples will not engage to promise the assistance of its armies unless in three cases :

Istly, in case of an invasion of some part of the ecclesiastical territory ; 2ndly, in case of a rising or internal commotion tending to a revolution ; 3rdly, in case of a formal attack of the Ecclesiastical State and a declaration of war against the pope.

The secretary of state has promised to give me notice whenever the Neapolitan troops enter the papal territory and when the treaty with Naples is signed.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 23 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 14, 1796].

I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of the answer which I have just received from the cardinal secretary of state, on the subject of your letter to the pope, which I transmitted to him to be delivered to his Holiness. Without hurrying the sovereign himself for an answer, I shall communicate to-morrow to Cardinal Busca that I am commissioned to demand from him also an explanation on the subject of the unsigned manifesto, because it is necessary to ascertain whether it comes from his Holiness or not.

Monseigneur Galeppi, whose arrival was reported yesterday, has not yet reached Rome. It appears that they wish to see him and hear what he has to say, for it is a most perplexing business to answer your letter.

You will see by the accompanying bulletins what are circulated by the newsmongers at Rome as authentic facts. They are even distributing a list of the Neapolitan regiments that have entered the Romagna to lend a hand to the pope against alleged premeditated insurrections.

It is true that the pope has despatched about 800 troops

to the Romagna. It is true that this government appears extremely apprehensive of rebellious plots, true or false, in the Romagna. It is true that, for two months past, there have been imprisoned here several persons accused of a plot for seizing the Castle of St. Angelo and exciting an insurrection in the Romagna. It is true that several persons, whose names I have sent you, have just been apprehended at Ancona ; but I believe it to be false that Neapolitan regiments have entered the Romagna ; for I am as sure as it is possible to be by means of good reports, that the general at the head of the papal army is not apprised of it, as however he must have been for the entry of the foreign troops to combine with the movements of the troops of the country, and for lodgings and stations to be prepared.

Citizen Manneville, commandant of the citadel of Bologna, has it in his power to inform you more speedily than I can of all that occurs in the Romagna, and he has about him better means of knowing it with certainty. I shall write to desire him to pay particular attention to this subject, and to send you by a courier the first certain intelligence of the entry of the Neapolitans into the ecclesiastical territory.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

23 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 14, 1796].

At the bridge of Formigosa, general, there were lately stopped four men who were endeavouring to get into Mantua. They were brought to me, and, on being searched, a good many letters were found sewed up in their clothes : among the number, I found but five that treated of our affairs ; they were from different persons, who agree in announcing a reinforcement of 15,000 Austrians in a first column, and a still stronger in a second column. I sent men and letters to Verona, where I am assured there is a council of war established for trying spies. I have addressed them to General Gauthier.

I have posted at Santo Benedetto 80 horse of the first regiment. The commandant informs me that the commune had required him to furnish an escort for 10,000 lires of Milan going to Castiglione, 6000 belonging to the monastery and 4000 to the commune, and likewise 216,000 lires of Mantua, 200,000 belonging to Gonzaga, and 16,000 to



Rolli. He remarks that the commune is much more pressing than the monks. The commandant has orders to stimulate and to threaten them.

The divisionary general Sahuguet, who has been ill for some days, set out this morning for Bozolo ; I have nobody to take his place but General Bertin. General Dallemagne informs me that he is much better, and that he shall be able to resume his functions. As for myself, I hope that my health, which is improving, will permit me to go abroad in a few days ; and General Blay writes to me from Bozolo, that he is much better and shall return shortly.

Every thing that comes from the magazines of Cremona is of such execrable quality, that the soldiers had as lieve drink water as the wine, which they call, and justly, poison, and they care so little for what is dignified with the name of brandy, as to leave it : I am afraid that all this causes us to have a great number of sick. All the demons conspire against our poor army of Italy. I know of no better way to put an end to these abuses than to give up the contractors to the justice of the soldiery.

I have deferred for some time the construction of the bridge of Camignana, because the roads between the citadel and the castle of Prado and Suave are not yet broken up, but they are at work upon them : for the rest, all the materials for the bridge are ready at Goito, and it may be in its place in twenty-four hours. We lose nothing by it ; for, before we could use it, we should be obliged to make roads on the left bank of the Mincio. The squadron, consisting of five vessels, will put to sea to-morrow or the day after : two for Lago Inferiore, each armed with one three-pounder and a howitzer ; three for Lago Superiore, each armed with one three-pounder.

There is an officer here named Clement, chief of brigade, not down in the list. He arrived with General Pelletier, at least so I believe. At any rate, he spares no pains, and displays great bravery and activity. I certify to you that he renders us great service during our illnesses : he is competent to everything ; nothing comes amiss to him ; but he is without appointments : would it not be possible to do something for him ?

I have no need to expatiate to you in praise of the chief of battalion, Andreossy ; you are acquainted with his

talents and his activity ; but every day adds to the obligations that we owe him.

The chief of battalion of engineers Samson' continues to do impossibilities : I have to bestow warm commendations on him and on the officers of engineers under his orders. I cannot say as much for the artillery ; I derive scarcely any service from it.

As I have proposed to you to place 300 cavalry at the disposal of General Sauret, to watch the Neapolitans, I have given orders to those who, I am informed, are on the point of leaving the depots to rejoin me, though in greater number than 300, to stop at Brescia, unless contrary directions arrive from you. Though I am obliged to form the moveable columns exclusively of cavalry, having no infantry disposable, I could add to them another hundred men, if you thought it necessary.

I think, general, that, if you are not strongly persuaded of the amicable intentions of the Neapolitans, you would do well to begin first : they are a great deal too far from me, and I have too many occupations besides, to be able to pay any attention to them.

I have sent the 24th chasseurs to Rovigo : its force is only 50 men ; I am sure that it will behave well ; I have given the necessary instructions to the commanding officer.

There were still left at Modena several horses ; somebody has got hold of them, I know not whom ; but I doubt whether the Republic will ever be the better for them. Fourteen hussar horses, belonging to the captured Austrian detachment, were sent to me ; I gave them to the 24th chasseurs, saddled and bridled. That regiment lost eighty at Brescia, and has many men dismounted : it is one of the regiments that I should most wish to see complete, because it is highly disciplined and very brave.

Cloaks begin to be indispensably necessary for the cavalry : there ought to be at least a hundred to each regiment.

I have placed the chief of brigade Taillefer at the head of the moveable column of the Upper Mantuan. I have not been able to find any other command suited to him : I know not whether I shall not have a great many letters from him, about very minute explanations ; I have already received several of that kind.

KILMAINE.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Trent, 23 Vendémiaire, year 5 [October 14, 1796].

I have the honour to confirm to you, general, the intelligence which I gave you on the 20th. I learn this moment that the enemy has received a reinforcement at Bolzano of 3500 men, including 500 cavalry, with orders to follow Brousol to the advanced posts of General Davidowich. All my reports on this corps of the enemy represent it as now amounting to 15,000 troops of the line; it is possible to reduce this number to 12,000, but not to less. From the advanced posts of General Vaubois, right and left, there is an armed man for each hearth incorporated in the troops of the line and Tyrolese chasseurs. This reinforcement proceeds from a forced levy which has taken place as far as Inspruck. From the knowledge of them that I have acquired personally, all these new comers handle their arms well and are good marksmen. It is impossible for me to procure at this moment a faithful report of their position, their cavalry, and their artillery: there is no getting within suitable range. I flatter myself that, on the return of the person whom I have sent to Bolzano, I shall have better intelligence.

As I informed you in my letter, general, all springs are set to work in behalf of Mantua. General Loudon, still on our left, according to all my reports, has just abandoned it and thrown himself upon Idro, that is to say, upon Brescia. His column amounts to at least 5000, including 1500 cavalry. General Vaubois is acquainted with all that passes, and I go to him whenever I think it serviceable. His communication with General Massena has been but momentary, since the enemy is frequently seen at Borgo, in small number, it is true, but yet strong enough to prevent the junction. We are said to have but two men, chasseurs or hussars, at Borgo, one killed, the other taken. It is the peasants who guide the enemy.

I have been to Roveredo: all is quiet, and the commandant will take care to maintain order there.

CASTANIER.

PS. It appears, however, from all the reports, that General Loudon, who has sent a courier to Vienna, has left troops on our left, and that General Davidowich and he are not on good terms.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Leghorn, 24 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 15, 1796].

Our country is restored to liberty. The viceroy having announced that he was about to evacuate Corsica, the city of Bastia immediately formed a committee, which caused all the republican prisoners to be set at liberty, and has appointed a deputation, which has just arrived with those of several communes, to renew, in the name of all our fellow-citizens, the oath of fidelity to the Republic.

I was waiting only for a fair wind to set sail, and I shall avail myself of the first to go and secure for the Republic the most interesting places in the island. Bastia, its forts, and St. Florent, are already guarded by the inhabitants jointly with the English, who will leave in three days.

I am flattered with the prospect of finding artillery and magazines: I shall take possession of all, and give you particulars.

GENTILI.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Chambery, 25 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 16, 1796].

I have not delayed for a moment the departure of the 40th: it will march immediately to join you. I have sent you absolutely all that I had, and now I cannot detach another man from my army. I am incessantly applying to the Directory and the minister of war for reinforcements of cavalry for yours.

I will answer you by the first courier on the subject of the cannon which you ask me for. Give orders for the arrival of the horses necessary for eight pieces. I have but two howitzers left and scarcely any horses, and those I have are unfit for work, so that carriers have had to bring me 2000 muskets from Grenoble, to arm the 40th demi-brigade.

Send me 30,000 francs by an extraordinary courier. I will transmit the 6000 muskets to you forthwith: give some money also for feeding the artillery horses at the points where I will point out to you to place them. You cannot form any conception of our poverty.

KELLERMANN.

*To General Wurmser, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Army.*

Head-quarters, Modena,  
25 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 16, 1796].

The general-in-chief of the French army in Italy, Bonaparte, orders me to write to your excellency.

The siege of Mantua is more disastrous for humanity than two campaigns: the brave ought to confront danger, but not the pestilence of a marsh. Your cavalry is without forage; your very numerous garrison is ill fed; thousands of sick need a change of air, medicines, and wholesome food: sufficient causes of destruction.

The general-in-chief of the French army conceives that it is consistent with the spirit of war, and with the interest of both armies, to accede to an arrangement. Give back to the emperor yourself, your cavalry, and your infantry; give up Mantua to the French army; we shall all be gainers by it, and humanity a greater than any of us.

Still, general, as you might believe that the general-in-chief of the French army has particular reasons, other than those of humanity, for making you this proposal, he thinks that you ought to make yourself acquainted with the state of his army of observation. He directs me, therefore, to say, that he sees no inconvenience in making arrangements which, according with the usages and spirit of war, shall enable you to acquaint yourself with the situation of the French army in the Tyrol and on the Brenta.

BERTHIER.

---

*To General Gentili.*

Head-quarters, Modena,  
26 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 17, 1796].

You will go over to Corsica, citizen-general, to command that division. On your arrival in that island you give the temporary command of Bastia to citizen Ristori, chief of brigade; that of St. Florent to citizen Jean Charles Coton, captain; that of Corte to citizen Collé, chief of brigade; that of Bonifaccio to citizen Sabrini, captain; and that of Calvi to citizen Mamobli, captain.

You will levy three companies from the national guard of Bastia, who shall do the duty of the fortress; you will choose three patriot captains, among others citizen Girasco.

You will levy two companies from the national guard of Ajaccio, who shall do the duty of guarding the fortress; you will appoint citizens Tornano and Levio captains. In like manner, you will levy a company from the guard of Bonifaccio, Calvi, St. Florent, and Corte, as a guard for the fortresses and the magazines of the place.

You will direct all the officers and soldiers belonging to the departments of Liamone and Golo to be extracted from the companies of gendarmerie of the 28th division. You will leave the command of the gendarmerie of the department of Liamone to citizen Gentili, with the rank of chief of battalion. You will concert with the commissioner of the government, Salicetti, on the selection of persons for the other employments. You will take men attached to the Republic and to liberty. You will organize three moveable columns in the department of Golo, each 300 strong. You will organize two in the department of Liamone. You will give the command of one to citizen Grimaldi; you will choose for the two others stanch and republican patriots: in Balagne and in the lands of the communes, you will choose for the command of one of the moveable columns of the department of Liamone citizen Bouchi, and a known patriot for the quarter of La Roque.

You will grant a general pardon to all those who have only been misled: you will cause to be apprehended and tried by a military commission the four deputies who carried the crown to England, the members of the government, and the leaders in that infamous treason, among others citizens Pozzo di Borgo, Bertholani, Piraldi, Stefanopoli, Tartarolo, Filipi, and one of the chiefs of battalion, who will be convicted of having borne arms against the troops of the Republic. Thus the national vengeance will have to be wreaked on only about thirty persons, who will probably have gone off with the English.

You will likewise cause all the emigrants to be apprehended, if any there be, who have the audacity to continue to dwell in the districts occupied by the republican troops. But I recommend to you most especially to do speedy justice on every one who, by a resentment contrary to law, has been impelled to murder his enemy; in short, citizen-general, do all that lies in your power to re-establish tranquillity in the island, to stifle all animosities, and to unite to the Republic this so long agitated country.

The paymaster of the army will take care to provide for the expenses of the pay of the different corps of French troops which shall sail from Toulon the moment it shall be ascertained that the passage is free, and which shall go to Corsica to occupy the fortresses.

You will give orders to General Lavoni and Adjutant-general Galliazzini to proceed to Modena, as well as to all the superior officers who may be in active service in the demi-brigades of that army, excepting those who have been specified as having to fill temporary commands, and whose places in their corps will thenceforth be supplied.

Orders are given that no salary be paid to any officer out of his demi-brigade; enjoin all those who are with you to rejoin their corps, where their presence is necessary, while it is become useless in Corsica. Still, if you think that there are any whom you ought to keep, send me a note of them, that two or three decades may be granted them before they rejoin their corps: you will likewise not neglect any means for bringing to Leghorn, and thence getting across to the army, as many Corsicans as possible. To this end it will be necessary to establish at Leghorn a dépôt for clothing, arming, and giving them their route, as fast as they arrive. The only way to turn out of Corsica all the restless men, even those who have fought for the English, is to send them to the army. If you can reduce the island of Elba with General Serrurier, whom I shall order to assist you in case that expedition should be possible, I authorize you to take possession of it.

Let me often hear of what you are doing. Order two of the most intelligent of the deputies to repair to the headquarters, which will be at Bologna or Ferrara.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Citizen Cacault, Agent of the Republic at Rome.*

Molena, 26 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 17, 1796].

I have this instant received news that the English are evacuating the Mediterranean: they have already evacuated Corsica, which has hoisted the tricoloured standard, and sent deputies to me to take the oath of obedience.

A courier from Toulon brings me intelligence that our squadron, composed of eighteen sail of the line and ten frigates, is on the point of setting sail; that it is already

VOL. II.

E

in the great road, and that it has with it a convoy of sixty sail, laden with troops for landing.

The strange delirium of the country where you are will not be of long duration: a prompt remedy will soon be applied to it. This folly will pass away like a dream; the liberty of Rome and the happiness of Italy will be left.

A hundred deputies of Bologna, Modena, Reggio, and Ferrara, have been assembled here: in all these countries there is an enthusiasm which we had no right to expect. The first legion of Lombardy is already organized: General Rusca commands it. You may be sure that I have put into it a good number of old officers, accustomed to conquer and to command.

At any rate, stay you at Rome yet awhile. The intention of the government is to make those people such fair offers, that the blame of refusing them shall lie at their own door.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 26 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 17, 1796].

The cardinal secretary of state has replied very politely to the note in which I intimated that I should be very glad to see him. I send you herewith a copy of his answer.

I had yesterday morning a conversation with him that lasted an hour and a half. I told him, I was sure, from your letters, that you had no wish to quarrel with the sacred college or with the pope, and that it was really surprising that the wise and veteran council of the Vatican should display more vehemence and warmth than an army of young Frenchmen, their promises to whom they had broken; that offers of peace, whatever they might be, could not be considered as a grievance, whereas the manifesto of the pope and the non-fulfilment of the armistice formed an indubitable one.

The cardinal replied, that the dismissal of M. Pierachi from Paris, and the inadmissible treaty proposed, not for the basis of the negotiations at Florence, but as a law which it was obligatory to accept, *sine qua non* the pope was evidently threatened with war, had authorized the apprehension that it was imminent and near at hand, and that, it being impossible to sign the treaty, they had been obliged to think of their safety; that the manifesto, and



indeed all the measures which the court of Rome is taking are but defensive, and that whoever is plainly threatened has a right to recur to all the means of defence; that they saw too clearly in what had happened and what was passing that the plan of destroying the papal government was decreed by the Directory; that they would perish if it must be so, but not without making all possible resistance; that it could not be either prudent or just to fulfil conditions of an armistice which would only furnish means against themselves, for the proposed peace was impossible: till there shall be an acceptable treaty, the threats of the Directory render war too imminent for it to be reasonable to put into its hands at present the sixteen millions remaining to be paid.

I observed to the cardinal, that whatever there was just and reasonable in favour of the court of Rome had not escaped you, and that all had been represented to the Directory; that I knew that the negotiation might now be opened afresh, and that discussion would be admitted.

The cardinal said, " You see clearly that the pope and all of us have no other interest but peace, and how much we desire it; but how can we hope for an acceptable one, after the articles of the proposed treaty; after the proclamation of General Bonaparte on the subject of the manifesto circulated by order of his Holiness; after the correspondences tending to excite insurrection in the Romagna?" He then entered into the detail of the panic terrors which are the disease of courts; that we are incessantly striving to form a party among their subjects hostile to their authority, which we are ever intent on undermining and overthrowing. It is these false notions that render peace so difficult. I explained to him, as I have done a hundred times every where, that we have in view none but reasonable and just interests, after so much mischief has been done us, with the perfidy of which we are suspected, but which we despise. But fear is an incurable disease, and, to a certainty, I have not convinced the cardinal.

He did not conceal from me that I was looked upon, with my prudent conduct, as the minister of the Republic of whom it was necessary to entertain the greatest mistrust; that I had, no doubt, my secret instructions, which I should not communicate; and that he feared what I said was only designed to lull the court of Rome. With people sus-

picious and uneasy to such a degree, how is it possible to come to an understanding !

The pope, nettled at your proclamation in reply to his manifesto, (which I did not know when I desired your letter to be delivered to him) is out of temper, and will not answer you immediately. My object in the conversation which I wished to have with the secretary of state was to lead him to reply to the note in which I inquire in your name if the manifesto is authentic or not, "that this paper escaped the Roman administration in the first agitation of a strong dread of the speedy war with which it was threatened ; but that his Holiness, who cannot but wish for peace, was still disposed to seek it, and desired a negotiation in the usual form in order to attain it, and that he was always ready to fulfil all the conditions of the armistice."

I said frankly that I had reason to believe that such an answer was necessary, and that it might be successful ; and I clearly perceived that the usual mistrust caused my proposal, though introduced and expressed in the mildest manner, to be regarded as a snare ; and I am thoroughly persuaded, from what the cardinal said to me and from the tone of the discourse, that they have promised the coalition, and Naples in particular, to proceed no further in the execution of the armistice, and that, at this moment, they are determined not to revert to the execution of the armistice till the treaty of peace is settled and signed. They fancy that they have escaped a great disaster by withholding the sixteen millions which would have served us to crush the pope, who would have had nothing to support his fine defence if he had paid them.

Everything proves that there is a treaty of union concerted between Rome and Naples, for opposing to you the resistance of the Sicilian army, which is numerous, and that of the general hatred against us which is instilled into the people. They flatter themselves that they shall repel by such means the army of Italy, as those of Jourdan and Moreau have lately been repelled in Germany. They hope that you will attempt the subjugation of Lower Italy with too small a force, and that, as in the time of Charles VIII. and the subsequent wars, the French will be finally driven out.

The cardinal incessantly repeated to me : "We are

waiting for the answer of the Directory on the subject of the treaty which the pope cannot sign in the state in which it has been proposed to him; we have complied with everything that has been required; if it is possible that we can flatter ourselves with the prospect of an accommodation, mention the terms." I remarked to him the difference in magnitude of the two powers, and that the urgency of circumstances and the many affairs of superior importance with which the Directory was engaged, required that the pope, who had only that serious business on his hands, should act in order to an accommodation, rather than wait to be sought after; that I apprized him, from pure love of peace, that the Directory had entire confidence in you; that I knew you to be well disposed; and that I was acquitting myself of the duty of an honest man in seeking to lead the court of Rome into the proper track. As they are too much accustomed here to see people talk otherwise than they think, who knows but that they give me credit for the like ability! The fact is, that I succeeded in nothing. I had no orders to make proposals; I pushed insinuations as far as I possibly could without indiscretion; and I shall wait till you inform me of your ulterior intentions.

I send you herewith the answer to your question concerning the manifesto, which the cardinal secretary of state has just transmitted to me. I send you also the list of the new patriotic donations for the war which the pope is about to wage.

The assurance of the people of this country and their resolution, which is very decided, are founded solely on the support of the armies of Naples, and on the hope that the emperor will gain advantages.

There is one most unfortunate circumstance here for the negociation. The secretary of state has very little influence, so that, after you have persuaded him, you are none the forwarder.

The will of the pope, an old man of eighty, depends upon the intriguers who surround him, and changes with their interests. It is the parties of Vienna and Naples, and the money of England, that have the ascendancy at that court. Moreover, the pope dares not take any resolution without assembling the cardinals in congregation. These men, most of them foreign to all the interests of the State, decide in a body, none of them being responsible for anything. That

ancient policy of the Vatican, formerly so celebrated, is fallen into dotage, and the internal administration of the State is likewise in extreme confusion.

It appears to the court of Naples and to that of Rome that a treaty by which they should bind themselves to admit Frenchmen with privileges, to open the prisons to their subjects confined for political opinions, and to renounce the persecution of what are called Jacobins, would deprive them of all their means of authority and safety. The gloomy spirit of tyranny is stronger than the sentiments of real interest. The fear that despotism has of being despised is greater than that which your armies can excite in it.

I spoke to Cardinal Busca about the report circulated in Rome of the entry of several Neapolitan regiments into Romagna: he told me that he had no intelligence of it, and letters from that country, which have arrived to-day by the ordinary post, make no mention of it either. It was, as I judged it to be, one of those false rumours, disseminated, with I know not what design, by the Neapolitan party. I remark that M. Galeppi has arrived here, and that he has not called upon me. No desire whatever is shown to conciliate and come to an understanding.

You made mention of a letter from the commissioners of the government, which has not yet reached me: I suppose it will arrive by the courier from Milan: it contains, perhaps, the answer of the Directory on the subject of the treaty which the pope has refused to sign. I will do all that is prescribed me, and report punctually to you. I have thought it right to let you know beforehand how things stand, that you may not reckon too much upon other ideas.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Zurich, 27 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 18, 1796].

Since the French have been forced to retire from Germany, we have found ourselves in a very alarming and dangerous situation: not only had we reason to fear that the troops which were in the vicinity would be forced to seek a retreat in Switzerland, but were also led to apprehend that Moreau's army, which remained for some weeks at Stockach, would likewise attempt a passage through our

country when the Austrians appeared in the country of Wirtemberg and in the Black Forest.

We have taken all the necessary measures for preserving and defending our neutrality: we have embodied a considerable number of men, and the other cantons are equally disposed to assist us on the first signal. Luckily, different corps of the French army marched along the Lake of Constance and the Rhine, towards the Forest Towns, without touching the Swiss territory, excepting petty bands of fugitives, who were pursued by the peasants, justly irritated against the French, and disarmed on entering the country. The bulk of Moreau's army turned towards Freiburg, and, though the Austrians had done their utmost to drive back the French, they could not oppose their march; so that the corps which filed along the Rhine at present occupy the Forest Towns. According to a letter dated the 15th, which I received from M. Barthelemy, Moreau has arrived at Freiburg with part of his army; the rest follows successively, and the head-quarters are to be at Lorrach.

We thank God that this danger which threatened us has so happily passed over. The slightest attempt which the French might have made to force a passage through our country would have brought upon us infinite calamities. The cruelties which the French have committed in their retreat have so indisposed the people towards them, that they would assuredly have met with the most vigorous resistance, and it would have been infinitely more difficult and more dangerous for them to have penetrated through Switzerland than by the route which they have taken.

KILCHSPERGER.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Tront, 27 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 18, 1796].

I had the honour, general, to write to you, on the 14th, 16th, 20th, and 23rd instant. Everything, in fact, indicated a movement of the enemy's column commanded by General Loudon, upon our left, to proceed to Brescia or Salo. Forage for 1500 horses and provisions for about 5000 men were ordered at Tion, in the Val di Sol; I was informed of it immediately, and the same night the whole was countermanded: then there was a movement of this same column upon Riva, where a pretty strong detachment

appeared at the distance of eight miles and retired. After comparing all the reports, I thought it right to despatch once more a trusty man to the Val di Sol, who sent me his report from Riva and pursued his route.

We may be easy about our front and our right: the reports agree up to this moment, as well those received from Bolzano as from the enemy's line. Besides the emissaries whom I send out every day, I have one at Bolzano, who will give me accurate information, if no accident befalls him.

I am assured that we have nothing to fear from the inhabitants of the conquered Tyrol: it is not to be presumed that they desire to see the Austrians again before the peace, and, if there are some who wish it, their number is too small to excite any uneasiness. Our care must be confined for the moment to keeping a close watch over the emissaries that the enemy may have; and in regard to this point, I neglect nothing.

I yesterday requested General Vaubois to give orders for the arrest of one Alessandro Pustalico, who calls himself a Corsican, but is not. He was the superintendent of Wurms's police.

The scarcity of the articles of the first necessity, which this country is obliged to obtain from the territories of Venice or from Lombardy, requires that you should grant the transit, as well as a sufficient number of barks to ascend the Adige. It is necessary to give them an escort, for dealers have already been plundered, so that they dare no longer trust themselves to such conveyances.

There are very few emigrants here, but there are wealthy men and monasteries from whom you might demand contributions. Your army has urgent wants: one part is in need of clothing, and will soon be exposed to the inclemencies of the bad season.

Take notice that the wealthy class does nothing for the relief of the poor; so that the burden of events falls upon the indigent and the artisan. This district of the pretorship alone paid annually 49,000 florins to the emperor, exclusive of customs, tolls, quit-rents, &c., &c., to have its property preserved and guaranteed to it. In the other provinces, both Roveredo and the Trentin, there are likewise opulent persons.

Nothing was more true, general, than the information which I gave you, in my letter of the 23rd instant, of the

movement of the enemy to advance upon Brescia ; but a counter-order, which arrived at the very moment that he was about to march, caused him to fall back.

To-day, according to my reports, I conjecture that he means to throw himself towards General Massena. I shall closely follow his movements, and you shall have immediate information of them.

CATANIER.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Lavis, 27 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 18, 1796].

While I was sending a chief of battalion to command the dépôt at Milan instead of Brive, whom I had at first nominated, you appointed another, and my nominee was sent back to me. As successor to Prompt, at Trent, I have appointed citizen Rubis, supernumerary chief of battalion of the 85th, the only officer that I could dispose of ; he is said to be very good and very punctual.

You will find herewith a letter from the municipality of Trent. I shall never cease, my dear general, to intercede in behalf of the brave men, who are really to be pitied if they do not find means to derive from without the prime necessities of life for next winter. I cannot but commend the conduct of the constituted authorities ; they seem to be attached to us.

I cannot disguise from you that I am persuaded that the requisitions, frequently indispensable, are degenerating into great abuses, and I strongly suspect that they often become the prey of the requisitionists.

Questions are frequently asked me about emigrants : let me know if it is your intention that regular sequestrations, of which an account must be given to you, shall be resorted to. There are also at the mont de piété, as I am assured, articles of higher value than those which you have thought fit to order to be restored : what would you have done with them ?

Several other communes solicit the favour which you have granted to Trent relative to the effects deposited at the mont de piété by indigent persons. Be pleased to give me the requisite authorization.

Nothing new in the division. I have the greatest hopes of success on any occasion. Austrian deserters are coming in almost every day.

VAUBOIS.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Verona, 28 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 19, 1796].

I send you a copy of a letter which I have just received from Turin, dated the 25th instant.

The king died this morning at eleven o'clock. The order has been renewed to-day to grant no more leaves of absence, to recall those which have been obtained, and to recruit indiscriminately and without regard to height. The nobles are assembling, particularly in the house of the Prince of la Cisterna, an intimate friend of the Prince of Piedmont. The object of these meetings is not known ; but I give you notice that their aim is to suspend the demolition of the fortresses.

Nothing new to-day.

PICO.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Venice, 28 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 19, 1796].

The Venetian government continues its armaments: troops are frequently arriving from Dalmatia: they do not make their appearance in Venice, but are dispersed in the different islands of the lagoons, where they are trained. All is done with the greatest secrecy.

Several months ago patrols were established in the villages of the Terra Firma, upon pretext of preserving good order there: I am assured that they have just been doubled. It appears that they design to arm successively a great part of the population, and it is easy to conjecture against whom it is proposed to turn these forces.

Every thing indicates perfidious intentions on the part of the Venetian government: its designs no longer appear a mystery to me; let but a favourable moment occur, and we shall see them break forth. We ought to have our eyes open to all its proceedings: too great security might prove fatal to the armies of the Republic.

It is eighteen months since I came to Venice. It required but a glance to perceive that the senate was an irreconcilable enemy to the French Republic: it was the necessary result of the opposition of the principles of the two governments. I have always thought that the political reasons which militate in our favour would be but a very



weak counterpoise in the balance in which the aristocracy weighs its dearest interests. But, at this moment, it is not the aristocracy alone that we have to fear: it has worked up the people to such a degree of effervescence that they await only a signal to break loose against us; all the springs of religious fanaticism have been set a-going, and this has been done with such success, that you very generally hear persons of the lower class complaining that the government does not permit them to arm against us.

You cannot conceive, general, the hatred instilled into these people against the French Republicans; they are hooted, despised, spit upon, with the most insulting indecency. The French government, its brave armies, all the persons belonging to it, are the continual objects of the most indecorous language, of the most atrocious calumnies: I venture to assert that there is not a single patriot at Venice who has not had humiliations to suffer. Every one has a right to inveigh against the French; nobody has liberty to say a word in their favour. It would seem that calumny directed against them is a virtue, and that truth is become a crime.

The few friends we have here shun us, hide themselves, and wish to make us forget them: one only still dared to visit the house of the minister; the Inquisition has just expelled him from Venice.

To avoid taking up your time, general, I have drawn only this slight sketch of the disgusting picture which presented itself to my view on my return from Milan. I have taken care to inform the government of it; though thoroughly persuaded that nothing has escaped the vigilance of the diplomatic agents, whose zeal and patriotism are known to me, I have thought that I should perform the duty of a citizen by joining myself with them in a circumstance in which it is so essential that you should be apprized of the manœuvres of our enemies.

I was assured, during these last days, that the senate had issued a decree of amnesty in favour of the Venetian subjects banished from the territories of Venice, on condition that they should enrol themselves among the troops of the republic. But before I reported it to you, general, I wished to have more certainty of the facts, and to make myself acquainted with the means employed to carry secretly into execution a decree of this nature. I have learned

that orders were given to all the podestas to communicate the information to the families of the exiles dwelling in their respective districts, and to leave them to recall them.

Such is the way in which the government always covers its operations with a veil, which, if not impenetrable, enables it, at least, to deny the facts against which complaints might be raised.

AILLAUD.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 29 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 20, 1796].

I have executed, general, the intention which I communicated to you during your stay here, of a journey to the Upper Adda, and I subjoin a summary of my trip to the castles of Como, the bridge of Lecco, and the castle of Trezzo. I have seen at Como the gunboats, which are laid up there by your orders: I found very little progress made in that business, for nothing is yet finished but the floors on which the pieces are to be placed: all the other tackle is wanting. It is highly important that the officer charged with your confidence for this business should come to inspect and hasten these operations, which languish out of the sight of the master. I could only order activity, for I was ignorant of the details of the prescribed measures. The gun-carriages will be ready in two days, but the guns are not yet arrived.

I found great negligence on the part of the commissary of war, or of the administrations of the hospitals, in the arrangements relative to the great depots of convalescents belonging to divisions of infantry; everything was still wanting on the 25th at Cassano, and on the 28th at Cremona; the soldiers were reduced to lie upon straw, without blankets or sheets, without cooking utensils or porringers, &c. &c. barefoot, without shirts, clothes in tatters: the state of these unfortunate creatures would excite your pity. I took upon myself, in order to obviate these inconveniences, to put in requisition a quantity of needful articles for this service. I again wrote the most urgent letters to the *ordonnateur*, and I learn from his answers that orders have at length been given to the different administrations. The depots at Milan and Lodi are going on extremely well. I have been equally well satisfied with the state of the hospitals in all the places through which I passed.

I have also examined, general, the works going on at Pizzighitone, and it seemed to me that, your object being to secure that place against a *coup de main*, the labourers have not been set to work on the parts that most needed repairs, such as that part of the enclosure of the place which is between the Cremona gate, the tower on its left, and the sluices. All these points are totally uncovered, and ought to have been the first objects of the attention of the engineer, because they would be the first exposed to attack in case of siege. The state of the sluices, in particular, is such that there is not an inch of water in the ditches, while the Serio flows past in an ample stream, and these ditches full of water would be a great resource for the besieged.

I take the liberty to submit to you some further ideas suggested to me by the information given me concerning the plan of the total destruction of the outer works of this place, because it seems to me that this plan is not consistent with the orders given to provision it for 2000 men for forty days, and it is contracting the defence of the place into a compass narrow, confined, cramped in all its dimensions, in all its salients, and which presents not the least resource; whereas, the mere re-establishment of part of the first bastioned outer enclosure, without being too extensive for the garrison, would suffice to oblige the enemy to commence his approaches with the greatest circumspection and to proceed methodically. I beg you then, general, to cast another and a particular look at that place, which may be rendered formidable with some care, and with very little more expense than you have destined for it. I think you will find enough to justify my observations, which the public interest alone has dictated, and which I offer, moreover, merely as an opinion.

I found at Lodi sparks of a religious fanaticism which was seeking to burst forth: they were performing miracles there; priests certified them, devotees circulated them, and idiots believed them. I thought it right, under these circumstances, to take a double measure: the first was to send for the bishop. I spoke to him with firmness; I declared that, if another miracle was wrought in his diocese, and the priests continued to abuse the tribunal of penitence, to calumniate the French and to arm the superstitious credulity of the people against them, he should be personally responsible to me for it; that I would bring him, as well

as the higher clergy, before a military commission as an agent, a spy, of the court of Rome, and an apostle of maxims contrary to the public tranquillity and to the ministry of peace which was his vocation, &c. &c.

On the other hand, being informed that, in the Lodisan, the people complained of a prohibition, issued I know not at what period, to ring the bells for the service of the Catholic worship, I authorized them to be rung in each parish three times a day at necessary and useful hours, supporting that permission by the development of this principle, that the government is far from making war upon the religious opinions of the people ; that it respects and protects all the ceremonies practised by the citizens in the exercise of their different modes of worship on the territory occupied by the armies of the Republic, whenever they cannot compromise their safety and the general tranquillity.

The têtes du pont of Placentia will be marked out to-morrow ; and those of Pavia the day after. I have conferred on this subject with the chief of engineers, and the funds are already on the spot. I shall hasten the construction of these works as much as possible ; but hands are scarce ; the labours of the last harvest and the sowing of the winter corn keep them all in the country ; and I have not troops enough to use means of constraint towards them. If, general, you could spare me a few battalions for a time, all this business would go on better.

The Lombard legion is making progress ; I send you a statement of its situation for the day : but the corps of sappers is at a stand-still. The administration is in want of money to defray the first expenses, and I have neither the funds nor the authority necessary for supplying it.

BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 29 Vendémiaire, year 5 [October 20, 1796].

They are busy, general, raising men, levying recruits in the Ecclesiastical State, to increase the papal army. You will find herewith the route and stations for about 1500 soldiers of the garrison of Rome, who are on march for the Romagna. It is asserted that Austrian and Neapolitan officers will come to train and command the army of the

priests. It has been long reported that the court of Naples and the pope have applied to that of Vienna for general Clairfayt.

They now talk of the speedy arrival of an imperial general officer, without mentioning his name: these German officers can come only by sea from Trieste. I think that they are amusing the pope by such promises of aid from the coalesced powers. If we occupy Upper Italy in such a manner as to separate the pope and the King of Naples, and to leave them no means of communication by land, they must find themselves this winter, if war should take place, without any external correspondence, unless by the posts of Venice, Turin, Genoa, Spain, and Florence: we cannot cut off the commerce of neutrals from communication with Rome and Naples: but if Lower Italy should happen to be blockaded, in that case couriers could not be suffered to pass to the enemy, to whom it would no doubt be a severe blow to be deprived of communications, stripping the priests of all the means of circulating their poison and doing us mischief abroad.

The Marquis del Vasto has apprized the officer commanding the troops of the pope that a corps of 9500 troops of the King of Naples would enter the Ecclesiastical State, under the command of a marechal de camp, whose name he did not mention; that 6000 infantry would pass the Tronto, marching into Romagna; that 3000 infantry would arrive at Rieti, and that 500 cavalry would advance by the Sora road to Rome. The Roman commandant asked him for the date of the entry, a note of the march and of the days of arrival, that he might give orders and have necessary preparations made. M. del Vasto was somewhat embarrassed: he replied that a Neapolitan commissary was to come to Rome, and with him all these details could be settled.

I am sure of this conversation. It proves that there is a thorough agreement with the pope concerning a passage or an establishment of the Neapolitans in the Ecclesiastical State, and that the court of Naples is studying to make it be believed that its troops are every moment on the point of entering, whereas it is yet undecided.

They are expecting in Rome the answer of the Directory on the subject of the refusal of the pope to sign the treaty, and they are expecting at Naples the return of the courier sent to Paris, who passed through this city about ten days

ago. Meanwhile, there is no talk but of defensive measures: every thing will be cleared up when the final explanations arrive from Paris.

According to the treaties of armistice with Naples and Rome, hostilities cannot commence till a certain number of days after the rupture of the negotiations, formally declared.

Naples will avail itself of this interval to withdraw its cavalry: as for the pope, the five days' prolongation is attended with no inconvenience, and I hope you will cause it to be observed, that I may have time to retire.

I have not yet any news from the man whom I sent to observe the Neapolitan camp below Sora.

I am assured that the King of Naples has given orders to the postmasters on the road from Naples to Rome, by Mont-Cassin, to keep eighteen pair of horses in readiness. Every one is striving to guess whether this extraordinary passage can be that of the King or of the principal officers.

I beg you to accept, &c.

CACCAULT.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Chambery, 29 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 20, 1796].

I send you, general, an extract from various reports concerning Italy, which I have just received.

KELLERMANN.

*Extracts from the Reports of Correspondents of Citizen Deloge.*

The news from Piedmont and Italy is again becoming very interesting: it is reported, on the one hand, that 25,000 Austrians are to reinforce the army of Wurmser, and, on the other, that Contino will profit by the disaster which the French are said to have sustained in Germany, as well as the ill-affected princes of these countries, to deliver themselves from the French. Contino is to declare war against the King of Sardinia: will the latter oppose with vigour and sincerity? That is doubted. So much is certain that the Swiss regiments in his service are recruiting fast.

The news from Italy at this moment appears to conceal some designs. France, it is said, has propounded sixty-three articles to the pope, all absurd, and tending to destroy religion. People hope to find in this rumour the poison necessary for inflaming a fanatical population. It is certain that

this report, circulated by the priests, does not accord with public opinion in Switzerland: add to this report the Neapolitan forces, the arrival of Russian troops, and all these things together indicate that new efforts are about to be made.

It is said that in Italy the women are the first to play off their artifices for the destruction of the French.

Those who desert from the army of Italy proceed from Milan to Como: they are then but eight leagues from Switzerland. That road ought to be watched.

People flatter themselves that Contino will form a party considerable enough to cut off the retreat of the French to Nice, in case they should sustain reverses in Italy. It is positively asserted that the English will not neglect anything to support him. It is even said that *employés* of the French Republic sell him munitions of war.

Depino, agent of his Holiness, is at Lyons.

DELOGE.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 30 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 21, 1796].

In regard to the Neapolitan troops, everything remains in the same situation. I related to you in my preceding letter what had passed between M. del Vasto and the commandant of the papal troops on the subject of the speedy entry of 9500 men into the Ecclesiastical State; and I wrote to you besides, at the moment of the departure of the post, that I was assured that the secretary of state had given orders for the lodging and stations of these Neapolitan troops: but this last piece of news is not true.

The general of the papal troops has the order both of the cardinal secretary of state and M. del Vasto to settle with a Neapolitan commissary, who is expected at Rome but has not yet arrived, all matters necessary for regulating what concerns the lodgings, the stations, and other supplies requisite for the Neapolitan troops in the Ecclesiastical State; but neither the time of the entry of the troops nor that of the arrival of the commissary is yet determined.

Naples is awaiting, 1stly, the issue of her negociation in Paris; 2dly, the effect of what the agents of the emperor promise themselves from a new Austrian army, sent to fight you and to raise the siège of Mantua. If this third effort

VOL. II.

F

of the Germans should prove successful, then it is probable that the Neapolitans would quickly set themselves in motion, and endeavour to go and support Wurmser.

CACAULT.

PS. They talk of a movement of Neapolitan troops upon Gaeta, whence they are to proceed by land or sea for the isle of Elba, to defend Longone, or for various places in Tuscany. It is true that thirty-six horses have been ordered at each post on the route from Naples to Rome by Mont-Cassin, and it is now known that they are for the use of the officers of the cavalry which the pope is preparing to set on foot.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Leghorn, 1 Brumaire, year 5 [October 21, 1796].

On the news, general, that the English were on the point of evacuating Corsica, I sent orders to the military commandant at Castiglione della Pescaia to proceed himself with 150 men to Porto Ferrajo, as soon as the English had left it, and to manage so as to arrive there before the Tuscans or the Neapolitans. If you do not approve this measure, I will execute such orders as you shall give me on this head. General Gentili, in concert with the commissioner of the government, has thought it advisable to send a detachment of hussars to the coast; I have granted the said detachment, which receives the orders of that general.

The sale will commence decidedly on the 26th of October. I send you a list of the articles which I have directed to be put aside; if there is anything that does not suit, pray let me know.

I am getting a report from Rome transmitted to you. I learned by another channel that the French were ill used at Civita-Vecchia; that, moreover, with the exception of the fanatics, the subjects of Rome wish to belong to a more consistent government.

I am assured that Naples is pushing its preparations for war with the utmost activity; but the news of the peace with that kingdom which we received this morning will put an end to all that.

I send you the translation of a letter which has been in-



tercepted at sea. There are always one or two English frigates stationed off this port.

Up to this moment we did not find any powder belonging to the *ci-devant* Duke of Modena: as it is possible that you may have occasion for it, I have despatched for Fort Urbin 23,009 quintals, 53 pounds, left by two English merchants who have fled from Leghorn and from the depot of an English frigate.

I have not been able as yet to obtain more than a very small quantity of saltpetre, and that not refined. I shall request the consul Belleville to examine the books of the suspected merchants, in order to obtain, if possible, a larger quantity.

The 8000 muskets have set off for Milan, as well as the old men of the 75th demi-brigade.

Will not the new circumstances cause you, general, to change your mind respecting the 100,000 rations of biscuit, with which you ordered me to provision the forts of this city? The commissary of war Fournier, charged with this business, is so slow, that I shall still have time to receive your answer, if it is your intention to suspend your operation. I have given notice to this commissary that I shall complain to you of the very bad forage with which he supplies our horses; he talks a great deal about his independence of the military authorities, and goes on no better than many others.

SERRURIER.

---

*To Monsieur the Cardinal Mattei.*

Head-quarters, Ferrara, 30 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 21, 1796].

The court of Rome has refused to adopt the conditions of peace offered by the Directory; it has broken the armistice, and, while suspending the execution of the conditions, it is arming; it wishes for war, and shall have it: but, before I can in cold blood foresee the ruin and death of those senseless persons who would pretend to oppose the republican phalanxes, I owe it to my nation, to humanity, to myself, to make a last effort to bring back the pope to more moderate sentiments, conformable to his true interests, to his character, and to reason. You know, Monsieur le Cardinal, the numbers and the strength of the army that I command: to destroy the temporal power of the pope I need but to will

F 2

it. Go to Rome, see his Holiness, enlighten him concerning his true interests, snatch him from the intriguers who surround him, who aim at his destruction and that of the court of Rome. The French government permits me still to listen to negociations for peace; every thing may be arranged. War, so cruel for the people, has terrible results for the vanquished; avert great calamities from the pope. You know how anxious I am to finish by peace a struggle that war would terminate for me without glory as without danger. I wish you, Monsieur le Cardinal, all the success in your mission which the purity of your intentions deserves.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizen Cacault.*

Verona, 3 Brumaire, year 5 [October 24, 1796].

You will find herewith a letter from the minister Delacroix. The Directory informs me that it has charged you to continue the negociations with Rome. You will keep me regularly apprized of what you are doing, that I may seize the favourable moment for executing the intentions of the Directory. You are well aware that, after the peace with Naples and Genoa, the good harmony which prevails with the King of Sardinia, the recapture of Corsica, and our decided superiority in the Mediterranean, I shall not delay for a moment to rush upon Rome, and to avenge the national honour: the great point just now is to gain time. My intention is, when I enter the papal territories, and it will not be long first, to do it in consequence of the armistice, in order to take possession of Ancona; thence, after setting my rear in order, I shall be better able to proceed further.

In short, the great art at this moment is to keep up the ball between us, to deceive the old fox. If you can bring about a commencement of the execution of the armistice, I think that it would be desirable, but difficult, I suppose. Our business is beginning again to-day, and victory appears to be returning to our colours.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Verona, 3 Brumaire, year 5 [October 24, 1796].

I am sorry, citizens directors, that your letter of the 20th Vendemiaire reached me too late. I beg you to refer

to the circumstances in which I was : Rome printing fanatical manifestoes ; Naples marching troops ; the regency of Modena manifesting its bad intentions and breaking the armistice by sending convoys to Mantua. The French Republic was despised, threatened : that vigorous stroke, the rupture of the armistice of Modena, re-established public opinion, and united Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio, under one cap. Fanaticism found itself disappointed, and the people, accustomed to tremble, felt that we were still there : the Republic had a right to break an armistice that was not executed. The regency itself does not deny having sent succours to Mantua.

Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, and Bologna, have decreed a levy of 2800 men under the title of First Italian Legion : the enthusiasm is very great ; the peasants who conveyed provisions into Mantua have come themselves to acquaint us with the secret ways which they followed. Perfect harmony prevails between us and the people.

At Bologna, a city of 75,000 souls, the enthusiasm is extreme : even already the lowest class of the people has committed excesses ; they refused to acknowledge the senate : I was obliged to leave them to organize their constitution, and to express myself strongly in favour of the senate, before I could restore order.

At Ferrara, a cardinal bishop, a Roman prince, possessing an income of 150,000 livres, gives it all to the people and is continually in the church. I have sent him to Rome, under pretext of negotiating, but in reality to get rid of him : he was well pleased with his mission.

The folly of the pope is unequalled ; but the news from Naples and the Mediterranean will make him change. My plan is, when I can, to get to Ancona by means of the armistice, and not to be an enemy anywhere but there.

You will find herewith a proclamation which I made at Bologna, and the letter which I wrote to the cardinal archbishop of Ferrara.

I congratulate you on the treaty signed with Genoa : it is useful on many accounts.

The sale at Leghorn is now proceeding. I occupy Ferrara with a small garrison. The Barbets are beaten, dispersed, and shot. Your orders for putting the disbanded soldiers in the pay of the congress of Lombardy are executed.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Verona, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [October 25, 1796].

We are in motion : the enemy seems to have an intention to pass the Piave, with a view to establish himself on the Brenta ; I suffer him to advance ; the rains, the bad roads, and the torrents will give me a good account of him.

We shall see how that will turn out. I beg you to let me know how I am to act at Trieste, if, after the rainy season and a good victory, I am obliged to carry the war into the Friule. If you could send three frigates into the Adriatic, they would be useful in all hypotheses.

Peace with Naples and Genoa, our situation with the people, and the troops that you announce, ensure Italy to us if they arrive. The 29th demi-brigade, which left Paris 4000 strong, was only 1100 when it arrived here. If Willot retains but 2000 men, the 83rd must be already on march. That excellent demi-brigade is 2500 strong : it has had a year's rest ; according to my orders, it ought to be at Nice by this time. If I have it before any great blows are struck, as it appears that I shall have the 40th, I hope not only to beat the Austrians and take Mantua, but also to take Trieste, to oblige Venice to do whatever you please, and to plant our flag upon the Capitol.

It will be necessary to send at least 1200 men to Corsica : it would be well for some frigates to proceed to Ajaccio and St. Florent, to show themselves.

If you send some frigates into the Adriatic, it would be advisable that some officer belonging to them should come and concert with me respecting the choice of a point for protecting them, and where we might correspond. It would be well if a large tender were to come to the mouth of the Po ; I would load her with hemp and timber : she might bring us in return 3000 muskets, 10,000 bayonets, 2000 swords for chasseurs and hussars, 4000 balls for six-inch howitzers, 1000 twelve-pound cannon balls, 6000 eighteen-pounders : these are things which we are continually wanting. I see no other way by which the navy can speedily obtain supplies, which are abundant in the Ferrarese and the Romagna. If you are afraid of wanting corn in spring, you have only to send vessels to the mouth of the Po, and I will have as much corn as you please carried down to them.

Snow is falling, but that does not prevent fighting in the Tyrol. It is not impossible that I may have to evacuate Trent; I shall be sorry for it, the inhabitants being extremely well disposed towards us; I shall not do it till the moment when it will be useful: I am not thinking of it yet.

Wurmser is at the last extremity: he is in want of wine, meat, and forage; he is eating his horses, and has 15,000 sick. He has found means to transmit to Vienna the proposal that I made him. I think we shall soon come to blows here: in five decades Mantua will be taken or delivered. If but the 83rd and the 40th arrive, that is to say, 5000 men, I answer for every thing; but an hour too late and these forces will be of no avail. If I am forced to fall back, Mantua will be relieved.

I am keeping men hard at work on the fortifications of Pizzighitone and the castle of Tresso, on the Adda, and likewise at our two bridges over the Po.

Six hundred sailors and soldiers, made prisoners by the English, have arrived at Leghorn from Bastia. When you send troops, I think it would be well not to chuse any Corsican for general or governor of a fortress, to command there.

There is an intention, as I am informed, of granting a general amnesty in Corsica: there ought, in my opinion, to be excepted from it, 1stly, the four deputies who carried the crown to London; 2ndly, the members of the viceroy's council of state, consisting of six persons; lastly, the emigrants who were entered as such in the registers of the department. I think that this is the only measure for rendering the amnesty sure; that will except but twelve or fifteen; where there are so many criminals, that is being indulgent.

I have had citizen Panalieri, secretary to Paoli, coming from London to engage in new intrigues, apprehended at Leghorn.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Verona, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [October 25, 1796].

It appears, citizens directors, from your letter of Vendémiaire, that the scientific men and artists have complained of having been in want of something: it would be very ungrateful of us not to give them all that is necessary for

them; for they serve the Republic with equal zeal and success, and I beg you to believe that, for my part, no person appreciates more highly the real services which they are rendering to the State and to the arts and sciences, and that I shall always be most ready to second with all my zeal your intentions on this subject.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Citizen Poussielgue.*

Verona, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [October 5, 1796].

I have received your letter of the 30th. The proposals are not acceptable. To give all Lombardy for an auxiliary force of 8000 men, that is to say, 5000, for there will never be more, is demanding too much just now, when peace is concluded with Genoa and Naples. Piedmont is a great gainer by making an alliance with us: it is sure to efface thereby from the minds of its subjects the contempt excited in them by the last treaty. Add to this, 1stly, vague hopes of being favoured in the treaty of peace; 2ndly, the imperial fiefs, or an equivalent in extent, towards the Riviera of Genoa: that ought to be sufficient.

The second article is inadmissible: never would France guarantee any thing further than success would permit her to obtain. Continue your negociations. All is going on well here.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Members of the Congress of State.*

Verona, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [October 25, 1796].

I authorize you, gentlemen, to take all the measures that you deem useful, communicating them to the general commanding in Lombardy, and obtaining his approbation.

You may in consequence grant to foreigners the faculty of purchasing immoveable property in Lombardy; recall all absent persons, especially such as reside in an enemy's country, upon pain of sequestration of their property; seize the rents of those who are in the service of foreign powers; expel all priests and monks who are not natives of Lombardy: increase the direct imposition to such a point as to make it suffice for the daily pay of the Lombard legion; change the municipalities, the pretors, and the professors of

the schools ; and for each of these measures, you must have for each document the counsel of the general commanding in Lombardy.

As for the seizure of all the plate of the churches, I consider it as necessary ; but I think that half will be sufficient for the Lombard legion ; the other half shall be paid into the chest of the army, which is suffering real want.

I have referred the execution of this essential measure to the commissioners of the government, who will appoint an agent to concert with you.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [October 25, 1796].

I have the honour to send you herewith the second part of the narrative of the man whom I despatched to observe the Neapolitan army as far as Sora and St. Germain.

I sent you, some time since, from Genoa, a table of the military forces of Italy, containing an accurate specification of the state and names of the corps of regular troops of the King of Naples and of the militia : supposing them all to be on foot and complete, the Sicilian army would amount to 57,000 men.

The court of Naples, by the repeated edicts which I have sent you, calls out of all the provinces the ban and the arriere-ban ; it has marched off as many men as it could, and it has required a greater number to raise the old corps to the war establishment, and thus to increase to 57,000 men an army which, before the declaration of war by the King of Naples, did not amount to 25,000 effective men, most of the regiments being under one half.

The population of the Two Sicilies, consisting of six or seven millions, has furnished forced levies, which have been going on for above three years, beyond what was required to complete the old corps, and wherewithal to form battalions of volunteers : this raises the Neapolitan army to a considerable number of men, which I cannot learn with sufficient precision to determine it with accuracy.

The King of Naples had six regiments of cavalry ; he sent four to the Neapolitan army, the remnants of which are held as hostages according to the treaty of armistice : he has but two left. His new cavalry, formed of volunteers,

is not considerable and must be bad. All the regiments of Neapolitan infantry have bad officers, and the soldiers are no great things in any respect.

The two corps on which M. Acton relies most, are that called the Esteri (foreigners) and that of the Albanians. The first is composed of the old stock of the Swiss regiments in the service of Naples, and of German and Piedmontese deserters, who have been picked up and enlisted every where abroad ; the other is composed of men enlisted in Albania and Macedonia, and of many deserters from Venetian troops born in the mountains on the other side of the Adriatic. These two corps, forming together above 10,000 men, are composed of soldiers, fighting men, tall, robust, but having the same spirit as all troops composed of deserters ; and the officers, rather better than the Neapolitans, serve only for the pay, and are not possessed in the slightest degree of the affection of their soldiers.

The King of Naples is certainly in want of arms, especially muskets, and of every thing belonging to the artillery, for so numerous an army.

They have made the camp of Sora a plaything for King Ferdinand IV. who fancies himself a great general. The officer who commands it under his majesty is M. de Gambes, an Alsatian, who served in the American war as lieutenant-colonel of the regiment commanded by the Vicomte de Montmorency-Laval : he was sent to Naples by the old French government, under Baron Salis, remained in the Neapolitan service, notwithstanding the declaration of war, and is now generalissimo : he is a mere man of details, shallow-minded, and of narrow views. The other Neapolitan generals know nothing whatever about war, and laugh, with the public and the whole kingdom, at the profession of arms, which M. Acton wishes the Neapolitans to take up seriously against every kind of interest and inclination natural to their country.

Contemptible as may be this great army, formed solely to serve for a bugbear and to impart assurance to a court devoured with terror, it would become extremely dangerous, if you should meet with reverses in your operations against the Austrians.

If we were to find ourselves in the perilous situation to need all our forces in Upper Italy for curbing the King of Sardinia, the Venetians, and the Imperialists ; if the army



of Naples durst advance into the Ecclesiastical State, into Tuscany, to Bologna, Ferrara, Modena; nothing would resist it, and though it might afterwards be forced to fall back, we should find only countries exhausted and ravaged by it. M. Acton would like to separate the kingdom of Naples from us by a desert, if he could.

All the great bodies of Neapolitan forces are collected at Sora.

The King of Naples can speedily transport by sea from Gaeta an army to Longone and other places of the Presidios of Tuscany, the central point of Italy; he can march another army across the Tronto into Romagna, and advance upon Rome with the army which is at Sora. I doubt whether M. Acton dares send out of the kingdom the troops that he deems necessary to curb the malcontents; but the scheme which he manifests for commanding respect and obtaining peace, which he desires to be honourable, after a cowardly and perfidious war, is certainly to come and occupy Rome with a large corps, and to attack us besides by the Romagna and the Presidios; but he wishes to do it safely; and you would see the Neapolitans overrun and ravage Italy, as they came to plunge the dagger into us at Toulon, if they could do it with safety.

I am sending off for Rieti and the Neapolitan frontier the same spy whom I despatched to Sora, to reconnoitre and observe the Neapolitans in that quarter.

The pope is causing as many recruits as he can to be raised, and horses bought for forming a cavalry. Some gentlemen volunteers are already making their appearance with their new uniform.

I send you herewith the charge of M. the cardinal Maury: such is the language of the priests and the madmen among whom one is obliged to lead here a most tedious life. You support me here by your victories with more real and solid dignity than do the swaggering envoys of beaten potentates.

I beg you, citizen-general, to accept the assurance of my attachment.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Leghorn, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [October 25, 1796].

I have given you an account of the expedition of the troops that I sent to Capraja. You will find herewith the report

just made to me by the military commandant and the military agent who have landed in that island. The Genoese troops were beforehand with us by two hours, and had occupied the fortress. Their commandant refused to admit our men without an order from the Genoese government; our detachment, nevertheless, took a military position, and, in concert with the inhabitants, is guarding the coast to prevent the English from landing. Next day there appeared off the island two English frigates, which sent ashore a flag of truce, to introduce to the inhabitants an order to surrender the fort again to them, upon pretext of securing them from the invasion with which they were threatened by the Corsicans collected at Leghorn. The Genoese commandant replied that he was ready to defend himself to the death. The junction of our troops with the inhabitants and the Genoese makes me quite easy about the fate of this country; I even hope that the commandant of the latter will consent to admit part of our detachment: I am writing him the annexed letter on the subject. I shall send a reinforcement of 50 men to Emmanuelli.

You will see by the letter received from the chief of battalion Gioranni and adjutant Ponte, that the English have sent all the troops they had in Corsica to Porto-Ferrajo, where the viceroy arrived on the 30th. In reply I direct Gioranni to proceed to Porto-Longone, to inquire what is become of the Corsicans who were in the island of Elba, to collect them together, and to endeavour by all possible means to occupy the citadel when the English shall evacuate it. Measures are taken to prevent the Tuscans from arriving there before our troops.

There arrived last night a Genoese vessel which sailed yesterday from Marinage, and brings intelligence that the English squadron is still at St. Florent, that Bastia was evacuated, and that the six privateers we had sent to Corsica, to escort the troops commanded by General Casalta, had proceeded to Bastia. There had been a bit of a fight between these privateers and an English brig, which must have surrendered but for the assistance of an English frigate. We lost in the action one privateer which took fire. I have not received official intelligence of the arrival of Casalta at Bastia, but I presume that he has, by his march, outrun the retreat of the enemy.

GENTILI.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Marmirolo, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [October 25, 1796].

I finished the reconnaissance of my posts very late yesterday evening. I wish I could make you a favourable report of them; but I have seen with infinite concern that all the departments of the different services are excessively neglected, which can be attributed only to the circumstance that it is impossible for the different general officers of my division to attend to them in person, their health rendering them incapable of any service.

The different works which have been ordered have not been executed, or are executed so ill that I find myself obliged to order them to be reconstructed. I must confess to you that the officer of engineers has inspired me with very little confidence; I do not think him qualified to take charge of such important works, and I cannot see without pain that the whole of the works of the blockade are consigned to his superintendence. It is urgent that there should be sent to us other officers of that arm on whom we could have more reliance.

The duty is done with great negligence at all the posts, and I am even astonished that several of them have not been already surprised. I shall give the strictest orders and instructions on this subject, and attend to their execution myself as much as possible. The destitute state of the troops, who are in want of every kind of clothing, is certainly liable to occasion some discouragement. Almost all the men are naked, without shoes, and with little covering for the winter which is approaching. It appears from the report of the commissary of war, that there are articles of clothing in the magazines here: I should wish to be authorised to distribute them. I am in the greatest need of a reinforcement of troops and labourers.

All is quiet in the division. The enemy confine themselves to foraging, sometimes on their glacis, always under the protection of their artillery: the measures that I am about to take will prevent them, without doubt, from going any further.

Though there are in my division only eleven pieces of field artillery, it is absolutely necessary to increase the number of the gunners, which is only fifty-nine, half of whom are incapable of doing duty. I presume that, considering

the importance of my application on this head, I shall not be long left in this penury. We want also a good many artillery horses.

CHABOT.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 6 Brumaire, year 5 [October 27, 1796].

I send you herewith copies of your letters, as you desire me. I should be very sorry if those that I have written to you were to be stolen. Scoundrels have already pretended that several of my despatches were delivered to them in Paris. After this they fabricated some to render me very odious to the coalesced cabinets, which, without ever having it in their power to attack me, did all they could to discredit me and even to expel me, first from Tuscany, where I brought about a peace with the grand-duke in spite of them, afterwards from Genoa and from Rome.

I am aware that intriguers are crossing me in Paris in the just promotion that I have deserved, saying for example, that I am not likely to be of any service at the court of Naples, because M. Acton owes me a grudge, knowing that none besides myself could furnish such accurate information as they possessed in Paris, of all that concerned the Two Sicilies. What are we come to, general, if the quality of being agreeable to a court can obtain a preference to services rendered to the Republic, and if it is believed that the State is better served by a clever intriguer than by a firm and intelligent negotiator?

I know that the answer of the Directory on the subject of the refusal of M. Galeppi to sign the treaty of Florence is arrived; but I have received no letter from the commissioners of the government. I know not how this answer will be communicated. I have done, according to your hints, all that was possible. If I had further information, I would continue to act in consequence; but the decision of the affair is in other hands. I am planted here like an *hors d'œuvre* since the suspension of the armistice.

The agent of England here says it is not true that his nation is abandoning all Corsica and the Mediterranean, and that the declaration of war by Spain against England is not so definitive and formal as we wish to make it be believed. M. Micheron, resident of Naples at Venice, is despatching

couriers to his court, who leave at Rome accounts of victories of the Austrians in the Tyrol, and brilliant sorties of the garrison of Mantua.

M. del Vasto is urgent for the repair of the roads for the passage of the Neapolitan army, and for the making of arrangements relative to provisions. The Neapolitan commissaries are expected, the one at Rome, the other at Ancona, to concert and fix the routes and the stations. The officers of Naples who are to come and teach the pope's officers their trade, are expected and never arrive like the Neapolitan army, which does not cross the frontier.

The aged pope has his head crammed with all these errors, and his valets foster and propagate them : the sensible man conceals himself and says not a word. Those of the persons interested in the preservation of this government, who have still retained any reason, have been struck by the perusal of the proposed treaty, and by the idea that the Directory has resolved to destroy or to bring about the destruction of the sacerdotal government of the Ecclesiastical State. " We shall perish," they cry, " that is certain ; we can die but once ; we will not fall without making some defence." I cannot go and preach in the public places and the drawing-rooms that a false principle as to what concerns us is misleading people ; that they will ruin themselves for want of knowing with whom they have to do.

I learn, on the other hand, from a good source that peace with the King of Sardinia was signed in Paris on the 9th, and I have received a letter from the minister of foreign affairs of the 17th, which makes no mention of it ; of course I cannot announce it to cardinal Busca.

The evacuation of Corsica and the Mediterranean by the English ; the operations of the Toulon squadron and the troops for landing ; which, you have the kindness to tell me, are ready to sail ; the capture of Mantua, which, I am also told, must surrender in a week ; and, above all, the peace with Naples, must soon reduce the pope and his councillors to despair. But is it possible for these aged bewigged heads to rid themselves of their infatuation, and to escape from the precipice by throwing themselves into my arms !

I have no authority : nothing has been entrusted to me but the execution of the armistice. Here is a treaty concluded and published, which they absolutely reject and look upon as impossible to be executed : it is very difficult to

make another that shall satisfy the Directory and be admitted here : so many points require discussion ! I know not whether fear will induce the preliminary fulfilment of the conditions of the armistice ; I know not whether a general thaw will take place, when the old pope, melting into tears, and all the cardinals thunderstruck, will throw themselves into our arms, because they can do no other, or whether fanaticism will persist in staking all that it has left.

You, general, have pursued an excellent plan, which was not expedient till after assured conquest, and after having delivered all the populations from the fear of the Austrians—that of at length decidedly revolutionizing and of forming Italian legions. You are master of the countries inhabited by the best races of men in Italy : we can make good republicans of them, and thus form a mass of power united to us in heart, strong enough to keep the kings of Naples and Sardinia within their limits. In this manner, Ravenna, the Romagna, and all that is between the chain of the Apennines and the Adriatic, as far as the frontier of Naples, must be revolutionized ; leaving Rome and the whole of the ecclesiastical territory on the other side of the Apennines to the Mediterranean to prepare itself by the surrounding spectacle for the revolution which will finally take place there. The colossus of Rome is less difficult to destroy than is imagined, by going coolly about it and taking from the priests nothing but the temporal government, as foreign and even contrary to the spirit of religion.

If peace with the King of Naples is signed, the whole Ecclesiastical State is in your power ; it is conquered beforehand, and entirely at your disposal.

If the court of Naples knows, as I have been assured for a fortnight past, that its peace is signed in Paris, it is mystifying the court of Rome in an abominable manner. The Duke Lante is arrived from Naples, and tells everybody that the queen has positively asserted that Naples would never make peace but conjointly with the pope. M. del Vasto, grand-master of the king's household, though a poor man, is a personage of the highest distinction. The chief clerk in the office for foreign affairs has been given him for secretary : all the Neapolitan trumpets are sounded to excite the Ecclesiastical State to war. Never was treachery more impudently framed and kept up.

CACAULT.

*To Citizen Cacault.*

Verona, 7 Brumaire, year 5 [October 28, 1796].

You will find herewith a paragraph which I have this moment received from the Directory. I beg you in consequence to commence overtures with the cardinal secretary of state, or to make use of Cardinal Mattei, who will be able to speak directly with the pope. The moment the court of Rome shall decide to open a new negociation with us, let me know it, and you can come with the minister whom it may appoint to a place that I shall specify—as Cremona, for example.

You may therefore signify to the pope that the answer from Paris has reached me; that, in consequence of the sentiments of moderation adopted by the French government, it has directed me to settle every kind of difference with Rome, either by arms or by a new negociation. Wishing to give the pope a mark of the desire I have to see this long war terminated, and an end put to the calamities which afflict human nature, I offer in an honourable manner still to save his honour and the head of religion. You may assure him verbally that I have always been against the treaty that has been proposed to him, and especially to the manner of negociating; that it is in consequence of my particular and repeated applications that the Directory has charged me to open the way to a new negociation. I am more ambitious to be the saviour of the Holy See than to be its destroyer. You know yourself that we have always held similar principles, and, in consequence of the unlimited latitude granted to me by the Directory, if they will be discreet at Rome, we will avail ourselves of it to give peace to this beautiful part of the world, and to tranquillize the timorous consciences of a great many people.

I expect your answer by the return of the courier.

Nothing new from the armies. The army of the Sambre and Meuse is advancing upon the Mayn, and the army of the Rhine has relieved Kehl and is absolutely out of all danger.

BONAPARTE.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 8 Brumaire, year 5 [October 29, 1796].

It is talked of everywhere at Rome, general, that you have paid a visit to Cardinal Mattei at Ferrara, and that you said to him you could not comprehend why Rome would not make peace with France; that you requested him to come to Rome to speak with the pope on the subject; that the cardinal begged you to express this desire in writing, and that you complied.

Cardinal Mattei has seen the pope; he has conferred with the cardinal secretary of state in the presence of M. del Vasto.

According to the etiquette of Rome, a cardinal does not pay a first visit to any one, not even to ambassadors; but, if he has come to Rome to be employed in the business of pacification, he ought to call upon me, and to be the first to express his desire, which would be easy, without derogating from the supreme etiquette. It is not for me to seek any one in the present state of things. According to the intentions which you have signified to me, I ought to keep up the hope of an accommodation and avoid everything that might subject me to the necessity of leaving Rome. I have followed and shall follow this direction, availing myself of all occasions to remove the bandage with which the eyes of the pope are covered; but it is still so evident that people are bent on straying out of the right road, that it seems to me they will rather suffer themselves to be duped anew by the offers of mediation which Naples will not fail to make, and by what the most ardent intriguers will propose, and by those who intrude themselves into negotiations to make a profit by them, rather than return frankly to M. Azara and myself, who have both upright and pure intentions.

You will find herewith a copy of a note, which I wrote yesterday to the cardinal secretary of state, sending him at the same time a copy of the letters announcing the peace with Naples and the military advantages in Germany, with the answer of that cardinal: the very high tone that has been taken is not lowered in any respect.

I beg you, general, to observe, in the map of the Ecclesiastical State, how the nature of the country favours the subdivision of that State into three Republics: that of



Bologna and Ferrara united, that of Perugia with the Romagna, and that of Rome to the Mediterranean. This may take place, and yet the pope, the head of the universal Church, be suffered to reside, as priest with his court of priests, and as pontiff, where he pleases, in the same manner as if he resided at Rome, before any donation of the French had rendered him sovereign of a territory.

The establishment of liberty and of good republics, from Milan to the kingdom of Naples, is doubtless what would best ensure our interests in Italy, and keep within bounds the King of Naples on the one hand, and mighty Germany on the other.

According to the mortuary registers of the hospital of the Consolation in Rome, to which all wounded persons are carried, there have been sent to that hospital 75,000 persons assassinated in various ways in Rome and its environs, during the reign of the present pope: <sup>1</sup> the same is the case in the kingdom of Naples and in the whole Ecclesiastical State. From this alone judge of the rest of the government, and how much the people must be attached to it! Superstition alone, and some dread of the sbirri, keep up an appearance of order among these vicious populations, so easy to be enslaved.

I am of opinion that we ought not to think this winter of doing more than uniting the legation of Ravenna with those of Bologna and Ferrara, and forming a new State of the Perrugino, Urbino, and the Romagna, leaving aside the city of Rome and its whole impested territory to the Mediterranean, which we should command by sea.

I wish that the state of our affairs may yet permit you to execute this enterprise, and that we may be able to uphold it. You are too prudent to set about anything that we should be obliged to abandon afterwards. I learn with pleasure that the business of Genoa is nearly settled, in the way that I always wished and proposed. It is good policy to secure in our favour the people of Upper Italy, who are infinitely superior to those of the lower part of the peninsula.

At Naples all are groaning and bending under an uneasy

<sup>1</sup> Pius VI. ascended the papal throne in 1775; in 1796, he had of course been seated upon it twenty-one years, so that the annual average number of murders or attempts at murder, in the city of Rome and its environs only, must have exceeded 3500.

terrorism : the foreign ministers themselves are held in such bondage that they cannot write or receive a letter which is not unsealed ; they dare not send for and lend to read in their own houses, not only our newspapers and those of the conquered countries, but not even that of Florence.

M. del Vasto asserts here that it is not possible that the peace of Naples can be signed in Paris : he has sent off a courier to his court to inquire into the truth of the matter. The development of this whole affair is extremely comic ; but in this country lies the current coin ; never do they utter a word of truth ; all is imposture and error, and the upright mind, obliged to listen to so much insidious and lying language, becomes disgusted and wearied, and cannot keep in the line of truth without continual fatigue.

At the moment when my letter is going off, I learn, in a very sure manner, that the agents of Naples assert here that they have, by the return of their courier, the certain assurance that his Sicilian majesty has no intelligence that his peace is signed in Paris, and that Faypoult's letter, published everywhere, which announces it, and the account of it given from Florence by Miot and Azara, are forgeries. I can make nothing of this *imbroglio*.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 10 Brumaire, year 5 [October 31, 1796].

I am very sensible, general, to the confidence which you have been pleased to testify for me, in your letter dated the 4th Brumaire last. Permit me to beg you to read mine, which accompanies this, to the minister Lacroix, which I send you with a flying seal, that you may forward it to him. You will find there an exposition of my ideas on our present situation in regard to Rome. I see no likelihood nor even an appearance of any negociation, and still less of any disposition to revert to the execution of the conditions of the armistice, unless there were a treaty ready made which chimed in with the notions of the pope. There is no doubt that it would be very easy to have peace on the conditions expressed in the armistice ; but they will no longer give themselves up to your discretion, after despoiling themselves of 21,000,000 francs. The treaty which the Directory has sent, independently of what relates to religion and

the articles that are humiliating only, clashes so violently with the spirit of the Roman government, that it would think itself degraded as well as ruined in signing it. Several things, in fact, are difficult of execution and embarrassing.

I think that there cannot be any negotiation unless in the spirit of my last conversation with the cardinal secretary of state, of which I have given you an account; it is in that same spirit that I shall speak, if they should come at last to call upon me.

I shall continue to report to you with the same regularity and attention as I have hitherto done, and I shall punctually follow your directions.

You will observe in the bulletin of Rome herewith sent, that at Ancona they have already stood upon the defensive against a vessel which was erroneously believed to be a French frigate.

You are informed of the orders given by the pope to the people and the troops, to stand upon their defence wherever there is any appearance of aggression: so that if to-day, on the faith of the armistice and the pope's order with which you are provided, you were to send a detachment to occupy the citadel of Ancona, it would be attacked in Romagna on its route, and it would not be admitted into Ancona, where a very bad spirit prevails.

The pope has suspended the fulfilment of all the conditions of the armistice which could be burdensome to him; he has not sent me away, but I enjoy here little more than the faculty of breathing the air of Rome; he has not declared the armistice broken, but he has refused everything. He has but one step more to take—to commence hostilities: this is what Cardinal Maury and all those to whom the manifesto of his Holiness has given the signal for sermons against us are doing. You are regarded in this suspicious country as certainly meditating an enterprise against the Ecclesiastical State, and people are everywhere busily engaged in preparing obstacles, though, according to the armistice, you were to find none but facilities.

This treaty, rashly broken by the court of Rome, is an evident grievance to you, in consequence of which you have a right to recommence hostilities, and to act according to all the laws of war; but the mistrust natural to priests, and the agitation and fear felt on our account, are so exaggerated

that, so far from relaxing in anything, they will imagine a great deal more than you ever thought of undertaking. The pope has at most about 8000 troops dispersed in the Ecclesiastical State, very badly armed: these recruits are contemptible; he cannot assemble a military force. You know what the false and fanatical ideas instilled into the people are to be valued at; the forces with which you will act, when that shall be necessary, will be proportioned to such obstacles; but be sure that, at the slightest spark or appearance of hostility on your part, the whole Ecclesiastical State will be in a blaze. They will run to arms wherever there is no enemy to fight, and run away before our battalions: your means can consist only in their military force.

I have perfectly understood your letter in cipher; be assured that I shall conform to your wishes and your intentions.

The congregation of State, which meets once a week, has summoned Cardinal Mattei and M. Galeppi, which leads to the conjecture that it will be engaged with the affairs of France, on occasion of the treaty of Naples signed by Prince Belmonte.

M. del Vasto, who seems to know nothing about the treaty signed at Paris, and of what is reported concerning the court of Naples being determined not to ratify the peace without obtaining that of Rome, is probably equally false and silly: however, I shall always repeat that one ought to have a great distrust of Naples.

CACAULT.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Bastia, 10 Brumaire, year 5 [October 26, 1796].

I lose no time in giving you an account of my arrival at Bastia. We sailed from Leghorn road on the 7th of this month, at eight in the evening, and arrived without accident at Bastia, at nine the next morning in a strong gale. Half an hour after we had entered the harbour, a terrible storm came on, and obliged two tartans, which were just gaining the road, to stand out to sea, and we have not seen them since. It is hoped that they have not met with any mishap, but have run into Porto Vecchio. The chief of brigade Ristori, and the chiefs of battalion Arrighi and

Salicetti, with about two hundred military men and refugees, are on board them.

I found the city and the interior of the island extremely quiet. Provisional committees established everywhere preserve the public tranquillity, and up to this moment there has been no reaction. Be assured that I shall neglect nothing to keep the country in a satisfactory state.

I am engaged in the execution of the different instructions which you have given me. I am sending the divisionary General Casabianca to command provisionally at Ajaccio ; he will there raise national guards and moveable columns, according to your instructions. I am proceeding with the nomination of officers, and I take care to select them from among the most noted patriots and such as have the good opinion of the republicans. I shall send General Casalta to Corte, to perform the like service there, and I shall stay at Bastia to organize the public force hereabout myself. I shall take care to transmit to you a list of all the appointments that shall be made, and of the definitive organization of the national guards of the towns and of the moveable columns.

You will find herewith the report of the commissary of war respecting whatever provisions have been found in the environs of Bastia. The service of the artillery was not yet organized on my arrival : I have entrusted the command of it to an officer given me by General Serrurier, with forty naval gunners.

I have found at Bastia nearly one hundred naval gunners released by the English, who had taken them in a frigate ; I shall send forty to Ajaccio with an officer, twenty to Bonifaccio, twenty to Calvi, and twenty to St. Florent : there will be subalterns at their head. This step was indispensable for getting all the artillery which the enemy had spiked before his departure unspiked and remounted in battery. I shall keep these naval gunners till the arrival of the troops of that arm which you destine for Corsica.

I transmit to you several official letters taken on board an English ship : they contain very important details, particularly respecting the distress of their naval forces, the bad state of their ships, and the want of provisions. They are in infinite dread of the Spanish squadron, which must by this time have joined ours. It would be most fortunate if they could but get out and go to meet them : the superiority of our force and the fears of the enemy would ensure

us the victory, and those gentry would not escape unscathed out of the Mediterranean.

These letters also make mention of a plan of an expedition for Barbadoes, in the West Indies; the troops are to be embarked at Trieste. These particulars will be valuable for our combined squadrons and for the government.

I have this moment received a letter from the commandant of St. Florent, informing me that the English squadron anchored in the gulf consists of fourteen ships of the line, six of them three-deckers and eight seventy-fours, with three frigates and eighteen transports.

The English have blown up the Lamortella tower and are keeping troops on shore. I shall march against them to-morrow with 600 men, and you may reckon upon my driving them entirely out of Corsica. It appears that they had found means to get away some provisions from the island.

I await with impatience the arrival of the commissioners of the government, for organizing all the civil authorities according to the constitutional plan. I hope that all will pass off quietly, and that the public tranquillity will not be disturbed.

I have not received any report of the evacuation of Ajaccio or of Bonifaccio: that of Calvi took place five days ago. All the guns are spiked; all the carriages sawed in pieces: but all will be put to rights.

GENTILI.

---

*To H. R. H. the Duke of Parma and Placentia.*

Verona, 11 Brumaire, year 5 [November 1, 1796].

I have received your Royal Highness's letter of the 24th of October, and have lost no time in complying with your desire. The intention of the French government is to do all that can be agreeable to your Royal Highness. You will find me, in all circumstances, ready to furnish you with the succours and forces which you have need of.

If *employés* of the army misconduct themselves, I beg your Royal Highness to cause them to be apprehended; when they are in your dominions, they ought to behave there with the decency and respect due to the authority of the prince. If your Royal Highness will be pleased to let me know of any failures in either, I will have them severely punished.

The good understanding which prevails between the two States, and the good conduct which your Royal Highness has held under all circumstances, ought to ensure to you the friendship and protection of the French Republic against any who would dare to condemn your authority, and to transgress the laws established in your dominions. I shall always be delighted to find occasions of testifying to your Royal Highness the sentiments of esteem and consideration with which I am, &c.,

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Commandant of Placentia.*

Verona, 11 Brumaire, year 5 [November 1, 1796].

The intention of the French government, citizen, is that not only the neutrality subsisting between the French Republic and the States of Parma be respected, but also that the prince be protected by the French army, whenever he needs it.

You will be pleased to conduct yourself accordingly, and to punish severely any Frenchman who may not observe this line of conduct.

BONAPARTE.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 7 Brumaire, year 5 [October 28, 1796].

We have received, citizen-general, the different despatches which you addressed to us from Modena, on the 26th of Vendemiaire, and the papers which accompanied them. We are aware, as well as you, how advantageous to the cause for which we are fighting is the enthusiasm for liberty in the inhabitants of Bologna, Modena, Reggio, Ferrara, and Milan; we are convinced how serviceable the good-will of the different populations of Italy which are manifesting a desire to shake off the yoke of despotism is likely to prove to the success of our arms; but, ardent as is that which we feel to second their enthusiasm for the Republic, prudence and policy combined command us, at the present moment, to moderate, as much as in us lies, the fire which animates them, and the steps which a first movement might impel them to take. It is true that the valour of the army of Italy and the talents of the chief who directs

it are powerful motives for causing us to believe that Austria will not wrest from our hands the glorious conquests that you have made ; but before the reduction of Mantua, before, above all, fresh successes in Italy and Germany have checked the audacity which our reverses on the Rhine have revived in the court of Vienna, it would be imprudent, as we have observed in one of our preceding despatches, to kindle in Italy too vehement a revolutionary flame, which might in the sequel prove fatal to the people whom we wish to encourage to set themselves free. War is made up of successes and reverses : the present campaign, the details of which, so honourable for us, History will delight to record, is a striking example of this. But, for the unexpected retreat of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, we should have been able to say to Italy, " Be free ! " with the certainty of being obeyed : now, citizen-general, that the lassitude of war is forcibly manifesting itself in the interior of the Republic, that part of the pledge of continental peace has been placed by events in the hands of the enemies of the Republic ; it behoves us to think seriously of that peace, the object of the wishes of all : and perhaps it will never take place without disposing of a portion of the conquests which the army has made in Italy in favour of some of the princes of Germany.

The Directory, nevertheless, will not forget how much it is to its interest to expel, as far as it can, the house of Austria from Italy, and none but the strongest circumstances can induce it to restore to the court of Vienna what the courage of the brave men whom you command has wrung from it ; but those different bases which it may become necessary to adopt, in order to arrive at a continental peace, remind us to think of the future interests of the Italian patriots ; and it would perhaps be compromising them to encourage too much the ardour which they testify. We think that the interests of the Republic require us to keep the people of the Milanese, the Modenese, &c., in sentiments that are favourable to us, without engaging to guarantee their future independence, and, above all, without exposing them, in a manner not less odious than immoral, to become hereafter the victims of their own imprudence or of our counsels.

We have seen with pleasure the organization of different Italian legions, and we hope that their courage against our



common enemies will be worthy of the army that obeys you. We request you to compose these troops, as far as possible, of foreigners, and principally of Polish deserters, from the service of Austria, in order to relieve the people of the country and to render them favourable to us. If you think it advisable that some Polish officers, who might stimulate desertion among the patriots of their country, who are forcibly in the ranks of the Imperialists, should be sent to you, we will order the minister of war to despatch to you those who are in the interior.

We approve the summons which you have sent to General Wurmser, and we hope that it will have the success which its wisdom and the humanity that dictated it seem to promise.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

---

*To General Serrurier.*

Verona, 11 Brumaire, year 5 [November 1, 1796].

I do not admit that the commissioners of the government have a right to make decrees for requiring generals of division. In consequence, I send you back the decree of the commissioners.

When General Gentili, charged with the expedition, applies to you for anything, it will depend on yourself to grant it, if no inconvenience can result from it ; but don't tell me about a decree of the commissioners, which is absolutely valueless for me : and this method is liable to too many abuses for you not to be yourself aware of the consequence of submitting to it. When the commissioners send you a decree, return it, saying that you know of no orders but those of the staff.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Gentili.*

Verona, 11 Brumaire, year 5 [November 1, 1796].

I have received, citizen-general, the letter which you have written to me. I have seen with pleasure that you lose sight of no opportunity to possess yourself of the isle of Elba. I have not yet received intelligence sufficiently precise respecting Corsica ; but, the moment we are masters

of the sea, French frigates will proceed to Ajaccio, and it will not be till they return that I shall send over troops to Corsica. You ought to live in good understanding with the commissioner of the government, without, however, deeming yourself bound to obey all the decrees that he may make for the military service, which is your exclusive province. You ought, above all, not to permit any legislative act, or the slightest deviation from the constitutional laws of the Republic. Corsica must be French in good earnest, and there must no longer be kept up there that petty system of favouritism, which tends to alienate the friends of France. I cannot conceive it to be the intention of the government to grant an amnesty to the four citizens who were base enough to carry the crown to the King of England, and to those who were members of the council of State.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Commissaire Ordonnateur in Chief.*

Verona, 11 Brumaire, year 5 [November 1, 1796].

The senate of Bologna has furnished citizen Arena with 60,000 ells of linen, of the estimated value of three or four hundred thousand livres. As that contractor had no order to furnish shirts, since the few that he delivered to the magazine were defective, improper for the service, and of coarse cloth, you will be pleased to order that contractor to desist from furnishing any supplies, and apprise him that the value of the said cloth shall be charged to him in account for his supplies of shoes. I am assured that there is due to him nearly the amount of the said cloth, especially if the 40,000 pair of shoes which he has at this moment in Milan be included.

I beg you not to lose a moment in coming to Verona with the paymaster, because it is urgent that we should take measures for the service of the army, and the operations which must take place. Though you may be put to inconvenience, your mere presence at Verona will enable you to direct the commissary who supplies your place, and to give unity to the service. I beg you, before you set off, to see citizen Flachet, to inquire if all the silks and other merchandize which were at Milan are sold, and what funds he can furnish for the army.

See also the congress of State and the municipality of Milan, to learn how matters stand with the contributions; call likewise on this subject at the offices of the commissioners of the government, and make them tell you plainly what resources they have for the army; all those fellows think of nothing but thieving. If it should so happen that you cannot possibly come, look out for some person whom you can charge with your operation: send him, to this end, the instructions which he will have need of.

I learn with indignation that citizen Auzou is retiring with the 15 or 16,000 livres which he has belonging to the army: this conduct is that of a swindler.

The service of the artillery carriages, that of victualling, in short, all the services, require that some course should be adopted. Come hither immediately.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 7 Brumaire, year 5 [October 28, 1796].

We have received, citizen-general, your letter of the 20th Vendemiaire, and two others following, with several papers, the receipt of which we shall successively acknowledge.

The minister of the finances has received orders to investigate the cause of the difference subsisting between the accounts rendered by the commissioners of the government and those produced by the paymaster of the army. The general statement which you have sent us of the orders drawn by the *ordonnateur en chef* on the paymaster of the army from the 21st Messidor to the 15th Vendemiaire, has been communicated to the ministers of war and of the finances.

We still persist in the opinion that the system of the requisitions is vicious in itself, and leads to many inconveniences, such as those of enriching dishonest agents, and estranging the people whom it is requisite to attach to the Republic.

We have written to the minister of war to attend to the application which you make relative to the *commissaire ordonnateur* Naudin, and the minister will speedily establish a system of administration which shall remedy the abuses of which you complain.

It would be easy for you to clear the French army of all

the foreigners who have introduced themselves into it, and to whom the Republic would be obliged to grant pensions at the peace, by incorporating them with the legions forming at Bologna and Ferrara and in the Milanese. There is no inconvenience in applying the church plate to the formation of these corps, but we must take care not to give the fanatics occasion to make a handle of that measure.

We have received all the notes that have been communicated to you by citizen Cacault: his alarm must have partly subsided since the treaty between the Republic and the King of Naples: and your political and military combinations will in consequence receive the modifications rendered necessary by this new order of things.

Circumstances will, perhaps, afford you the means of acquiring for the Republic the horses and equipments of the 2,400 Neapolitan cavalry placed under our superintendence in the Brescian. We desire, citizen-general, that you would find, or adroitly make, an occasion that might authorize this measure, which would serve efficaciously to remount the horse troops of the army of Italy.

Continue to watch the Grand-duke of Tuscany, and to repress the clandestine efforts which he is making to injure us. We likewise recommend to you to take care of your health.

The affairs of Genoa being settled, the apprehensions expressed in the letter of the minister Faypoult, which you have sent us, must be completely appeased.

We wish that you would bestow some part of your attention on the sick of the army, so as to be accurately informed of the manner in which they are treated. It is probable that their too great number proceeds, to a certain degree, from the vicious system that exists in the administration of the hospitals.

The 10,000 men of the reinforcement promised you come from the departments of the Interior, and from the army of the Coasts of the Ocean.

General Kellermann has given us notice of the departure of the 40th demi-brigade for Italy; and General Willot has orders to keep no more than 2000 men for the arrondissement of his command: all the rest being destined for you.

It is a very prudent precaution to fortify the places on the banks of the Adige and Adda, as well as the important

posts in that part of the States of the pope occupied by the French troops.

The officers Chasseloup and Lespinasse shall be retained in the command of the engineers and the artillery. The minister of war has orders to send you the generals of division Dugua and Dumas, and the general of brigade Mignote. As General Duvigneau could not accept his appointment to the army of Italy, the Directory will send it other officers of the same rank.

Your observations relative to the recruiting of the cavalry regiments, and all that is necessary for speedily remounting that arm, have been taken into consideration, and the minister of war will do all that lies in his power to comply with your application on that subject.

The chiefs of brigade Goudran and Senilhac shall be removed, as shall also the *chef d'escadron* Gourgonier, and the chief of the 7th regiment of hussars: they shall be succeeded by officers better qualified to answer your views in regard to the activity of the military service.

The account given by the commandant of Leghorn makes us easy respecting the present state of that place.

The Directory approves the plan that you have submitted to it for the formation of the first Italian legion.

We have received several printed papers in the Italian language, which formed part of the despatches to which we have been replying.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 7 Brumaire, year 5 [October 28, 1796].

The Polish patriots, anxious to prepare the means for the regeneration of their country, wish, citizen-general, to range themselves in the glorious phalanxes of the French Republic. The proposal has just been made to us by General Dabrowski [Dombrowski] to take into the pay of the Republic those who might be induced to desert from the imperial troops. As, according to the terms of the constitution, the French government cannot take any foreign troops into its pay, the proposal is impracticable. Nevertheless, as it might not be indifferent to the interest of the Republic to facilitate at this moment the means of desertion to the Poles in the service of Austria, the Direc-

tory requests you to see if it would not be possible to induce the provisional government of the Milanese, of the Modenese, &c., to take them into their pay.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 7 Brumaire, year 5 [October 28, 1796].

One of your despatches of the 26th of Vendemiaire last, citizen-general, gave us reason to believe that five or six million francs might be demanded from the commerce of Leghorn, instead of two which it offers as an indemnity for the English merchandize. We authorize you to demand that sum, if circumstances permit, after concerting with the commissioners of the government with the army of Italy and citizen Miot.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 7 Brumaire, year 5 [October 28, 1796].

The minister of war has just confirmed, citizen-general, the interesting news of the successes of general of brigade Garnier against the Barbets. We request you to write a letter of satisfaction to that general on this occasion.

We shall transmit to the minister for foreign affairs the note which you have sent us respecting the 20,000 muskets belonging to the King of Spain, which necessity has forced you to take. We hope that this measure will have the approbation of the court of Madrid, to which it would be well if M. d'Azara were to write, in order to dispose it favourably.

The reinforcements which we have sent you give us hopes of fresh successes, as well against the Austrian troops in the Tyrol, as against those which are at this moment on the Piave. We recommend to you to attack them separately as soon as possible, particularly those in the Tyrol, above all, before they are joined by the reinforcements which the Austrian armies in Germany might be disposed to send them.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Lavis, 12 Brumaire, year 5 [November 2, 1796].

It was said, general, that we had but few enemies before us: we have perceived the contrary to-day. We have had a very warm affair, and, notwithstanding prodigies of valour, we have not succeeded in what we proposed to ourselves.

General Guieux attacked St. Michael, with the intention of proceeding farther; he was obliged to return three times to the charge before he could carry it. Adjutant-general Jomard's adjunct Jouanne, by dint of intreaties, rallied the grenadiers for the third time; he had an arm broken: his conduct is worthy of the highest praise. We had at least a hundred wounded and several killed at the post.

Adjutant-general Vaux attacked one part of the hill. He had to do with five columns, two of them of about 1500 men; he took from them sixty prisoners, and many were killed; he lost but few men.

Fiorella and I were on his left, going to Cembra: we were stopped by a most formidable position: on our approach, twelve men fell. We gave orders to our advanced guard to turn it: it lost its way. This was no great mischief; it fell in with the columns which Vaux had engaged, and which were coming upon our rear. I witnessed the combat, but knew not the result.

At the same time, the 88th attacked Segonzano: it took thirty prisoners, and killed a prodigious number of men. It fought hand to hand, twice took the castle of Segonzano, which was retaken; but the columns arrived from all sides against it, and it lost 100 killed or wounded and 200 prisoners. In short, the result is that we have taken about 500 prisoners and killed many of the enemy; but this costs us dear.

There were 4000 men more at Cembra and Faver in order of battle, waiting for us. Among the troops with which we were engaged there were no peasants: they were entirely composed of troops of the line.

According to the report of the deserters who have come to us, we were to be attacked to-day: we have anticipated them, and I think that we have done right.

Nature is here the greatest difficulty to be conquered; add to this a strong force. It is impossible to fight with greater courage: Mori and Santo Marco were nothing in comparison with these attacks.

VAUBOIS.

VOL. II.

H

## PART FIFTH.

FROM THE RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM THE TYROL TO  
THE BATTLE OF RIVOLI.*To the Commissioner of the Government.*

Verona, 13 Brumaire, year 5 [November 3, 1796].

We are in the greatest want of money : all our chests are empty, and all our services fettered : the soldiers pay even is not regularly supplied. Your clerks, citizen-commissioner, make out very fine statements, which never agree with the paymaster's, and for the last three months that we have been endeavouring to reconcile your accounts, we have not been able to discover how a difference of three or four millions which exists has been applied.

For these two months, the *ordonnateur* has received no more than two millions : everything suffers and we are in presence of the enemy. You told me that you would have the 20,000 livres transmitted from Modena to Milan, and only half that sum has been sent. Of the 300,000 livres which were to be paid at Ferrara, only half has been paid. As for Leghorn, instead of furnishing us with money, we are offered 5 or 600,000 livres, entered without any legal form. Flachat and Co., who have all the resources of the army, who have all the funds, who supply all the services with promises, have alone the means of providing for the urgent wants of the moment. Make them pay 1,500,000 livres into the chest of the paymaster of the army. You ought to supply our wants, and for these two months the *ordonnateur* has been crying that all the services have been in want.

I beg you then, citizen-commissioner, to consider that the whole army is in motion, that we are in presence of the enemy, that the least delay may be disastrous ; exert yourself, therefore, to cause the *ordonnateur* to be supplied with the money that is necessary : we are here on the eve of the



most important events. If the 83rd demi-brigade, now the 75th, had left Marseilles, according to the order which I gave, we should have nothing to fear ; but 3000 good troops the fewer, under such circumstances as these, are a terrible misfortune for us. The 40th even comes very late : it appears that the first battalion at most will arrive in time ; however, as we have some battalions on the way, I beg you to despatch a courier to General Kellermann, to require and beseech him to march off all that there is disposable. All the troops of the empire have arrived by post with extraordinary celerity : they appear to be really determined to make great sacrifices, and we, we are left to ourselves : fine promises and some petty corps of troops are all that has been given us.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Baraguay d'Hilliers.*

Verona, Brumaire 13, year 5 [November 3, 1796].

We are in presence of the enemy, who has passed the Piave. You are aware what need we have of troops ; hasten, therefore, the march of all the depots and of all the battalions coming to us, it being thoroughly understood that you are to take measures that the muskets which are at Cremona be divided between the depots of Lodi and Cassano, and that all the soldiers coming to us be armed. You will direct the depots of Augereau's and Massena's divisions upon Verona, where they will take fresh orders from the staff ; the depots of Mantua as usual, and the depots of General Vaubois' division to Peschiera, where they will receive fresh orders. Send us speedily the eighty men of the 5th regiment of dragoons, whom you have kept at Milan ; send off the first battalion of the Lombard legion for Verona. You do not now write often enough to us. We are not accurately informed of what is occurring at Milan : you must keep up a regular correspondence with the general commanding at Tortona, to be informed of the day on which the different battalions leave Tortona, the days on which they arrive in Milan, and to announce it immediately.

The enemy appears to be in force : it is necessary to have at once activity and vigilance, and to second to your utmost the operations of the army, especially the provision-

H 2

ing of the artillery. Keep an eye on whatever may pass towards Bergamo and in the valleys of Trompir and Dider; though it is at a distance from you, yet it interests you too much that you should not be informed before any of the others of whatever may happen in that quarter deserving of your attention.

The army is totally destitute of funds: the pay itself is in danger. I beg you to deliver the accompanying letter to the commissioner of the government, if he is there, or to citizen Flachet. See also the congress of State and the municipality of Milan, that all that is due may be speedily paid.

If we form stores of provisions, I shall perhaps send them to the other side of the Po, to remove them into another country. I hope that the second cohort of the Lombard legion will be speedily organized, which will furnish you with means of escort.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Chief of the Staff.*

Verona, 14 Brumaire, year 5 [November 4, 1796].

General Massena evacuated Bassano at five o'clock this morning, the enemy being in force at Castel Franco. The 75th must have arrived by this time at Vicenza. General Augereau is already at Montebello; besides the hussars of the first regiment, that general will have the 20th dragoons, 350 strong. I have given to General Meynier the command of Verona, to General Kilmaine the command from the fort of Chiusa to Rovigo, as well as that of Mantua; he will reside at Verona. Picot, who left Padua at midnight, and has been as far as the enemy's posts, assures me that they do not amount at most to above 8 or 9000 men. None of their patrols have yet appeared at Padua. Arrange thoroughly with General Vaubois for him duly to execute the dispositions of the plan. I hope that this time we shall be able to settle his business at a single blow. If this letter finds you on the road, communicate it to General Vaubois, and beg him for God's sake not to spare couriers. This adjunct may go on to General Vaubois, and send me back Louis. I shall not be sorry if citizen Junot remains till to-morrow. If it be agreed that the attack shall be

to-morrow, contrive to let me have intelligence three times in the course of the day.

In passing the Chiuza, take a rapid glance, and make sure that there is no want of provisions there : ascertain too the state of the bridge and what sort of guard is kept there, that is to say as far as the darkness will permit.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Chief of the Staff.*

Head-quarters, Vicenza, 15 Brumaire, year 5 [November 5, 1796].

We have arrived with Augereau's division at Vicenza : Massena's was eight miles off, where it halted when it heard of our coming. The enemy yesterday evening entered Bassano, where it is said there are but 2 or 3000 men. The rest of his troops, estimated as high as 7 or 8000, are at Citadella : a light corps has even passed the Brenta at Ospidaletta da Brenta. Massena is going to drive them out.

Hasten by all possible means the arrival of the five pontoons : it was necessary to forward them by post : you ought to have met them between Villa Nova and Montebello.

If these pontoons arrive, I will pass the Brenta to-night ; I have had thirty-six horses got ready here to take them to the spot where I shall want them. I ordered a like number to be kept ready at Montebello. Thus far, everything here is going on smoothly. If we have our pontoons to-night, the battle to-morrow will be decisive. Massena has lost nothing but a single man who has had a thigh broken, and whom he has placed in the hospital of Bassano. I imagine that the battalion of grenadiers will arrive to-day at Vicenza. I await you with impatience. I have no intelligence from General Lespinasse, General Dommartin, or any officer of the engineers.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Bassano, 13 Brumaire, year 5 [November 3, 1796].

The troops under my command have been all night under arms. Yesterday evening I sent General Leclerc to Castel-Franco with a few horse, for the purpose of pushing this

morning a reconnaissance very far forward upon Treviso : he met with the enemy on entering Castel-Franco, charged him three times, and took from him one man ; he turned back and arrived at Bassano at ten at night. According to his report and the information which he was able to obtain from the inhabitants of Castel-Franco, there was reason to fear that it was not the advanced guard of the troops which have passed the Piave, and this induced me to make immediate dispositions for preparing to fall back upon Vicenza. The cavalry patrols sent out upon all the roads will give me notice for executing my retrograde movement. An order was given to two pieces of artillery, which I had at Carpenetto, to fall back upon Bassano ; they will not return thither till there is a change in my position. What gives me some uneasiness is that, yesterday evening, before I knew of the passage of the Piave by the enemy, citizens Fernet and Duclos were out reconnoitring : they have not yet returned.

I repeat, general, that my position is not cheering : I am on the *qui vive*, night and day ; if I had at least force sufficient to stop the enemy for some time, I should be less uneasy. The arrival of the 75th at Montebello makes no change in my position, since your intention is that I should let it rest there and not dispose of it unless at the last extremity. We are at a great distance from Montebello, and the succour comes, I fear, too late.

I have sent this morning two spies to Treviso. One of them is to keep his fixed post there, and not to leave it till he is certain that the enemy is marching upon us. The enemy has pushed infantry posts quite close to Castel-Franco ; I think his design must soon be known—that is to say, that he will attack us shortly.

If you insist so strongly on my remaining at Bassano, general, why not reinforce me ? I should then be able to keep that position, which appears a very important one ; but to remain there in observation is, in my opinion, extremely hazardous.

Your letter of to-day does not say whether I am to receive definitively the two brigades of General Vaubois. To-morrow, 400 men will leave Carpenetto, to make a movement upon Borgo. I dare not order them to go far, for, if I were obliged to fall back during their absence, those troops would be in great danger.

My cavalry is running about night and day: it is only by means of it that I can have timely warning so as to be able to pass the Brenta without danger.

I shall give orders, the day after to-morrow, to the 75th demi-brigade, to leave Montebello and to proceed to Vicenza, unless you order otherwise.

Adjutant-general Fernet has this moment arrived from his reconnoissance: he has been pursued by the enemy's cavalry, and reports that the enemy, as he was assured, is marching in two columns, one upon Assolo, the other upon Castel-Franco; this latter column has cannon with it. If this report is verified, I shall probably make my retreat in the night; you shall be apprised of it: meanwhile, I shall take all the measures that my position requires in order not to be surprised.

The reconnoissance upon Borgo is suspended.

MASSENA.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Lavis, 13 Brumaire, year 5 [November 3, 1796].

Yesterday's fight did not turn out as we wished, in spite of all our efforts.

On the morning of the 11th, two deserters from our posts of Navi and Penet informed the enemy of our movements, and we found him well prepared and particularly well posted. On the morning of the 12th, General Guyeux, at the head of 1,500 men, a squadron of the 22nd chasseurs, and the artillery of the division, was to march from Navi, to take St. Michael, to burn the bridges there, and to manage to pursue as far as Neumareck. General Fiorella, commanding the centre column, about 1800 strong, was to march from Lacroix upon Cimbra, while adjutant-general Veau with 600 men was to proceed thither along the crest of the mountains, following the left of the column of General Fiorella, between that general and General Guyeux. At the same moment, the 85th demi-brigade, commanded by the chief of brigade Gaspard, was to start from Penet, to possess itself of the village and castle of Segonzano and to pass the Lavis.

On the 12th, at three in the morning, these columns marched each their own way. General Guyeux met with a vigorous resistance at St. Michael; all the houses were

embattled and full of troops, and the entry of the village barred by an entrenchment.

Thrice did our troops beat the charge, and thrice were they repulsed with incredible animosity: at length Adjunct Jouanne put himself at the head of the troops, returned to the charge, overthrew the obstacles, and penetrated into the village: at the same instant he was himself wounded by a musket-shot; but the village was carried in spite of the fire from the houses, which was extremely brisk.

The advanced guard of General Fiorella, commanded by the chief of brigade Marchi, found the enemy about four miles from Cimbra, attacked and pursued them to some distance from that place, opposite to a very steep hill: there the enemy defended themselves with courage, pouring down upon us a shower of stones. Citizen Marchi, with a few carabineers of the 25th, as tirailleurs, had the boldness, in spite of the enemy's fire, to climb the hill, and, on reaching the top, to seize one of the horses of the Austrian officers.

When General Vaubois, who was with General Fiorella, did not hear the column of Adjutant-General Veau coming up, he conjectured that the enemy was in force, and that he had met with a strong resistance: he ordered eight companies, commanded by the chief of brigade Marchi, to pass to the left: these two united corps marched upon the enemy, who, divided into five columns, was proceeding towards Lavis to cut us off: a moment afterwards, Adjutant-General Veau came alone to General Vaubois, and informed him that the enemy was very strong; that these five columns formed a total of 6000 men, who were marching towards Lavis: at the same instant, the fire of the 85th demi-brigade on our right was observed to cease, which decided General Vaubois to order the troops to return to their positions. On their way back, these troops, bearing a little to the left, joined the eight companies at the point where Adjutant-General Veau was, a superb plain on the crest of the mountains: there the enemy was beaten the whole day, and at night pursued to a great distance. The 85th attacked Segonzano, passed through the village without stopping, and proceeded towards the castle, defended by 1200 men: the troops in the houses suffered it to pass, and, when it had cleared the village, they assembled: the demi-brigade, taken between two fires, that of the castle and that of the village, both very brisk, could not withstand them, and retired to its first

positions at Penet. In all these affairs, the enemy lost 1200 men and about 500 prisoners. We have in all 400 men *hors de combat*.

General Guyeux, before leaving St. Michael and returning to Navi, burned the two bridges which the enemy had over the Adige. The two deserters that we had left us in a rage on account of their bare and bleeding feet. It appears certain that we were to be attacked. Generals Loudon and Dabowick came in the evening to St. Michael to concert together.

LOUIS BONAPARTE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Lavis, 13 Brumaire, year 5 [November 3, 1796].

It appears that the enemy is very strong; he is incessantly in motion: his troops fight as they never did before; it is not mere bravery—it is a rancour, a fury, that borders on despair. General Vaubois is not satisfied with citizen Castangés; his spies come up to our advanced posts and report all that they are told by the peasants; he frequently sends them out with patrols of horse chasseurs; he does less than nothing: sometimes he comes hither and wants to interfere with the army.

According to what I am told, the operation is finished. Let me have your orders. Am I to remain here or to rejoin you?

General Vaubois is informed that the enemy is in great force towards Penet; that he can turn us and proceed to Trent by our right; he intended to change position and to move on this side of the Lavis to make head at Segonzano and Penet; he is very uneasy about that quarter, and he begs me to send off a man to you by post that you may give him speedy orders; he is fearful that he shall not be in time if you delay answering him.

The troops are without shoes, without coats—in short, they are naked, and are beginning to be daunted: they looked yesterday with respect at the fine appearance of the Austrians in order of battle; they are in the snow: their state ought to be taken into most serious consideration. With what consequences would not our defeat be attended! The officers in general are worn out: there were some who, amidst the fire, talked only of retiring to their homes.

At this moment, patrols are seen coming towards our advanced posts ; however, I dare say that it will be nothing : it is possible that they merely wish to retake their positions.

It is said that the enemy has two very strong divisions composed of peasants and troops of the line ; that Loudon's amounts to between twenty and thirty thousand men, five of the line, and that of Dabowick [Davidowich] to 15,000, the greater part of the line. The fact is, that yesterday they had greater forces.

L. BONAPARTE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Lavis, 3 Brumaire, year 5 [November 3, 1796].

I informed you yesterday of what had occurred in the action, in the first instance, before I could collect the details. The real result is, that the column of St. Michael, which met with a vigorous resistance, has lost a great many men, who cannot be estimated at fewer than 300 ; they have certainly wounded as many, and taken about 300 prisoners. We had there about 100 wounded, and about fifteen killed.

Adjutant-General Veau has taken about sixty prisoners ; with 500 men he maintained a fight of three hours, within pistol-shot, with a force eight times as strong. He killed a great number of the enemy.

Part of the advanced guard of our column, commanded by Marchi, fought admirably, but it was abandoned by the larger portion at two different times. It was the 27th and the companies of grenadiers of Graveline and the Ain that abandoned it : the few that were left it fought with sword and bayonet, repulsed the enemy, and would have taken many prisoners, had they not been so abandoned. Unfortunately, in these mountains, one cannot see what is passing, and it is not till some time afterwards that one hears of events : the orderlies lose their way, or enter the villages to plunder ; and I am persuaded that we had not fewer than 600 men engaged in these horrors.

The attack on Segonzano was not properly made, owing to a misinterpretation of my order ; but the combat was most obstinate : the enemy sustained prodigious loss in killed and wounded ; our men fought hand to hand with the



considerable forces that were continually augmented. In this affair we took but 30 prisoners; we had 25 killed, 73 wounded, and 150 prisoners. The fault of the commandant Gaspard, a man of unparalleled bravery, was, that he did not keep in check a corps which he saw during his attack. As I had told him to employ his whole force in his operation, he did not consider that it is one operation facilitating another to keep the enemy in check upon a point on which one sees him, while one acts on the other. Such is the result of the action of yesterday: you may boldly set down the loss of the enemy at 1200 men at least. We have taken precisely 401 prisoners, four only of whom are officers.

I must now tell you what I think of my position. Besides the forces at St. Michael, the mountain of Salorno, and Neumarck, which I may estimate at 4000 troops of the line, many of them Hungarians, who fight bravely, there are at Cimbra the regiment of Waldeck complete, that of Strasoldo, a Tuscan battalion, and some cavalry; which make, according to the reports, 4500 men between Cimbra and Faver. There are also troops in rear at Castello and in the valley of Fiume. There are 2000 men at Segonzano and Bedol; at Pallu, 600; towards Borgo great numbers of infantry and cavalry are collecting. Besides these, Loudon is constantly on the other side of the river with 5000 men: he never stirred yesterday. If one may believe a deserter of the regiment of Schirz [?] whom I have just been questioning, there are also a great many men at Neumarck.

We saw scarcely any peasants yesterday; there were some, nevertheless. In short, I think that the lowest at which we can estimate the enemy before us, both in that part where Loudon commands, and on the other side of the river, and from that river to Borgo by the Fiume, is at least 15,000 troops of the line.

Our position is precarious: the right risks much, and I am assured that Loudon will make a forward movement upon Salo and Brescia; the 1200 men that I have towards the Adige will have difficulty to prevent him. I should think, then, that, if we would cover Trent, we must leave Lavis, break down the bridge, and guard the heights which command it as well as the road.

It would therefore be necessary to place the 25th demi-brigade at Sevignano, the 85th at the Piave, Penet, and on the road from Penet to Pergine; to have a good post above

Sevignano ; to have at Pergine two battalions of the 39th, comprising nearly 900 men, and four companies of grenadiers of the 85th ; at Levico the 29th light infantry, consisting of no more than about 500 men. It is indispensable to guard Levico, on account of a road there which descends to Roveredo. Two battalions of the 27th, which are very weak, would guard the point of Lavis.

The rest of our force would remain in its positions on the other side of the river. I think we should be more compact, stronger, and that our right would be more secure.

VAUBOIS.

---

*To the General of Division Vaubois.*

Lavis, 13 Brumaire, year 5 [November 3, 1796].

I have executed with great labour the order which you gave me. Yesterday morning, at daybreak, I caused an attack to be made on the enemy, who was in superior force : the most obstinate resistance was opposed to us : the post of the mountain of la Corona was not carried till after a very brisk fire of small arms, which was continued for two hours.

I marched upon St. Michael. The enemy, who had reinforced himself in the houses, whence he kept up a steady fire, manifested unparalleled obstinacy : he had made barriers in all the avenues to the village to prevent our entry : these served the purpose for a few moments.

A most violent cannonade and an equally brisk fire of musketry could not dislodge them from the village : the third battalion of the 25th attempted three times to enter, and three times it was repulsed. I immediately ordered the commanding officer of the artillery to direct his fire against the door of the house from which the enemy were firing ; the sappers to cut down the barricades which the enemy had made at the entrance of the village ; and the chief of the third battalion of the 25th to charge along the high road, and to take whatever should be found in the village ; while the chief of battalion Arnaud, at the head of the carabineers and grenadiers, turned the village by the opposite side, in order to make himself master of the bridge over the Adige : this was completely successful. We took 285 prisoners, among them four officers and a surgeon. Thus we were at length masters of St. Michael and of the

avenue to the bridge, after a most obstinate combat of four hours and a half.

I gave orders immediately for breaking down or burning the said bridge; but the enemy, who had been obliged to flee from the other side of the river, where he had a battery, kept firing from within the houses, and prevented the approach to them: my aide-de-camp Ducret, whom I had charged with this operation, ordered a quantity of wood to be placed under the bridge and set on fire. This was done with the greatest celerity; the bridge is burned and incapable of being repaired.

I proceeded beyond St. Michael, with the grenadiers, carabineers, and part of the third battalion of the 25th, to make myself master of the bridge of Mazet also, which is over the Adige. The enemy, after the most obstinate resistance, was repulsed from the other side of the river; it was now half-past five in the evening: I received your order to retreat and resume my old positions, which was executed in the best order in the night.

In this glorious action every one did his duty. The chief of brigade Salva ably directed the fire of his artillery, which contributed greatly to our success. The detachment of the 22nd regiment of horse chasseurs behaved extremely well. I cannot bestow too high praise on citizen Gaguët, chief of the third battalion of the 25th, who entered St. Michael at the head of his troop, overleaping all obstacles, and on chief of battalion Arnaud, who conducted himself with superior intrepidity, and who was wounded in the leg by a musket-ball, in repulsing the enemy from the bridge of Mazet.

The adjunct Jouanne received a ball which went through his arm: this brave officer was wounded on entering the village of St. Michael at the head of his troops. The enemy has lost many men and been completely beaten.

GUYEUX.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Bassano, 14 Brumaire, year 5 [November 4, 1796].

A spy coming from Castel-Franco confirms Adjutant-general Fernet's report of the march of the Austrian troops upon Castel-Franco. This spy has himself seen artillery, a great quantity of infantry and cavalry: he reports, be-

sides, that the remnant of the troops that have passed the Piave is marching also upon Castel-Franco. I am going to give orders in consequence of yours, and of those which you transmitted to me through the chief of the staff, for my retreat to Vicenza, as I am not to risk a battle at Bassano: it is very galling to my self-love to run away from an enemy without fighting him: such are your orders, and they must be obeyed.

The retrograde movement shall take place in the best order: the infantry will begin to file away at three in the morning; I shall form the rear-guard with the cavalry and the grenadiers: on arriving at Vicenza, I shall take military positions as far as the localities permit.

I shall send orders to the 75th to repair to Vicenza as soon as I have arrived there. I have ordered the bridge of Carpetto to be broken down.

MASSENA.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Roveredo, 16 Brumaire, year 5 [November 6, 1796].

Your order, general, arrived too late. I was ignorant of your design and of the importance of directing so great a force towards the Adige. Mori shall be attacked to-morrow morning in front and rear: all the forces of Loudon are in that quarter. The post cannot hold out: if I reinforce it too much, I risk my artillery in that position, and I risk being beaten piecemeal and losing everything. I shall order them, in case of attack, and they find themselves between two fires, to retreat by the bridge. I shall maintain my position with all my force, and there is no retreat left for me but upon Verona or la Corona, if the enemy does not get thither before me, by the right of the Adige; but it is possible that he may be marching thither already. No intimation was given me of the importance of retiring by the other side, and of keeping it with my utmost force; it would have been in time this morning: I would cheerfully have done it, knowing your idea, but I should have been beaten at La Pietra, and driven off at a great rate. On both sides I see dangers; but I hope that courage will help us out of the scrape on this side.

I am left without cartridges and ammunition for artillery,  
VAUBOIS.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Roveredo, 16 Brumaire, year 5 [November 6, 1796].

I wrote to you from the field of battle. I continue my report. The action has been brilliant on my part. We have taken 500 prisoners and killed a great many men; our loss is not considerable. It was past noon when the enemy attacked us: night alone put an end to the conflict. The troops deserve the highest praise. Several persons have distinguished themselves: I shall mention them to you when I have all the details.

But I must report one trait of an officer who is incessantly performing brilliant actions, and whose courage does honour to your country: it is the chief of battalion Marchi. Agreeably to the advice of General Berthier, I had sent him to Vigolo to protect our retreat; after we had passed, I sent to him three men to apprise him to retreat: this order he never received, the bearers of it having probably been taken by the enemy: he was then surrounded by a great number of Austrians; their commandant summoned him to surrender; he refused to do so, dashed through the enemy, and fell upon their rear, while we were fighting. This officer deserves the rank of chief of brigade.

While I am writing, an unpleasant piece of intelligence is brought me. I had strongly reinforced Mori; but Torbole has suffered itself to be surprised; it was attacked on both sides: the post of Nago has fallen back upon Mori; one part has crossed the bridge; I shall send it orders to recross immediately. I am bringing up fresh forces; and, to-morrow morning, Torbole shall be attacked.

VAUBOIS.

---

*To the General of Division Kilmaine.*

Roveredo, 17 Brumaire, year 5 [November 7, 1796].

General Vaubois has already informed you, citizen-general, that Torbole was in the power of the enemy; I lose no time to apprise you that he has likewise made himself master of the heights of Mori: consequently, there is nothing further to prevent him from proceeding to Montebaldo and La-Corona. In this critical circumstance, you will think it essential, I imagine, to send the greatest possible force to Rivoli, to which place the enemy will not fail

to push on. The battalion of the 40th demi-brigade, which is to arrive there to-day, according to the orders that I have despatched to it, cannot be sufficient for its defence; and the second battalion of the same demi-brigade, as it will only arrive to-day at Peschiera, cannot reach Rivoli till very late to-morrow: besides, no military dispositions have yet been made for the defence of those heights; it seems to me extremely advisable to send thither immediately an officer of artillery to place a few pieces of cannon there. If General Joubert is at Verona, he might come over, and in concert with me make all the dispositions necessary to detain the enemy as long as possible, in order to give the general-in-chief time to fall back upon Verona, and to oppose to the enemy in that quarter forces equal to his own. I must observe to you that those which he has hitherto brought to Torbole do not amount to more than 6000 men; but there is every appearance that he will march up more. General Vaubois, who has no longer any hope of retreating upon La Corona, is preparing to send to Rivoli two battalions of the 85th demi-brigade, who will proceed thither along the high road of Trent, crossing the Adige by the bridge on this side of the Chiuza. He will even send a greater number the same way, if he can without danger, before he effects his retreat, which he purposes to make by the Chiuza upon Verona, or even upon Rivoli, if we can occupy it in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from making himself master of it.

I purpose to set out in two hours for Rivoli; I should have gone thither immediately, though I have but just arrived at Roveredo, if there had been troops there; but there are not yet any: the object appears to me extremely urgent, and in consequence I shall beg General Vaubois to hasten the departure of the two battalions of the 85th. Be pleased to address to me at Rivoli any orders that you may think fit to give.

VIGNOLLE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Roveredo, 17 Brumaire, year 5 [November 7, 1796].

The posts of Mori have made no resistance. I have just received an orderly from General Gardanne, who brings me word that two battalions of the 85th took to their

heels when attacked by a very small number of the enemy : they rushed in a crowd to the bridge, and some wretches cut the ropes, while there were still troops at the other end. There were five battalions to defend a single bridge. I dare say that those at Torbole behave no better.

During these provoking doings, we were fighting with the greatest success on our side. I can no longer effect my retreat but upon Verona, perhaps upon Rivoli. I shall send thither immediately two battalions to join those of the 40th : General Vignolle, who goes first, will get them over, if possible.

---

VAUBOIS.

*To General Berthier.*

Vicenza, 18 Brumaire, year 5 [November 8, 1796].

I received your letter at three o'clock this morning. All my division is on march to reach Montebello as soon as possible. Rely upon my zeal and my devotedness to the good of the cause and to the welfare of our troops.

---

AUGEREAU.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Rivoli, 19 Brumaire, year 5 [November 9, 1796].

General Massena reported to you yesterday evening that we have at length extricated ourselves from the critical position into which we were brought by the mere circumstance that General Vaubois was so unacquainted with the importance of the post of La Corona, as to have done everything to deprive himself of the means of retreating thither, whereas, all his efforts ought to have been confined to the conservation of the right bank of the Adige as far as the Lake of Garda. When I arrived at Roveredo, there were still means for recrossing that river and making ourselves masters of La Corona, but he would not employ them, thinking them not sufficiently safe (especially after the rout which General Gardanne had just sustained), though he was then certain that such were your intentions : for he declared that he was unacquainted with them till that moment. The fact is that General Vaubois, though a very brave man and a well informed officer, had not sufficiently considered his position, and was not really aware of the danger incurred by his whole

VOL. II.

I

division, till he saw the debouché of the Val de Cabrino in the basin of Rivoli and the slope of that basin of the river. In his affair of the day before yesterday, he appears to have lost a great many men ; the enemy, on his part, has lost a great number too. The battalion of the 40th demi-brigade, for which I was waiting with great impatience at Rivoli, to send it up to La Corona, did not arrive till yesterday, when I had already repaired to that post with the 4th demi-brigade of light infantry, which I had begged of General Kilmaine. General Joubert, who went up with me, disposed that demi-brigade of light infantry in all the posts that we had formerly occupied. The division having at length arrived, these posts were strengthened with some other troops. General Vaubois is making dispositions for occupying La Corona with all the forces indispensable for its defence, as well as all the points dependent upon it.

The retreat was not harassed by the enemy, and everything indicates that the forces which were opposed to General Vaubois have moved off elsewhere. General Berthier has, no doubt, communicated to you, general, the letters that I have written to him since I left you at Vicenza, and that related to the object with which you charged me.

If we are masters of La Corona, it is because the enemy did not want it ; which is a further indication that he designs to proceed to some other quarter.

VIGNOLLE.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 17 Brumaire, year 5 [November 7, 1796].

By informing us, citizen-general, in your despatches of the 4th Brumaire that the enemy is breaking up in the Friule and that you are in motion, you have fixed more particularly our attention upon Italy. Our reverses in Germany give additional value to the conquests of the army which you command. If a reinforcement of 5000 men present appears to you sufficient to enable you to overthrow the plans of the Austrians, we ought to have, and we have, in fact, an entire confidence in the issue of the operations which are preparing, since the succours that we are sending you amount to 26,000 men, most of whom ought to join you forthwith. Whatever be the deduction that must be made for losses sustained by the troops during the march,



and for the inaccuracy of the statements of situation, there will remain an imposing force and far surpassing your demands.

The security in which we are henceforward in regard to Southern Italy, and the favourable dispositions of the people bordering on the theatre of the war, will be to you new means of strength against the enemy whom you have to fight and to conquer.

The minister of the marine, on his part, is about to second your operations by sea.

A division of ships of the line or of the strongest frigates that it will be possible to equip, and in the shortest time, shall be sent into the Gulf of Venice. The officer destined to command it is well acquainted with those parts and also with Trieste, and he will have orders to concert with you.

A tender also shall be sent with escort to the mouth of the Po, where she shall land the munitions required, and load with the articles that you mention.

A convoy of vessels shall moreover be despatched to the same destination, to load with corn : all these cargoes will be valuable.

If, as we hope, the course of the operations should bring you to Trieste, the conduct which you will have to pursue there will depend on the effect produced at Vienna by the declaration which we commissioned you to make, and we await the account of it which you will give us, to acquaint you with our definitive intentions on the subject.

The course which you have adopted in regard to the cardinal who justly gave umbrage to you at Ferrara has appeared to us to be the fruit of a happy conception.

You know our intentions relative to the political situation of the different States which have given themselves a popular government, and we persist in them.

We have read with satisfaction the details which General Berthier has given in his letter of the 30th Vendemiaire, respecting your military dispositions : their result will be, we have no doubt, the taking of Mantua, the defeat of the new army formed against you, and an eminent title of glory for the brave army of Italy.

BARRAS, President.

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 17 Brumaire, year 5 [November 7, 1796].

The Directory purposes, citizen-general, to direct orders to be given for a few frigates to sail and show themselves off the coast of Corsica. The proposal which you make on that subject appeared to them worthy of being adopted as far as the state of our navy will permit. It is impossible to draw at this moment from the territorial divisions of a South a force of 1200 men which you judge necessary for guarding Corsica; but the reinforcements which we are sending you will enable you, when they have completely effected their junction, to detach from the army troops for that destination.

We have been thinking for a moment of a plan, the execution of which would powerfully favour your operations: it is, to send by sea to Trieste a corps of 7 or 8000 men, which would surprise the rear of the enemy and cut off his communications. The experience of this campaign proves the importance of gaining advantages of this nature over him. It is grievous that we cannot assemble in time the forces which this operation would require; it deserves consideration, however, while reserving it for the moment when it might possibly be executed with success; and we invite you to give us your opinion respecting the advantages that it presents.

BARRAS, President.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Bastia, 18 Brumaire, year 5 [November 8, 1796].

On my arrival at Bastia, I gave you an account of the military and political state in which I had found the department, and of the first dispositions that I had made agreeably to your instructions. To my letter, dated the 10th of this month, I had added a copy of the circular which I had addressed to the committees and municipalities, and also of the important despatches in the English language taken from the enemy.

By another letter of the 14th I acquainted you with the result of my expedition to St. Florent, and, in announcing the total evacuation of the enemy, I gave you such information as I had obtained respecting the position of his naval forces.

Citizen Gallanzini, who arrived yesterday, has intimated that my despatches have not yet arrived at Leghorn, which makes me fear that the enemy may have intercepted them. I have, therefore, resolved to send you duplicates, to make you acquainted with all that has been done since my arrival in Corsica. I hope that you will be satisfied with the state of the country.

The principal chiefs, Pozzo di Borgo, Peraldi, Tortaroti, Bertolani, Negrocie, Ciampietri, and others, had fled with the English before our arrival: several others, who are not less guilty than they, have retired into the interior. I am sending troops in quest of them, and hope that they will be secured. But I cannot conceal one truth from you, general—that the gold and the bribery of the English had gained so decided an empire over the minds of the Corsicans, that a very great number have incurred the guilt of rebellion. There were formed at different times battalions, corps of gendarmerie, free companies; everybody was eager to solicit an appointment: hence the number of officers in the service of the enemy; so that, if all must be punished, the sword of national justice would have to be kept at work for a long time. The amnesty has eased many minds: almost all think that they have a right to it; almost all come to implore the clemency of the Republic; it is for those who have proclaimed the amnesty in the name of the government to make exceptions. After a positive explanation on this subject, it will be known who ought to be punished and who to be pardoned. The French emigrants are all gone.

Corsica is generally tranquil: people are awaiting with impatience the arrival of citizen Salicetti, to accept the constitution and to organize the civil powers. Provisional committees elected by the people every where supersede the Anglo-Corsican authorities, and I have reason to be satisfied with their zeal and their energy; but I am not so well pleased with the district of Vico, the town of Bonifacio, and the district of Isle Rousse.

The communes of the district of Vico, after the departure of the English, rose, armed, and marched against the unfortunate Greeks of the colony of Cargheze, drove them out, and seized their habitations and all their property. Two Greeks were killed.

At Bonifacio, the town, upon pretext of the fear of pillage, refused to admit Captain Barboni, a good officer of gendar-

merie, who arrived in Corsica with citizen Bonelli, and who had hastened up with the national guards of Sartine, to prevent the English from embarking all that they intended to carry away at the moment of the evacuation.

At Calvi, the same refusal was given, but the spirit of the town was different : they held festivities on account of the departure of the English, at the same time that they refused to admit the people of the Balagne, whose spirit of pillage they had a dread of.

I have ordered General Casabianca to march at once with an imposing force, and even with artillery, to Cargheze, to drive the peasants of Vico out of it, to put the Greeks in possession of their properties, reserving to the insurgents a right to enforce their claims by means of regular justice, when the tribunals are opened. As for Bonifacio, I have sent citizen Subriné with a company of national guards and very precise instructions. I hope that he will be admitted. In case of refusal, I order General Casabianca to collect forces, to march against that town, to blockade it by land, and to intimate that it is in a state of rebellion, and shall be blockaded by sea also. I know the spirit of that unhappy district : the mere show of force will reduce it ; but if it were necessary to employ it, I think we ought not to hesitate ; and you may be assured that I shall neglect nothing to carry the point. The rest of Corsica must not be permitted to presume us to be at this moment capable of weakness. It is requisite that it should perceive that the government is as willing to load the repentant and submissive Corsican with generosity and pardon, as to chastise and quell the Corsican persisting in rebellion and revolt. These, if I mistake not, are your principles.

As for Calvi, that town has received for commandant the chief of battalion Savary : a company of national guards has been organized there, and order is completely restored as well as in the Balagne.

I will repeat to you, general, that all the fortresses in Corsica are destitute of provisions and ammunition ; that everything is wanting there ; that they are incapable of making a resistance of any length, if the enemy were to return ; and that it is absolutely necessary to send thither, as speedily as possible, troops, munitions, artillery, and provisions.

GENTILI.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Rome, 21 Brumaire, year 5 [November 11, 1796].

I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of a note which I transmitted yesterday evening to M. the cardinal secretary of state, according to the intention which I announced to you. I await the decision of the pope on this matter.

As soon as Cardinal Albani knew that I proposed to reopen the negociation, he went to the pope, to remind him of all the emperor's promises to interest himself in behalf of the Ecclesiastical State at the general peace, and of all the assurances to obtain restitution of the legations of Bologna and Ravenna to his Holiness. He advised that the pope should immediately despatch a courier to Vienna, to assure the emperor that the court of Rome would never treat with us.

It appears that M. del Vasto now knows that his master has ratified the treaty of peace signed in Paris, and that he is somewhat disconcerted. Nevertheless, as you will see by the Italian bulletin, they are still putting forth the same ideas, to keep up the spirit of error and infatuation, that, in case you should meet with a defeat, all may be ready for falling upon you.

CACAULT.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Florence, 21 Brumaire, year 5 [November 11, 1796].

I transmit to you, general, two letters, which I have just received for you from Leghorn, at the same time with news of a landing effected on the coast of Tuscany by 500 English; their object is to procure provisions, of which they are in very urgent need at Porto Ferrajo: they will find the greatest facilities, in this business, in that part of the Tuscan territory where they are now seeking supplies. Not the slightest doubt can be entertained of the cheerfulness with which they will be furnished by a great part of the inhabitants. In order to strengthen their favourable dispositions towards the enemies of liberty, the priests employ all the means which fanaticism arms them with. Those of Grosseto have proved by their conduct that they were animated by a desire to raise the inhabitants against the French

troops. This important fact is attested to me by General Serrurier, who will assuredly not fail to make you acquainted with it. I am going to make a strong remonstrance to the government of Tuscany, and to require the repression of the hostile dispositions which malevolence is striving to develop against us in the inhabitants of this country. Consider, general, whether, under present circumstances, it might not be of some advantage if you also were to express your opinion on the same subject.

General Serrurier informs me that he finds it indispensably necessary to withdraw all the posts from the coast and to attend exclusively to Leghorn. He is the more chagrined that the small number of troops which he commands imposes the necessity of this resolution, because the English would soon have been reduced to the greatest straits, if they had been repelled from the country, without being able to subsist at Porto Ferrajo.

You know, general, that they have collected all their wealth in that place, and that their squadron has sailed away. Be the object of its departure what it may, the English would receive a terrible blow, if the combined fleet were to take possession of the Mediterranean.

Before the departure of my courier, I shall receive an answer from the Tuscan government to my demand for the repression of the malevolent persons of whom General Serrurier complains. I send you a copy of that paper, which probably will not appear more satisfactory to you than to myself, and which will tend to confirm your opinion respecting the dispositions of those who govern this country.

MIOT.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Rivoli, 23 Brumaire, year 5 [November 13, 1796].

I apprise you that the enemy is advancing upon us, and that his fires, on the other side of the Adige, are opposite to our posts. Yesterday there was a slight firing of musketry at La Corona. I am drawing in the troops that are at Segna and Bassalengo. Apparently we shall be attacked to-morrow morning.

VAUBOIS.

---

*The Executive Directory to his Majesty the Emperor and King.*

The Executive Directory cannot presume that your Majesty sees with indifference the calamities which afflict Europe ; neither can it persuade itself that you will refuse to seize the hope which it conceives and which it holds out to you of at length putting an end to the miseries of so long and so disastrous a war.

If your Majesty considers what have been the results of the preceding campaigns, and, looking to the future, what would be the probable consequences of a new campaign, you will be led to conclude that, in the supposition most favourable to yourself, success would be at least balanced, and that, after many vicissitudes and alternations of advantages and reverses, the state of things would not be more decided than at this moment, since the respective situation of the two powers, with the exception perhaps of some changes in the limits of the theatre of war, would probably differ very little from what it is at present. Human blood spilt anew, resources again exhausted, would, therefore, be the only fruit that you could gather from the effort.

We say nothing about the influence which the allies might have on the result of this campaign, since your Majesty knows that most of those who were engaged in the coalition have embraced the happy and prudent course of neutrality.

The moment is therefore come when there can be no real interest in running fresh risks, when the further prolongation of a disastrous struggle would henceforth be without object ; when, let the reciprocal grievances and the diversity of the political principles of the two governments be what they will, their interests coincide in this point, that everything urges them to conciliation for the relief of nations and the restoration of peace.

The Executive Directory proposes, therefore, to your Majesty this so necessary peace: it invites you to accelerate with all your means an epoch so desirable and so important for all mankind.

The Directory is nevertheless sensible that a solid peace, a peace befitting the two powers, must be the result of a negotiation deliberately conducted, and which might be attended with delays, since honour requires that on either

side the allied powers be invited to take part in it, and that their respective interests be stipulated if they desire it.

But must blood continue to flow during this interval? and if it be possible to stop its effusion, must we not believe that your Majesty will be eager to adopt the means, especially if they can be admitted by the two belligerent parties, without prejudice to the interests or even to the pretensions of any?

These means exist; they are to be found in a *status quo*, or a general armistice between them. This armistice is the more necessary since, besides putting an end provisorily to useless hostilities and diminishing the reciprocal exasperation by infusing hope into all hearts, it combines the advantage of facilitating and hastening the conclusion of peace, by suppressing the accidents and events, which, sometimes favourable and sometimes contrary, alternately raise the pretensions of the contracting powers, shift incessantly the bases of the negotiation, and defer its result.

The two proposals which the Executive Directory makes to your Majesty then are these:

1. Simultaneous suspension of arms, in all parts of the theatre of war, between the French troops and the Austrian troops;

2. Convocation of ministers plenipotentiary for treating for a definitive peace between the two powers and their respective allies, in so far as the latter shall be desirous to accede to the invitation that shall be given them.

A negociation is already begun at this moment between the French government and one of your principal allies, the King of Great Britain; and the step which the Executive Directory is this day taking towards your Majesty, so far from being opposed to these first overtures, is a manifestation of its ardent desire to accelerate the effects of them, to urge the necessary meetings, and, above all, to suspend from this moment the course of the calamities of the war between the Republic and your Majesty, by pronouncing immediately upon the provisional and important measure of the proposed armistice.

We transmit the present proposals to your Majesty by an envoy invested with our confidence, and charged with instructions and powers sufficient to decide immediately, as well upon the mode of the armistice as upon the place and mode of meeting of the plenipotentiaries.

BARRAS, President.



*The Minister for Foreign Affairs to General Clarke.*<sup>1</sup>

Paris, 4 Brumaire, year 5 [November 14, 1796].

The short time that is left till your departure, and the multitude of subjects to which we have to attend, do not allow me, citizen-general, to discuss them with the details which their importance would require. I shall therefore merely point out to you those which concern the foreign relations, and on which it is very important that the Directory should receive accurate information from you. Permit me to follow your route.

Piedmont.—You will certainly see General Kellermann, perhaps the commissioners for the demarcation of the limits : confer with them on the importance of obtaining for us all the military posts in the chain of the Alps. On this point the treaty gives them all possible facilities.

Citizen Poussielgue is still at Turin, charged to follow up the negotiations, which General Bonaparte has thought proper to commence for an alliance. Be in no hurry about this, and, above all, promise no cessions of territory which would form an obstacle perhaps insurmountable to peace or to the establishment of liberty in Lombardy. I beg you to ascertain as far as you can what are the dispositions of the King and the government towards us ; and whether it is possible, without coming to an alliance difficult to conclude, and which would perhaps be more injurious than serviceable to us, to keep them in dispositions of neutrality, which are sufficient for us.

As for Milan, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Ferrara, it would be of great value to the Directory and to me to have the result of the judicious observations which you would be capable of making.

Are those people really ripe for liberty ? Are they in a condition to defend it, either alone or with our support ? In the latter case, what number of troops would they be able to maintain ? What are their dispositions in regard to the house of Austria ? Would they return without a struggle under its yoke, in case the peace were at that price ?

You know the real and serious wrongs of Venice towards us. Persons acquainted with the country assert that all

<sup>1</sup> General Clarke was the person selected by the Directory to be the bearer of the preceding letter to the Emperor, and to negotiate the armistice to which it was expected to lead.

the provinces of the Terra firma, particularly the Bressans, the Bergamascons, and the Veronese, are incensed at the pride of the Venetian nobles, and disposed to arm for liberty. If admitted into the Lombard republic or become its allies, they would give it increased strength. I request your observations on the obstacles or the facilities which may attend the execution of this project.

I likewise request your remarks on our position in regard to the pope and the other powers of Italy. You will not traverse their territories, but your conferences with the general-in-chief and his worthy co-operators will enable you to form a correct idea of them, and I expect from your zeal for the public weal that you will be pleased to communicate it to me.

I suppose you arrived by this time at Vienna, observing all the great personages who figure on that theatre, and drawing their portraits with a touch equally firm and free. Your journey will be serviceable enough if it merely made us acquainted with the passions which animate them and the means for turning them to the advantage of the Republic and of humanity.

Without being specially charged to negotiate peace, you might prepare the way for it in the conferences which you will have with influential personages. We should assuredly arrive at it much more easily, if we could offer Austria suitable compensations. This system of compensations admits of a multitude of combinations, which you might touch lightly on in your conversations, to find out which would be the most gratifying. Let us endeavour to sketch the principal.

1. To restore to Austria what she possessed in Italy ; to give her in Germany the bishopric of Salzburg, the provostship of Berchtoldsgaden, the bishopric of Passau, with the exception of the city of that name, and the Upper Palatinate as far as the Nab. Such is indisputably the easiest, that which would best please the house of Austria and all Germany ; but it would sacrifice our new friends in Italy ; it would deprive us of the advantages which we ought to expect from that fine country, if we succeed in withdrawing it from Austrian influence.

2. Modify the first plan, substituting for the States of Milan part of the States of the pope, the Romagna, the March of Ancona, the duchy of Urbino ; transfer the grand-

duke of Tuscany to Rome, give him the rest of the States of the pope, reserve the Siennese for him, consent to call him King of Rome ; give Florence to the Duke of Parma ; effect an exchange of part of his States with Sardinia, reserve for us the island of Elba, for which let the King of Naples be indemnified by Benevento, Ponto Corvo, and the March of Fermo ; letting us be paid in America for what we suffer to be taken in Italy.

3. Cede to Austria, Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Salzburg, Passau, and other ecclesiastical sovereignties enclosed in it, on condition that the house of Austria shall renounce all that it possesses to the south of the chain of the Alps and in the circle of Suabia ; indemnify the Duke of Modena ; appanage the grand-duke of Tuscany ; give the elector palatine the States of the pope, with the exception of the march of Fermo, Benevento, Ponte Corvo, Bologna, and Ferrara ; add the Siennese, and give him the title of King of the Romans. This plan would be highly agreeable to Italy, and place our interests there in safety ; but it might displease in Germany. The means of effecting its adoption would be to give the King of Prussia an ample indemnification : he satisfied, all the rest would be reduced to silence.

4. Give to the house of Austria all that is allotted to it in the preceding number : treat the grand-duke and the States of Italy as in No. 2 ; obtain the cession of the Austrian share of Poland to the elector palatine, and let it serve as a rallying point for the restoration of that State ; reserve to the King of Prussia the greatest part of that portion of it which he has acquired. It is very doubtful whether the house of Austria would consent to this plan : its alliance with Russia and its antipathy to Prussia appear insurmountable obstacles.

There is a multitude of other combinations, which you will form much better than I can : these might be sufficient to sound the matter, and to enable the ministers and those about them to explain themselves and to develop their sentiments on this subject.

The capital point which you will seek to attain is to persuade Austria that, notwithstanding the pretended advantage which England offers her by way of compensations, this latter power, who has interests opposite to hers, could but clog the course of the negotiations ; that the house of Aus-

tria will obtain more, and more promptly, by treating with the Republic alone.

On your return from Vienna, you will be able to see several princes of Germany and their ministers. They are frightened at the ambition of the house of Austria, and at the animosity which it shows against all who have sought to make friends with the Republic. They will perhaps be uneasy about the consequences of the proposal for an armistice; it will be very easy to make them sensible that their own interest commands it; that it gives them time to unite, and to combine the means of breaking the odious yoke which is attempted to be imposed upon them; and that it gives the Republic time to re-establish strict discipline in its armies, and to prepare the means of a more vigorous attack than any of the preceding, and which will be the last if they will but second it.

I recommend, citizen-general, to your zeal and sagacity the subjects which I have here touched upon, and those also to which want of time has prevented me from adverting, certain that nothing which can interest our common country will escape you.

I send you a cipher to be used for the interesting correspondence that I expect from you.

C. DELACROIX.

---

*Instructions of the Executive Directory to the General of Division Henri Clarke, Envoy Extraordinary of the French Republic to the Court of Vienna.*

26 Brumaire, year 5 [November 16, 1796].

The Directory of the French Republic, willing to respond to the general wish of Europe, and to contribute as far as lies in its power to stop the effusion of the blood of the people, and the calamities which a long and ruinous war brings along with it, has determined, citizen-general, to send you to his Majesty the Emperor and King of Hungary and Bohemia, for the purpose of negotiating, in the name of the French Republic, an armistice between the Imperial and French troops, as well in Germany as in Italy, and to propose to that prince a meeting of ministers plenipotentiary to treat for a general peace. In consequence, the Directory thinks it right to lay down for you, by this present, the bases upon which it wishes the negotiation to be conducted,

and on which will essentially rest the steps which you will have to take at the imperial court to obtain a happy result for the French Republic.

The first object which the Directory confides to you being the conclusion of the armistice, its intention is that in concert with the persons charged with the powers of his Imperial Majesty, you endeavour to get as long a term as possible fixed for it; and, in no case, and on no pretext, must it be liable to be broken before the 1st Prairial (May 20, 1797) or even the 1st Messidor (June 19). After the expiration of that term, the armistice must not be annulled unless in case of the cessation of the negotiations which shall take place for peace, and at the charge of that party which wishes to recommence hostilities, which resumption of hostilities must not take place till ten or fifteen days, or even a month, after it has been signified.

As for the other conditions of this armistice, they must be confined to the ensuring of the *status quo* in which things stand at that moment; and the desire of the Directory is that no cession of advantages won by republican valour, either in Germany or in Italy, take place.

You are, in consequence, authorized, citizen-general, to resist as long as possible any proposition that may be made to you tending to obtain a cession of that kind. You will absolutely refuse all conditions assenting to the evacuation of the *têtes de pont* of Kehl and Dusseldorf, and you will not stipulate that of the *têtes de pont* of Neuwied and Huningen, unless in case of absolute necessity, and your obtaining that the Austrian troops shall not be allowed to leave Mentz, and the evacuation of the *tête de pont* of Manheim on the left bank of the Rhine.

If the fortress of Mantua has not fallen into our hands before your arrival at Vienna, its blockade and the then state of its garrison might raise some obstacles which the Directory considers easy to remove by referring things, on this head, to the *status quo* demanded. It authorizes you, in consequence, to stipulate that the emperor shall have a right to cause the men composing the garrison of Mantua and the inhabitants of that city to be supplied day by day with provisions, according to the quantities that shall be determined and apportioned to the number and the age of the persons whom that place shall contain: and to this end there shall be appointed two French commissioners, one

within, the other, out of the place, to ascertain the number of the men to be fed and the quantity of provisions remaining; but no person or effects whatever shall be allowed either to leave or enter the place; and the French commissioners shall have a right to superintend the execution of this disposition. A particular arrangement concerning what relates to Mantua may be concluded between you and the persons charged with the emperor's powers; but the principal stipulation of the maintenance of things, as far as regards that place, in the state in which they shall be at the moment of the conclusion of the armistice, must form part of the conditions of that armistice.

The circumstances as well as the conduct of the negotiation being capable of admitting of some modifications in what has just been said respecting the garrison of Mantua, we give you power to discuss, to fix them definitively, making them concur as much as possible with the bases which the Directory has established above, and with the information with which you shall be furnished by the general-in-chief of the republican army in Italy. That general shall be directed to transmit to you notes which shall form, as it were, part of your instructions, and the Directory requests you to consult them. He will fix the moment of your departure from Italy for Vienna, according to the political and military state of things in the country where he commands.

In case the court of Vienna should wish to interpose, in order to screen the pope from the efforts which our situation in regard to him might enable us to make against him, the Directory authorizes you, citizen-general, to assure the emperor that the conditions of the armistice concluded with the pope shall be observed on our part so long as they shall be by the pope himself. This assurance may even, if the emperor wishes it, furnish the text of one of the articles of the general armistice which you are called to conclude with the court of Vienna.

The Executive Directory has already manifested in the most authentic manner a desire to contribute by all the means in its power to bring about a general peace, which shall fix in an invariable manner the political interests of Europe, and ensure its future tranquillity and happiness, by establishing a suitable and salutary equilibrium between the powers. The voice of humanity has made itself heard; it cries loudly everywhere for this great object to be generally

attended to : and it is to attain it the more surely that the Executive Directory has determined to demand the armistice between Austria and the French Republic ; but, as it behoves it to second efficaciously the general wish for peace, and to give the most convincing proofs of the sincerity and reality of its intentions, it charges you to propose, in its name, to his Majesty the emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, that there be sent forthwith either to Basle or to Paris, on the part of the emperor, one or more plenipotentiaries for the same object ; and if his majesty, moved by the same sentiments, should consent to that measure, it would be advisable to determine, with persons who shall be appointed to negotiate with you on this subject, that the respective allies shall be invited to send also their plenipotentiaries to Basle, or to charge with letters of credence such of the plenipotentiaries called to that meeting to whom they shall think fit to entrust their interests.

Such, general, are the instructions which the Directory gives you in conferring on you an honourable mission, and the result of which will no doubt be beneficial to the general interests of Europe and to those of the Republic in particular.

BARRAS, President.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Verona, 24 Brumaire, year 5 [November 14, 1796].

I owe you an account of the operations which have taken place since the 21st of this month : if it is not satisfactory, you will not attribute this to the fault of the army : inferior as it is, and drained of its bravest men, I am under the greatest apprehensions about it. Perhaps we are on the eve of losing Italy. None of the expected reinforcements have arrived ; the 83rd demi-brigade has not set out : all the succours coming from the departments are stopped at Lyons and especially at Marseilles. It is thought a matter of indifference whether they are detained eight or ten days ; it is not considered that the fates of Italy and of Europe are deciding here in the mean time. The whole empire has been in motion and is so still. The activity of our government at the beginning of the war can alone convey an idea of the manner of proceeding at Vienna. Not a day passes but 5000 men arrive ; and, for the two months that it has been evident that succours are needed here, there has arrived only

VOL. II.

K

one battalion of the 40th, while all our old soldiers of the army of Italy are languishing in repose in the 8th division. I do my duty, and the army does its duty: my heart is rent, but my conscience is at peace. Reinforcements! send me reinforcements! give up playing with the matter; we want not effective men, but men present under arms. If you announce 6000 men, the minister of war announces 6000 effective men and 3000 present under arms; on their arrival at Milan they are reduced to 1500 men: of course 1500 men are all that the army receives.

I was informed on the 10th that a corps of 2500 Austrians were advancing from the Gorizia, and already encamped on the Piave. I immediately sent General Massena with a corps of observation to Bassano on the Brenta, with orders to retire upon Vicenza the moment the enemy should have crossed the Piave. I ordered General Vaubois to attack the enemy's posts in the Trentin, and in particular to drive him from his positions between the Lavis and the Brenta. The attack took place on the 12th; the resistance was obstinate. General Guieux carried St. Michael and burned the enemy's bridges; but the latter foiled our attack upon Segonzano, and the 85th demi-brigade was roughly handled there in spite of its valour. We had 300 wounded, 100 killed, and 250 prisoners: we took 500 prisoners and killed a great number of the enemy.

On the 13th, I ordered the attack on Segonzano, which it was absolutely necessary that we should have, to be renewed; and, at the same time, being informed that the enemy was passing the Piave, I set off with General Augereau's division. At Vicenza, we joined Massena's division, and marched on the 15th to meet the enemy, who had passed the Brenta. It was requisite to startle the enemy like a thunderbolt, and to sweep him away at his very first step. The action was sharp, hot, and bloody: we had the advantage; the enemy recrossed the Brenta, and the field of battle was ours. We made 518 prisoners, and killed a considerable number of men; we took one piece of cannon. General Lanusse received a sword wound. All the troops have covered themselves with glory.

Meanwhile, on the 13th, the enemy had attacked General Vaubois at several points and threatened to turn him, which obliged that general to retreat upon La Pietra, his right backed upon the mountains, his left upon Mori. On the



16th, the enemy did not make his appearance; but on the 17th the combat was most obstinate. We had already taken two pieces of cannon and 1300 prisoners, when, at nightfall, a panic seized our troops, the rout became complete: we abandoned six pieces of cannon.

On the 18th, the division took its position at Rivoli and at La Corona, by a bridge which I had ordered to be thrown over for the purpose. We lost in this retreat, besides the six pieces of cannon, 3000 men, killed, wounded, or prisoners. The loss of the enemy must have been considerable.

Having learned something of what was passing in the Tyrol, I hastened to set out at daybreak on the 17th, and at daybreak on the 18th we arrived at Verona.

On the 21st, at three in the afternoon, having been informed that the enemy had left Montebello and encamped at Villa-Nova, we marched from Verona. We fell in with his advanced guard at St. Martin: Augereau attacked it, put it to the rout, and pursued it for three miles: night saved it.

On the 22nd, at daybreak, we found ourselves face to face. It was necessary to engage the enemy immediately: we attacked him with intelligence and bravery. Massena's division attacked the left, General Augereau the right. The success was complete. General Augereau had taken the village of Caldero and made 200 prisoners; Massena had stormed the height which turned the enemy, and taken five pieces of cannon; but the rain, which fell in pailfuls, suddenly changed to a fine, cold sleet, which, driven by a violent wind into the faces of our soldiers, favoured the enemy, and, added to a corps of reserve, which had not yet been engaged, enabled him to retake the height. I sent the 75th demi-brigade, which had remained in reserve, and the fight was kept up till night; but the enemy continued master of the position. We had 600 wounded, 200 killed, and 250 prisoners, among whom was the general of brigade Launai, and the chief of brigade Dupuis, who was wounded for the second time. The loss of the enemy must have been greater.

The weather continues to be bad. The whole army is worn out with fatigue, and without shoes: I have led it back to Verona, where it has just arrived.

An enemy's column, commanded by Loudon, is advancing upon Brescia, another upon Chiuza, to form a junction

with the main army. To resist all this I have but 18,000 men.

The enemy has at least 50,000 men, composed, 1, of an Austrian corps coming from the Rhine; 2, of all the garrisons of Poland and of the frontiers of Turkey; 3, of the remnant of his army of Italy, recruited with 10,000 men.

To-day, 24th Brumaire, rest for the troops; to-morrow, according to the movements of the enemy, we shall act. I despair of being able to prevent the raising of the blockade of Mantua, which would be ours in a week. If this misfortune happens, we shall soon be behind the Adda, and still further if no troops arrive.

The wounded are the flower of the army: all our superior officers, all our best generals, are *hors de combat*: all that come to me are so silly, and they have not the confidence of the soldiers. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is worn out. The heroes of Lodi, of Millesimo, of Castiglione, and of Bassano, have died for their country, or are in the hospital: the corps have nothing left but their reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Charlot, Dupuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Menard, Chabrand, are wounded; we are abandoned at the furthest extremity of Italy. The presumption of my strength would be beneficial to us, and they are publishing in Paris, in official speeches, that we are but 30,000 men.

In this war I have lost few men, but all the superior men, whom it is impossible to replace. The brave men who are left me have before their eyes inevitable death, amidst such continual chances and with forces so inferior. Perhaps the last hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, of Berthier, of . . . . is at hand; then, then, what will become of these brave fellows! This idea makes me cautious: I dare no longer confront death, which would be a subject of discouragement and disaster for that which is the object of my anxiety.

In a few days, we shall try a last effort: if Fortune smiles upon us, Mantua will be taken, and Italy along with it. Reinforced by my besieging army, there is nothing that I cannot attempt. If I had received the 83rd, 3500 strong, known to the army, I would have answered for everything. Perhaps in a few days 40,000 men will not be sufficient.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Commissioner of the Government.*

Head-quarters, Modena, 25 Brumaire, year 5 [November 15, 1796].

Flachat and Co. have not yet made any sale, and yet there are silks and other goods of consequence in Lombardy and at Tortona. The sales which they make at Leghorn take place in their presence: it is indispensably necessary that the consul of the Republic should have a hand in them. This company, which has received fourteen or fifteen millions, does not pay the mandates, upon pretext that it has no funds, but, in fact, to negociate them through a third hand at a loss of 15 or 20 per cent. Make it give you a statement of all the mandates that it has paid up to this day: order it, firstly, to post within twenty-four hours the sale of all the goods that it has, to be made afterwards conformably with your resolution; secondly, that all the money produced by the goods be paid within twenty-four hours into the central chest; and that, on no pretext whatever, do that company presume to retain that money; thirdly, that it remit to you a statement of the deliveries of corn that it has made to the army since the commencement of the campaign; for it is strongly accused of having made false entries of 80,000 quintals.

I beg you to keep a strict eye upon that company. In all quarters complaints are made of it: all its agents are of such marked incivism that I have reason to believe that a great part of them serve the enemy for spies. I request you to inform that company that if M. Paragallo, so unworthy a Frenchman as to have renounced the national character, comes into Lombardy, I will have him thrown into prison. I have strong grounds for believing that this man is connected with the Russian minister at Genoa, and I am further informed that I am surrounded by spies. The clerks that it has at Leghorn are mostly emigrants.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Commissioner of the Government.*

Verona, 30 Brumaire, year 5 [November 18, 1796].

The general-in-chief requires the commissioner of the government Garreau to make citizen Flachat pay in all

the money arising from the sale at Leghorn within forty-eight hours, the necessities of the army of all kinds being such that it is likely to fall short on the very first day ; and to get all the resources existing in Italy realized, the wants being urgent, and even the pay being on the point of failing. Citizen Garreau will cause these funds to be paid into the chest of the paymaster of the army.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Commissioner of the Government.*

Verona, 29 Brumaire, year 5 [November 19, 1796].

The army is without shoes, without pay, without clothes; the hospitals are in want of everything; our wounded are on the floor, and in the most horrible destitution: all this arises from the want of money, and that at the moment when we have acquired 4,000,000 at Leghorn, and when the goods which we have at Tortona and Milan offer us another real resource. Modena ought also to give us 1,800,000 francs, and Ferrara considerable contributions; but there is neither order nor unity in the department of the contributions with which you are specially charged. The evil is so great as to require a remedy. I beg you to answer me in the course of the day whether you can provide for the wants of the army; in the contrary case, I beg you to order citizen Haller, a rogue who came to this country solely to rob, and who has erected himself intendant of the finances of the conquered countries, to render his accounts to the *ordonnateur-en-chef*, who is at Milan, and at the same time to let them take measures for procuring for the army what it stands in need of. The intention of the government is that its commissioners should specially attend to the wants of the army, and I see with pain that you give yourself no concern about them, and leave that duty to a foreigner whose character and intentions are most suspicious.

Citizen Salicetti makes resolutions [*arrêtés*] on the one side, you on the other; and the result of all this is that there is no harmony and that we have no money. The 1500 men that we are keeping at Leghorn cost us more than an army: in short, we are, thanks to all these inconveniences, on the point of wanting indispensable things. Our

soldiers are already in want of what they ought not to want in so rich a country, and after the successes which they are obtaining.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Gossolengo, 27 Brumaire, year 5 [November 17, 1796].

We have been vigorously attacked this morning by forces at least double our own ; the right repulsed the enemy three times. The 85th was next attacked ; it gave way without much resistance and fled. The centre, finding itself pressed by this flight, ran away too. We had the good fortune to rally, a quarter of a league in rear, on the heights of Pionvesano. I know not whether we shall be able to keep them : if not, we shall retreat upon Castel-Novo and Peschiera, unless the enemy, who has marched forces upon our left, has anticipated us, which I shall ascertain. I narrowly escaped being taken by the enemy. I should not have been very sorry for it, having the misfortune to command troops who will not stand fire long. Our loss, however, is inconsiderable : we have taken from the enemy more than 300 prisoners.

VAUBOIS.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 28 Brumaire, year 5 [November 18, 1796].

The reports which we have received, citizen-general, of the affairs which occurred on the 12th, and of the approach of the enemy, lead us to think that more serious operations may have begun since that moment, and we reckon upon soon receiving intelligence of them from you. The greater part of the reinforcements which we announced must have joined you, and, whatever despatch the emperor may have used in collecting new troops against the army of Italy, you have, and you will retain, no doubt, the superiority in number ; but the superiority in daring and dispositions is much more deserving of our confidence.

After astonishing Europe, without being able to force our enemies to peace, the highest interests of the Republic now repose upon the brave army which you command ; those which occupy the line of the Rhine can be, at this season,

in the penury of means which they are enduring, and, after the arduous retreats which they have effected, but mere spectators, in a manner, of the new campaign, in which you find yourself engaged. Still, in enjoining the generals who command them to keep the defensive, and to ensure the possession of the passage which they have over the Rhine, we recommend to them to attempt partial enterprises, smart enough to give serious alarm to the archduke, and to threaten him incessantly with another combined and general irruption into Germany.

It cannot be long, according to military probabilities, before the fate of Mantua is decided in our favour; and we expect from that event, or from some important success over the enemy who keeps the field, a favourable issue of the mission with which we have entrusted General Clarke.

We send you a copy of a letter from General Lapeyrouse, relative to armed assemblages, which appear to be distinct from those of the Barbets. Whatever is occurring in Piedmont cannot be indifferent to you, and we beg you to verify these accounts.

BARRAS, President.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Rome, 27 Brumaire, year 5 [November 17, 1796].

I have not yet received an answer from the cardinal secretary of state to my note for proposing the opening of a negociation with the pope: I know that despatches on this subject have been sent off to Vienna and Naples. There had arrived here, as usual, false accounts of the battle of the 7th, according to which we had been beaten, and all Rome gave itself up to hope and joy. General Berthier's letter to citizen Miot, which has just arrived, must produce a change of ideas.

Cardinal Mattei has not had the politeness to pass and leave his name at my house, after the visit which I paid him: here I am, again reduced to a cipher!

There still subsists the greatest intimacy between M. del Vasto and the court of Rome, though now neither the treaty of peace nor the ratifications are any longer disputed. There are assuredly defensive conventions and a treaty of defensive alliance prepared and agreed upon, if not signed,

between the King of the Two Sicilies and the pope. The Neapolitan cabinet will pretend that a treaty of defensive alliance is not contrary to its peace with France.

The policy of Naples is modelled after that of Petersburg: its cabinet acts the same comedy on a small scale, finding itself at a distance which renders it strong.

Naples has placed itself in safety by the treaty of Paris: its funds at Leghorn are saved, as well as its cavalry; its immense undefended coasts and its navy will have nothing to fear. Naples will now have nothing to do but to study how to elude and to evade, if possible, the fulfilment of the onerous conditions of the treaty. If, as I am assured, it is to furnish us with eight millions' worth of commodities, and to pay indemnities to the expelled French, let them be wrung from it: we shall see what that court is when we have given it back its cavalry, and taken off the sequestration of Leghorn.

It is not consistent with the interest of France that Naples should be entirely dependant on Spain: but it is still less consistent with it that the Two Sicilies should be united with Petersburg, Vienna, London, the pope, which now form the great counterpoise to France and Spain. A cabinet like that of Naples, which is double and has two faces, is still worse than that of Rome, the hatred of which is always undisguised; it will artfully contrive to avoid dangers and perils, but it will really do us more mischief, by deceiving and seducing whenever it cannot defy.

The peace with Naples, if it thoroughly assures to us its neutrality in the war with Rome, gives up to us the pope and the whole Ecclesiastical State: for nothing can prevent us from coming hither and conquering it at any favourable moment.

The policy of the coalesced powers tends evidently to attract the pope to them, to give him guarantees, and to attach him to themselves, with a view to deprive us, as much as possible, of the advantages to be derived from that fine portion of Italy. The refusal of the pope, in the very commencement of the Revolution, to receive the ambassador Segur, the murder of Basseville, the persecution of the patriots, the inflammatory briefs, the manner in which they have agitated themselves here about the coalition, give but a very feeble idea of the sacerdotal ferocity against the French Republic.

Extreme fear, when you had arrived at Bologna, forced this government to beg pardon on its knees, but still with the most perfidious intentions : accordingly, the treaty of armistice has served only to heap grievance upon grievance. New advantages to the Austrian armies, true or false, served every day to stop the execution of a formal treaty.

The court of Rome dreams of nothing but the extermination of the French in Italy, and it is firmly decided, when that happens, to continue, by its incendiary pamphlets and by all other means, to do the Republic all the mischief in its power, even for ages to come. It cannot forgive the French for the abolition of tyranny, religious intolerance, the influence of the clergy, the payment of the annates, and lastly the many rights and fine prerogatives which the old system conferred upon it in France. Would you believe that the King of Prussia has so far solicited the pope in vain to retrench from the oath of the bishops of Silesia the promise which they make at their consecration to persecute heretics ?

Such is the enemy with whom the Directory would have us make a hasty treaty signed by the pope, so that it may have nothing to do but to give its approbation and to get it ratified by the legislative body.

If the circumstances of Europe do not permit us to take the Romagna and to come afterwards to Rome to overthrow the pontifical throne, our natural enemy ; if, after you have taken Mantua, the army must stop there ; if Rome can reckon upon the succour of the shadows of armies of the King of Naples ; and a peace which separates the emperor and Italy is not made ; it will be difficult even then to bend the court of Rome to moderate conditions.

The Directory desires, no doubt, the execution of the conditions of the armistice, and desires that it be speedy. This court will reply that the country is ruined, and that it is impossible for it to fulfil them. Long disputes will follow before the parties agree.

In regard to Bologna and Ferrara, one might consent to grant them some privileges, but never to relinquish the sovereignty of them. I do not think that the proprietorship of Avignon will be much contested with us. But the easiest point, the smoothest with any other power, will be one of tremendous difficulty with the pope.



Rome is exactly like what Constantinople was when conquered by the Turks ; it is easier to take that city from a people who do not care about establishing themselves there than to know what to do with it afterwards. To come to Rome, for the purpose of extracting a contribution from it, and forcing the pope with a pistol at his breast to sign a treaty, then leaving this unfortunate country to itself and to its government, and in the clutches of the King of Naples, is not fulfilling a very honourable object, neither is it securing commercial advantages.

We must abandon Rome with contempt to its present state, till we have it in our power to change everything beneficially. If, however, the Directory persists in judging that matters must be settled with Rome by a treaty, everything ought to be arranged beforehand : there will be required positive instructions and regular, full powers, which we will make use of when your situation and events shall have placed us in a condition to treat.

CACAULT.

---

*To Citizen Miot.*

Verona, 3 Frimaire, year 5 [November 23, 1796].

I have received, citizen-minister, the letter which you wrote me before your departure for Corsica. The mission which you have to fulfil is extremely difficult ; it will not be till all the affairs are arranged that troops can be sent over to Corsica. You will there find General Gentili, who commands that division. He is an honest man, generally esteemed in that country.

Corsica is a people extremely difficult to learn to know ; having a very lively imagination, it has extremely active passions.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Monsieur Paul Greppi.*

Verona, 3 Frimaire, year 5 [November 23, 1796].

I have received, sir, the letter which you took the trouble to write to me from Milan, dated the 6th Brumaire last. I have there seen with indignation the particulars of that anarchical and licentious scene, to which you had well nigh fallen a victim. So long as the French armies shall be at

Milan, I will never suffer property to be injured any more than persons. I beg that, after you have taken your excursion into Tuscany, you would return to Milan, your native place; and be assured that this handful of brigands shall be curbed, who regard liberty as the right to murder, who never think of imitating the French people in its moments of courage and in its lofty flights of virtue which have astonished Europe, but who would seek to renew those horrible scenes produced by crime, and the authors of which will be the eternal object of the hatred and of the contempt of the French people, even of Europe and of posterity. Be under no apprehension, therefore, and persuade yourself that the French people and army which I command will never suffer hideous and disgusting anarchy to seat itself on the ruins of liberty: we have bayonets to exterminate tyrants, but, above all, crime.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the General of Division Kilmaine, commanding the  
Blockade of Mantua.*

St. George, 5 Frimaire, year 5 [November 25, 1796].

Yesterday, general, I gave up the command of the first division of the blockade to the general of brigade Serviez, who arrived about noon on the 3rd, and was my senior in rank. In the evening of the 3rd, I addressed to you, by an adjunct who came on your behalf from Roverbello, a report of the circumstances of the action, the particulars of which I could not furnish, because they had not then reached me. General Chabot, finding himself too ill to act, first gave up the command to me, and left. I have already reported to you in what manner the posts of Prada, la Favorita, and St. Antony, were forced, and afterwards retaken on the same day, with great bravery by our troops. The enemy had directed against the two latter points 3000 men at least and several pieces of cannon: he occupied the high roads in the rear, and invested St. George, which he battered incessantly with the cannon of the place and several pieces that he had brought upon the road to la Favorita. General Serviez will transmit to you a particular report of the orders which must have reached him yesterday at Marmirollo. I think it right just to mention them, that you may bear testimony to

the general-in-chief to several particular circumstances likely to interest him.

General Chabot, in a most violent fever, proceeded to the principal point of the attack, on the high road of St. Antony, and never quitted the head of the troops till the enemy was completely repulsed.

A medical officer, whose name I do not know, rallied with zeal and courage, at several points leading to la Favorita, the scattered soldiers who had retreated.

Citizen Klais, sergeant in the second battalion of the 69th demi-brigade, placed along the lake, between la Favorita and St. George, defended himself there with the utmost coolness, sagacity, and courage, against the troops that bore down upon that point with several pieces of cannon. He stopped them for several hours, giving up the ground only step by step, disputing the passage of every ditch, taking advantage of every tree to face the enemy with the brave men whom he commanded, and who got back to St. George without ammunition.

Citizen Grasiaux, my aide-de-camp, contributed to rally the troops at several points : with grenadiers and dragoons, he charged the enemy in his retreat from la Favorita, in which two pieces were taken. He served me throughout the whole action with great activity and intelligence ; all the chiefs did their duty. Adjutant-general Rambaud, and the chief of battalion Monneau, commanding the first two subdivisions, particularly distinguished themselves, as did also the chief of battalion Jeanneau.

MIOLLIS.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 5 Frimaire, year 5 [November 25, 1796].

We have had laid before us, citizen-general, a statement of the forces that have been employed during this campaign in Italy : you will find a copy herewith, and you will convince yourself with us that the Republic could not have made greater efforts to obtain and to preserve the glorious conquests of the army which you command. The whole of the interior has been stripped of troops ; the Coasts of the Ocean will be scarcely guarded at all after the departure of General Hoche, whose expedition will employ nearly all that are disposable ; and there are but eight or ten thousand men left in the 17th

division. The armies of the Rhine, which cover Holland, Belgium, and our old frontiers, have received but slight reinforcements during their operations: our principal interest has been constantly directed towards Italy. The emperor, it is true, has already lost two armies there; but it has cost France a great many men. This result would be a necessary consequence of the climate of these countries and the heat of the war, whatever might have been your solicitude to spare French blood in battle, when the need to conquer permitted you to do so.

The last columns of troops that have marched to join you cannot be long before they are in presence of the enemy and put an end to the inequality of number that may exist between you and him. The superiority which you have in all other respects assures us that the glory of the army of Italy, the brilliancy of which has been reflected on the whole nation, and that which you have personally acquired, will not be tarnished by ulterior events: Italy is the pledge of peace, and, whatever may be the efforts of the emperor to recover it, we found on its preservation the certainty that the honour and the interests of the Republic will not be compromised by them.

BARRAS, President.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 5 Frimaire, year 5 [November 25, 1796].

The treaty which we have just concluded, citizen-general, with the King of Naples, has furnished us with a new occasion for applying the principle that we have already established in our preceding despatches, relative to the introduction of revolutionary principles into Italy. The King of Naples, alarmed at the vicinity of people who have constituted themselves into popular States, and fearing the attempts which they might make to spread their political opinions in the South of Italy, has caused explanations on this subject to be demanded of us for his satisfaction. The result has been that we have agreed that neither French troops, nor the national militia of Bologna, Ferrara, and the other confederated States, shall penetrate into the States of the Church, till the pope has definitively explained himself respecting the armistice concluded between the French Republic and him; and

that we will not favour in any manner the innovations which the people of Southern Italy may desire in their government.

We invite you, citizen-general, to take such measures that this arrangement be faithfully observed, so long as the King of Naples shall prove himself a religious observer of the treaties which unite us to him.

BARRAS.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Venice, 7 Frimaire, year 5 [November 27, 1796].

When you desire the generals of your army to point out to you the officers of the different arms who have distinguished themselves in this campaign, I must not leave you in ignorance of the brilliant actions of the artillery, which has likewise contributed to your successes.

I shall say nothing of the passage of the bridge of Lodi, because I was not at that time employed under your orders, and you have yourself pronounced a eulogy on the artillery then commanded by the general of brigade Sugny.

The siege of the castle of Milan soon afterwards furnished the artillery with a new occasion for distinguishing itself: it is scarcely credible that that citadel, one of the best in Europe, from its position and the nature of its works, should have surrendered twelve days after the opening of the trenches. Its artillery was so superior in number to ours that every day our batteries were destroyed down to the knees, but in the night they were completely re-established and stronger than before. I never saw such perseverance in our artillerymen, or, to express myself more properly, such a rage [*acharnement*] for victory—that is the term which I used in my report at the time of the operations of the siege; but what particularly contributed to the speedy surrender of this fort was that the artillery and the engineers perfectly agreed upon the system of attack. It is said that those two corps are rivals; there they vied with each other only in glory and talent, and showed what art and courage well directed are capable of accomplishing.

The taking of the citadel of Milan decided the siege of Mantua, which you kept for a long time blockaded. This place, at once bombarded and battered by a well served artillery, was near falling into the power of the French, when the Austrian army came to attack you in force, and caused

you to conceive the bold plan of raising the siege of Mantua, of collecting your whole army, and dashing upon the mistaken enemy with the impetuosity of lightning.

A series of victories ensued, which I wish that I were able to describe, and which may be called a second conquest of Italy. Without adverting here to each of those memorable battles, in which your generals and your army covered themselves with glory, I will mention only that of the 18th Thermidor, when, in the plain of Castillon, the French artillery silenced that of the Austrians, though inferior in number and not so advantageously placed. Twelve pieces of artillery were placed in position on the left of the army, upon the heights in advance of Castillon, and fifteen pieces of light artillery on the right. The front of battle, under the protecting fire of these lateral batteries, marched to meet the enemy in an imposing silence and with an order worthy of troops the most inured to war. A complete victory, a prodigious number of prisoners, and the taking of part of the Austrian artillery, were the results of that great battle, which will ever be one of the most brilliant epochs of this war.

The Austrian army in flight and divided, you crossed the Adige at Salo, and pursued the enemy beyond Trent and into the gorges of the Tyrol. If, in that mountainous country, studded with rocks, the artillery has not had occasion to develop itself as in the plains, where it had recently obtained such great advantages, it is because each arm has its particular ground for fighting; but where the artilleryman cannot act and finds all his means chained up, such is not the case with the infantry: it is the only arm that nothing checks, and accordingly it has done everything in the Tyrol. Mountains climbed, torrents crossed, rocks scaled, nothing has resisted it: the love of glory and the impetuosity natural to the French have enabled it to fly to all points, to confront all dangers. History has never furnished an example of a pursuit so bold and so courageous.

It cannot be said that the Austrian, who is neither without bravery nor without discipline, has not defended himself in the mountains, where Nature seems to have delighted in multiplying obstacles and entrenching man against man; but nothing can stand against the French. The cavalry also has had some occasions for signalizing itself in this difficult country, by rushing upon the enemy when our troops had dislodged him from his rocks and cutting off his

retreat. It was in particular between Bassano and Citadella that our dragoons and hussars pursued the Austrian army with most success, stopped his artillery, took his entire park, and made so many prisoners that they embarrassed us, if that expression can be employed in war.

I have thought it right, citizen-general, to enter into all these details, in order to do justice to all the arms. I now return to the artillery.

Our victories brought us back to the road to Mantua, which the enemy's army was taking to escape us. On the 28th Fructidor commenced the attack of St. George, a suburb of Mantua, which it was essential to carry. Never, perhaps, did men fight with such animosity. In the heat of the battle, a numerous corps of Hulans dashed upon our infantry and threw it for a moment into disorder: I had caused two 12-pounders to be dragged with ropes to the causeway, under the direction of the chief of battalion Carrere, commanding the artillery of Massena's division, a brave and good officer, who has always accompanied me in this expedition. Citizen Lasseron, lieutenant of the 19th company of the 14th regiment of foot artillery, commanded the first of these two pieces: he had promised me that he would rather die than abandon his post. He kept his word, and, suffering the Hulans to approach within good range, he poured upon them such a discharge of grape as covered the ground with men and horses: thereupon the sudden rallying of our troops, an impetuous charge with the bayonet, and the rout of the enemy.

A reflexion here presents itself. It is easy to be brave in the heat of battle, when a man, occupied by the multitude of objects that strike him, has no time to think of danger; but it is not usual to wait coolly for the enemy who is seen rushing impetuously upon you, and to calculate the distance at which he ought to be received: this calm courage is true bravery; it is that of Lasseron, already made an officer for such a trait.

On the following day, the 29th, we again marched upon St. George, at the moment when the head of the column commanded by General Massena was approaching the village. I ordered citizen Carrere to let the two 12-pounders be brought forward. They were brought to me by that officer, and the most advanced was placed in position under the fire of the Austrian infantry. When the emperor's

cuirassiers set themselves in motion to charge us, the fire of the piece swept down the infantry; and the cuirassiers repulsed on the left, commanded by General Augereau, made application to capitulate. I already occupied the gate of St. George, with adjutant-general Leclerc and your aide-de-camp Marmont. I had caused the French artillery and that taken from the Austrians to be placed as well at the gate of St. George, whence it drove the enemy in flight, as at the different avenues to the villages which he was desirous to occupy.

You know what my zeal urged me to do on this occasion; but I ought to forget myself here and notice only the arm with the command of which I am entrusted.

In the affair of the 16th of last month, which took place on the banks of the Brenta, our artillery, though manœuvring upon most unfavourable ground, did not for a moment fall short of its reputation. The division of the right, commanded by General Massena, began the attack; the enemy advanced in force at the moment when our troops deployed. A piece of light artillery stopped him: he was for returning to the charge and rushing upon the main body, when two pieces of foot artillery, 11-pounders, obliged him to fall back; but his first attack and the fire of his artillery had been so violent that fifteen artillerymen of the two 11-pounders were killed or wounded, three of them having their arms carried away in placing the battery. Lieutenant Vaille powerfully supported these two 11-pounders by the fire of a light artillery howitzer, which he had worked with equal address and intrepidity.

On the left, commanded by General Augereau, the ground was still less adapted for the manœuvres of the artillery. Some pieces were, nevertheless, brought forward to annoy the enemy; I chose the positions for them myself; but no success was obtained from them, owing to the local difficulties. After the expedition, it required all the address of the French to withdraw these pieces, involved in roads, no wider, in a manner, than the carriages, and on which it was impossible to turn them but by main strength, especially the caissons and the *wurts*. These laborious operations are not the less creditable to the officers and artillerymen who derived advantage from so difficult a ground, and united courage and address to conquer the difficulties which opposed the manœuvre.



Let us pass rapidly to the battles of the 25th, 26th, and 27th, in which, to use your own expression, the artillery covered itself with glory at Ronco.

On the 25th, that arm served as on the banks of the Brenta, manœuvring on narrow causeways, avoiding sloughs, supporting the troops at all the points of attack, and earning the commendations of all, but without any striking events.

On the 26th, the enemy having formed the plan of making himself master of the bridge which you had caused to be thrown over the Adige, attacked our troops unexpectedly, and with such impetuosity, that our first posts were driven back almost to the bridge itself: two 5-pounders, commanded by citizen Gabriel, placed on the dike to the left, swept down the Austrians with grape, and strewed the causeway with carcases. This was the signal for the rallying of the French and the defeat of the enemy, who, attacked at the same time on the right and in the centre, left more than 1200 dead on the field of battle and in the marshes, besides a considerable number of prisoners and nine pieces of cannon. Citizen Gabriel died of the wounds which he received in the fight and carried with him the regret and the admiration of the army.

On the 17th, our troops, attacking the village of Arcole, were staggered by the flank fire to which they were exposed. Citizen Delaitre, captain of foot artillery, ordered up the two 5-pounders which he commanded, and his fire checked the enemy: this gave time to our troops to return to the charge and to drive the enemy from Arcole. These two pieces, placed at the avenues of the village, were soon reinforced by three pieces of horse artillery, commanded by Captain Bougeat, which General Dommartin, whose zeal and activity are known to you, sent for, and which the chief of battalion Carrere placed in position to assure to us that important post.

These dispositions were made with the rapidity of lightning, and the more opportunely, as at nightfall the enemy advanced anew to recover Arcole, and a moment might have snatched from us the fruit of a sanguinary combat, which had lasted twelve hours. Citizen Delaitre's two pieces, supported by Captain Bougeat's three pieces of light artillery, which had equally distinguished themselves in the battle, covered the ground with balls, grape, and howitzer

shot, and saved the blood of our soldiers, who, but for the assistance of the artillery, would have been involved at night in an obstinate and perhaps doubtful combat. General Massena bestowed the highest praise on Captains Delaitre and Bougeat, and they received the applause of the troops whom they so ably supported. Lieutenant Gin, who was at the piece directed by Captain Delaitre, deserves also to be mentioned in this report and rewarded.

Nor must I forget the artillery which fought at Rivoli under the command of the chief of brigade Salva. General Guieux has made you a highly honourable report on the subject, and particularly concerning the officer who directed it in all the affairs that have taken place in that division. The officers of artillery have behaved like those of Rome, St. George, and the Brenta: they have defended their pieces, and the brave Captain Branoux was cut and cruelly wounded at his post. What proves also the intrepidity shown by our artillerymen in these different expeditions is that, since the 16th of last month, we number more than 100 killed or wounded.

I shall conclude this report, citizen-general, with a word relative to the officers of the parks of the army: their operations, it is true, have not the brilliancy of military actions; but they contribute to the success of the latter: for no battles are fought, you know, without cannon, arms, and munitions. With all these means of attack and defence, and a thousand other accessories belonging to them, the troops have been supplied with a celerity with which you have testified your satisfaction. You have in particular been astonished at the promptness with which the artillery stores of all kinds have been furnished in the expedition to the Tyrol, since, in this extraordinary course, in which you daily gained new victories, which consequently required forced marches for overtaking the enemy, and carried us further and further from the grand park, from which all the convoys of artillery issued, the distances of the places, the difficulty of the roads, the scarcity of horses, the dearth of forage, were all against us, and yet nobody perceived it: the service of the artillery went on as though in the bosom of abundance. You have experienced the same thing in your later expeditions, and particularly in that of Rome, where the army had munitions, I may say, in profusion: this can be the effect only of excellent order, of persevering

labour on the part of the officers charged with the detail of the parks, and of continual foresight in him who superintends the whole.

Citizen Faultrier, director of the parks of artillery, is an indefatigable, incorruptible man, and fertile in means: I have likewise been well seconded by the chief of brigade Songis, and by the chief of battalion Andreossi, director of the bridges of the army. Here is the place, citizen-general, to say a word on that part of the labours of the arm of the artillery, less striking than that of its parks.

The bridge of Ronco was thrown over the Adige as soon, if one may so say, as ordered: the same was the case with those of Formigosa, Canigniana, the Chiuza, and the equipment of the boats destined for the defence of the upper and lower lakes of Mantua.

Such are the talents of the three chiefs of artillery, superior to their places, that with them I have only general orders to give, and that I can direct the artillery at whatever point of the army I may be, even at the advanced posts, as I have done on several occasions in the expeditions in which I have had the advantage to accompany you: these officers are a treasure.

Citizen Pernety, sub-chief of the staff, is equally laborious and full of talents; you, citizen-general, have frequently employed him yourself; in particular, you charged him with the park of artillery at Borgoforte below Mantua: he is another officer to be encouraged, and who deserves to be promoted and distinguished.

I thank you for having procured the rank of chief of brigade for citizen Longis, and for having made the same application for citizen Andreossi, and for that of chief of battalion for Captain Delaitre. They are so many more friends that you give me for doing good. I beg you to demand also the rank of chief of brigade for citizens Faultrier and Carrere, that of chief of battalion for citizens Pernety and Bougeat; that of captain for Lieutenants Lasseron and Gin, of the foot artillery, and for citizens Viller, Perrin, and Vial, of the horse artillery, who have served with remarkable intrepidity and intelligence in the different expeditions to which I have adverted; and lastly, that of lieutenant for citizen Cheri, quartermaster of light artillery, who particularly distinguished himself on the banks of the Brenta, where, though almost all his artillery-

men were killed or put *hors de combat*, he would not abandon his piece, which he worked like a private and at which he was wounded.

I believe, citizen-general, that I have not forgotten any of those who have done honour to the arm of the artillery in this glorious campaign. I have not mentioned all those who have done their duty well, because I should have been obliged to name, I may say, all the officers and artillerymen: I meant to notice only brilliant actions. If some names have escaped me, I invite my brethren in arms to communicate them to me, and I will lose no time in laying them before you, certain that they will not be left unrewarded by a general who appreciates merit, and who makes his strength consist less in the number of his troops than in the courage and the talents which he collects around him.

I cannot conclude this memorial without mentioning citizen Boinneau, commissary of war, charged with the police of the artillery: he is laborious, upright, and a sworn enemy to rogues; there are some in your army with whom you are at war. I should like to declare it too against the contractors, who let the artillery want horses, forage, clothing, &c. Commissary Boinneau strives to keep them under; but he would have many more means of doing so if he were *commissaire ordonnateur* for the third department of the artillery; he would choose an ordinary commissary to succeed him in his present functions, while he would have the general superintendence over the whole administration of the artillery, under the authority, however, of the *commissaire ordonnateur-in-chief* of the army. This is what I think myself obliged to solicit of you, citizen-general, having it at heart to place the service of the whole department of the arm, the command of which is entrusted to me, upon a good footing, and to extirpate from it, as far as I possibly can, all abuses, in order to be at all times able to second your views.

LESPINASSE.

---

*To General Rusca.*

Milan, 14 Frimaire, year 5 [December 4, 1796].

It is essential, citizen-general, to occupy the fort of Grafignanne, and to put an end to the troubles which disturb the tranquillity of that district. I have not information

sufficiently positive to determine what course it is expedient to pursue: I beg you to give me a detailed account of what I ought to think on the subject.

I authorize you to order the hostages who have been the cause of the disturbance to repair to Milan, if you consider it necessary.

Arrest and send to Milan the pope's general who has arrived at Modena.

Exercise the greatest vigilance, and inform me of all that is plotting: circulate a report that I am sending 6000 men to Modena: that will overawe.

Order immediately that two deputies be sent from the Graffignanne to the congress at Modena; I authorize you to nominate them.

I expect, by the return of the orderly, precise particulars, which shall enable me to come to a determination.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Citizen Faypoult.*

Milan, 14 Frimaire, year 5 [December 4, 1796].

Flachat and Co. were at once receivers of the money arising from contributions and army contractors. The company ought naturally to be entered in the expenses of the army, and of course paid by the paymaster: nevertheless, Flachat's house at Genoa, in the accounts which it has delivered to you, sets down five millions for compensation. It is indispensable to compel by all possible means the speedy refunding of these five millions, part of which will serve to pay the rest of the mandats, particularly that of the marine and of the army of the Alps. The wants of the army are so urgent that we have need to reckon upon the resource of the other part in order to supply the necessities of the service. I beg you, therefore, to employ such means as you shall think most expeditious to get these five millions speedily paid into the coffers of the Republic.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 16 Brumaire, year 5 [December 6, 1796].

Citizen Denni   is an excellent man, well enough for an ordinary *ordonnateur*, but not possessing firmness and talents

sufficient to be at the head. I should wish you to send me the *commissaire ordonnateur* Vilmanzi, of whom everybody speaks in high terms.

I have ordered citizen Ozon, chief agent of forage for the army, to be arrested: he has received 1,700,000 francs during the campaign, and he neglects his duty everywhere: I will have him tried by a council of war. Some signal example is wanted: unfortunately, there is a great deal of intrigue in these councils, which are not severe enough.

One Lenosse, whom public opinion denounces, and who has been specially denounced to me by the monks of a convent, whom he offered for 200 sequins to exempt from the establishment of an hospital there, has been liberated by the council of war during my absence: I have just ordered him to be displaced and turned out of the army; but this is a very slight punishment.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 16 Frimaire, year 5 [December 6, 1796].

General Clarke arrived some days since; I wrote the same evening to M. le Marechal Alvinzi. General Clarke justly thought that a letter ought to be written to the emperor himself, which was despatched with the letter for M. Alvinzi.

General Clarke has communicated to me the object of his mission. If nothing but the situation of this army had been considered, it would have been desirable that the fall of Mantua should have been awaited, for I am afraid that an armistice without Mantua will not be a step towards peace, and that it will be exclusively to the advantage of Vienna and Rome.

You will find herewith three notes relative to the important object with which General Clarke is charged. I hope that in a few days we shall receive the answer from Vienna, and that this general will proceed to his destination, there to fulfil your intentions.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 16 Brumaire, year 5 [December 6, 1796].

The government of Venice has treated the Austrian army very handsomely: M. d'Alvinzi had about him proveditors and supplies.

The Germans, in going off, committed every kind of enormity, cut down fruit-trees, burned houses, plundered villages. At this moment, the enemy are at Trent and on the Brenta. We are on the Adige, and we occupy the line of Montebaldo: it appears that they are considerably reinforcing themselves in the Tyrol, where M. Alvinzi is at this moment.

Nothing has yet arrived for us, neither do we hear anything of those 10,000 men from the Rhine, nor of the 10,000 from the Ocean: these two reinforcements are very necessary for us.

If there is another campaign, we must direct all our efforts towards the Friule, and have for this purpose two armies in Italy: one in the Tyrol, which would occupy Trent and attack the enemy; the other, in the Friule, would march to Trieste, and make itself master of all the establishments of the enemy on that sea.

If you could send 30,000 men hither, we could feed and pay them, and reduce the whole of the Friule; the emperor would be obliged, firstly, to withdraw 30,000 men from towards the Rhine; secondly, to retain at least 20,000 men for second line, otherwise a fortunate battle would endanger Vienna; then there would be scarcely any fighting upon the Rhine, and the theatre of the war would be removed to a great distance from us. To this plan there is but one objection, namely, the diseases which our troops contract in summer in Italy; but this assertion is false: we have had in this army 20,000 sick, of whom 4000 were wounded: of the 16,000 others, 14,000 belong to Mantua, and 2000 to the rest of the army: this is not the ordinary proportion.

Send us, then, 10,000 men from the Rhine and 10,000 from the Ocean; add to these 1500 cavalry and a few companies of artillery, and I promise you, before the month of May, to clear the Rhine and to force the emperor into a war the more disastrous, inasmuch as it will be at the expense of his own territory.

My present army, reinforced by the 10,000 men of the

Rhine and the 10,000 of the Ocean, which you have announced, is sufficient for the Tyrol and Italy.

The 10,000 men besieging Mantua, who will soon be 12,000, with the 20,000 that I am asking for, will form the army of the Friule: with these two armies I will go to Vienna, or at least I will keep during the whole of the next campaign in the emperor's States, living at his expense, ruining his subjects, and carrying the war of insurrection into Hungary.

Lastly, citizens Directors, I think that on the speedy departure of the 10,000 men of the Rhine may depend the fate of Italy; but, if you draw from it 10,000 more and add to them 10 or 15,000 from the Ocean, you will have a right to expect millions of successes and a good peace. From Trieste to Vienna is 100 leagues, without fortresses, without any plan of defence laid down: that country has never been the theatre of war.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Citizen Auzou.*

Milan, 18 Frimaire, year 5 [December 8, 1796].

I have received, citizen, the two letters which you have written to me.

If I have not yet intimated the reason for which I caused you to be arrested, it is because I was waiting for the installation of the new councils of war, which, being composed of officers, will give you judges more enlightened and more capable of understanding you.

I complain of you, because your service has never been organized in the army, and the duty never done; because Peschiera has never been provisioned; because you have never furnished your agents with the necessary means; because, finally, you have let the service drop dead at a critical moment for the army; in short, because you have never been at head-quarters when your presence there was necessary, that is to say, when the enemy was on the point of attacking us.

It is through your culpable negligence that we have lost several hundred horses, that the service of the artillery has suffered considerably, and that the cavalry, obliged to scour the fields and to ransack farms in quest of subsistence, has frequently committed excesses tending to exasperate the



inhabitants against us; all this, moreover, when your department has been paid, since the beginning of the campaign, seventeen or eighteen hundred thousand livres, of which, to a certainty, you have not expended one third.

I beg you to send me, 1, a statement of the daily consumption of forage in the army, or a summary of the orders for one of the past months; 2, a statement of the manner in which the money paid to you has been expended; 3, an exact account of what you have paid to each of your agents; 4, if it is the case that among them there are any who, by misconduct or incapacity, though supplied with funds, have caused the service to fall short, to denounce them to me.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Rusca.*

Milan, 18 Frimaire, year 5 [December 8, 1796].

I learn from the letter brought me by citizen . . . . that the affairs of the Grafignana are somewhat arranged.

Three companies of grenadiers and 150 piquet men of the 19th have marched for Modena. Citizen Lahoz, chief of brigade, has also set out for Modena, with two cohorts of his legion and two pieces of cannon. I have sent an order, which you must have forwarded to the general commanding at Leghorn, to send 300 men by way of Massa and Carrara. I desire that, with these forces and the two cohorts of Modena and Reggio, you proceed to Castel-Novo; that you cause six chiefs to be seized and shot; that you cause the house of a family of that district, well known for having been at the head of the rebellion, to be burned; and that you cause twelve hostages to be apprehended and all those disarmed who have taken part in this rebellion; after which you will publish a general pardon for the past. You will put into the castle of Mont-Alfonso a garrison of 50 men of the cohort of Modena; after which you will give orders to citizen Lahoz to proceed with his two cohorts, and those of Modena and Reggio, 6 pieces of cannon, and 80 horse, to Leghorn, to keep garrison there, under the orders of the commanding general.

You will give immediate orders to the cohort of Bologna and that of Ferrara to repair to Cremona. I shall order General Menard, who commands there, to complete the arming of them.

As for the grenadiers and the piquet of the 19th, if you think that you have no need of them for the Grafignana, keep them at Modena till your operations are finished, and send them back immediately afterwards to Milan.

I forgot to tell you that you must make the government of Modena, the little town of Castel-Novo, and all the villages which have joined in the revolt, take a new oath of obedience to the French Republic.

Make a great stir, make haste, and punish the guilty severely, that they may not take it into their heads to revolt, when we may be busily engaged.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Proveditor General of the Republic of Venice.*

Milan, 18 Frimaire, year 5 [December 8, 1796].

I have not recognized, sir, in the note which you have transmitted to me, the conduct of the French troops in the territory of the republic of Venice, but clearly that of the troops of his majesty the emperor, which, wherever they have passed, have perpetrated horrors that make one shudder.

The style of five out of the six pages, of which the note sent to you from Verona consists, is that of a bad scholar of rhetoric, who has been set the task of making an amplification. Ah! good God! Monsieur the proveditor, the evils inseparable from a country which is the theatre of war, produced by the collision of passions and interests, are already so great and so afflicting for humanity, that, I assure you, it is not worth while to augment them a hundredfold, and to garnish them with fairy tales, if not put forth with special motives, at least extremely ridiculous.

I give the lie direct to any one who dares to say that in the territories of Venice one woman has been violated by the French troops. Would not one suppose, from reading the ridiculous note which has been sent to me, that all properties are ruined, that not a church, not a woman has been spared in the Veronese and the Brescian? The city of Verona, that of Brescia, that of Vicenza, of Bassano, in short the whole terra firma of the State of Venice, suffer severely from this long struggle; but whose is the fault? It is that of a selfish government, which concentrates all its solicitude and all its attentions in the isles of Venice, sacrifices its interests to its prejudices and to its passion, and the welfare

of the entire Venetian nation to the gossip of coteries. Assuredly, if the senate had been moved by the interest of the public weal, it would have felt that the moment was come for closing its territory for ever against the indisciplined armies of Austria, and for protecting its subjects and securing them for ever from the theatre of war.

Threats are held out to me of exciting disturbances and raising the towns against the French army: the people of Vicenza and Bassano know whom they have to blame for the calamities of the war, and can distinguish between our conduct and that of the Austrian armies.

It seems to me that the gauntlet is flung down to us. Are you, in this step, authorized by your government? Does the Venetian republic also mean to declare against us? I am already aware that it has shown the kindest solicitude for the army of General Alvinzi: provisions, succours, money, everything, were lavished upon it: but, thanks to the courage of my soldiers and to the foresight of the French government, I am a match for both perfidy and the declared enemies of the French Republic.

The French army will respect property, morals, and religion; but woe to the perfidious men who would raise up new enemies against it! it is under their influence, no doubt, that murders are daily committed on the territory of Bergamo and Brescia. But, as there are men untouched by the miseries which their misconduct is liable to draw down upon the terra firma, let them learn that we have squadrons. Assuredly, it will not be at the moment when the French government has generously granted peace to the King of Naples, when it has drawn closer the ties which united it with the republic of Genoa and the King of Sardinia, that it can be accused of seeking new enemies; but those who will shut their eyes to its power, murder its citizens, and threaten its armies, shall be the dupes of their perfidies and confounded by the same army which, though not reinforced, has to this hour triumphed over the mightiest enemies.

For the rest, I beg you, monsieur the provveditor, to believe, as to what concerns you personally, the sentiments of esteem, &c.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizen Lallemand, at Venice.*

Milan, 18 Brumaire, year 5 [December 8, 1796].

Insurrectional movements, now completely quelled, have taken place in part of the *ci-devant* duchy of Modena called the Grafignana. They are attributed in a great measure to Frater Zoccolente Magesi, a Cordelier of the convent of Castel-Novo in the Grafignana. I am assured that this villain has retired to Venice: it is possible that he might be found either about the duke or in the convent of the Cordeliers of that city.

I beg you to address a note to the government of Venice, demanding his apprehension, and let me know the result of your proceedings.

BONAPARTE.

*To Monsieur the Provéditeur General of the Republic of Venice, at Brescia.*

Milan, 20 Frimaire, year 5 [December 10, 1796].

If I was surprised, sir, at the tone of the last note sent to me at Verona, it was because, as its extreme exaggeration is evident to all eyes, I thought that it might be the commencement of a system: the conduct held towards the army of M. Alvinzi furnished me with a very natural proof of it. Be this as it may, sir, the French army will pursue the same line in which it set out at the beginning of the campaign; and we shall not forget to punish exemplarily such soldiers as shall deviate from the rules of strict discipline.

I would only request, sir, that you will be pleased to desire the governors under your orders, when they have complaints to make to me, to explain simply what they would wish to have done, without drowning them in a flood of fables. For the rest, you will always find me disposed to give you proofs of the sentiments, &c.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Congress of State.*

Milan, Frimaire 20, year 5 [December 10, 1796].

I see no inconvenience, citizens, in your sending deputies to the federation of Reggio: the union of the patriots constitutes their strength. I gladly seize these circumstances

to destroy reports propagated by malevolence. If Italy wishes to be free, who could henceforth prevent her? It is not enough for the different States to unite; it is requisite, above all, to draw closer the bonds of fraternity between the different classes of the State, to repress in particular the small number of men who love liberty only for the sake of revolution: they are its greatest enemies, and they assume all sorts of shapes to accomplish their perfidious designs.

The French army will never suffer liberty in Italy to be covered with crimes. You can, you ought to be free without revolutions, without running the risks and experiencing the calamities which the French people has experienced. Protect property and persons, and inspire your fellow-countrymen with love and respect for the laws and for the martial virtues, which defend and protect republics and liberty. The scene which several bad men have got up against citizen Greppi has excited an alarm and terror which you should exert yourselves to dispel. Curb the ill-affected, but accustom not a small number of persons to style themselves the people and to commit crimes in its name.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Citizen Lavalette, Aide-de-camp to the General-in-Chief.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

You will go to Placentia; you will pass there the whole day to-morrow; you will give me an account of the state of the two *têtes de pont*, and of that of the artillery which defends them; and you will send me an inventory of it, as also a statement of the situation of the garrison of Placentia. You will send me a list of all the French who are at Placentia, with notes as to how they are employed and how long they have been there. You will visit the hospitals; you will send a report on their state, observations on the manner in which they are kept, and a summary of what demi-brigades the sick belong to, with a list of the officers who are there; you will inspect all the magazines and send me inventories. You will set out to-morrow night from Placentia; you will arrive in the morning of the 23rd at Parma; you will call upon his Royal Highness and compliment him in my name on the treaty of peace which has recently united the two States.

You will obtain a list of all the French at Parma; you

will have those arrested who are there without cause, especially an adventurer who has long called himself my aide-de-camp, named Lemarais, and send him under good escort to me at Milan, as well as a commissary named Fleuri.

You will find herewith a letter for the prime-minister of the duke. I beg him to get made 2000 pair of boots, of which you must bring me a specimen, for which ask General Beaurevoir, and in default of a specimen, a model, and 25,000 pair of shoes.

You will write to me from Parma on all these subjects. You will set out in the night between the 23rd and 24th for Reggio and Modena. You will send me a list of the French in each of these towns, whether officers, soldiers, or *employés*; you will communicate to me everything that strikes you, and that can characterize the spirit of the inhabitants of these two towns, especially as to what concerns their legion.

From Modena you will go and join General Rusca; you will write to me concerning the present state of the Gragnana, the manner in which the Italian legions conducted themselves, the examples made, as well as at Carrara; you will proceed thence to Leghorn. You will send me a list of all the French in that place not belonging to the garrison.

You will write to me as often as possible to inform me of the state of things, and you will not come back till I give you orders, unless something very important should occur to necessitate your return.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Rusca.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

General Vaubois reports to me, citizen-general, that, on the 16th of this month, there was a revolt in the city of Carrara: my intention is that, after you have executed my orders to the letter at Castel-Novo, you go to Carrara, have three of the chiefs shot, and the most conspicuous house of those who have taken part in the rebellion burned, and that you take six hostages, whom you will send to the castle of Milan; they have had the wood of Levinzo cut down: my intention is, that my order, both for Castel-Novo and Carrara, be promptly executed. We must cure the people of the disposition to revolt, and to suffer themselves to be misled by ill-affected persons.

---

BONAPARTE.

*To General Vaubois.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

You will be pleased, citizen-general, to give me an account of the order directing the wood of Levinzo to be cut down. It is always by exactions made by the commissioner of the government that the people are excited to revolt : it is requisite that the punishment of the principal leaders of the revolt be signal. I am giving orders to General Rusca to go thither from Castel-Novo, to have three of them shot and six seized as hostages, and to burn in the town of Carrara the most conspicuous house belonging to one of those who have taken part in the rebellion.

You will be pleased to organize the three demi-brigades which you have in Leghorn, and to form out of them two battalions of the 69th, and the third battalion shall be formed with the troops coming from the Ocean. The 80 horse, the 700 of the Italian legion, and the 900 of the Lombard legion, with six pieces of cannon which are to come to you, will enable you to drive the English from the coast, and to overawe the ill-affected. Let me know what has been the conduct of the military agents in the direction of Massa and Carrara.

On no pretext and on no order whatever suffer anything to leave Leghorn. All the resources which can be there are absolutely necessary for the army, which is in want of every thing, and the finances of which are in the worst state. The *commissaire ordonnateur* was to have given orders for the sale of all the articles that you apply for. As for clothing for the demi-brigades under your command, the experiment made with the 65th has turned out so ill, that it is impossible to think of supplying the troops with clothes in that town : they must be made at Milan.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Senate of Bologna.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

The tax called *imposta* is a heavy burden to the country people of Bologna. The impost called *casuel*, which is paid to the priests by the parishes, has an object of real utility, since it is destined for the maintenance of the ministers of religion ; but it is not less burdensome for the people, who

VOL. II.

M

are obliged to pay for receiving the sacraments; you have abundant means for abolishing these two impositions, and improving the condition of your fellow-citizens.

In consequence of the order which you have given for the expulsion of the monks who are not Bolognese, you have saved the maintenance of three or four hundred persons: it is right that the people should enjoy the advantage which the wisdom of your measures has procured for your Republic.

Decree that there shall be but a single convent of each order in the State of Bologna; suppress all those which have fewer than fifteen members, and apply the considerable resources which this will give you to make good the deficiency which the suppression of the tax called *imposta* would produce in your public treasury, and to indemnify the parish priests and their curates for the deficit which the suppression of the *casuel* would bring upon them.

I beg you to let the annexed order relative to the commanders of Malta be carried into execution. I have not extended it to the monks, because I have thought that you would avail yourselves of it for the relief of the people.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Senate of Bologna and to the Provisional Government of Modena and Ferrara.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

You will be pleased to order all commanders and other holders of benefices or farmers of the Order of Malta to pay into the chest of the senate, in the course of Nivose, one year's revenue, upon pain of forfeiture of their benefices or farms. The receivers of the senate and the governments of Ferrara and Modena will account to the chest of the paymaster of the army for the amount, and, to this end, they will correspond with the *ordonnateur en chef*.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizen Freville, Secretary of Embassy at Florence.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

I had already received, citizen, through the general commanding in Leghorn, the *procès-verbal* drawn up by the officer commanding the French detachment which is gone to Sienna. I have there seen, with the greatest satisfaction



that the conduct of the governor commanding for his royal highness the Grand-duke of Tuscany, had been conformable with the principles of neutrality between that prince and the French Republic.

Disreputable persons of the city of Sienna have proceeded to some excesses injurious to the French army; the time is not far distant when we shall see if the inhabitants of Sienna will keep up that character of contempt which they appear to manifest at home against the French army; they have insulted a detachment of 200 men: they alone, of the whole brave Tuscan people, have deviated from those sentiments of esteem which are generally professed for the French Republic.

Say not a word to the court of Tuscany about these bagatelles, as soon as it is proved that the governor has done all that lay in his power to curb these ill-affected persons.

When the moment arrives, I shall order a French general to teach the inhabitants of Sienna that the French army is not to be insulted with impunity; that, sooner or later, people find it in the midst of them, and in good number, when they least expect it. It is then too late to repent.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Citizen Rusca.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

I beg you, general, to express my satisfaction to the municipalities of Mirandola and St. Felsa on the conduct which they have pursued. You will be pleased to get it authenticated immediately that the five rebels apprehended at Concordia continued to strike those who had the national cockade and to destroy the tree of liberty; after which you will have them shot all five, in the public place of Modena by the Modenese legion. You will send off the two hostages for the castle of Milan, where they shall be strictly guarded. I highly approve the conduct which you have held in this delicate affair; it is to your promptness that the successful issue of your operation is due.

I await with some interest the tidings of your expedition to Castel-Novo and Carrara: I hope you will punctually execute the orders that I have given.

BONAPARTE.

*To General Rusca.*

Milan, 21 Frimaire, year 5 [December 11, 1796].

You will find herewith, citizen-general, the *procès-verbal* of what occurred at Carrara. My intention is that you cause all those denounced as having participated in the revolt to be apprehended; if they have escaped, burn their houses, but not more than one in each village that has misbehaved itself: all the hostages that you think likely to ensure tranquillity shall be seized and sent to Milan. Not that there is any thing to fear while we are conquerors; but, on the slightest reverse, they might stir; which would be a bad example for the imperial fiefs and for the inhabitants of the mountains of the Apennine. Send off for Leghorn the pieces of cannon which are towards Carrara, as soon as tranquillity is perfectly re-established, when you have put the patriots into place: do all that is necessary to frighten the ill-affected and to satisfy the people; cast an eye upon the imperial fiefs, and let me know what we could do to attach their inhabitants to us.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizens Paragallo, Flachat, and Co.*

Milan, 23 Frimaire, year 5 [December 13, 1796.]

You have, gentlemen, received money destined for the subsistence of the army, and it is suffering the most urgent want: the pay has been suspended for two decades: this service ought to be under the responsibility of the treasury, with which you have a bargain, which specially applies to it the produce of all the contributions and of all the goods arising from the conquests of the army of Italy. It is notorious that you have received 5,000,000, of which you have rendered no account. I trust that you will pay immediately 600,000 livres, necessary for the paymaster of the army, and I give you notice that he has, in consequence, drawn bills of exchange upon you for 600,000 francs.

If, from an inconceivable dishonesty, you should have the imprudence to elude discounting the said bill of exchange, you shall be held responsible for whatever events may happen, and for the injury which this would do to the army; and I shall require citizen Faypoult to consider you as bankrupts and to treat you as such.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizen Faypoult.*

Milan, 24 Frimaire, year 5 [December 14, 1796].

Citizen Regnier will communicate to you a resolution [*arrêté*] of the commissioners of the government, which draws upon the house of Flachat and Paragallo for 600,000 livres of the 5,000,000 which they hold, arising from the contributions for the army, and which they ought to have turned into the chest of the paymaster. This sum is destined to discharge the pay, which has been withheld from the army for two decades. If they will not accept the bills of exchange, I require you to have seals put upon the house of Flachat, Castelli, Paragallo, and Co., and to endeavour to procure that money for the paymaster of the army. Operations of the greatest consequence may be involved in the execution of this measure. I have ordered General Baraguay d'Hilliers to have seals put upon the papers of the correspondent of that house at Milan.

The army is in want of everything; the pay is two decades in arrear: we have now no resources but in the 5,000,000, and the 2,000,000 which ought to be paid us according to the convention, the ratifications having been exchanged in Paris. The paymaster is going to draw for 2,000,000 for this latter object.

You ought to have, besides the seven chests coming from Bologna, four or five from Milan, which have been estimated, I believe, at 8 or 900,000 francs. Take infinite care of them, for the time will come when we shall have need of them to feed the army by borrowing upon them.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Baraguay d'Hilliers.*

Milan, 24 Frimaire, year 5 [December 14, 1796].

Be pleased, citizen-general, to send for citizen Rouillet, chief agent of Flachat and Co.; require him to pay into the chest of the paymaster the four or five millions which he has, proceeding from the contributions; and, on his refusal, put him under arrest and seals upon his papers.

BONAPARTE.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief  
Bonaparte.*

Paris, 1 Nivose, year 5 [December 12, 1796].

We have just been informed, citizen-general, by citizen Poussielgue, that the negociation with which he is charged at the court of Turin is so far advanced, that he is only waiting for our final intentions and sufficient powers to conclude it by a definitive treaty. An alliance with that court seemed necessary to us at the moment when the overtures for that purpose were made: it is less so now that the peace with Naples and the strengthening of our military position diminish the influence of the King of Sardinia; but, of whatever weight those circumstances may be, our determination is independent of them: we wish to profit by the victories of the Republic, not only to diminish the number of its enemies, but also to increase the number of its allies, in order to arrive the more speedily at a general peace, and to consolidate in Europe the opinion of the honour of the French government in regard to partial treaties of peace that it has concluded.

Citizen Poussielgue submits to us, in the memoir, a copy of which accompanies this, the bases upon which he has negociated; they are conformable to our preceding instructions, and, after the assent given to them by the King of Sardinia, all that remains to be done is to draw up the articles of the treaty: we charge you, citizen-general, with that important function. When you have settled them and signed the draft, citizen Poussielgue will convert it into an official treaty by means of the full powers forwarded to him by the same courier: we are informing him of this disposition, in virtue of which we authorize him solely to conclude with the minister plenipotentiary of the King of Sardinia.

The advantages which must accrue to that power from our alliance offensive and defensive with it ought to induce it to increase the strength of the troops which it brings into the field against the common enemy: the guarantee of its present territory and the promise of an aggrandizement, if, however, it be compatible with the conditions of the general peace, seem not to be sufficiently compensated by the succours which it offers for the continuation of the war. Still, whatever may be the effect of this observation, which may still be usefully applied, as well as those which you may

add, we shall subscribe to what shall be stipulated conformably to what precedes.

If the siege of Mantua appears to you indispensable for reducing that place before the opening of the next campaign, you will assuredly seize the occasion which offers to obtain from Piedmont the necessary equipage for a regular attack. The war with the Barbets must also engage your attention; it is time that it should cease, and that the court of Turin should take decisive measures on the subject. As the operations require cavalry, it would be desirable to procure the means of augmenting that which you have.

If there are other matters of less general interest, which may deserve a particular or verbal convention, we commit to you, citizen-general, the task of producing it. The interval of your military labours could not be better filled than by the conclusion which promises you new ones.

BARRAS, President.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 1 Nivose, year 5 [December 12, 1796].

Your letters of the 16th Frimaire, citizen-general, have reached us. We acknowledge with you that it is time to form our plan for the next campaign, for, from this moment, we must consider it as inevitable. It is no longer, in a manner, for the fate of Italy that we have to fight: the speedy fall of Mantua will confirm that conquest, and we must think of carrying our forces and our hopes still further. To penetrate into the Friule with confidence, we must have a separate corps to curb the Tyrol till the army of the Rhine and Moselle, appearing again upon the Danube, forces the enemy to evacuate it. You will be in a condition to divide yourself into two armies.

The 10,000 men from the Coasts of the Ocean, whom we have announced to you, are already crossing the Alps; 30,000 men will be detached from the Rhine, and march immediately to join you. We hope that this movement will be effected in time to enable you to commence operations in the month of Ventose. We conceive that 20,000 men present would be a sufficient reinforcement; but the inaccuracy of the statements of the effective force and desertions on the road obliges us to increase the number of the troops in a superior proportion even to your demands.

Prepare, citizen-general, to make a use of these forces, the effect of which shall be decisive against the Empire. We are stripping ourselves on the Rhine in a manner that might prove disastrous, if the enemy were not pre-occupied by your operations, and obliged to fall back from that quarter to oppose your progress on the new theatre of war upon which you will be acting.

Observe, moreover, that it will not be possible for us to send you further succours, since there is no corps of reserve left in the interior, unless your successes have a powerful influence on the operations upon the Rhine, and afford us the faculty of extracting from it a few more troops.

As to the departure of General Clarke for Vienna, we refer on that point to our last despatch: we feel with you how important it is that his arrival at that court should be preceded by the fall of Mantua.

BARRAS, President.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Bussolingo, 2 Nivose, year 5 [December 22, 1796].

I have received your paper for my division; I sent it to the generals of brigade, with orders to cause the officers you have chosen to be immediately acknowledged.

The pieces of cannon are established for signals, and the ten orderlies on horseback at Castel-Novo.

Your aide-de-camp will give you an account of the second line to be taken at Rivoli, and of the position of the pieces of cannon. We shall not visit Castel-Novo till to-morrow morning.

I send you a copy of the report of my spy.

I wish I could give you an account of the punishment of the authors of the insubordination which has taken place in General Vial's brigade when informing you of it. I have placed twenty-one culprits or accused in the hands of the council of war. I have recommended to the president to ascertain as speedily as possible which is the most guilty, and not to be severe with the multitude. They demanded bread, which was delayed for some hours by the bad weather; but the ration arrives every day. They demand shoes, and a cry louder than any other has been raised, "No money, no soldiers!" In truth, these new troops

have not that admirable patience of our old troops ; but, a little firmness and perseverance, and we will make soldiers of them.

JOUBERT.

*Field-Marshal Alvinzi to Marshal Count Wurmser at Mantua.*

Trent, December 13, 1796 [25 Frimaire, year 5].

I have the honour to transmit to your excellency, literally and in the same language in which I received them, the orders of his majesty, dated the 5th of this month.

“ You will take care to desire Marshal Wurmser forthwith not to discontinue his operations. You will let him know that I expect from his valour and his zeal that he will defend Mantua to the last extremity ; that I know him too well, and also the brave general officers who are with him, to be afraid that he will surrender himself a prisoner, especially if there were any idea of transporting the garrison into France, instead of sending it back into my territories. I desire him, in case of his being reduced to the utmost extremity and without resources for subsistence, to find means, first destroying as far as possible every thing in Mantua that would be preferably useful to the enemy, and taking away with him such part of the troops as are capable of following him, to gain and pass the Po, to proceed for Ferrara or Bologna, and in case of need to retire upon Rome or into Tuscany. He will find in that quarter very few enemies, and good-will for provisioning his troops, for which, in case of need, he must use force, as well as to surmount any other obstacle.

“ FRANCIS.”

A trustworthy man, a cadet in the regiment of . . . , will deliver this important despatch to your excellency. I will add, that the present situation and the necessities of the army forbid the attempting of any new operations for three weeks or a month, without exposing it again to the danger of miscarriage. I cannot too earnestly exhort your excellency to hold out as long as possible in Mantua . . . the order of his Majesty serving you, moreover, for a general direction. At any rate, I beg your excellency to let me hear from you through sure channels, which I may be able to make use of in Mantua for corresponding with you.

ALVINZI.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Mormiruolo, 5 Nivose, year 5 [December 25, 1796].

In consequence of the orders which I had given to exercise the utmost vigilance at the advanced posts, especially in the night, three men were taken the night before last endeavouring to introduce themselves into Mantua. As soon as they were brought to me, I questioned each of them, but fixed particularly on one who appeared to have most means, and whom I suspected of being charged with an important mission. After causing him to be searched, but to no purpose, I told him that he had despatches, and that I was sure of it from my knowledge of the means employed by their generals. I was far from presuming those which they had used in regard to him; I doubt even whether the idea which occurred to me ever suggested itself to anybody else. I maintained that he had the despatches in his inside; I threatened to order him to be shot if he persisted in denying it. The air of assurance with which I spoke disconcerted him; he stammered; I pressed him, and he confessed the fact. I then told him that I ordered him, if he wished to avoid being shot, to give me notice whenever he had a call of nature, that I might ascertain whether he had not imposed upon me. He conformed to my orders, and to-day voided the letter which I send you herewith.

This letter, marked duplicate, led me to presume that Wurmser might have received the other. In order to thwart his passage of the Po, I shall order the greatest vigilance on that side, while awaiting your instructions; and, in case of need, I shall make use of the battalion which is in reserve at Goito.

No doubt, general, you have been apprized by General Kilmaine, that he has left me *ad interim* the chief command of the blockade. As I owe you frank observations, I will tell you that I have received no instructions, and that, if I am obliged to act, I have no other guide but a sincere desire to serve my country. I am also informed, general, that General Kilmaine, wishing to relinquish the command of the cavalry, intended to propose to you to give it to me: I shall only observe that it is six years since I quitted that arm, and that I should not like to leave the line in which I have always served with tolerable satisfaction.



In the last visit which I paid to the advanced posts to superintend the operations, I saw with surprise that the houses adjacent to the advanced posts were inhabited by private persons: it is through them that the business of spies is carried on in Mantua: my opinion is that they ought all to be sent to the rear. I await your orders on this subject.

The General of Division AL. DUMAS.

---

*To the Commissaire Ordonnateur-in-Chief.*

Milan, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 28, 1796].

A very great abuse exists, citizen *ordonnateur*; there is no kind of order in the accounts of the paymaster, neither is there in the delivery of your orders. My intentions are, that you should give the necessary instructions to the paymaster, that his accounts be kept in such a manner as to enable us to see every day how we stand.

The paymaster of the army shall pay, out of the funds which are put into his chest for the payment of the troops, nothing but the pay of the demi-brigades, of the artillery, of the sappers, of the miners, and of the cavalry, as well as the appointments of the officers of the army and of the commissaries of war.

There shall be every month 150,000 francs at your disposal, out of which, agreeably to the order of the minister of the 11th Nivose, year 4, you shall be reimbursed what is necessary for dressing, medicines, and shoeing of the horses, that is to say, three francs per month per horse: it will be requisite, therefore, that you should send an ordinance to each council of administration, giving notice to the paymaster that you will assign to it a sum out of the 150,000 livres.

You will likewise cause to be paid out of this sum the gratuity on taking the field, and indemnities for the loss of baggage: the expenses of offices [*bureaux*] for the whole army shall be included in the general statement which the chief of the staff will lay before you.

The expenses of posting for the whole army and the extraordinary expenses shall be paid by the chief of the staff. You will remit to him for this purpose, at the commencement of every month, 50,000 livres, out of the 150,000 which are at your disposal; and, at the end of every month,

he must submit to you a statement of the expenses of the bureaux of the whole army, and the expenses of posting.

On no pretext whatever must you expend more than 100,000 francs per month for the objects above mentioned, and 50,000 for the two articles with which the chief of the staff is charged.

When extraordinary circumstances occasion a necessity for an increase of funds, you must first give an order to the paymaster, to the end that the funds placed at your disposal be approved.

The appointments of the surgeons and other administrators of the hospitals shall be paid out of the funds placed at your disposal, and you will arrange with the paymaster; but the funds destined for the pay of the troops must not, upon any pretext whatever, be diverted to any other purpose.

For the month of Nivose, a fund has been formed for the pay [*prêt*], and 100,000 livres have been placed at your disposal; I shall direct 50,000 to be remitted in execution of the present order. I beg you to let me know what sum is necessary for the pay of the officers of health.

Pray send a copy of this letter to the paymaster of the army.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 28, 1796].

There are at this moment in Lombardy three parties:—

1, that which suffers itself to be guided by the French; 2, that which is desirous of liberty, and even manifests its desire with some impatience; 3, the party friendly to the Austrians and hostile to the French. I support and encourage the first, I curb the second, and I repress the third.

It is false that I have augmented the contribution of Lombardy eight millions, and the party who has sent you a memorial based on that fact had much better pay the five millions which he and his partners owe the Republic, and which they have robbed the army of, than talk of a country where his company has incurred universal contempt by the knaveries of all kinds which it has committed.

The Cispadane republics are divided into three parties:—

1, the friends of the old government; 2, the partisans of

an independent but somewhat aristocratic constitution ; 3, the partisans of the French constitution, or of pure democracy. I repress the first, support the second, and moderate the third.

I support the second and moderate the third, because the second party is that of the wealthy proprietors and the priests, who would in the end gain the mass of the people, whom it is essential to rally round the French party. The third party is composed of young men, writers, and persons who, in France, as in all other countries, do not change the government, and are fond of liberty only for the sake of producing a revolution.

The Germans and the pope are joining their influence to excite insurrection in the Apennines ; their efforts are unavailing : part of the Graignana, however, did revolt, as well as the little town of Carara. I sent a small movable column to bring those people to reason, and to make terrible examples, which teach those mountaineers that we are not to be played with. The revolt of the Apennines, if it were to take place at the moment when we had the enemy on our hands, would give us great embarrassment. As these mountains extend to Tortona, the inhabitants might obstruct the communications. I have, therefore, my eyes constantly upon them.

At this moment the Cispadane republics are assembled in congress, which they hold at Reggio.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 28, 1796].

You will find herewith the letter written by General Alvinzi and General Berthier's answer : in consequence, Baron Vincent and General Clarke are to meet at Vicenza on the 13th of this month. My opinion is that, whatever may be stipulated for the *status quo* of Mantua, the execution of it will always be impossible. If the emperor consents to conclude the armistice without the pope, the advantage of being able to squeeze thirty millions from Italy this winter, and to give fifteen of them to the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and the Rhine, is a consideration, inasmuch as it enables us to open the next campaign with advantage.

But if the emperor insists on including the pope, the armistice will cause us to lose Mantua and the money of Rome, and give the pope time to organize a military force with Austrian officers: that would turn all the chances against us for the next campaign.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 28, 1796].

The Venetians having overwhelmed General Alvinzi's army with attentions, I have thought it right to take a new precaution by seizing the castle of Bergamo, which overlooks the town of that name, so as to prevent the enemy's partisans from coming to disturb our communication between the Adda and the Adige.

Of all the provinces of the Venetian States, that of Bergamo is the worst affected towards us. There was in the town of that name a committee formed to circulate the most ridiculous news concerning the army; it was in the territory of this province that more of our soldiers were murdered than in any other; and it was there that the desertion of the Austrian prisoners was favoured. Though the taking of the citadel of Bergamo was not a military operation, it nevertheless required dexterity and firmness: General Baraguay d'Hilliers, whom I charged with it, acquitted himself admirably on the occasion: I shall give him the command of a brigade, and I hope that, in the first engagements, he will earn the rank of general of division.

You will find herewith several papers of my correspondence with the Duke of Parma, which it would be well to communicate to our ambassador in Spain; that he might make a merit of them with the court of Madrid.

I have had an interview with M. Manfredini, who, as you know, was governor to the emperor, Prince Charles; and the grand-duke of Tuscany: I agreed with him, after two hours' parleying and diplomatic finessing, that, for the sum of two millions, I would evacuate Leghorn: he complained bitterly of poverty. I expect the grand-duke's answer in a few days.

The Neapolitans have caused the peace to be notified to me, and applied for permission to return to Naples: I re-

plied that the government had not yet signified the peace to me, that I was going to send off a courier to you, and that I should wait for orders. I beg you to let me know your intentions on this subject. I should wish, however, before I let them go, to have come to some settlement with Rome, for that cavalry is a pledge to me that the King of Naples will adhere to the peace and behave as he ought.

As for Rome, the pope has, at this moment, assembled all his forces at Faenza and in the other towns of the Romagna, where there are nearly six thousand men. As this excites great alarm in the Bolognese, and might serve to favour the escape of Wurmser from Mantua, agreeably to an article of the armistice, I will have hostages seized in the different countries, conformably with the custom of all nations, and these hostages shall be the citizens most attached to the pope and the greatest enemies of the French party; by this means, the country will organize itself in the same manner as Bologna did. I will sequester all the revenues of the Romagna and the March, to indemnify myself for the non-payment of the fifteen millions according to the armistice. I will put into Ancona the 1500 men whom I have in Leghorn, and by this means I shall remove to a distance that corps of the enemy which seems to combine itself with Alvinzi's position at Padua and the order which the emperor has just given to Wurmser; and I shall find money for the army.

If I defer the execution of this plan for a few days, it is: 1, that I must let a few days pass, that the impression produced upon the Venetians by the occupation of Bergamo may entirely wear off; 2, that I must be certain that the reinforcements which you have promised me are on the way and really coming. You are aware that I must have at least 3000 men to go to Ancona, which is forty leagues from Bologna. If the 10,000 men from the Ocean and the 10,000 from the Rhine, whom you have so long promised, arrive at last, I will take 6000 and go to Rome. You must be sensible that in all these hypotheses, it is essential to continue to hold as hostages the 3000 Neapolitans, who will keep in respect the court of Naples, which, moreover, as I am assured, is already beginning to disarm. This is another reason why I put off my operations for a few days.

Citizen Poussielgue has reported to you in detail the issue of the negotiation with Turin. It seems that those

folks cannot accustom themselves to the new state of things. The new king is introducing order into the finances, winning his subjects, and, I have no doubt, hoping, by the continuation of the war, to be again able to play a part. I think our policy in regard to this prince ought to consist in keeping up in his country a leaven of discontent, and particularly in making sure of the destruction of the fortresses towards the Alps.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 28, 1796].

Citizen Muiron has served, ever since the first days of the Revolution, in the corps of the artillery; he especially distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon, where he was wounded when entering the celebrated English redoubt by an embrasure.

His father was then apprehended as farmer-general: young Muiron presented himself before the National Convention and the revolutionary committee of his section covered with the blood which he had just shed for his country: he obtained the liberation of his father.

On the 13th Vendemiaire, he commanded one of the divisions of artillery which defended the Convention: he turned a deaf ear to the seductions of a great number of his acquaintance and associates. I asked him, if the government could depend upon him. "Yes," said he, "I have taken an oath to uphold the Republic; I form part of the armed force; I shall obey in obeying my officers; I am, besides, from my way of thinking, an enemy to all revolutionists, and quite as much of those who adopt the maxims and the action of revolution only to re-establish a throne, as of those who would fain re-establish that cruel system by which my father and my relations so long suffered." He behaved himself, in fact, like a brave man, and was very serviceable on that day which saved liberty.

Ever since the commencement of the campaign in Italy, I have had citizen Muiron for my aide-de-camp: he has rendered me essential services in almost all the actions; and, finally, fell gloriously on the field of battle of Arcole, leaving a young widow eight months pregnant.

I solicit, in consideration of the services rendered in the

different campaigns of this war by citizen Muiron, that the citizenne widow Berault Courville, his mother-in-law, be erased from the list of emigrants, in which she is entered, though she never emigrated, and also citizen Charles Marie Berault Courville, his brother-in-law. This young man was fourteen when he was put upon the list of emigrants, being in a foreign country for his education.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 28, 1796].

The army of General Alvinzi is on the Brenta and in the Tyrol, the army of the Republic along the Adige, occupying the line of Montebaldo, Corona, Rivoli. We have an advanced guard in advance of Porto Legnago.

Mantua is blockaded with the utmost strictness. On the 2nd of this month, General Dumas surprised a spy who was entering the city: it was an Austrian cadet who had been sent from Trent by Alvinzi. After much hesitation, he confessed that he was the bearer of despatches; and he actually voided twenty-four hours afterwards (on going to the close stool) a small cylinder containing the accompanying letter from the emperor. If this method of swallowing despatches were not well known, I would send you the particulars to be transmitted to our generals, because the Austrians frequently make use of this method. Spies in general keep such things in them for several days: if the bowels are moved, they search for the cylinder, steep it in an elixir, and swallow it again. The cylinder is steeped in a solution of sealingwax in vinegar.

You will see by the emperor's letter that Wurmser must really be at the last extremity. The garrison has nothing to eat but polenta and horse-flesh, yet it is possible that its surrender may be longer delayed: the Austrians have such hope in that fortress that it is not surprising they should submit to any extremities rather than give it up. The course which the emperor orders is not very dangerous.

The free corps of Vienna volunteers, 4000 strong, has arrived at Trent; there is a corporal in it who is chamberlain; it is a national guard. Three thousand men, from the Rhine, have already arrived at Trent, and 4000 recruits from Hungary. The roads are covered with troops. We,

VOL. II.

N

on the contrary, we are still looking out for the first of the reinforcements announced at the commencement of the campaign, which do not arrive.

The statement of situation which you have sent me is full of double entries and blunders. I took the field with an army of 24,000 infantry, a division of the Col de Tende and of Fenestre, and the garrisons of the Maritime Alps, of 8000 men, 6000 of which joined me after the battle of Mondovi, when descending the Col de Tende. I had, therefore, 30,000 men of the former army of Italy in the plains of Piedmont.

The army of the Alps furnished me with 8500 men, who ought not to be considered as a reinforcement, since the army of the Alps was defending the frontiers of Italy. The army of Italy, properly so called, may therefore be considered as having consisted originally of 38,500 infantry.

The government has reinforced it with 2600 men coming from General Chateauneuf-Randon, and with the 33rd, 6th, 40th, and 58th demi-brigades from La Vendée, and the 14th from Paris, making in all 10,000 men.

If then the army had not sustained any loss, it would consist of 51,100 infantry; but of these 4000 have been killed on the field of battle, as the annexed statement proves: 1000 wounded, past service; 2000 dead in the hospitals; total, 7000. Thus we have lost 7000 men, of whom 1000 were horse, pioneers, or artillerymen; of course there remain 45,100 infantry, of which it is composed.

You see, then, citizens Directors, that your army has received reinforcements to the amount not of 57,000 men, but of 12,600 only, during a campaign in which there have been so many battles, and in which the same men have destroyed the Sardinian army and the army of Beaulieu, 73,000 strong; the army of Beaulieu reinforced by 20,000 men from the Rhine, commanded by Wurmser; the army of Wurmser, reinforced by 18,000 men drawn from Poland, 6000 from the Rhine, and 12,000 recruits, commanded by Alvinzi; and we are on the point of having to do with the wrecks of all these armies, reinforced by 4000 Vienna volunteers, 3000 men from the Rhine, 3000 recruits already arrived, 15,000 whom, as I am assured, the enemy expect in the course of January, besides recruits who are arriving from all quarters.

It has required good luck and good play to conquer Al-



vinzi. How hope to conquer Alvinzi, reinforced by 30 or 35,000 men?

The recovery of the sick is assuredly an advantage, but Wurmser's sick recover too in Mantua.

You announce 10,000 men from the Ocean and 10,000 from the Rhine, but none of them ever arrive; and yet it is six decades since you first gave me notice of them. It is even said that the head of the column of the Ocean has turned back.

It appears from the emperor's letter that a struggle is preparing for January: manage at least that the succours which were to have come against Alvinzi, and with which the victory of Arcole has enabled us to dispense, shall actually arrive, otherwise you sacrifice the army most attached to the constitution, and which, be the movements of the enemies of the country what they may, will be attached to the government and to liberty with the same zeal and the same intrepidity which it has shown in preserving Italy for the Republic.

I say with sincere satisfaction that there is not an army more solicitous for the preservation of the sacred constitution, the only refuge of liberty and of the French people. Those here hate and are ready to fight the new revolutionists, let their object be what it will. No more revolution—this is the fondest hope of the soldier: he does not demand peace, which he inwardly desires, because he knows that it is the only way not to obtain it, and that those who do not desire it call loudly for it that it may not arrive. The soldier is preparing for fresh battles, and if he sometimes casts an eye upon the spirit which animates several cities of the interior, it is with regret that he sees deserters welcomed, protected, and the laws without force at the moment when the fate of the French people is to be decided.

Lastly, citizens Directors, the enemy is drawing troops from the Rhine to send them to Italy; do the same; succour us; nothing but the too marked disproportion of the enemy can conquer us. We ask you for men only; we will procure everything else for ourselves, with the greater facility the greater our number.

Herewith a petition of the officers of the 57th, demanding the release of citizen Maçon, their chief of brigade, arrested by General Willot.

BONAPARTE.

N 2

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Trent, December 13, 1796 [23 Frimaire, year 5].

I have just received orders from his Majesty the Emperor relative to the letter which M. the general of division Clarke has addressed to him, and which I transmitted on the 9th of this month. His Majesty desiring that Baron de St. Vincent, one of his adjutant-generals, may confer with General Clarke and have an explanation with him on several points of his letter to his Majesty, I have the honour to request you, monsieur le general, to send me a safe-conduct for the Baron de Vincent, for himself, his aide-de-camp and one servant, forasmuch as that this interview may be assented to and take place. In this latter case, I should propose Vicenza as the place most convenient for both armies, and which, besides, is not occupied as a fixed post by either of them. I would likewise beg you, monsieur le general, to let me know on what day Monsieur le General Clarke is likely to reach that city, that the Baron de St. Vincent may regulate his movements accordingly.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ALVINZI.

*To M. the General Baron d'Alvinzi, commanding the army  
of his Majesty the Emperor in Italy.*

Milan, 6 Nivose, year 5 [December 26, 1796].

I have communicated to the general of division Clarke and to the general-in-chief Bonaparte your letter dated Trent, December 13th, and I transmit a letter from General Clarke for you.

The general-in-chief Bonaparte accepts the proposal which you make of Vicenza for the place where Baron de Vincent and General Clarke shall confer; in consequence, I have the honour to inform you that General Clarke will be at Vicenza on the 13th Nivose, [January 2nd] whither M. Baron de Vincent may proceed at the same time.

The general-in-chief Bonaparte will send an officer of the staff with a trumpeter and two hussars on the 12th Nivose [January 1st] to Vicenza, to provide lodgings there for General Clarke, and on the same day orders shall be given to the commandant of the advanced guard of the French army towards Vicenza, not to 'push any patrolle into that

city after twelve o'clock at noon; and that, during all the time that General Clarke and Baron Vincent are conferring, the advanced posts of the army shall not approach nearer than three miles to Vicenza: these same posts shall have twelve hours notice of the moment when the service shall resume its ordinary course. If you, M. the general-in-chief, will be pleased to give orders for the same dispositions, all will be settled.

I enclose herewith the safe-conduct for which you apply. I request you also to give one for General Clarke, an aide-de-camp, a secretary of legation, and two servants, and likewise a second for an officer of the staff, a trumpeter, and two hussars, and to let them be delivered to the officer who brings this letter.

You will be pleased also to signify to me your consent to the dispositions in question.

AL. BERTHIER.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Bergamo, 6 Nivose, year 5 [December 26, 1796].

I inform you, general, that, agreeably to the notice I gave you, I made myself master last night of the citadel of Bergamo by a combination of stratagem and force, which was crowned with success. The particulars of the operation are these.

The second battalion of the 57th demi-brigade, 650 strong, and a detachment of dragoons, proceeded on the evening of the 4th, as I sent you word in my letter of the 4th, to Stezano. This advanced guard was followed, on the morning of the 5th, by the third battalion of the 57th demi-brigade, 350 strong, the horse artillery, 30, the foot artillery, 94; the one with two 8-pounders, the other with two 3-pounders, which I had taken in passing through Cassano, for want of howitzers, and 200 dragoons. With these troops I started from Cassano precisely at six in the morning; I arrived in the greatest order at Stezano; I waited at Stezano for intelligence on which I could rely, and particularly for the return of citizen Robineau, captain of engineers, whom I had charged to carry my letter to the proveditor, to pick up all the news he could, and to reconnoitre the citadel.

Reports had concurred in assuring me that there were, as well in the upper town, which is fortified, as in the citadel

and the suburbs, 1200 infantry, 500 cavalry, 200 Venetian artillery, 700 Neapolitan horse, and that the upper town was the important part to gain possession of: I therefore made dispositions so as not to arrive before nightfall. A quarter of a league from the town, I went on with the dragoons, and the infantry had orders to follow me: some difficulties were made at the gate; I spoke roughly to the guards, and entered, with carbine raised, at a long trot, with the dragoons. Officers sent by the proveditor would have conducted me to the lodgings which I had expressly bespoken in the marketplace and at the lazaretto in the lower town. I expressed a wish to speak to the proveditor himself; they told me that it was impossible for me to enter the upper town with all my escort. Without insisting, I affected to limit myself to 25 men, and secretly sent orders to the rest to follow me so closely that in two minutes' gallop they could overtake me, and I sent the infantry directions to enter the town at the charge step and to follow the movement. Arriving by a very rough ascent at the gates of the upper town, the barrier was opened, the drawbridges let down. I darted upon the first that was lowered; my escort followed me; the gate was opened; but they insisted on replacing the posts behind me: I would not hear of it, continued upon the bridge, and required that my communications should remain free; they refused; I parleyed, I threatened: messengers ran off to the proveditor; the cavalry arrived, and immediately seized the bridges, gates, posts, browbeating the sentries, and I ordered the Venetian guard to go in. The cavalry remained in column upon the bridges under the direction of the adjunct Brugère. I repaired immediately to the proveditor with 50 dragoons, and, having chatted with him in an extremely vague manner and for a good while, that the infantry might have time to arrive, I asked to speak to him in private, and, abruptly changing my tone, I acquainted him with your orders and my mission. He started with astonishment, and after a vain attempt to evade, by proposing to send off a courier to Brescia, where his superior was, and representing that it was impossible for him to satisfy me without being authorized to do so, he wanted to give some secret orders; I bade him not to leave his place, and traced around him the circle of Popilius, allowing him but five minutes to decide. The infantry was in the upper town; I could be arrogant without imprudence; he then asked me to signify to him

your orders in writing, and to state that, in case of refusal, I should employ force. I thought that I could do so without inconvenience, and he immediately gave me the major of the place, that he might cause the gates of the citadel to be delivered up to me. I sent thither the chief of battalion of engineers Campredon, with the third battalion of the 57th demi-brigade. All these troops bivouacked in horrible weather; they were perished; but I hope that they will dry themselves to-day in the Venetian barracks, which I destine for them.

I have had no occasion to try the courage of the troops, but they have observed the best order and the best discipline; and all the officers, each in his respective functions, have multiplied the proofs of their zeal, intelligence, and punctuality.

BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Bergamo, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 29, 1796].

I inform you, general, that, from the more accurate reconnaissance which has been made this morning of the citadel of Bergamo, with reference to the upper and lower town, it has been acknowledged and agreed that the arming of the citadel would sufficiently fulfil the interesting object for the twofold purpose of keeping both in submission by the fear of assured destruction. To-morrow, therefore, labourers will be set to work to repair the roads, up which, by dint of main strength, it will be possible to get artillery; and I will not lose a moment to accelerate the important operation of putting the castle into a state of defence, by making the labours of the artillery, the engineers, and the provisioning, go hand in hand. The general of brigade Songis has also examined with care the resources in artillery and ammunition which the magazines of the place afford. Slender as they are, I rely, as you do, upon his activity and his talents to make the most of them. He is writing to you, I believe, on this subject, for we must have hands, cordage, machines, and money: only about twelve pieces at most will be required. Is it your intention that the surplus of the Venetian artillery found in the city shall be shut up in the citadel? There are about 1800 muskets; shall I dispose of them by sending them to a French depot, after taking what may be necessary?

All is very quiet. I have learned by authentic reports from the lower town that the minds of the people have recovered from the alarm, that the emigrants who were here have fled, and that the aristocracy, awed by fear, is content to roar in private. I am on the best terms with the proveditor and the bishop: one enjoys, as it appears, but little consideration, but the pastor possesses the respect of all, and to him I shall pay most attention. He seems to me not to live in high style: the furniture of his house is more than modest, and I have not precisely asked him to dine with me, but I shall force him to do so in a few days, according to your intentions.

I avail myself of my sojourn here to make reconnaissances in all the débouchés of the mountains. I went yesterday to Strozza, through Almé and Almeno, to inspect the passes from the Val Brembano into the Val Salina; to-day I am reconnoitring the Val Serio, passing through Alzano; and the day after I purpose to set out on an excursion of four days to reconnoitre Parzegno, as far as Piazza Santo Martino and the Val Brembano, which is the direct route from Bergamo to Morbegno. I shall connect all these different reports; when they are finished I shall transmit them to you. The adjunct Charles will set out to-morrow morning to execute your orders. He will go by Udine and Lovere into the Val Camonica. From all the reports, I doubt whether he can have intelligence of the enemy before Ponte de Legno.

BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Castel-Novo, 8 Nivose, year 5 [December 28, 1796].

I owe you an account of my operations upon Castel-Novo and in the Grafignana. Our march was very toilsome on account of the bad weather, and it was fortunate for us that we did not take the small road by San Pellegrino: besides being covered with snow, it had been broken up by the rebels.

The government of Lucca gave us a very good reception, and, on my part, I made the troops observe strict discipline. A Lombard grenadier was shot for having committed gross excesses: a report of his sentence is addressed to the general staff.

Deputies from Castel-Novo brought me the keys of Fort Alfonso to Lucca, assuring me that the rebels had fled. I have fulfilled your views by despatching for Leghorn the Lombard cohort, that of Reggio, the six pieces of artillery served by the Lombard artillerymen, and the detachment of eighty hussars of the 7th regiment.

When I have made an inventory of Fort Alfonso and that of Verrucole, I shall put garrisons in them, and send the surplus of the Modena cohort to Leghorn. The French detachment of the 9th demi-brigade will escort the hostages, whom I shall pick out of the wealthiest class of the inhabitants of the Grafignana.

Several of the revolters are in prison, but the leaders of the insurrection have fled: I am for causing preparations to be made for their trial, to give an example to the province by punishing those who have taken the most prominent part in this revolt. I shall conform to your instructions in regard to the less guilty.

I shall send off to-night a detachment to disarm Vagli di Sofra, which joined in the revolt. Castel-Novo is disarmed. I shall organize a civic guard, composed of our friends, and exclude from it those who have shown themselves hostile to us.

The population of the Grafignana is about 24,000 souls, divided into seventy-two parishes. The whole of this province is not in revolt, but it is to be feared that the insurgents will compel the others to follow their example, which has been the case in several places. If one chose to penetrate by the north-east into the Grafignana, one might despatch 200 men from Leghorn to take them at all points.

Tranquillity prevails at present in Modena.

RUSCA.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 10 Nivose, year 5 [December 30, 1796].

We learn, citizen-general, from General Clarke's despatches, that you have thought it right to defer the bombardment of Mantua, for fear of a movement on the part of General Alvinzi: but your return to Milan indicates that you consider another attempt in favour of Wurmser as impracticable, or at least distant. His obstinacy has hitherto

baffled our conjectures, but it is not probable that he can hold out much longer.

We have taken precautions for avoiding, in the movement which is to be effected from the banks of the Rhine to Italy, those delays which have too often taken place in the march of the reinforcements that were destined for you ; and we hope that the 30,000 men present under arms, whom General Moreau is to detach from the two armies which he commands, will have reached their destination before the end of next month : it is at that time that the opening of the campaign ought to take place, if the court of Vienna does not accept the proposals which General Clarke is commissioned to make to it. You know that our desire for peace is strong and steady ; but we know how to appreciate the sacrifices which the Republic has made in this war, as well as its victories, and the price which they ought to produce : our moderation cannot descend to weakness. The formidable force which you will have to deploy will astonish the emperor, and he will be convinced that we are determined to keep Italy irretrievably as a pledge of peace.

General Clarke has sent us interesting notes respecting the general officers and the staff of the army which you command : they point out necessary reforms ; but it is important that you should name to us the individuals who ought to be comprehended in these changes, whether their services be useless to the Republic, or whether they are becoming more dangerous than useful. The strength of an army results principally from its moral organization and the selection of its leaders ; the good composition of the heads of corps and of the inferior officers is also a matter of great importance, and hitherto but too much neglected.

Carry, citizen-general, into all matters that prepare or keep up military successes, the judgment, sagacity, energy, and impartiality which characterize you : we shall approve your views and lend to your measures the support of our authority, as you already have that of our confidence.

BARRAS, President.

---

*To the Chief of the Staff.*

Milan, 12 Nivose, year 5 [January 1, 1797].

You will be pleased to bring to trial before the council of



war of Lombardy, citizens Bockty, Chevilly, and Descriveur, *employés* in different administrations of the army, for robbery and compromising the army and the most important operations of the war. It is by this infamous embezzlement, the redemption of orders, and factitious payments, that they have compromised my operation, and have caused the loss of a great number of our comrades: in short, these are such rogueries as must be repressed by severe examples, in order to keep the soldier in the heart of Italy, that is to say, the most fertile country in Europe, from wanting necessities, which has several times happened.

I accuse M. Bockty of having brought corruption among our agents, and of having come to the army solely to thwart my operation by making factitious payments.

I accuse citizen Chevilly of being one of the points of support of this whole intrigue, and having made considerable sums to the detriment of the soldiers.

Citizen Descriveur, storekeeper at Cremona, offered M. Bockty to make a false entry of 10,000 quarts of wine: he is known to have long carried on this infamous trade.

I demand, in consequence, that these three *employés* be condemned to suffer death, since they cannot be considered as mere thieves, but as men who are daily diminishing the means of the army, and causing the failure of the best concerted operations, or at least preventing their success after an expenditure of French blood, which is too precious for us not to take all the measures capable of deterring their accomplices, too numerous in the army of Italy.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Citizen President of the Cispadane Republic.*

Milan, 12 Nivose, year 5 [January 1, 1797].

I have learned, with the warmest interest, from your letter of the 30th of December, that the Cispadane republics have united into one, and that, taking for their emblem a quiver of arrows, they are convinced that their strength is in unity and indivisibility. Miserable Italy has long been erased from the list of European powers. If the Italians of the present day are worthy of recovering their rights and giving themselves a free government, we shall some day see their country figuring gloriously among the

powers of the globe; but forget not that the laws are nothing without force. Let your first attention be paid to your military organization. Nature has given you everything; and, after the unity and wisdom exhibited in your different deliberations, you need nothing more to attain the end but battalions inured to war and animated with the sacred love of country.

You are in a happier position than the French people were; you can arrive at liberty without revolution and its crimes. The calamities which afflicted France before the establishment of the constitution will never be seen in the midst of you. The unity which binds together the different parts of the Cispadane republic will be the model constantly followed of the union that shall reign among all classes of its citizens; and the fruit of the correspondence of your principles and your sentiments, upheld by courage, will be liberty, the republic, and prosperity.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To M. Bataglia, Proveditor of the Republic of Venice at Brescia.*

Milan, 12 Nivose, year 5 [January 1, 1797].

I have this moment received, sir, the letter which you have taken the trouble to write me. The French troops have occupied Bergamo, to anticipate the enemy, who had an intention to occupy that essential post. I must frankly confess that I was very glad to seize this occasion for expelling from that town the great number of French emigrants who had taken refuge in it, and to inflict a little chastisement on the libellers, who are very numerous there, and who, ever since the commencement of the campaign, have not ceased to preach up assassination against the French troops, and have, to a certain point, produced that effect, since it is an ascertained fact that Bergamascans have murdered more Frenchmen than all the rest of Italy put together.

The conduct of M. the proveditor of Bergamo has always been extremely partial in favour of the Austrians; and he has never taken the pains to disguise, either in his correspondence, his language, or his actions, the hatred that he bears to the French army. I am not his judge, nor that

of any subject of the most serene republic of Venice ; yet, when there are persons who, contrary to the well known intentions of their government, transgress the principles of neutrality and behave like enemies, the law of nature would authorize me to use reprisals.

Induce, I request you, M. the proveditor of Bergamo, who is your subordinate, to be a little more modest, more reserved, and less swaggering when the French troops are at a distance from him. Desire him to be rather less pusillanimous, to let fear overcome him not quite so much at the sight of the first handful of French soldiers. If this sentiment, arising perhaps from a consciousness of the chastisement which he had deserved by his past conduct in regard to the French, had not got the better of him, the castle of Bergamo would not have been evacuated by the Venetian troops ; but the same course would have been pursued there as at Brescia and Verona.

Immediately after the receipt of your letter, I took into consideration the position of the city of Bergamo, and caused it to be evacuated by part of the troops which were there. I have given orders to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to restore the castle to the Venetian garrison, and to do the duty together. As for the tranquillity of Bergamo, your intentions, those of the government, and the good disposition of the people, are a sure pledge of that. I know the small number of ill-affected persons, who, for these six months, have never ceased preaching up a crusade against the French. Woe to them if they deviate from the sentiments of moderation and friendship which unite the two governments !

It is with pleasure that I seize this opportunity, sir, to do justice to the desire of public tranquillity manifested by M. the Bishop of Bergamo and his respectable clergy. I am convinced of a truth which is daily demonstrated to my sight, that, if the clergy of France had been as discreet as moderate, as attached to the principles of the Gospel, the Romish religion would not have undergone any change in France ; but the corruption of the monarchy had infected even the class of the ministers of religion : there were no longer to be seen in them men of exemplary life and of pure morals, like Cardinal Mattei, the Cardinal Archbishop of Bologna, the Bishop of Modena, the Bishop of Pavia, the Archbishop of Pisa : in conversing with these venerable

personages, I have sometimes fancied myself carried back to the first ages of the Church.

I beg you, sir, to believe the sentiments of esteem, &c.,  
BONAPARTE.

---

*The Minister for Foreign Affairs to General Clarke.*

Paris, 10 Nivose, year 5 [December 30, 1796].

I have received, citizen-general, the letters which you have done me the honour to write me: I shall make it a duty and a pleasure to lay before the Directory the excellent reflexions which they contain. I think, like you, that our interest and sound policy require the French government to wait a little longer, before it decides upon the fate of the north of Italy; that a premature decision might form a great obstacle to peace; that a people so destitute of energy, the slaves of the most degrading prejudices, would ill-support the part of a free people; that it will always be time to enfranchise it absolutely, and to ensure to it a more happy and more free constitution, at the moment when we shall treat of the peace of Italy. In my communications with the deputies of Milan, I have never said anything to them contradictory to these principles, and what you tell me confirms me more than ever in the resolution to be always as circumspect. If my letter finds you still at Milan, you may flatly contradict Savador. It is true that, last winter, I sent him into the Milanese, to learn the dispositions of the public mind, the strength of our enemies, &c., but that mission ceased as soon as Bonaparte had crossed the Apennines, and before then I had clearly perceived that I could derive scarcely any benefit from that man, concerning whom I was furnished much about the same period with very unfavourable particulars. Even at the time when he was charged to make inquiries, my correspondence with him was almost null; since we have been masters of Milan, it has ceased entirely.

I should not be surprised if the court of Vienna were to refuse you, or at least to delay sending you the necessary passports, so tight and so strong are the ties which bind it to the court of London; many circumstances, however, may combine to shake its pride and the fidelity to its engagements of which it makes a parade: the in-

vasion of Ireland, the success of which everything thus far prognosticates; the death of the Empress of Russia, the pacific dispositions of her successor, his partiality for Prussia, his attachment to the Duke of Wirtemberg, whose aggrandizement depends upon us; the dissatisfaction of all the secular princes of Germany, and their desire to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the ecclesiastical princes; the threats of the Ottoman Porte, which claims for us the boundary of the Rhine, and which, as Aubert Dubayet informs me, is marching troops to the Danube to support the mediation which it is desirous of interposing between a neighbour whom it is not at all fond of and its old friends. There is talk also of a coalition that is to be formed in Germany to force the emperor to make peace upon our principles. General Dubayet, by his letter of the 19th Brumaire, informs me that the Porte has intimated in a firm and decided tone to the internuncio that its intention in intervening in the treaty between the emperor and the Republic is that, as a preliminary, he should cede entirely and without restriction the whole left bank of the Rhine, conquered or not, evacuating immediately Mayence, Cassel, and dependencies; that, at his demand, the Porte ordered the Pachas of Romelia and Bosnia to send troops to different points of the frontiers of Germany, at the same time that it should make a new levy of men to strengthen its garrison; that this service is punctually performed, and he has no doubt that, coupled with the declaration of the Porte, it will produce a powerful diversion. I owed you these particulars for your guidance in the important mission with which you are charged.

I reply to your letter of the 28th Frimaire. I am aware, like you, how important it is to the interests of the Republic not to give up to the personal sentiments of a man, or to a more enterprising enemy, a secret which may have an influence on the destiny of one of our natural allies: but it seems to me that you have in your hand a surer and an easier expedient for attaining this end. Supposing it were possible to induce Count de M..... to come to France, his apprehension here would inevitably make a great noise, and might produce serious inconveniences. He might conceive suspicions, and find means to conceal his papers from us. He is now in a country subject to military government: but, just arrived from Tuscany, he must feel perfectly

secure ; he must have his papers at hand ; it would be easy to seize them by causing him to be arrested on the slightest pretext. As soon as we had possessed ourselves of his papers, he might be set at liberty. The government would be in possession of a mighty means of influence over the power to which those papers relate ; the momentary detention of the Count de M . . . would not compromise us in the least, and could only be considered as a mistake. Such, general, is the way in which I think that affair ought to be conducted. At any rate, I shall submit your letter to the Directory, which, if it thinks proper, will transmit its orders to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*The Executive Directory to General Clarke.*

Paris, 18 Nivose, year 5 [January 7, 1797].

We have received, citizen-general, your despatches of the 7th and 8th Nivose.

The resolution taken by the court of Austria to fix upon a place remote from the capital for the negociations shows, perhaps, that they have been afraid to give you access to the emperor, and that the party hostile to peace still prevails in that cabinet. We await, nevertheless, the effect of that light which must be shed by your first interviews with his envoy, to fix our opinion, which we admit not without regret. If the house of Austria combined at this moment with the ambitious views which have always characterized it an accurate knowledge of the general tendency of Europe towards political innovations, more or less analogous to those which France has experienced, it would be sensible that its system of preponderance, founded at present on the Germanic constitution, requires another support. This support is offered in the plan of pacification which we propose, and circumstances can never be more favourable for giving nations and their governments a relish for it and ensuring the duration of its effects. For the rest, we have nothing to add on this subject to your instructions, till the receipt of your despatches from Vicenza.

As for the armistice, we still think that, if it can be but of brief duration, it would be disadvantageous to us without the possession of Mantua. The distress to which that place is at last reduced, and the fear expressed by General Alvinzi

that it will not be in his power to relieve it, offer us favourable chances for awaiting its surrender.

It is true that the fort of Kehl is in a deplorable situation and on the point of being wrested from us ; but, Prince Charles having refused to agree to an armistice on the Rhine, based on the *status quo*, we cannot but conclude that he will obstinately persevere in the siege of it. All these considerations add new weight to the opinion of the general-in-chief against a suspension of arms, which would be of no benefit to us on the Rhine, since the fate of Kehl will probably be decided before advantage could be taken of its conditions, and which would be injurious to us in Italy, if Mantua were not in our possession.

With regard to the pope, he cannot be comprehended in the armistice unless he shall immediately execute the conditions of that which has been particularly concluded with him, with suitable indemnifications : but his obstinacy, if further prolonged, will furnish us with occasion to indemnify ourselves, by force of arms, in the State of the Church, for the effects of his breach of faith.

The strong reinforcements which we are sending to Italy ought also to be taken into consideration in balancing our rights and our interests with those of the emperor.

We reckon upon being apprized immediately of the respective overtures which are to take place at Vicenza.

P. BARRAS, President.

---

*Instructions to the General of Division Clarke, Envoy  
Extraordinary of the Republic to the Court of Vienna.*

The Executive Directory has taken communication of the despatches which you have addressed to it as well as to the minister for foreign affairs. It approves what you have done with a view to keep a door still open to negotiations ; and, in the hope that the court of Vienna will determine to commence them, it loses no time in sending you the powers and instructions necessary for conducting them speedily to a happy result.

The Directory approves the refusal which you have given to consent to a partial armistice ; which would have served only to deprive us of the advantages of our present position in Italy. If Austria is sincerely desirous of peace, the settle-

ment of the bases on which it is to rest, and the signature of the preliminaries, will not be attended with more delays or more difficulties than would have arisen from the conclusion of the armistice.

To enable you to go on, either with M. Gherardini, or any other minister or agent of the emperor's, the Directory will specify the conditions to which you are authorized to consent and from which it conceives that it cannot depart.

The first and the most essential, to which the Directory is bound by the existing laws, is the cession and surrender to the Republic by the emperor and the house of Austria of the Austrian Netherlands, the duchy of Luxemburg, and all that it possesses on the left bank of the Rhine.

You are well aware of the motives which must render this sacrifice less painful to it. These countries have been for two centuries a source of wars incessantly arising between France and the house of Austria, and the greatest obstacle that has opposed the sincerity of their amicable communications. The restitution of its territories in Italy will offer it a very advantageous compensation. It finds a second in the richest provinces of Poland, which, bordering immediately on the bulk of its old States, have added to its strength, whereas the distant provinces, which it is required to sacrifice, would only serve to exhaust them by the frequent wars which they would occasion.

The second condition, to which the Directory equally adheres is, that the emperor, both in that quality and as head of the house of Austria, shall not oppose the possession by the French Republic of the property and sovereignty of the countries above-mentioned, and of all those which have been ceded by the treaties now existing, or incorporated by the laws and the constitution, as well as of all the territorial possessions which princes of the Germanic empire enjoyed there.

You are not ignorant, citizen, of the irresistible influence exercised by the emperor upon the resolutions of the Diet: the consent of both is held in Germany to be necessary for the alienation of countries forming part of the Germanic empire. Besides the Austrian possessions, the laws and treaties have incorporated with the territory of the Republic several territories that formed part of the empire, such as Porentruy, Montbeillard, the bishopric of Liege, the abbeys of Stavelot and Malmedy, &c.: it is therefore necessary, in order to facilitate the peace to be concluded with the Germanic empire,



for the emperor, in that quality, to assent to their incorporation.

You will insist that the emperor shall not oppose the possession by the Republic of the property and sovereignty of the portions of territory dependent on the Germanic empire, which are surrounded on several sides or entirely enclosed either in ancient territories of France, or in the newly incorporated departments, or in the cessions which have been made to the Republic by treaties. This clause is necessary for adjusting the line of the frontiers, facilitating the levy of the customs, and preventing the sanguinary disputes which arise from the intermixture of districts subject to different governments.

If the declarations of non-opposition which form the subject of the preceding articles could produce any difficulties for the patent treaty, they might be comprehended in a secret article, as well as those which the emperor might demand from us relative to the indemnities which he may expect to obtain.

The Directory adds to the present instructions a frontier line conformable to what it has just prescribed to you : you will strongly insist that it be inserted in the preliminary articles which you are authorized to conclude. If, however, delays and difficulties should arise, which is not to be presumed, you can confine yourself to the clause above expressed, reserving the right to revert to this demarcation in the definitive treaty.

By various treaties concluded with the Palatine house, the bailiwick of Germersheim ought to be incorporated with France, but the possession of it has been deferred till after the decease of the elector-palatine. You will require the emperor not to oppose the possession by the Republic from the present time of the whole bailiwick of Germersheim.

If the person with whom you shall treat demands for the house of Austria some indemnity on the right bank of the Rhine, avoid treating on that subject as much as you possibly can ; however, you may declare, if you are pressed, that the Republic will not oppose the arrangements which that house may make with the princes of the empire in the countries situated on the right bank of the Rhine ; but you will not make this declaration so long as you can hinder the conclusion of the preliminaries being made dependent on it, and till the emperor consents, on his part, that the other

princes who sustain losses shall receive suitable indemnities. If possible, you will confine yourself to a verbal declaration.

You are not ignorant that, by the treaty of the Hague, we are obliged to comprehend the Batavian Republic in all the treaties that we conclude : it is, therefore, indispensable to include it in our treaty with the emperor, as it has been included in our preceding treaties of peace.

You will also require that the emperor shall consent expressly and employ his good offices that the stadtholder may obtain suitable indemnities in Germany, in the countries situated on the right bank of the Rhine ; but this article may be secret till the definitive treaty.

You will stipulate expressly that the French Republic shall continue to occupy and enjoy on the present footing the bridges and fortresses dependent on the Germanic empire, which are actually occupied by the French troops, till the definitive conclusion of peace with the empire.

As to the evacuation of the States of the emperor and king in Italy, the Directory charges you to concert with the general-in-chief Bonaparte, to whom it refers entirely for the determination of the mode and the time of that evacuation.

The occupation which we have made of part of Germany must necessarily have propagated the love of liberty there. A very great number of the inhabitants of those countries have declared in favour of our principles ; they have been excited to it by our example, perhaps even by direct invitations of some of the agents of the government : this, it is true, is not a sufficient motive for compromising the safety and the interests of the Republic, by the emancipation of the countries which they inhabit, and where everything shows that they are in a minority ; but republican honour requires that they be not victims of the attachment which they have manifested for us and of the services which they have been able to render us. You are, therefore, specially charged to stipulate that no individual in those parts of Germany and Italy which have been occupied by the troops of the Republic shall be molested, either in person or property, on account of opinions or actions, civil, political, military, and commercial, during the present war.

You will stipulate the cessation of all hostilities immediately after the ratification of the preliminaries, and in consequence of the reciprocal removal, on the part of the two contracting powers, of the sequestration which either may

have laid on the property and rights belonging to subjects of the other, as well as on the public establishments situated in their respective territories. The French Republic will engage to pay all that can be due for constituted annuities and funds lent by the government and the subjects of the house of Austria residing in the countries under its domination, and the public establishments situated in them ; and reciprocally the house of Austria will fulfil the same object towards the French government, the establishments, and the citizens domiciliated in the departments of the Republic and in the recently incorporated territories.

You will observe that this whole negociation must be conducted not as a definitive treaty but as preliminaries of peace, which have no need of the ratification of the legislative body, and which the Directory is authorized to conclude alone. You will demand, in consequence, that the emperor shall ratify them with the least possible delay, which you will settle in concert with his agent. The Directory will ratify reciprocally within the same term. You will accelerate the ratification as much as possible. It may happen that the emperor will not treat separately from England : you will require him to consent to preliminaries for a particular peace, and you are authorized to accept the emperor's mediation for our peace with England ; which will screen that prince from all blame on the part of his ally.

Such, citizen, are the preliminaries which you will propose in the name of the Directory, and at which you will definitively stop. You will keep aloof from the usual routine of negotiations ; and the moment you have ascertained that the person with whom you will have to treat has the necessary powers to do so, you will submit them frankly to him, and declare that the Directory will not depart from them.

You know the object of the hereditary ambition of the house of Austria—Bavaria : the Directory has no doubt that it will demand that as an augmentation of indemnities. You may hint that the Directory will not oppose this incorporation, on condition of suitable arrangements in favour of the Republic and its allies ; but you will not introduce any thing on that subject into the preliminaries, upon an understanding that it shall be resumed at the time of concluding the definitive treaty.

Such, citizen, are the instructions which the Directory can give you for the negociation which you are charged to seek

to open : it relies upon your talents and your dexterity for developing the motives proper for facilitating the adoption of the different clauses, and on your devotedness to the interests of the Republic, of which you have given proofs.

It is possible that the person with whom you will have to negociate may express his fears respecting the publicity that may be given to the acts and papers of the negociation : the Directory authorizes you to make him easy on that point, and if he demands expressly and in writing that those pieces be kept secret, even though the negociation should come to nothing, you can enter into a formal engagement to that effect, on the clear understanding that a similar one shall be made in the name of his Imperial Majesty ; the Directory even prescribes to you to observe the most profound secrecy. You must be aware that, if a report of the evacuation of Italy were to be circulated with any appearance of reality, the most serious inconveniences might result from it for us.

The Directory charges you to communicate these instructions to General Bonaparte, to concert entirely with him respecting the negociation, and to propose nothing, to take no step, unless he deems them conformable to the interests of the Republic and to the safety of his army.

BARRAS, President.

---

*General Bonaparte to Divisionary General Clarke.*

Mantua has been blockaded for several months ; there are at least 10,000 sick, who are without meat, without medicine : there is a garrison of six or seven thousand men, who are reduced to a half-ration of bread, horse-flesh, and no wine ; even wood is scarce. There were in Mantua 6000 cavalry and 3000 artillery horses ; they are killing 50 a day ; they have salted 600 ; many have died for want of forage ; there are still left 1800 cavalry, which are diminishing daily : it is probable that in a month Mantua will be ours. To accelerate the surrender, I am preparing wherewithal to supply three batteries for red-hot shot, which will begin to play on the 25th of this month [Frimaire, November 15].

The army which came in such force to relieve Mantua is beaten : it might be reinforced in a fortnight, but succours

are arriving for us; besides, General Clarke cannot commence his negotiations in less than twelve days; and, at that time, if the court of Vienna concludes the armistice, it will be because it cannot come forward again with any hope of success. In the contrary case, the court of Vienna would await the issue of its last efforts before concluding anything. When we are masters of Mantua, they will be too happy to grant us the boundary of the Rhine.

Rome is not in armistice with the French Republic; she is at war; she will not pay any contribution: the reduction of Mantua can alone produce a change in her conduct.

We should therefore lose by the armistice,

1. Mantua till May, and then we should find it completely provisioned, whatever argument might be held; and the heats would render it impregnable at the conclusion of the armistice.

2. We should lose the money of Rome, which we cannot have without Mantua: the State of the Church is unapproachable in summer.

3. The emperor being nearer, having more means of recruiting, will have in May a more numerous army than ours: for, whatever one may do, as soon as there is no fighting, everybody will be off. Ten or fifteen days' rest will do good to the army of Italy, three months will ruin it.

4. Lombardy is exhausted: we cannot feed the army of Italy without the pope's money or that of Trieste. We should find ourselves extremely embarrassed at the opening of the campaign that would follow the armistice.

5. Masters of Mantua, we should be in a condition not to include the pope in the armistice: the army of Italy will have such a preponderance that they would be happy at Vienna to be able to paralyze it for a few months.

6. If, after the armistice, a new campaign must be begun, the armistice will be extremely prejudicial to us; if the armistice is to be the preliminary to peace, it ought not to take place till after the reduction of Mantua: there will be double the chance of its being good and profitable.

7. To conclude the armistice now is to deprive yourself of the means and probabilities of making a good peace in a month.

All comes to this point—to wait for the reduction of Mantua, to reinforce this army by all possible means, in order that we may have money for the next campaign,

not only for Italy, but even for the Rhine, and in order to be able to take an offensive so determined, so alarming for the emperor, that peace may be concluded without difficulty, and with glory, honour, and profit.

If they would but reinforce the army of Italy with 20,000 men, including the 10,000 announced to us from the Rhine, and 1500 cavalry, they might promise 30,000,000 francs to the army of the Sambre and Meuse before the month of April, and oblige the emperor to turn all his efforts towards the quarter of the Friule.

BONAPARTE.

---

*General Clarke to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

We are in hopes of soon seeing Mantua fall into our power; but, according to probabilities, the time of its surrender cannot be earlier than in a month, and it is not denied that we shall perhaps be obliged to lay siege to it in January. Mantua, it is true, is to be bombarded on the 25th Frimaire; but it seems to be far from certain that this bombardment will force Wurmser to capitulate immediately.

Mantua taken, we are, it is added, absolute masters of Italy; but, before that place is taken, we have still several risks to run; twice already the blockade has been raised, as it has recently well nigh been for the third time, and we have been on the point of losing part of our conquests in Italy. The armistice will ensure to us the quiet possession of this country for six months, as well as the possibility of making ourselves useful friends there, who will arm for our cause.

Opinion attaches, and justly, a great value to the taking of Mantua, but, to await the moment of it, must we continue a winter campaign, which our soldiers of the Rhine would refuse to make? I think not; and as, by confining the benefit of the armistice to the armies of the Rhine and Moselle and the Sambre and Meuse, we should evidently permit the enemy to direct their whole force against that of Italy, and they would even have nearly a certainty of arriving before the reduction of Mantua, I think that it is useless to conclude the armistice in maintaining the present *status quo*.

What, moreover, is our position at the moment that I am writing?—The lassitude of war is felt in all parts of the interior of the Republic. The people ardently wish for peace; the armies murmur loudly because it is not made; that of Italy, and even the bravest of that army, talk of and desire it. The legislative body wills, nay, commands it, as it were, no matter on what conditions, and its prolonged refusal to furnish the Directory with funds for continuing the war is a proof of this. Your finances are null; agriculture claims, entices, or recalls the hands which it sent to protect it from the foreigner; war would have, every day, an almost universal immorality, which might in the sequel overthrow the Republic: in short, all parties, harassed, wish for the end of the revolution; and if our state of internal misery is prolonged, the wearied people, not finding benefit in that which is, will be disposed to seek it in another order of things, which will give rise to new revolutions, and we shall have for twenty or thirty years all the calamities which these convulsions bring in their train.

In the course of this winter, whether there is fighting or whether things continue undecided, great part of our soldiers will return to their homes, from which nothing will be able to draw them: for, from want of money, we have neither internal police nor gendarmerie, and our constituted authorities are far from being all pure and proof against seduction. We must, therefore, have peace; and for recovering the enthusiasm which has enabled us to conquer, it is necessary that our enemies defer the conclusion of it, and that there be not a creature in France who is not convinced that the government has been desirous of a reasonable peace, and that it has been rejected from ambition or from hatred of our principles.

The moment for talking of peace is the present moment—that when the army of Italy has just beaten its enemies; that, above all, when the weariness of an extremely active campaign is felt throughout Germany; that, when England must appear to her allies to have acted solely for herself and to have trifled with them by attempting to trifle with us, by opening negotiations full of insincerity and concealment. It is certainly unfortunate not to have Mantua; but, if we conclude the armistice, will it not be the same as if we had concluded peace, since the

government need only resolve not to break that armistice to turn the cry of all Europe against the emperor, if he recommences hostilities? By this armistice we continue possessors of Italy, at least till the peace, or if we must make war, it will be with the approbation of all nations. Already the obstinacy of the emperor makes us forebode the formation of an armed neutrality in Germany, which it is his interest to prevent.

Can he expect to make us resume arms, as he did at the beginning of this campaign, without exposing himself to the greatest dangers? Our military situation in Germany gives us certain means of offensive for the next, when we shall be somewhat re-organized; and shall we not be threatening for Austria when the army of Italy has received the reinforcements which it is expecting, and those which the Directory may be able to send in addition? Mantua, it is true, will not yet be taken; but, whatever abuse one may suppose in the superintendence which it will be necessary to establish in order to prevent the introduction of provisions, it cannot be so strict but that this place will be able to provision itself for two months beyond what it will have at the conclusion of the suspension of arms. We must expect, we are told, to see 20,000 men go into the hospitals; but these 20,000 men we shall have regained in part by the recovery of our sick during the armistice; and, moreover, the garrison of Mantua, obliged to live in that place during this time, will certainly have, at the moment of the blockade, double the proportion of sick to ours. The bravery of the army of Italy, and the talents of the generals who command it, are likewise pledges of our success during the next campaign; and if the armed neutrality of Germany were to place us during this time in defensive on the Rhine, it is easy to perceive how many chances of conquering and entering upon a brilliant offensive the concentration of all the means of the army of Italy, better administered, would give to it. One may presume, without disparagement to its courage, that, if the armistice is not soon concluded, the blockade of Mantua may be raised: for the best founded military calculations are frequently overturned by the slightest causes. The loss of part of Italy and that of the friends whom we have there would be the consequence of the success of our enemies.

It appears to be believed that in a fortnight we may be



attacked. If the Austrians were successful, their progress would be suddenly stopped by the effect of the armistice, in case the court of Vienna should think fit to consent to it; and then that armistice would prove beneficial to us. In my opinion, at the present moment, the chances seem to be uncertain, and it is impossible to determine to which side the balance will incline. The court of Vienna will, perhaps, think that, before the blockade of Mantua is raised, it runs a risk of losing a new army, the wrecks of which would be briskly pursued; and if it were disposed to attack at the moment when the armistice is under consideration, that danger may deter it, and induce it to sign the conditions, however strong may be the hopes on which events have taught it not to place much reliance. Moreover, Germany, fatigued, wishes, like us, for peace. Our principal resources are in our courage, and, I hesitate not to say, in our talents; the resources of Germany consist in part in the regularity of its administrations and in the useful employment which it makes of its finances. It is time to put an end to so long a struggle. We are conquerors: the conditions of peace cannot but be honourable for us. Events may change this fortunate situation. Charged to talk of peace, I shall never forget what the national dignity and reason require.

Should we be stopped by the desire of conquering Rome? Glorious as might be that advantage, I venture to say that it would be but momentary. We have wanted our religious revolution. France is again become Roman Catholic, and we are perhaps in the point of needing the pope himself, for causing the revolution to be seconded among us by the priests, and consequently by the country, which they have found means to govern again.

If one could have annihilated the pope three years ago, it would have been the regeneration of Europe: by overthrowing him at the present moment, should we not run the risk of separating for ever from our government a great number of French submissive to the pope and whom he can rally round him. I firmly believe that it is for the interest of almost all States to reduce his power, still almost colossal, to an absolute cipher; but the prejudices of kings and nations are adverse to that interest. It requires thirty years' liberty of the press in Italy and France to bring about that moment, and to break down the spiritual power

of the Bishop of Rome. Spain, Naples, Sardinia, and all Italy, would join our enemies, rendered irreconcilable, and would never forgive us for having destroyed a power which subjugates and shackles them, but which the authority of time and that of absurdity, inculcated from principle, causes them to respect and cherish.

Will the glory of Bonaparte fall short of the conquest of Rome? Certainly not, since that conquest was achieved and consolidated on the day that the armistice which delivered to us its masterpieces and its wealth, and which separated the people of Bologna, Ferrara, &c., was signed. It is necessary to enforce the execution of the conditions of that armistice, and to include it in the general armistice, and such is the intention of the Executive Directory: this is an answer to everything.

I request General Bonaparte to favour me with a few notes respecting the best arrangement to be made for Mantua and on the limits to be traced for the French and Austrian armies towards the Friule and the Tyrol, as well as those which we ought to observe in regard to the pope.

He will oblige me by adding a copy signed by himself of the order of the pope relative to Ancona. CLARKE.

---

*General Bonaparte to General Clarke.*

After long consideration, I do not see any reasonable condition that can be established for the *status quo* of Mantua.

There are three things: 1, the forage for the cavalry; 2, the provisions for the garrison and the inhabitants; 3, the medicines for the sick.

Whatever may be done or established, we shall see Mantua slip out of our hands if we conclude the armistice before the reduction of that place; and, without that place, we shall obtain no reasonable peace.

The armistice, I repeat, whether considered as the preliminaries of peace or as subservient to the preparations for the ensuing campaign, will be useful and conformable to the interests of the Republic when we shall possess Mantua; to conclude an armistice without having Mantua is a sure way to have another campaign, for the success of which all the successes obtained in this will have been rendered null. Let it not be forgotten that a premature step of this kind may ruin everything.

The limits which ought to be assigned are :—

The imperial troops ought not to pass the Brenta ;

The French troops the Adige.

Toward the north, the imperial troops must not pass Alla, Mori, Torbole, Thion, as far as Lodrone, nor have a right to enter the Venetian States from that quarter ;

The French troops the Chiusa, Rivoli, Torri, Salo, Brescia, Bergamo.

The rest of Italy, whether belonging to the emperor, the Duke of Modena, or the Archduchess of Milan, should remain in *statu quo*.

Bologna, Ferrara, and Ancona, in *statu quo*, agreeably to the execution of the armistice with the pope ; but, as the armistice ought to have been executed in Thermidor and in Brumaire, and that period is past, a month at most might be granted him, reckoning from the day on which the treaty shall be signed.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Milan, 17 Nivose, year 5 [January 6, 1797].

The more I examine in my leisure moments the incurable wounds of the administrations of the army of Italy, the more I am convinced of the necessity of applying a prompt and infallible remedy.

The accounts of the army are, with the paymaster, in striking disorder, and to the comptroller's well authenticated character for roguery is added the incapacity of the other *employés*. Everything is sold. The army consumes five times as much as it needs, because the storekeepers forge orders and go halves with the commissaries of war.

The principal actresses of Italy are kept by the *employés* of the French army : luxury, licentiousness, and speculation, are at their height. The laws are insufficient : there is but a single remedy ; it is analagous at once to experience, to history, and to the nature of the Republican government ; it is a syndicature—a magistracy which should be composed of one or of three persons, whose authority should last only three or five days, and who, during this short space, should have power to cause any administrator whatever of the army to be shot. Such magistrates, sent yearly to the army, would make everybody respect public

opinion and observe a certain decency, not only in manners and expenses, but also in the daily service.

Marshal Berwick caused an intendant of the army to be hung, because he was in want of provisions ; and we, in the midst of Italy, having everything in abundance, spending in a month five times as much as we need do, are frequently in want. Imagine not, however, that I am soft, and that I betray the country in this essential portion of my functions. I have *employés* arrested every day, I have their papers examined, their chests inspected ; but I have none to second me, and the laws do not grant sufficient authority to the general to strike a salutary terror into that host of rogues. However, the evil is diminishing ; and, by dint of scolding, punishing, and putting myself into a passion, things will, I hope, go on with a little more decency ; but consider, I repeat, of the idea of a syndicature which I suggest to you.

You will find herewith the minutes that have been brought me of the examination of a contractor, arrested by my orders : by these minutes you will see to what a height the evil has arrived and how much it needs a powerful remedy.

Flachat and Co. have set Italy the example of redemptions [*rachats*]. The *commissaire ordonnateur* Sucy, who gets wind of all these manœuvres, gave me some particulars about them at the time of his last visit to Milan.

Those fellows have made, perhaps, three millions by false entries. That company owes the army five millions arising from the contributions : the paymaster of the army drew bills upon the house at Genoa to the amount of 600,000 livres for the pay ; it had the impudence to have them protested. I have treated that company as bankrupt, and caused seals to be put on its houses at Leghorn and Genoa. I beg you to give orders for apprehending the agents of this company in Paris : they are the greatest swindlers in Europe, and have placed us here in a most embarrassing situation. I intended to have had Flachat arrested and his brother-in-law, agent of the company in Milan, but the rogues had escaped.

In directing your attention to the knaveries that are committed, I must not fail to do justice to the *employés* who behave well and conduct themselves with decency.

I am much pleased with citizen Pesillico, agent of Cerf-

beer and Co. If that company had sent us such a man at the commencement of the campaign, it would have gained several millions, and the army still more. I am likewise satisfied with the agent of the victualling, Collot; he is an administrator; he supports his character.

Among the commissaries of war, the probity of citizen Boinot is particularly distinguished and acknowledged by the whole army. If there were with the army a dozen or fifteen such commissaries of war, you might make each of them a present of 100,000 crowns, and we should be gainers of fifteen millions. I beg you to confer tokens of your satisfaction on these different administrators.

Herewith is a denunciation of the commissary of war Boinot against Thevenin, the former agent of Cerfbeer and Co.

BONAPARTE.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 18 Nivose, year 5 [January 7, 1797].

The Executive Directory has received, citizen-general, your six letters of the 8th Nivose: it replies here to that which relates to the different powers of Italy.

The peace of Naples has been partly the result of one of your despatches, in which you developed all the advantages of concluding it. At that time it was indispensable, and it is always useful to us: it therefore behoves us, under the double aspect of honour and interest, not to provoke its violation. Establish your intercourse with the King of the Two Sicilies on this essential consideration; and, for the rest, make use of the means which, without infringing it, are likely to fulfil your military views and to bind that power still more to the observance of the treaty.

To us, your opinion of Rome seems just; her obstinate refusal to fulfil the conditions of the armistice indicates sufficiently that she will not observe them any better for their being comprised in the general armistice, should it take place. In consequence, we authorize General Clarke not to admit her into it unless she will comply immediately with her preceding engagements, and consent to indemnify us for the resources promised you by the operations which you are preparing against the pope. We approve the plan, but to us it appears that it ought to be executed with caution,

at the same time combining it with the safety of the blockade of Mantua, according to the presumed ulterior movements of General Alvinzi. The proposed arrangement for the evacuation of Leghorn likewise deserves our approbation. The emperor's intercepted letter enlightens us still more respecting the spirit of Tuscany, and this information ought not to be lost.

We have no doubt that the occupation of Bergamo has made a deep impression upon Venice. You have acted quite right, since that measure appeared indispensable to you in a military point of view ; but we think it advisable not to alarm that power too much, till the favourable moment for following up the instructions which you have in regard to it. We have, nevertheless, deemed it necessary to publish the motives which have determined you to put a garrison into Bergamo.

The state of the negotiations at Turin indicates that this new court has formed a system for itself, which it is following in silence, and that it is only waiting for a favourable opportunity to let it break forth. The simply defensive alliance which it proposes is inadmissible ; and what is particularly remarkable in the plan which it presents is that it demands compensations for the territory which has been the price of our peace with it, and which is irrevocably united with the French Republic. At any rate, it is expedient not to break off entirely the course of the negotiations with that power, which the fall of Mantua and the reinforcements that we are sending to Italy will probably incline towards sentiments more analagous to the conditions of the treaty which we offer it.

BARRAS, President.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 18 Nivose, year 5 [January 7, 1797].

We have approved, citizen-general, the list of promotions which you submitted to us in one of your letters of the 8th Nivose. It belongs to you, above all others, to judge of the talents, the daring, and the integrity of the persons under your orders : it is an essential part of the command, and our confidence on this point has been completely acquired by you. Our opinion has always been wisely and usefully enlightened in all accounts that you have given us either of

things or men. We propose to you to make use of the notes which General Clarke has transmitted to us in concert with you, respecting the general officers, those of the staff, and the commissaries of war ; but, as there are considerations of utility and services rendered, which at this moment prevent the extension of reform to men but little estimable in other respects, we have requested him to concert again with you, to point out to us the changes that ought to take place immediately, and those which it is important to suspend for the present, to avoid changing the organization of the army, when on the eve of new operations.

We shall take into very serious consideration your applications in behalf of citoyenne Muiron, and we have desired the minister of the general police to propose to us immediately the adoption of all the measures which the law permits.

BARRAS, President.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Porto-Legnago, Nivose 20, year 5 [January 9, 1797].

I informed you, in the report of yesterday, general, that the enemy was marching troops upon Ronco, and that he meant to give us the slip and to cross the Adige at a distance from this place.

The reports which reach me from the commandant of Ronco inform me that the enemy has a post of cavalry at Cologna, that our hussars were stopped there in the reconnaissance which I ordered : those sent me by different spies apprise me of a strong movement of the enemy's troops upon Montagnana, where 3000 infantry and 800 horse have arrived ; on Este, 4000 foot and 500 horse.

What seems to give probability to these different reports is a new attack made by the enemy, about four in the afternoon, on our advanced posts of St. Zeno and St. Menerbet, at the moment when I was giving orders to adjutant-general Duphot to make the retreat upon Legnago : it was effected in tolerable order. Our troops are beneath the walls of Legnago ; I shall canton them in the environs. An eight-pounder was left in the possession of the enemy, through the fault of the artillery officer and drivers, likewise a howitzer. These cowards chose rather to cut the traces than to march in order with the troops who were escorting

those pieces. I shall bring the accused to trial before the permanent council of war.

There has been no movement upon the right of Legnago, according to the reports of the commandants of the posts: notwithstanding this, I persist in believing that the design of the enemy is to proceed towards Ferrara and occupy the country conquered from liberty, to unite there with the partisans of his system, to increase his army, and to procure for himself, to the detriment of ours, those resources which feed us, to levy for his benefit the contributions due to us, and finally to secure a retreat into the States of the Church by throwing garrisons into the fortified places. Such, citizen-general, is what love of my country and the glory of the army of Italy suggest to me as being the plan of the enemy; perhaps he will be bolder than I suppose, and has views upon Legnago. I have assembled great part of the division at Zeveo, Ronco, and Legnago. I am waiting for further reports, which will perhaps enable me to penetrate the real object of the enemy.

Your presence with the army, citizen-general, would produce a very good effect, if the more important affairs with which you are engaged would permit you to repair to it.

The works of the tête de pont of Ronco are not quite finished: that of Castagnana would not have been begun yet, had I not gone thither myself. I have ordered the officer of engineers who conducts that work to be watched, and to be prevented from slipping away before the bridge is finished.

AUGEREAU.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Legnago, 24 Nivose, year 5 [January 13, 1797].

Your orders, general, are executed: the cavalry in reserve, commanded by General Dugua, is about to proceed to Castel-Novo; the artillery also is ready to start. I have reason to be surprised, general, that my despatches have not reached you: but this very day I sent off an officer to bring you the report of a spy and the detail of my yesterday's operations. The enemy seems to have a design to attempt something this evening: he has established a post visible on the other bank, which he had not yet done, and Villa-Bona is the point upon which his attempt seems to bear. Whatever he may do, we are ready for him.



I am very sorry, general, that my division is nailed to guard the Adige, and that the expedition which you are projecting is to be executed without it: one must, however, be of good cheer under all disappointments; the success of your enterprise will compensate me for the privation which I experience.

AUGEREAU.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Legnago, 26 Nivose, year 5 [January 15, 1797].

The day of the 26th has been passed in making dispositions for cutting off the retreat of Provera's column, which my wishes and the proceedings of the enemy promised me. I hope to learn to-morrow that he is completely beaten. I defy him to force his way to the Adige to rejoin the 2000 men, who could not have belonged to the column of Mantua. The annexed extract of the order will acquaint you with my plans. The cannonade heard towards Mantua has determined me to send off General Lannes and General Duphot, with 1600 infantry and two squadrons of cavalry, and one 8-pounder, with a six-inch howitzer.

I sent out a reconnaissance from Legnago towards Bevilacqua, with orders not to compromise itself. Daubigni, chief of the 5th light infantry, who commanded it, reports to me that the enemy is evacuating the Adige and retiring upon Padua, with four pieces of artillery: he took from him eight prisoners.

Montagnana and Cologno were evacuated this morning; so the expedition which I had planned against the remnant of that famous army has no attraction for me: I shall, nevertheless, send a strong patrol of infantry and cavalry to Montagnana and beyond, and transmit the report of it to you immediately. I ought to add to that of yesterday that, instead of eight pieces of artillery, there have been taken thirteen, with a bark, partly laden with chests full of muskets. I have not yet been able to procure a statement of the articles taken in that bark, because the chief of battalion of artillery, whom I sent on board, has not had time to draw it up: I hope to send it you to-morrow.

I have just given orders to General Ballard to establish himself at Catagnara, and to post the second and third battalions from Abadia to Legnago, as well as the cavalry and artillery, two pieces of which are to be placed on the bridge.

P 2

Thus, general, the communication between Verona and Ferrara is perfectly secure.

Give me, I beg of you, the news of the day about Mantua; I am easy respecting the division of Rivoli: the severe lesson which Davidowich has received assures me that Alvinzi will think himself fortunate if he is held to be quits for that payment on account. I have sent off under good escort the 2000 prisoners or thereabout taken yesterday, and ordered the forty officers to be detained, that they may not communicate with the soldiers: they shall set out to-morrow, with the exception of some who are wounded.

AUGEREAU.

PS. I have this moment received General Berthier's letter to General Guieux. I shall set out with the present forces of the division for Castellara and other environs of Mantua. I shall leave a good garrison at Legnano, and, the enemy being no longer on the other bank, I think that I shall be able to proceed to any point where need is indicated by the presence of the enemy; I shall show thereby that I know how to avail myself of all circumstances: for every military man will acknowledge with me that, when a division of 10,000 men is scattered over an extent of above thirty leagues, it requires more than a quarter of an hour to collect it.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rivoli, 26 Nivose, year 5 [January 15, 1797].

I have scrupulously followed your dispositions for the attack of La Corona; the success has been beyond hopes: three pieces of cannon, four or five thousand prisoners, Alvinzi himself flung among the rocks, and escaping like a scout upon the Adige, and without soldiers: such is in brief the result of that affair.

We attacked in three columns: General Vial commanded the right, and filed through St. Mark; the general<sup>1</sup> commanded the centre and marched by Pajou; adjutant-general Veaux commanded the left column, and, by following the back of Montebaldo, cut off the enemy from La Corona. General Rey directed the right, and I was on the left. The resistance was vigorous for two hours; but the ardour of our troops at length overcame it. The enemy was forced back to

<sup>1</sup> Name omitted.

the steps [*échelle*] of Brentin; he was obliged to surrender: the rest fled over the snow, or upon the Adige, and I have no doubt that many of them will be brought back to me in the evening. We have about 60 superior and other officers.

I shall write to the general to proceed to Villa Franca; and shall this evening send off for that place all the artillery and the cavalry, which are of no use to me.

The enemy, thoroughly persuaded that he has been beaten, is taking his precautions and marching a column of about 1500 men along the heights of Monte Postello, to cover his retreat into the Tyrol.

I have yet to make my report of the officers who have distinguished themselves: I will do it as soon as possible.

JOUBERT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Caprine, 27 Nivose, year 5 [January 16, 1797].

My aide-de-camp must have informed you of the total discomfiture of the enemy at La Corona. I mentioned to you that we had taken 4 or 5000 thousand prisoners; but I assure you that there are above 6000. Rey's division is on the way to its destination. I shall write to you from Verona, and I may send one or even two brigades through that city, if the enemy should attempt to penetrate thither, as the movement of the column which filed from Monte Postello in that direction might lead one to surmise.

General Murat's column arrived in time in rear of the enemy: it produced the effect which I expected.

JOUBERT.

---

*To M. Albani at Vienna.<sup>1</sup>*

Rome, January 7, 1797 [18 Nivose, year 5].

The intelligence which you send me is most cheering. I learn by the last two couriers that Baron de Thugut has changed his language: notwithstanding his air of mystery, we cannot doubt the assistance of the emperor, especially as he and the empress have promised you it. It seems to me too that Baron de Thugut reckons upon us, to judge from the departure of General Colli, from the obligation imposed

<sup>1</sup> This is without doubt one of the intercepted letters referred to by Bonaparte in his despatch to the Directory with which the next Part opens.

upon him to make haste and inspect our troops, and from the manner in which we are excited to recover our provinces. Everything tells us that we are already regarded as allies.

They talk no more to us about sacrifices: can they have abandoned the idea of them? No doubt I am flattering myself too much, and I must not think myself safe till the treaty shall be signed on the conditions specified to you by my last courier. Now that you are furnished with full powers, M. de Thugut can no longer shuffle, and must make up his mind.

As for me, so long as I am permitted to hope for succours from the emperor, I shall temporize relative to the proposals for peace made to us by the French. You cannot form an idea of all that is done to oblige me to answer Cacaault: some strove to persuade me by the hope of better conditions; others by fear and threats. But, constant in my opinion and jealous of my honour, which I should deem wounded by treating with the French when a negociation is begun with the court of Vienna, I have not suffered myself to be seduced or intimidated, and, till I find myself forced to it, I will not change my course, and you cannot doubt the sincerity of these sentiments.

It is, nevertheless, true that the French have a strong desire to conclude peace with us: of this I have a recent proof in the accompanying letter of monseigneur the nuncio in Florence, and you will see by the answer, a copy of which I send you, the manner in which I have conducted myself. I send you the two copies, that you may have it in your power to attest the constancy and the good faith with which I treat.

By the time you receive my letter, M. Colli will, no doubt, have set off: I hope that he will soon be at Ancona. I have written to the general commanding at that post relative to his reception, and to propose to him to go into the Romagna to take a glance at our troops before he comes to this capital, that we may be able to take measures in our first conversations.

I am sorry, I must confess, that General Colli should have conferred with Alvinzi before coming hither. This is necessary, I am aware, for their operations; but I have, I know not why, an unfavourable opinion of Alvinzi. Though I am not capable of judging of his operations in Italy, I think that he might have done more than he has; but the

conference was necessary, and I pacify myself with thinking that Alvinzi's honour is at stake, and his glory in promoting the intentions of his master.

As for the appointments to be given to General Colli, even if the emperor should not allow him anything for the time that he is in the service of the pope, we will furnish the whole, and I shall not be sorry for it.

I commend that general much for bringing with him two officers, particularly the one of the engineers, in which department we are totally deficient: he was to bring with him some subalterns also for drilling our troops. The praise which Marshal Lascy bestows on Colli is cheering.

Since you are persuaded that Baron de Thugut would be jealous if you were to speak to any besides himself in favour of our cause, give up the other means which I proposed to you when the baron's intentions were not so favourable as at present: continue, nevertheless, to court all those who can prove serviceable to us in case of need.

I conjecture that the proposals of the Prince of the Peace were designed to intimidate us, and that, if the object was not to strip the pope of his temporal power, at any rate the intention was to retrench a good part of it. The Queen of Spain is most desirous to aggrandize the territories of the Infant of Parma, her daughter's husband, and will do everything to gratify him; the chevalier Azara, dissatisfied with us, does not cease to prompt: but I cannot think that the court of Vienna will quietly see the Spaniards masters of the best parts of Italy.

I have no doubt that you have taken measures to learn the purport of the conferences with Clarke that are to be held at Znesereck [? Innsbruck]: the particulars that you furnish will be a guide for me.

You must have seen by my preceding courier that I had thought of an expedition of some Austrian troops into the Romagna to join ours, and that I had conceived also that they might be shipped at Trieste and land at Ancona. Cultivate this plan, which would be very serviceable to the emperor and to us; and if it is realized we shall be ready to enter into the same contract as the King of Sardinia.

You will do quite right to comply with the requisitions made by the constable, through the medium of your brother, relative to the armies.

Monseigneur Stay has not yet finished the briefs for the

elector of Saxony ; for which you apply to me ; consequently I cannot send them to you : his Holiness does not think it expedient to grant the other briefs, which you propose ; because, as they must be addressed to all the Catholic sovereigns of Europe, it would be declaring a war of religion before the time, without the possibility of concealing this action of the pope's from the eyes of the French ; and then, for the reasons that I have mentioned, we should be exposed to their indignation without being sure of the alliance of his imperial majesty.

According to the accounts which you give me on the subject of a war of religion, his Holiness will resolve to grant briefs and to take other steps.

If the treaty of alliance is concluded, it will be proper to make the nuncio sign it, provided that M. de Thugut, with whom he is not on very good terms, makes no objections.

I am sending to monseigneur the nuncio the pontifical briefs for the Emperor of Russia, with instructions directing that if this court or the chargé d'affaires of Russia should be sending to Petersburg, he should avail himself of that opportunity for forwarding them. In case there is not a good opportunity, I desire him to send them to monseigneur the nuncio at Warsaw, that he may transmit them to his imperial majesty.

When you see their imperial majesties, present them the like thanks for the solicitude which they manifest respecting the health of his Holiness, and assure them of the fervour with which he prays for the preservation and the glory of those who have upheld and are upholding the just cause with such perseverance and such interest.

The Cardinal BUSCA.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Rome, 23 Nivose, year 5 [January 12, 1797].

There has been sent to us from abroad by the foreign post a printed pamphlet, entitled, *Lo Stato pontifico agli altri incliti Co-Stati d'Italia* [The Ecclesiastical State to the other illustrious Co-estates of Italy].

The author, giving speech to the State of the pope, represents it relating to the other States of Italy the history of what has passed since the commencement of the Revolution between the French government and the Roman government :

the exposition is perfidious and hypocritical, and the impostures and the declamations against the French are atrocious. It is evident that the materials for such a work have been furnished by the cabinet of Rome; it is a clandestine and unavowed manifesto tending to exasperate more and more against us. It has been impossible for me to procure for myself a copy of this pamphlet, which I have read. It is more malignant than the many others which are sold here, and which I take care to send you as they appear.

General Colli, granted to the pope by the emperor, with other officers, to command the papal army, will soon arrive. It is certain that Monseigneur Albani writes from Vienna that the papal troops must absolutely attack forthwith Bologna and Ferrara, and that the imperial party here is soliciting the government to find means to send me away.

The counsellors of the pope, the insane monks, contend that the pontifical troops ought not to attack; that nothing should be done to provoke war; that they should continue, nevertheless, to arm and to take the strongest defensive measures; but nobody is of opinion that the cardinal secretary of state should answer my note, and enter into a negotiation for peace with us, which would break the measures taken with the court of Vienna, and, above all, abate that hatred and that audacity against the French which is regarded as the greatest strength.

Alfonse, minister of Tuscany, has received a letter from M. Corsini in Paris, of which he has sought to make use, in order to dispose this court to peace. The Marquis Manfredini, agreeably to the conversation which he had with you, has also intimated that we are desirous of it, and that they would do well to avail themselves of this opportunity. The Marquis del Vasto likewise recommends accommodation, but with the intention of making his master mediator; and it would be hard if we were again to break faith on this point with Spain, by now accepting another mediation. Can these petty underhand dealings cause it to be forgotten that I have offered peace officially, and that this court refuses to enter by writing into the least answer, fearful of the consequences of such an engagement?

So long as the estrangement of the pope from every sound idea relative to the French Republic shall not permit even his cabinet to reply to my note, which is no other than courteous, presented on behalf of the Directory and of you,

there is nothing to be done; he is beyond measure astray, given up to our enemies, persuaded that by waiting for events he shall be able to recover Bologna and Ferrara, to pay nothing more on account of the armistice, and to keep us in the same political separation as the Protestants. When there is an obstinate determination not to answer my note, what course can I take? by what other means can I succeed with a sovereign who is above paying the most trivial attentions to France?

The continuance of my residence here, under such circumstances, as a public man, is without dignity, whatever one may say. Honour is wounded to remain so long without being able to give any answer, amidst scoffs and abuse, and witnessing the wrongs done to the Republic.

I have preserved my person from insult and annoyance by continual attention to avoid occasions for them; but in all that is national I can neither be ignorant of what galls nor resent it: the continued trial of our patience revolts the soul and tends to indiscretion.

I should wish to be authorized to leave Rome, to go to Leghorn, Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, and even to the headquarters, to confer with you; nothing would be thereby broken beyond what is at present: setting off without parade or threat, I could correspond with this government on the trivial matters of ordinary occurrence.

After taking a survey of the conquered countries on my journey and deriving new light from you, I should repair to the post destined for me at Florence, where I could, with suitable dignity, render myself useful both in regard to Rome and the new conquests of the Republic, while performing as well as I could the duties of the petty ministry of Tuscany, with the affairs of which and the spirit of the court I am perfectly acquainted.

I am sensible how important it would be for the army of Italy to wring from the pope the 16,000,000 which he owes us for the armistice, or at least a part. That money is necessary for pushing the operations of Mantua, on the Adige, and on the Brenta. If, in spring, the victorious army were to enter Germany to put an end at length to the war with the emperor, the pope's millions would be still more necessary for it. How I wish that I could obtain them for it, without its being obliged to come so far out of its way to fetch them!



Our enemies well know how needful that money is to us ; and the viceroy Elliott, who has been here, and all the agents of the coalesced powers and even those of the neutrals of Italy, desire that we should not receive that aid, hoping that, for want of means, we shall be forced to recross the Alps.

This court, which hates and abhors you, and to which the loss of Bologna and Ferrara, and the contributions for the armistice, are a very important object, will not hear talk of giving anything. If ulterior circumstances impose sufficient constraint to decide to this great sacrifice, doubt not that M. Galeppi will then come to seek me everywhere. My presence here is in no way useful, perhaps even detrimental : it indicates too strong a desire for peace, which, they see clearly here, only proceeds from that of obtaining payment conformably to the treaty of armistice.

I cannot believe that, even after Colli's arrival, the pope will dare to attack Bologna and Ferrara : he has yet but 12,000 troops, and up to this time has sent only about 6000 at most into Romagna : it is not a formidable army. Bologna has its little party of malecontents, who write hither that the papal troops should be well received there ; these malecontents are much more numerous at Ferrara, from which city they send the same intimation : this it is chiefly that encourages the pope to arm, and to march his troops towards the two legations.

They are enraged here at the republican organization of the Cispadans, but they are not yet in a condition to oppose it. They are preaching up a crusade against republicanism, and giving a hand to the emperor ; but what do they expect to gain by this pretended alliance ? It was for him to demand what the pope solicits, for the Austrians will do without Rome all they can to drive the French out of Italy, and, if they should succeed, the pope would be saved without having occasion to commit himself ; but, if the Austrians are driven out, as there is every appearance that they will be, the silly conduct of the pope, who will be left alone to face a justly irritated enemy, will put his tiara into great jeopardy.

If the court of Vienna suspects that, after the victory over Alvinzi, which we have reason to hope for, you would be able to enter Germany, its game is to send an army into the Ecclesiastical State, to form a junction with the pope's

soldiers, who will become those of Austria, and perhaps to Naples, the sincerity of which can scarcely cease to be suspected. They might thus wrest from us Italy as far as the Alps: all the cabinets of that country would gladly unite against us, if they could do so with safety.

It is said that, in your last conference with the Marquis Manfredini, you asked him for a loan from Tuscany, and offered to procure for the grand-duke the legation of Urbino. That might succeed, if the present grand-duke were ambitious and courageous; but how expect from a brother of the emperor's, who is but a meek boy, assistance against Vienna!

No State in Italy will give anything but by force; for the passionate wish of all the cabinets of this country is that we should recross the Alps.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Castel-Bolognese, 26 Nivose, year 5 [January 16, 1797].

On the 20th Nivose, a paper was picked up at Imola, which said in reference to the French and the papal troops: "The first that comes to the mill gets his corn ground first"—[First come, first served].

On the 25th of the same month, there passed through Castel-Bolognese two deputies, Zappi and Mancanti, who were going to Faenza to the general of the papal troops, said to be lieutenant-marshal Colli, to apply for forces. He answered, six thousand Germans, who are to embark at Ancona, will come, be assured, to guard your town, and on the representation of the usefulness of those succours, the general sent to-day to Imola 600 men, 100 cavalry, and 500 infantry. We are assured that the like number will be sent to-morrow.

We rely entirely upon your talents and courage. We are without cannon; we have but fifty soldiers; we are surrounded by enemies whose number is daily increasing, and if they were to attack us, how many good citizens would fall victims to the fury of the priests! Be pleased to recollect that it was I who first begged you, at Modena, to give liberty to my country. I should die of grief if it were to fall into the hands of despots. I wish you all possible success.

---

ZAOLI, Consul.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 28 Nivose, year 5 [January 17, 1797].

There have occurred since the 23rd operations of such importance, and which have so exceedingly multiplied military business, that it is impossible for me to give you a circumstantial account of them before to-morrow. I confine myself at present to a mere announcement of them.

On the 23rd Nivose, the enemy came and attacked General Massena before Verona, which gave occasion to the battle of St. Michael, in which we beat him completely. We took from him 600 prisoners and three pieces of cannon. On the same day he attacked the head of our line of Montebello, and gave rise to the action of La Corona, in which he was repulsed. We took from him 110 prisoners.

On the 24th, at midnight, the division of the enemy's army which had been established ever since the 19th at Bevilacqua, where it had obliged the advanced guard of General Augereau to fall back, rapidly threw a bridge over the Adige, a league from Porto-Legnago, opposite to Anghiari.

On the morning of the 24th, the enemy marched a very strong column by Montagna and Caprino, and thereby obliged General Joubert's division to evacuate La Corona and to concentrate itself at Rivoli. I had foreseen the movement, and proceeded thither in the night; and this led to the battle of Rivoli, which we gained on the 25th and 26th, after an obstinate resistance, and in which we took from the enemy 13,000 prisoners, several colours, and several pieces of cannon. General Alvinzi, almost alone, had great difficulty to escape.

On the 25th, General Guieux attacked the enemy at Anghiari, hoping to overthrow him before he had completely effected his passage. He did not succeed in his object, but took 300 prisoners.

On the 26th, General Augereau attacked the enemy at Anghiari, which led to a second battle of Anghiari. He took 2000 prisoners, and 16 pieces of cannon, and burned all the bridges over the Adige; but the enemy, taking advantage of the night, filed off for Mantua. He had already arrived within cannon-shot of that place; he attacked St. George, a suburb which we had entrenched with care, and could not carry it. I arrived in the night with reinforcements, which

gave occasion to the battle of La Favorita, and on the field of that battle I am writing to you. The fruit of it is 7000 prisoners, colours, cannon, all the baggage of the army, a regiment of hussars, and a considerable convoy of corn and cattle, which the enemy were endeavouring to introduce into Mantua. Wurmser attempted to make a sortie for the purpose of attacking the left wing of our army; but he was received as usual, and obliged to go back. Thus during the last three or four days the fifth army of the emperor is entirely destroyed.

We have taken 23,000 prisoners, among whom are one lieutenant-general and two generals; 6000 men killed or wounded; 60 pieces of cannon, and about twenty-four colours. All the battalions of Vienna volunteers have been made prisoners: their colours are embroidered by the empress herself.

General Alvinzi's army was nearly 50,000 strong: part of it had come post from the heart of Austria.

The moment I get back to head-quarters, I will send you a detailed report, to make you acquainted with the military movements which have taken place, and likewise the corps and individuals that have distinguished themselves. In all these affairs we have had but 700 men killed and about 1200 wounded. The army is animated with the best spirit and in the best dispositions.

You gave me notice, above three months ago, that 10,000 men were coming from the Ocean: the 64th demi-brigade, 1800 strong, is all that has yet arrived. The emperor will have organized a new army in Italy, before I have received these 10,000 men.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Parma, 24 Nivose, year 5 [January 13, 1797].

My commissioners having arrived from Paris with the ratification of our country, I lose no time in transmitting to you a few copies of a paper which I have had printed and published, to render notorious to all the world an event that gives me so much pleasure.

I avail myself of this occasion to beg you to be pleased to order away from our territories one Faure, who pretends to be in the service of the Republic, but who has

long fixed himself at a place in my States called Cortemaggiore, where he is incessantly holding revolutionary language and exciting a small number of hot heads in that quarter, such as you know are to be found everywhere.

Apropos precisely of hot heads, you know, general, that we have such at Placentia. As for those who are not dependent on the Republic, I know what I ought to do with them, but for those who are dependent on it, who wear its uniform for instance, the just regard which I have induces me to beg you to cause the commission which they may have to be taken from them, if they have one, or to let them be arrested. The just and honourable sentiments which you have already manifested on this point lead me to hope this from you.

Yesterday there passed through this place a great number of Milanese legionaries, who would have occasioned many disturbances, had not their commanding officers conducted themselves extremely well ; but, general, all may perhaps not be so good. I venture, therefore, to beg of you, if it can be done, that as few as possible may pass through our country. I know that the last time you passed this way, you explained yourself on the subject in a favourable manner for us.

Permit me to trouble you on one more subject. The Marquis Manasa, of Parma, a respectable old man, and who has been my minister for several years, is in the greatest affliction, because his son-in-law, della Volpe d'Irrule, has had the misfortune to displease you and been chastised by you. He is a young man who is attached to me, and whom I have always known for a good fellow : if he has misbehaved, I dare flatter myself that it is neither from malice nor ill-will, and I venture to recommend him to you.

Find here, at the same time, general, the assurances of the usual consideration and friendship, with which I repeat myself, &c.,

FERDINAND,  
Infant Duke of Parma.

---

*To General Joubert.*

Verona, 24 Nivose, year 5 [January 13, 1797].

I beg you to let me know as soon as possible if you think that the enemy has more than 9000 men before you. It is

very necessary that I should know whether the attack made upon you is a real attack, equal or superior to your strength, or whether it is a secondary attack made to delude. The enemy is bringing up towards Verona nearly 6000 men, whom I am this moment giving orders to attack. If you have before you 9 or 10,000 men who may be destined to attempt a real attack, it would follow that there cannot be more than 9 or 10,000 on the side of Legnago; and, if this is the case, and your attack and that which I am making here succeed this evening as they ought, I shall be far from fearing their crossing the Adige.

BONAPARTE.

*To General Joubert.*

Villa Franca, 26 Nivose, year 5 [January 15, 1797].

I have pleasure in acquainting you, my dear general, that General Augereau attacked the enemy yesterday, took some men and twelve pieces of cannon, burned his bridges, &c.

You have done right to keep the 75th; the victory will be no longer doubtful, and the success of this morning is a good omen. Mantua is at this moment making a sortie, which does not appear likely to succeed.

I shall send the 18th demi-brigade, which is coming up, to his assistance.

BONAPARTE.

*To General Joubert.*

Roverbello, 26 Nivose, year 5 [January 15, 1797].

The 18th and 57th are here. The enemy, after crossing the Adige, divided into two corps: the first marched towards Mantua, the second remained at Anghiari, to defend the bridge over the Adige. The generals of division Guieux and Augereau attacked this corps, from which they took 2000 prisoners and several pieces of cannon, and burned all his bridges over the Adige.

About noon, the first corps appeared at St. George: General Miollis, whom it summoned to surrender, replied with cannon balls. After a very obstinate fire of small arms, the enemy could not force that important post: he is at this moment between St. George and the Mincio, at the village of Valdagno, where he is seeking to communicate by the

lake with the garrison of Mantua. I am having his position reconnoitred at this moment, and waiting for some reports of reconnaissances of the Nolinella that I have had made, after which I shall try to beat him. If General Augereau is marching, as I think, upon Castellara, in pursuit of that column which has escaped him, you must suppose that we shall easily conquer. The 32nd has just arrived at Franca; this will enable us to finish soon this violent and sanguinary struggle, which is, to my thinking, one of the severest of the campaign. I expect before midnight a brief note from you from la Corona.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Joubert.*

Verona, 28 Nivose, year 5 [January 17, 1797].

Here we are then in the same positions that we were: M. Alvinzi cannot say as much: the point now is to make the most of them. I beg you to let me have a statement of your situation, and take care to let it be accurate. I have just ordered the 24th regiment of chasseurs to be sent you instead of the 22nd; if this arrangement should not suit you, let me know immediately.

I have just given orders to the general of artillery to furnish your division with twelve pieces ready to march and three pieces of hill artillery. You will want nothing for marching but shoes and provisions. Let your magazines be examined, and 30,000 rations of biscuit be conveyed to Rivoli, and ascertain that there is in your magazines all that is necessary for having 30,000 rations of bread on the evening of the 30th: that will be a four days' provision for your division.

It appears too that you are in want of shoes. Let me know in the night precisely and without exaggeration how many you need. Send me the map of the line between Rivoli and the Adige, which I left with you.

I give you notice that you must set yourself in motion in the night between the 30th Nivose and the 1st Pluviose.

Send me as soon as possible a report of the two actions of la Corona and the battle of Rivoli; the names of the men who have distinguished themselves, and the promotion that ought to be given them.

There you are then, with only two generals of brigade,  
VOL. II. Q

Baraguay d'Hilliers and Vial; I have just given orders to General Dugoulet to put himself under your command, and to-morrow I shall give orders to a fourth.

I did not see the chief of brigade of the 14th of the line at the battle of Rivoli: my intention is that the chiefs of brigade in command remain continually with their corps, and that the members of the council of war, whatever their rank, be with their colours in all general engagements.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 29 Nivose, year 5 [January 18, 1797].

The loss of the fortress of Kehl, which has just surrendered, after a long and brilliant defence, attaches us more than ever, citizen-general, to the plan which we have adopted of pursuing the war in Italy with fresh vigour. A powerful diversion in that quarter in favour of the ulterior operations of the Rhine is even become indispensable. We are hastening to the utmost of our power the march of the reinforcements destined for you, to enable you to fulfil our common hopes; and we have reason to believe that, as we have already intimated, before the end of next month, you will have received the succours necessary for commencing the campaign in an imposing manner, whatever might then be the fortune of Mantua, though we presume by that time it must be in our power.

General Kellermann writes to us that the troops shall experience no delay in the passage of the Alps, from the precautions which he has taken; he informs us at the same time that the state of the magazines of the army of the Alps will not permit the supply of the articles of clothing and equipment requiring to be replaced. The minister at war has received the most urgent solicitations to provide for them; but the want of means will perhaps delay the execution of his order, and it is of great importance that you should remit to General Kellermann some funds taken from those of the army of Italy, in order to the efficacious supply of these necessities. We cannot but be aware that the delay of the pay, or privation of the means of subsistence, will send shoals of deserters to this side of the Alps; and this disorder it is highly essential to prevent.

We earnestly hope that the new instructions which we



are addressing to General Clarke may obtain favourable results at the peace: they will at last force the court of Vienna to speak out and to disclose to us its most secret intentions. The activity of the negotiations ought not, however, to abate the energy of your military operations, or to prevent you from commencing them when the favourable moment has arrived; above all, it ought not to cool the enthusiasm which has presided over the victories of the army of Italy.

We request you to give us an account of the measures which you have taken relative to Corsica, and your opinion as to the possibility of drawing men for recruiting the corps of the army from that island.

P. BARRAS, President.

PS. General Clarke is directed to concert with you respecting all his diplomatic operations, that there may be no contrariety between them and your military operations.

## PART SIXTH.

FROM THE BATTLE OF RIVOLI TO THE PRELIMINARIES OF  
LEOBEN.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Verona, 1 Pluviose, year 5 [January 20, 1797].

Herewith, citizens Directors, you will find some intercepted letters which are extremely interesting, inasmuch as they show the obstinate perfidy of the court of Rome, and the refusal to accept the alliance of Rome, which the cabinet of Vienna appears to give, and which can only proceed from the desire it may have not to put a clog upon the general peace.

I have had those letters printed in the newspapers of Bologna and Milan, to convince all Italy of the insane raving of those old cardinals.

To-morrow I shall make 5000 men pass the Po, near Ferrara, who shall march direct for Rome.

A great noise is heard in Mantua, which leads us to suppose that the besieged, according to the emperor's instructions, are breaking up the gun-carriages and the artillery waggons : this is only conjecture, but what is not so is that they have long been upon a half ration of bread, and horse-flesh, without wine or brandy.

We are in motion to-day, for the purpose of occupying Vicenza and Padua, where we shall have better cantonments. If the reinforcements from the army of the Rhine, which you announce to me, arrive, we shall soon have important events here ; but I have seen a statement which has been sent to me, in which the demi-brigades are calculated at 2400 men. I consider it impossible that the demi-brigades, after such a campaign as the army of the Rhine has had, can be of that number. I think 2000 as much as they can be estimated at ; and then how many will run away on the road !

The 9th regiment of dragoons has but one squadron here, as well as the 5th cavalry and the 18th dragoons. I

beg you to give orders for those entire regiments to be united with the army of Italy, otherwise you will lose excellent corps : it will be, moreover, a fine reinforcement of cavalry that you will give us. Specify in your order that the men composing these regiments are to join their corps at Milan, either on foot or on horseback. The depot of the 1st regiment of cavalry is at Lille ; I request you to order it to march for Milan.

We have need here of a reinforcement of cavalry. The 15th regiment of chasseurs is not sufficient. I am told that in the other armies no use is made of heavy cavalry : for my part, I esteem and employ it much. I should be glad if you would send me 1000 men of that class, who, joined to another regiment of dragoons, would form a reinforcement of from 2 to 3000 cavalry, which would be sufficient for us.

We have but two battalions of pioneers reduced to nothing ; pray send us two more.

I particularly request you to give orders that all the regiments of cavalry sent to me have their arms, swords, and blunderbusses, and the dragoons their muskets.

We want also three or four companies of light artillery, 5 or 600 hundred foot artillery, and some good officers of that arm ; for, with the exception of citizens Chasseloup and Samson, the others are not capable of drawing a *flèche*, and only play stupid tricks. Those that you have promised, none of them arrive : yet there is no want of officers of engineers and artillery ; but these are peace officers, fit only for the desk, who never see fire, so that, excepting the two that I have named, the rest are inexperienced : accordingly, the works of the engineers are universally complained of in the army.

The *commissaire ordonnateur* Dennié is seldom well ; Villemanzy does not come, nor Naudin, nor Eyssautier : all those gentlemen do what they like : and yet it is more and more urgent that the administrative department should be organized.

You will find herewith a list of the general officers, who, from their want of talents, are incapable of commanding, and whom I beg you to withdraw from the army.

If you send me generals or adjutants-general, I beg you not to send me such as have served in La Vendée, because they know nothing of war. If Chasset is not more useful

in Paris, as well as the adjutants-general Sherlock, Doulcet, and Beauvais, I beg you to send me them. I should also wish to have adjutants-general Espagne and Camin: I believe that the latter is not at present employed, but he is an officer of the highest distinction.

As for generals of division, unless they are distinguished officers, I beg you not to send me any; for our mode of making war here is so different from the others that I cannot trust a division till I have tried in two or three affairs the general who is to command it.

I beg you to send hither adjutant-general St. Martin, the chief of brigade of artillery Gueriau, at present director of the park of the army of the Alps, the chief of battalion of artillery Allix, the chief of battalion of engineers La-roche. It is most essential for the army and for the Republic, to send hither to me young men to learn to carry on a war of movement and manœuvres; it is that which has enabled us to obtain great successes in this army.

BONAPARTE.

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Chambery, 2 Pluviose, year 5 [January 21, 1797].

In announcing to you, my dear general, two columns, forming 30,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, which will debouch in about eight days by Bourg and Lyons, I asked you for 100,000 francs for the supply of their wants in clothing and equipments; but the carelessness of the officers at the stations, and the refusal of most of them to continue their service, together with the state of our magazines drained of stores, will oblige us to sacrifice all the funds we have in order to provide for that purpose, and also for their pay, which must absolutely be discharged.

Thus we shall have no means left for giving them at least shoes, gaiters, breeches, shirts, and coats, if we would not see them perish in the snow.

The representation just made to me on this subject by the *ordonnateur en chef* is frightful; but, if you can remit, by the commissary of war Clapier, whom I send to you, the 200,000 francs which you have promised me, I hope with that assistance to be able to supply the most urgent wants of your troops; but that sum, I tell you plainly, is indis-

pensable, and I earnestly request you to send it me as speedily as possible.

I have received with a pleasure which it is difficult to express intelligence of the new victories which you have just gained ; I shall be very glad to have the confirmation of it from yourself.

KELLERMANN.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Padua, 3 Pluviose, year 5 [January 22, 1797].

The troops of the division not having been assembled at Legnago till the night of the 30th Nivose, did not set out till the 1st Pluviose, to sleep at Este, and to proceed to Padua on the 2nd. It was therefore yesterday, general, that the division made its entry into Padua. The advanced guard, commanded by adjutant-general Lorcet, by its mere presence, made the posts of cavalry from Bataglia to Padua fall back without the least resistance : however, 150 hussars, who formed the whole garrison of Padua, drew up in order of battle in the place ; but, agreeably to the orders which I had given, the advanced guard did not commit itself, and the adjutant-general required the governor to make the Austrians evacuate immediately, if he would not see the city become the theatre of an inevitable combat. The governor instantly summoned the Austrian commandant to quit Padua, which was done forthwith, so that our hussars pursued the enemy for about four miles on the Treviso road.

I afterwards demanded the enemy's baggage ; but the prudence of General Provera, directed by the probability of the ill-success of his enterprise, had caused it to be sent off to Treviso at the same time that he set out for Mantua.

It appears, from all the reports, that the enemy has fallen back upon Treviso and Trieste. No more than about thirty soldiers have passed through Padua, returning singly and without arms from the banks of the Adige. The column took yesterday in the road one of the cadets of Vienna in disguise.

The roads are so bad that the troops have worn out their shoes ; they are absolutely destitute of them ; let orders be given for their supply as speedily as possible.

The governor appears well disposed to procure means of subsistence for the French : he provided yesterday for the wants of the troops, and issued a sensible proclamation to the inhabitants, which promises us the maintenance of order and tranquillity ; I have engaged on my part to maintain them among the troops that I command. I am starting to make a reconnaissance. I must inform you, general, that there are no funds in hand for paying the soldiers the premium for the cannon taken from the enemy. Every day I am assailed by claims justly founded on the dispositions of one of your *arrêtés*. Be pleased to give orders so that we may have it in our power to justify the faith placed by the volunteers in your promises, and to keep up, by that means, their ambition and their courage.

I think, general, that it would be more useful to put the fortress of Legnago under the orders of the general commanding the blockade of Mantua, because my correspondence must necessarily be established by Vicenza ; it is important too that General Massena should establish it from Vicenza to Verona : by this means I should be spared making advances for posting expenses.

There were found at Montagnana 15,000 rations of bread and 900 sacks of oats.

AUGEREAU.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Bologna, 1 Pluviose, year 5 [January 20, 1797].

Ought I, general, or ought I not, to attack the troops of the pope which are at Imola ? I request you to give me an answer by the courier whom I send to you, and according to your instructions I promise to act.

You will find herewith the instructions and information that I have been able to obtain respecting the troops of the pope at Imola and Faenza. They have the insolence to push their cavalry patrols half way to Bologna, and they say openly to any body who will listen to them that they are waiting for 6000 Austrian troops to attack us and come to Bologna ; they are to be led and commanded by the General Colli who was a few days ago at Faenza, and who has left for Rome, where he is not to stay long. My opinion, general, is that we ought to anticipate him.

There are at Faenza about 4000 infantry and 2000

cavalry : we must, brave general, take the 2000 horses to remount our dragoons, chasseurs, and hussars ; charge me to make this remount, if you think proper : I think that I should need but 3000 good infantry to sweep all the Romagna. I should want also a company of light artillery with four pieces of cannon : that would be enough, I think, though they have 18 pieces at Faenza, their head-quarters ; but, as I reckon upon being master of them as soon as I receive your answer, I shall send all those papal pieces to Fort Urbino. You know, I repeat, what need we have of horses, and there they are ready to our hands : as for money, you want that for subsisting your army, and I am certain to find it wherever I go, and be assured that I will render you an account of it.

In short, I want 3000 infantry, a regiment of dragoons, chasseurs, or hussars, with what I have of the Cispadane and Transpadane legion ; and I answer for the success.

The organization of the cohorts of Bologna, Modena, Reggio, and Ferrara, is completed, as well as that of the foreigners.

BERRUYER.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 2 Pluviose, year 5 [January 21, 1797].

To-day it is forty-one days since I demanded of the pope the opening of a negociation for peace, and four days have elapsed since M. Galeppi came to tell me that an answer would be given, but that answer has not yet arrived. They have, no doubt, strong reasons for delicacy towards the emperor and others of the coalition, when they dare not respond to the most courteous invitation from us.

From the time of Charlemagne till the present, it has not happened that the French have had the sway in Italy. Our army keeps the Germans out of it in a manner that astonishes and distracts our enemies ; but they continually flatter themselves that such extraordinary luck will not last, and that the war in Italy will degenerate, like all preceding wars, into disputed advantages, and that all will end in our leaving that fine country in its former state.

The pope believes and desires that the continuance of the emperor's efforts will bring his army into the Ferrarese, and that the siege of Mantua will be raised. If the Austrians were for a moment to obtain the ascendancy, the

pope would have gained nothing by an accommodation with us. This it is chiefly that makes the court of Rome hang back.

If I were to show great impatience for an answer; if I were to strive to effect more than the nature of things and the dispositions of this court admit of; I should only strengthen the idea which people already entertain, that we are not in a condition to invade the Ecclesiastical State, and that we offer peace merely to derive from it, without striking a blow, the advantages which they will not grant till forced to it; that, on any ulterior event, they may have it to say to the court of Vienna, that whatever they have ceded to us has been wrung from them by indispensable necessity.

According to these motives, you see, citizen-general, that, to remain here, as I am desired, waiting for an answer, which it is indecorous to have withheld, I must be a cipher, keeping the cardinal secretary of State constantly under the necessity of giving me an answer. I cannot extricate him from the embarrassment in which he is involved of replying to me after forty-one days, but by offering him a treaty to his liking, which would be a golden bridge, and this I am not authorized to do.

If I were not sent hither by a great victorious power, my situation would be that of a very ill-treated suppliant: it is very disagreeable and very unserviceable now.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 4 Pluviose, year 5 [January 23, 1797].

The letters of Monseigneur Albani, envoy of the pope at Vienna, are not flattering for his Holiness, and the emperor, in the situation in which he finds himself, wishes the pope to grant him money, cedes to him Ferrara and Commacchio, and confirms all the arrangements made by Joseph II. relative to ecclesiastical matters. You see that his imperial majesty rates at a high price the alliance which the court of Rome has been stupid enough to solicit of him.

On the other hand, the King of Naples continues to keep a considerable garrison in Ponte Corvo, which belongs to the pope, and the commandant of the Neapolitan troops in that town has ordered the pontifical governor to be arrested for



not having punctually executed a requisition for thirty horses.

M. the Cardinal Secretary of State, whom Vienna had intimidated and Naples gained, and his Holiness, who takes fire and desponds by fits and starts, find themselves disturbed in their operations. They are told that Alvinzi still has a large army at Padua, Bassano, and in the environs, which will receive strong reinforcements : that we shall be obliged to gain another great battle and to take Mantua before we can attack the State of the Church : hence, they are embarrassed, but as yet not very much frightened.

They continue to make me talk ; and when I remind them of the necessity of replying in writing to my note, they always promise that I shall have that reply, saying, " But the inadmissible treaty, proposed with such rigour by the Directory, has put us out sadly, and reduced us to the necessity of seeking support everywhere ; which has engaged us with other powers, and unsettled the ideas of a great part of the sacred college. Be kind enough to excuse us if we delay answering ; the pope wishes to put himself into a condition to return a categorical answer."

I make no noise ; according to my instructions, I let things go on without betraying any resentment at that which I could not combat without quarrelling. I think that I shall soon receive the answer in writing which has already been deferred for forty-four days. If the Directory had wished me to treat, it would have given me instructions respecting the fundamental points.

What is proposed to be stipulated in regard to Bologna and Ferrara ?

What is intended to be relaxed or conceded of the ancient rights and prerogatives which Catholic France enjoyed at Rome ?

On what bases are reconciliation and friendship to be established ?

I hear everybody saying that nothing is so easy as peace with Rome : for my part, I know nothing so beset with difficulties.

The conditions of the armistice are ratified in such a manner as to leave the pope no pretext for departing from them. They hoped here to exempt themselves from them, or to obtain at least great mitigations.

M. the Prince de Belmonte sends word from Paris, that,

having frequently spoken in favour of Rome to the Directory, he was answered that, notwithstanding all that had happened, peace might have taken place, if a beginning had been made to execute the conditions of the armistice, and that time would have been granted for the payment of the sums agreed upon. To judge from these fair words, we are giving way, and not thinking of obtaining anything further.

The courts have spies everywhere to discover our politics. They strive also to undermine us; and, as I am not apprized of what the Directory may have decided upon after my long despatches, and am ignorant of its plan in regard to Rome, if a favourable circumstance were to arise, I durst not avail myself of it, to concert an accommodation.

I am assured that there is at this moment at Naples an envoy from Vienna with full powers to make the King of Naples break his treaty of peace. I know the timid character of M. Acton; I know that his army is ravaged by a terrible epidemic disease: he will not dare to stir; but he is very glad that the queen, secretly in agreement with him, declares that she abhors your treaty of peace. This keeps up that double-faced policy of the court of Naples.

At this time, an Englishman, like any other foreigner, does not obtain a passport here without great difficulty: there are on the route ten guard-houses where this passport must be exhibited; at that nearest to the capital, he is obliged to alight from the carriage, his pockets are searched, and all his papers taken away: on his arrival at Naples, he claims them, and very often they are lost; he goes to his minister; no foreign agent dares to meddle with matters of this kind; even that of England abstains from supporting the claims of individuals, because he will not sacrifice to such disputes the more important interest of the provisioning of the English fleets in the Two Sicilies.

The organization of a republic in our conquered countries drives all the cabinets of Italy to distraction and despair. Our sway, ensured by this measure in that fine country, causes us to be hated to the utmost excess by the nobles and the high clergy: it can give us the incomparably stronger party, that of the people; but they are fearful of being abandoned, and hence our destiny continues undecided in this peninsula, where everything depends on preventing the entry of the Germans.

The willingness of the Italians to organize themselves

into a republic, and their extraordinary intelligence, promise us a new republican army ; but everything is yet done trembling : all appears dependent upon the negotiations begun ; and thus there prevails a timid sentiment of confidence in us, on the one hand, and more decided rage in our enemies, on the other. It is of importance to arrive at a more settled situation.

CACAULT.

*Proclamation of the Roman Government to the People.<sup>1</sup>*

Religion for ever ! Long live the sovereign !

The disturbances of the public tranquillity, the unjust oppressors of justice, of religion, of all laws, are advancing. They burn to make their vices and their villany triumphant : deaf to the remorse of their conscience, they despise God himself, who can blast and annihilate them in a moment : people, you have to defend religion, your country, and your livelihood ! Be assured of every assistance from those who govern you. Swear, every one of you, to save religion — to defend the country, the State, and the sovereign—or to die !

Death to cowards !—everlasting praise and reward to the brave men who expose their lives for the defence of all that is most sacred in the world !—

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Verona, 9 Pluviose, year 5 [January 28, 1797].

General Augereau's division marched to Padua, crossed the Brenta, and proceeded to Citadella, where it fell in with the enemy, who fled at its approach.

General Massena marched to Vicenza, thence to Bassano, and pursued the enemy, who retired beyond the Piave and into the gorges of the Brenta : he sent the brave general Mesnard in pursuit of him : that officer overtook him at Carpenedolo, and took from him 800 prisoners after a very smart action. The grenadiers of the 25th demi-brigade passed the bridge of the Brenta at the point of the bayonet, and made a horrible slaughter of all who opposed their passage,

Joubert's division marched to follow the enemy into the

<sup>1</sup> This appears to be the manifesto concerning which so pointed an inquiry is made by Bonaparte at page 3 in this volume ; and which is referred to in the letter of the French minister at Rome, page 51.

gorges of the Tyrol, which the bad weather renders very difficult: he fell in yesterday at Avio with the enemy's rear-guard, and took 300 prisoners after a slight action.

Rey's division has accompanied the prisoners. Nothing new at the blockade of Mantua.

I have written to citizen Cacault to leave Rome three hours after the arrival of the courier whom I sent off to him for that purpose.

The weather is horrible: the rain has been falling in pailfuls for these forty-eight hours.

I am giving orders to citizen Leroux to assume the functions of *ordonnateur en chef*, and persuading citizen Dennié to remain with the army as *ordonnateur* of division; we have not too many of them. Commissary Naudin is arrived. If citizen Villemanzky is to come to Italy, let him make haste, because, when the campaign is once begun, he will not be able to seize the thread of our operations.

None of the troops of the 10,000 men of the Ocean have yet arrived but the 1800 men of the 64th demi-brigade.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To Citizen Carnot, Member of the Executive Directory.*

Verona, 9 Pluviose, year 5 [January 28, 1797].

I received your letter, my dear Director, on the field of battle of Rivoli. I saw at the time with pity all the stories circulated about me. Every one makes me speak according to his own passion. I think you know me too well to imagine that I can be influenced by any person whatever. I have always had to congratulate myself on the marks of friendship which you have bestowed on me and mine, and I shall ever feel truly grateful to you for them: there are men to whom hatred is a necessity, and who, being unable to overturn the Republic, console themselves by sowing dissension and discord wherever they can get. As for me, let them say what they will, they cannot reach me: the esteem of a small number of persons such as you, that of my comrades and of the soldiers, sometimes too the opinion of posterity, and, above all, the approbation of my conscience and the prosperity of my country, solely interest me.

Two divisions of the army are now at Bassano; the enemy, as I am assured, is evacuating Trent; Mantua is still strictly blockaded. Baron de St. Vincent left Trent

on the 4th for Vienna. On the 15th we shall bombard Mantua. Colli, he who commanded the Austrian army in Piedmont, has landed at Ancona, with some Austrian officers and sub-officers; he has already reviewed the papal army. By the time this letter reaches you, one of our divisions will already have attacked that army. I have written to citizen Cacault to leave Rome immediately; you have no idea of the treatment he has received from that priestly crew.

I am still waiting impatiently for Villemazy. Dennié goes on no longer; Leroux takes his functions for the present.

All the Austrian officers, generals, and others, to whom I have mentioned the stupidity of the court of Vienna, which, in its interviews with General Clarke, affected not to recognize the Republic, have cried out vehemently. The public opinion at Vienna is strongly against Thugut. I told Manfredini, the last time I saw him, that, if the emperor wished to have proof that Thugut had sold himself to France at the time of his embassy to Constantinople, it would be easy to procure it for him. I beg you to urge Truguet to send some frigates into the Adriatic.

The head of the troops that you announce as coming from the Rhine has not yet arrived at Lyons; from Lyons to Verona is twenty-eight days' march. To-day is the 9th Pluviose; so that there is no hope that we can have here a single battalion of the columns coming from the Rhine before the 9th Ventose. Of the 10,000 men from the Ocean, announced so long ago, but 1800, forming the 64th demi-brigade, have yet arrived. From Vienna to Trent is but thirty days' march; from Vienna to Piave, that is to say, to the environs of Bassano, still less. I have written to the treasury relative to its indecent conduct with Flachat and Co. Those fellows have done us infinite injury in carrying off millions, and thereby placed us in the most critical situation. For my part, if they come into the arrondissement of the army, I will have them put in prison till they have restored to the army the five millions of which they have robbed it. Not only does the treasury care nothing about furnishing the army with its pay and supplying its wants, but it even protects the rogues who come to the army to feather their nests. Those fellows, I fear, are greater enemies of the Republic than the courts of London and Vienna.

You will see by my letter to the Directory that we have taken 1100 more prisoners in the two actions of Carpenedolo and Avio. We shall shortly be in Trent. I calculate upon keeping that part of the Tyrol and the Piave till the arrival of the forces which you announced to me. After their arrival, I shall soon be at Trieste, Clagenfurt, and Brixen; but for these operations the 30,000 men whom you have announced must arrive.

I shall be obliged to you to give me by the first courier news of the expedition to Ireland, especially if unfavourable; for any little reverse that we meet with people are sure to exaggerate a hundredfold.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Mantua, January 29, 1797 [10 Pluviose, year 5].

A military reason has determined me to offer you the fortress of Mantua, on the preliminary condition of my being permitted to march out freely, with my garrison and all the artillery and munitions, to the imperial army.

I await the honour of your answer, and am, &c.,

COUNT DE WURMSER.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Bologna, 11 Pluviose, year 5 [January 30, 1797].

I arrived yesterday evening at Bologna, where I await your orders.

Immediately after the arrival at Rome of your courier, who brought me your letter of the 3rd Pluviose, I wrote to the Cardinal Secretary of State—"I am called by the orders of the French government, and obliged to set out this evening for Florence. I have the honour to inform your eminence of it, and to renew the assurance of my respect."

The cardinal immediately replied: "Cardinal Busca, secretary of state, has just received the note of M. Cacault, apprizing him that he shall set out this evening for Florence. This departure, alike sudden and unforeseen, leaves the cardinal only time to assure him of his distinguished esteem."

You see that they were not at all tempted to detain me, and, as I have already told you, they have always wished

that I would be gone; and at the moment when the news of your last victories arrived, they were seriously engaged in devising how to get rid of me, in compliance with the solicitations of the court of Vienna: they no longer durst dismiss, but they have not sought to detain me.

CACAULT.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Bologna, 13 Pluviose, year 5 [February 1, 1797].

You will find herewith, citizens Directors, a letter written to me by Marshal Wurmser: I have replied that I could not grant the capitulation which he demanded, and that, as for himself, I would allow him to march out with 500 men of his own choice, on condition that they should not serve for three months against the Republic, but that all the rest must be prisoners. I left my instructions with General Serrurier and set off for Bologna.

General Serrurier has informed me that he has just received a fresh flag of truce, by which he offers the place, on condition that he shall march out with the garrison, and that he will engage not to serve for a year against the French Republic. I shall answer General Serrurier that I adhere to my first proposal, and that, if General Wurmser does not accede to it before the 15th, I shall retract it and grant him no other capitulation than to be prisoner of war with his garrison.

I have this morning sent off General Victor's division, which has proceeded to Imola, the first town in the territories of the pope. You will find herewith my proclamation and other papers printed on this occasion.

Might one not, if we go on to Rome, unite the Modenese, the Ferrarese, and the Romagna, and make out of them one republic, which would be tolerably powerful? Might one not give Rome to Spain, on condition that she should guarantee the independence of the new republic?—We might then restore to the emperor the Milanese and the Mantuan, and give him the duchy of Parma, in case we were obliged to let it go, in order to accelerate the peace that we have need of. The emperor would lose nothing by it; Spain would gain much and we still more: we should have a natural ally in Italy, who would become powerful, and with

VOL. II.

R

whom we should correspond by Massa, Carrara, and the Adriatic.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

St. George, 10 Pluviose, year 5 [January 29, 1797].

A fatality pursues me in the reports which are made to you of the military events in which I have had a part. The action of the 3rd Frimaire has been attributed in the public papers to General Kilmaine, who was not with the division at all on that day. The general of division Chabot, obliged by fever to take rest, resigned the command to me at day-break; he went to Goito and returned about noon: we were successful, but in no way whatever could General Kilmaine contribute to that success.

The Austrian column, which appeared on the morning of the 26th before St. George, and was forced next day to capitulate and surrender itself prisoners of war, is an event which was likewise attributed to others, and which, nevertheless, belongs incontestably to the troops which were under my command. The enemy hemmed us in on all sides: we attacked about nine o'clock, obliged him to fall back, though our force was not equal to his; but daring and temerity made amends; we pressed him on both flanks, at the same time attacking him in front; his advanced guard was overthrown, enveloped, and conducted prisoners to Roverbello, by Captain Beranger.

General Provera, finding himself pressed, fearing for his rear, stopped us by a flag of truce, who desired, in his name, to capitulate: I replied that, in the first place, he must lay down his arms; he consented, and sent me some articles in pencil, which I put into form, altering two of them, and sent to him signed. I then directed my course upon la Favorita, which was in danger from a sortie from Mantua; matters being set to rights at this point, I returned to the Austrian prisoners: Generals Serrurier and Victor were there. I perceived, from what General Serrurier said, that he was not acquainted with what had passed on our side; but I did not think fit to dispute the point, conceiving that the facts would speak for themselves: this has not been the case, and I therefore appeal to you, general.



If General Provera capitulated with me, it was because he was forced to do so; otherwise, he would probably have addressed himself to some one else. The other troops did not arrive till after the capitulation: the conditions were dictated by me; to whom then ought to be ascribed the honour of that brilliant day, if not to the troops that I have the honour to command?

MIOLLIS.

*Proclamation by General Joubert.*

Roveredo, 11 Pluviose, year 5 [January 30, 1797].

I am come into the Tyrol with precise orders from General Bonaparte to spare the inhabitants as much as possible, to make no requisition in money, but only in articles of subsistence, which the rapidity of my march requires. My character disposes me to execute orders so beneficent. I will take care to appoint to the command of Roveredo, as well as of all the places where I shall arrive, officers of not less integrity than I flatter myself I am; but then, Tyrolese, I will not suffer you to share the obstinacy of the emperor in continuing this unjust war, which ruins the people, and which the French carry on in spite of themselves.

Send all your arms to a depôt which shall be committed to the care of the commandant of the place, and which none shall have a right to touch but by my order; the inhabitants who fail to comply with this order I shall be obliged to treat as enemies; and I declare that I shall not consider as soldiers, nor treat with the regard due to such, any who are not clothed in a uniform which shall distinguish them from the citizen or the inhabitant of the country.

JOUBERT.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Roverbello, 11 Pluviose, year 5 [January 30, 1797].

I have seen Colonel Wurmser this afternoon, general. It appears that the marshal is extremely sensible to all that has been said to him from you; but he persists in saving his whole garrison, that, he says, it may not be supposed at Vienna that he has capitulated for his own sake only. He would promise that this garrison should not serve for a year against France, but he should wish this article not to be

R 2

inserted in the capitulation : I have confined myself to the general terms which you offered yesterday ; I promised to report to you, but intimated that your answer could not arrive in less than four days.

Colonel Wurmser spoke to me of a courier whom the Austrians had seized a day or two before the affair of the 26th and 27th, saying that he was the bearer of a letter from the Directory, which desired you not to leave till the affair of Mantua was terminated : of course they were astonished when I said that it would take at least four days to have your answer.

SERRURIER.

---

*To the Minister of War.*

Mantua, 14 Pluviose, year 5 [February 2, 1797].

I reply, citizen minister, to the inquiry which you make in your letter relative to the present military situation of the island of Corsica.

The general of brigade Casalta, whom I sent to Corsica, landed at the head of the gendarmerie of that department and several other refugees, and completed the expulsion of the English from that island. It was not long before General Gentili followed, with all the Corsican refugees who were in the army of Italy, and who, by means of their connexions in the country, will completely consolidate our establishment. I sent over also 100 artillerymen, with several officers of artillery and engineers, to arm the different forts. General Gentili has, by my order, formed in the departments of Golo and Liamone a good corps of gendarmerie and five moveable columns composed of 300 men, as well to attend to the defence of the coasts as to repress our internal enemies. The guard of the forts of Ajaccio, Bonifacio, and Bastia, is committed to corps of national guards of known fidelity and patriotism.

The *commissaire ordonnateur* of the army has made contracts and caused the different fortresses of the island to be supplied with all that was necessary for them : he has also provided for the pay of all those different corps.

Since the two departments of which the island of Corsica is composed have been again under the rule of the Republic, there has been no assassination nor any attack upon property : never was country more quiet, and never was revolution effected with so little commotion.

I have not sent any troops to Corsica: we are in the habit of keeping 5000 men in garrison there, and my troops are too necessary in Italy for me to be able to spare the smallest portion of them for Corsica, the tranquillity of which, moreover, is better secured by the measures of internal police which I have adopted and by the money which I have had sent over than by a corps of 4000 men. However, when the affairs of Rome are finished, and the English have evacuated Porto Ferrajo, I shall send over 600 men for the fort of Bastia and 400 for that of Ajaccio.

You may be perfectly easy, citizen minister, about the tranquillity, internal and external, of the island of Corsica. It can only be an enemy to the country, I should think, who could desire that the corps of the army of Italy should be weakened in order to send troops to Corsica, where they would be nearly useless. If the Directory continues to leave me authority to do what is fitting, I will send troops to Corsica, as soon as the situation of the army shall permit, or as circumstances require.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 8 Pluviose, year 5 [January 27, 1797].

The successes which you report to us, citizen-general, in your letter of the 28th Nivose, throw upon the army of Italy a fresh lustre, which must strike Europe with astonishment, and which can belong only to republican enthusiasm. The nature of the circumstances in which France finds herself called for a great event, capable of heightening her consequence in the eyes of foreign governments, and which would at the same time rally all minds around the wish for an honourable peace, and give steadiness to the march of the constitutional system. The result of the operations that have recently taken place has fulfilled this important object; the resistance of Mantua, the prolongation of which gave us some uneasiness, became favourable to us from the reverses of the enemy of which it was the occasion; and it is now beyond doubt that, the enemy being baffled in the attempt to re-victual that fortress, it will very soon open its gates. Longer obstinacy on the part of Wurmser ought to deprive him of an honourable capitulation. You will find in another despatch a statement of the forces marching from the banks of the Rhine to join you. As for the column from the

Coasts of the Ocean, General Kellermann intimates in a letter, an extract from which is annexed, that it has passed the Alps 9151 strong : so that we have reason to hope that our orders on this head have been completely executed.

The superiority which you enjoy in your military position and the advantages of the season offer you favourable chances for the operations projected against Rome ; but we leave you still to decide the moment when they are to be commenced, whether you think that they ought to await the fall of Mantua and the arrival of the reinforcements, or the destruction of Alvinzi's army permits you to act before that period. We recommend to you, however, to consider that, notwithstanding the weakness of the pope, that enterprise requires a respectable force, in order to derive from it all the fruit that it offers, and not to compromise the safety of the corps which shall be employed in it.

The indemnities which we shall have to draw from the State of the Church will supply the administrative service for a considerable time ; but we have other resources opened in the State of Venice. The example of our enemies, the partiality shown for them by the Venetians, and the wrongs that we have to allege against that power, dispense us from sparing its territory. The requisitions to which it will be subjected must nevertheless be equitable.

The *ordonnateur-en-chef* Villemanzy is about to set off for the army, and he gives us reason to hope that the abuses which prevailed during the last campaign will be soon powerfully repressed. We will second his efforts with all our authority.

We hope that these military events will make so strong an impression on the cabinet of Vienna, as to dispose it in favour of the mission of General Clarke ; you give us moreover the certainty, citizen-general, by the superiority of your talents, that if Prince Charles passes into Italy with new forces, as it is rumoured, you will receive him like Alvinzi, and that the glory which he arrogates to himself will be of short duration.

In communicating to the army the honourable decree that its victories have merited, congratulate it also, in the name of the Executive Directory, whose high confidence it has justified in so striking a manner.

P. BARRAS, President.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 10 Pluviose, year 5 [January 29, 1797].

The Executive Directory has received, citizen-general, since sending off the last courier, the report which you addressed to it on the 29th Nivose, of the operations of the army of Italy, the brilliant success of which you had announced to it. These details add a new value to the victory, by attesting that it is due not to the chances of fortune, but to the valour of the troops, to their confidence in their able chiefs, to the talent with which you have multiplied your forces, and to the ascendancy of republican genius.

You will, no doubt, have ordered some light corps to pursue the wrecks of Alvinzi, who, it is said, has saved no more than ten or twelve thousand men; but an object of still higher importance is the reduction of Mantua. Its surrender can alone enable you to commence with entire security a movement which is first to carry you to Rome and then into the Friule. Wurmser is said to have relinquished all hope of being relieved in time, and you have certainly interdicted him, by an energetic summons and demonstrations of attack, that of an honourable capitulation if he persists longer in a vain resistance.

General Kellermann has acquainted us by a letter of the 4th Pluviose, that the two columns marched upon Lyons and Bourg were about to arrive there, and that he was preparing to make them file rapidly by Mont Cenis.

You recollect, citizen-general, the statement you gave us of the sums which these reinforcements, and the ulterior successes which they promise you, will render disposable for the service of the other armies, after supplying that of the troops which you command. The preparations for a new campaign on the Rhine require that funds should be immediately found for them, in order to accelerate the commencement of the operations, and thereby to promote your progress. We earnestly request you not to lose sight of this object, to which the penury of the public treasury frequently draws our attention.

We approve the treaty which you have concluded with the Grand-Duke of Tuscany.

The promotions which you propose shall be adopted; we shall grant, in like manner, what bravery and talent appear to you to deserve.

It is now some time since we ordered General Willot to send back to his corps the chief of the 57th demi-brigade. This brave corps has justified your desire to see it take its place in the line, and we hope that the like emulation will prevail among those which are marching to join you.

P. BARRAS, President.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 15 Pluviose, year 5 [February 3, 1797].

The Executive Directory, in turning its attention to all the obstacles which oppose the consolidation of the French constitution, has perceived, as it is thought, that the Romish religion is the one of which the enemies of liberty could, for a long time to come, make the most dangerous use. You are too habituated to reflect, citizen-general, not to be aware, as well as we, that this religion will ever be an irreconcilable enemy of the Republic, in the first place by its essence, and in the second because its professors and ministers will never forgive it the severe blows which it has dealt against the influence of the former, against the prejudices and habits of the latter. There are no doubt means to be employed in the interior for gradually annihilating its influence, either by legislative measures or by institutions calculated to efface old impressions, by substituting new impressions more analogous to the present order of things, more conformable to reason and sound morality.

It is for the government to strive to discover these means; but there is a point not less essential, perhaps, for attaining this desired object: that is, to destroy, if possible, the centre of Roman unity; and it is for you, who have hitherto combined the most distinguished qualities of the general with those of the enlightened statesman, to realize this wish, if you judge it to be practicable.

The Executive Directory, then, invites you to do all that shall appear possible to you, without compromising in any way the safety of your army; without depriving yourself of the resources of all kinds which you can now command for its subsistence and for the service of the Republic; and without rekindling the torch of fanaticism in Italy instead of extinguishing it, to destroy the papal government, either by putting Rome under another power, or, what would be better still, by establishing there a form of internal govern-

ment which should render the government of priests odious and contemptible, so that the pope and the sacred college should not have the least hope left of ever seating themselves again in Rome, and should be obliged to seek an asylum in some other place, or at least should have no temporal power whatever.

This is not, however, an order which the Directory gives, but a wish that it forms ; it is too far from the scene to judge of the real state of things ; *that* it must leave to the zeal and prudence which have invariably guided you in a career as glorious for yourself as for the Republic which you serve. Whatever may be the course that you think fit to pursue in this circumstance, and whatever be its issue, the Executive Directory will never discover in it, as far as you are concerned, anything but a desire to serve your country advantageously, and not lightly to compromise its interests.

REWBELL, President.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 16 Pluviose, year 5 [February 4, 1797].

While the brave army which you command, citizen-general, was triumphing over its enemies, a new conspiracy was plotting in the interior against the Republic ; but it has just been frustrated by the apprehension of the principal agents. All true Frenchmen must have rejoiced at the discovery of this plot, which though impotent, it is true, for the re-establishment of royalty, was not the less alarming for the public tranquillity.

This fortunate event will render the march of the constitution still more firm and regular ; it will make the republican armies prouder of their successes, and prove anew to France and Europe that the same vigilance and the same severity repress all the manœuvres of anarchy and royalism in the bosom of the Republic. Our attention is daily drawn more and more to the result which our recent victories must obtain in regard to Mantua. We approach the favourable moment for commencing the operations which are to change the reinforcements marching to join you into millions : these reinforcements will cross the Alps forthwith ; and the armies of the Rhine, for which we destine the military contributions of Italy which it shall be possible to dispose of, are in urgent need of this aid for the preparations for the

new campaign. Prince Charles is striving by his activity to compensate the emperor on the Rhine for his reverses in Italy; and it is important that we should soon be able to resume the offensive on this part of our theatre of operations, either to prevent the enemy from following up his advantages over the *têtes de pont* which are left us upon the Rhine, or to prevent him from accumulating his forces against the army of Italy.

General Bernadotte, who is conducting the troops from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, will continue under your command, as well as the other generals employed among them. He has already earned from us testimonies of satisfaction, and we hope that you will have a favourable report to make of his services.

General Berthier having applied to us to place his brother, the adjutant-general, on your staff, we have given orders in consequence. We think that this officer, who has talents as historiographic engineer, might be usefully employed in that department, in order to enrich our topographical collections with sketches of the most interesting points of that theatre of war, and the fields of battle which have shed glory upon it.

REWELL, President.

---

*To the General Chief of the Staff.*

Lavis, 14 Pluviose, year 5 [February 2, 1797].

I cannot help expressing to you, general, my extreme surprise on reading the general orders of the army on the 9th and 10th of this month. I there see with astonishment that the light infantry and the 85th demi-brigade and their leaders are mentioned with commendation, while the actions of the 14th demi-brigade are spoken of in such general terms as these: "General Joubert writes from Avio on the 8th, that the advanced guard of the division has overthrown the enemy's posts, notwithstanding the most formidable entrenchments, and that it has taken 400 prisoners" (Order of the Day, 10 Pluviose). Well, general, the advanced guard of Joubert's division, on the right bank of the Adige, was composed of the 14th demi-brigade, under my command.

It was this alone that was engaged; it was this that carried at the charge step and at the point of the bayonet those formidable entrenchments; it was this alone that sus-



tained any loss, since, at the attack of the entrenchments of Avio, it had eight officers and twenty grenadiers wounded, and at those of Chizzola, the chief of brigade Auriere killed by the shot of a rifle. I beg, therefore, general, and I expect from your equity, that you will repair an omission which resembles an injustice, and at which the 14th demi-brigade has cause to feel sore. Soldiers, you know, live but for glory, and they find it in the publicity of the actions by which they have sought to acquire it. Be pleased to accept my remonstrance, to do what is right by it, and to believe that it is dictated by a noble sentiment of emulation, free from every kind of injustice.

BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.

*To General Bonaparte.*

St. Antoine, 14 Pluviose, year 5 [February 2, 1797].

I have surveyed the post of Goito with greater attention than I had yet done, and am of opinion that a certain advantage may be derived from it: I shall advert to this subject in the report which I am going to draw up for you concerning Mantua.

This Mantua we shall at length enter to-morrow: it is a grand epoch for the engineer corps of the army of Italy, and the favourable moment for soliciting promotion for it; I cannot help reminding you of the note which I gave you a month ago, till I give you another of the same kind.

It is customary, on the taking of a fortress, to give horses to the officers of the engineers: however, as they are necessary for the army, I will reduce the demand, and, instead of demanding them for all the officers, I should wish them to be given to those only who have not been able to mount themselves and who are on foot; that will be a dozen horses to sacrifice for this object: they must not be delivered to any but those who shall have a certificate signed by me; and till then keep the horses.

CHASSELOUP-LAUBAT.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Roverbello, 15 Pluviose, year 5 [February 3, 1797].

I send you herewith, general, the original of the capitulation of Mantua and the citadel, a copy only of which

you have yet received. We took possession of the citadel at nine o'clock this morning ; the general of brigade Miollis commands there. I have not yet received the report of the artillery and the engineers.

According to the report of the commissary of war and Adjutant-general Brouart, there is nothing in any magazine. The garrison is represented as amounting to 15,000 of all arms, and 6000 in the hospitals.

As it would have taken infinite time to make so many troops file off, and there are but 20,000 rations left, without any means of making more of them, we were obliged to arrange their departure at three times, in divisions of 5000 each time, or to let them perish of hunger. The first column sets out on the 16th, the second on the 17th, and the third on the 18th.

I have seen Marshal Wurmser in the citadel, and he has charged me to say many things to you from him : he leaves to-morrow.

SERRURIER.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Pezaro, 19 Pluviose, year 5 [February 7, 1797].

General Bernadotte writes to me from Metz, to inform me that the six demi-brigades coming from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which, according to General Moreau's account, were to consist of 2400 men each, which would make 14,400 men, amount to but 12,800. Supposing that the six demi-brigades sent by General Moreau are of the like force, that would make 25,000 men : to have 30,000, it would therefore be necessary to give orders for the departure of two more demi-brigades ; you might send us two from the army of the Ocean.

These corps will necessarily lose men by the way. The least they can lose is 500 men each, which would reduce the reinforcement of 30,000 men announced for the army to 19,000 : I think, therefore, that it would be necessary for you to send us three more demi-brigades, drawing them either from the departments of the interior or from the two armies of the Rhine. With the reinforcement of these five demi-brigades, the extraordinary succours sent would be 17 demi-brigades ; it is a high calculation to estimate them on their arrival in Milan at 1500 men, especially the demi-brigades of light infantry, which in most of the

armies are scarcely half as strong as the others : these demi-brigades, therefore, would comprehend 25,500 men. The succour, therefore, would still be inferior by 5000 men to the 30,000 whom it is your intention to send to the army of Italy.

General Kellermann reckons the same thing twice over when he includes the 40th, which was sent us two months ago, and has been comprised in another account. Of the 10,000 men announced, then, we have really only received the 64th and the 13th, forming a total of less than 4000 men. Four regiments of cavalry from the two armies, and the 15th chasseurs coming from Bourges, are announced to me. I asked you for two squadrons, remaining at Bordeaux and Marseilles, of the 18th dragoons, two squadrons of the 5th cavalry and 9th dragoons at Lyons, and the various small detachments of cavalry of the army left in the 8th division, and which it is urgent to rally to their corps. If you could send me 600 heavy cavalry, 600 dragoons, and 7 or 800 of the different arms of the cavalry, on foot and armed, whom we will endeavour to mount with such horses as we can find, I shall be strong enough in cavalry.

Of the light artillery announced by the minister at the beginning of the campaign, we are deficient four companies, which have never arrived : we are in the greatest want of them.

I calculate upon bringing into line against the Germans the Lombard legion, which fights tolerably well, but numbers no more than 1500 men. The Polish legion, which is raising, will furnish nearly 1500 men, who, with the Cispadane legion, will serve to guard Lower Italy.

I beg you to send to the army citizen Champeaux, heretofore chief of brigade of the 10th chasseurs, whom I have appointed chief of brigade of the 7th hussars, which is extremely addicted to plunder, but which Champeaux will reduce to order.

I recommend to you to send us two thousand drivers for the artillery.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Ancona, 22 Pluviose, year 5 [February 10, 1797].

We have great complaints to make, citizens Directors, of the conduct of the Swiss bailiffs. I have placed gun-

boats on the Lake of Lugano for no other reason but to prevent the smuggling that was carried on and the desertion of the Austrian prisoners, protected by the Swiss. We had a right to put these boats upon the lake, since a great part of the shore belongs to us; however, if the Swiss bailiffs continue to behave ill, I shall not grant them any more corn; and, if they proceed to acts of violence, I will order the villages that have misconducted themselves to be burned. The Swiss of the present day are not the men of the fourteenth century: they are not bold but when one coaxes them too much; they are humble and cringing when one shows that one has no need of them; if we were not to supply them from the Milanese, they would be famished to death: we have a right then to require them to behave with some decency.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Trent, 24 Pluviose, year 5 [February 12, 1797].

Prince Charles is in the Tyrol; such is the public report; all the forces are moving upon Bassano. The peasants towards this quarter are organizing; fanaticism is busy. Peaceful as the Italian Tyrol is, in consequence of the measures that I am taking, so excited is the German Tyrol; and you may expect a very speedy campaign, at least according to all the accounts that reach me.

I know not whether the enemy is concealing his movement upon Trent: till now it seemed to me to be his intention to cover Trieste: for the rest, the movements of the Austrians follow one another with such rapidity, that one cannot yet guess anything very precise concerning them, unless that they appear to be falling back upon their left; but you know that when the principal effort was to be made upon Rivoli, there was talk also of going to Bassano and Brescia.

I am engaged in making myself thoroughly acquainted with the country, by inspecting it with the commandant of the engineers.

JOUBERT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 24 Pluviose, year 5 [February 12, 1797].

We have received, citizen-general, the tidings of the taking of Mantua, as one of the most remarkable events

of this war, and we congratulate the brave army of Italy and its celebrated general upon it.

We have caused a flaming account to be published of this news, at which the whole Republic will rejoice. The surrender of the fortress of Mantua will not be the only prize of the victories which we have won in Lombardy. The possession of the Tyrol and the Friule, the occupation of Trieste, and the conquest of Rome, will be its immediate and glorious consequences. Rapidity of movements has been an essential and constant guarantee of success ; we, therefore, see with joy that, while waiting for the reinforcements, part of which must be already in Milan, you continue to disperse the wrecks of Alvinzi, in order to secure the most important passes of the Tyrol and the Friule ; but we are not less pleased at the faculty which you have gained by the capitulation of Mantua, to increase the force of the division which is acting in the Romagna. Your march upon Rome and your entry into that immense city require precautions, which the sudden effervescence of a people without energy, but easily excited, ought to render the more attentive. A corps of 10 or 12,000 men nevertheless appears to us necessary for that operation, as you yourself thought when the subject was started during the last campaign. For the rest, we rely entirely upon you in regard to your dispositions.

As for the pope, since he has trusted to the fortune of arms, it seems right that the loss of his territorial power should be an effect of the infatuation of his counsels, and the proposal which you make to us on this subject deserves to be discussed. We hope that the reinforcement of the twelve demi-brigades and of three regiments of horse, which are on their way to the army of Italy, will enable you, after the expedition to Rome, to debouch from the Tyrol with superiority, and we will at that time order General Moreau to pass the Rhine and to combine his movements with yours. General Hoche, at the head of the army of Sambre and Meuse, will occupy part of the enemy towards Franconia, and blockade the fortresses of the Rhine.

Orders are despatched for the artillery for which you apply, as well as for the officers of that arm whom you mention.

We are sorry that we cannot send you the succour in cavalry which you require, owing to the weakness of that arm in the armies of the Rhine. It is, moreover, to be ob-

served that you have under your orders about twenty skeletons of horse corps, and that you will find in the countries which you occupy resources independent of the depots of remounts which are in the interior, and all empty at the present moment.

You will find herewith a note transmitted by the noble of Venice, M. Quirini. You are acquainted with our intentions relative to that power, and we await the result of the measures which you have taken in regard to it.

REWBELL, President.

Rome, February 12, 1797 [24 Pluviose, year 5].

To our dear son, General Bonaparte, health and the apostolical benediction.

Pope Pius VI., desiring to put an end of his own accord to the differences existing between us and the French Republic, by means of the withdrawal of the troops which you command, we send and depute to you, as our plenipotentiaries, two ecclesiastics, M. the Cardinal Mattei, perfectly known to you, and Monseigneur Galeppi, and two laymen, the Duke Don Louis Braschi, our nephew, and the Marquis Camille Massimi, who are furnished with our full powers to concert with you, to promise, and to subscribe such conditions as, we hope, will be just and reasonable, binding ourselves by our faith and word to approve and ratify them in special form, that they may be valid and inviolable in all times. Assured of the sentiments of kindness which you have manifested for us, we have abstained from any removal from Rome, and you will thereby be persuaded how great is our confidence in you. We conclude with assuring you of our highest esteem, and with giving you the paternal apostolical benediction.

Given at St. Peter's in Rome, the 12th of February, 1797.

His Holiness PIUS VI.

*To M. the Prince Belmonte Pignatelli, minister of his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies.*

Ancona, 24 Pluviose, year 5 [February 12, 1797].

The Executive Directory sent me at the time, sir, the notes which you addressed to it, expressing the desire which

the king your master had that the armistice concluded between the French Republic and the pope should continue to subsist, and that it might serve for a definitive accommodation.

In consequence, I repeated at that time to the court of Rome my solicitations for the execution of the conditions of the armistice, and for the opening of negotiations for peace, as you will see by the accompanying papers. But the court of Rome, swayed by a spirit of infatuation, preferred the chance of arms : war then became inevitable ; but, adhering to the system of moderation which exclusively governs the operations of the Executive Directory, and desirous to give his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies a proof of the consideration which the French Republic entertains for him, after the first conference which I had the honour to have with you, I wrote the letter to M. the Cardinal Mattei which I have communicated to you. I have no doubt that the Executive Directory of the French Republic will be delighted, under all circumstances, to seize occasions for consolidating the peace which unites it to his Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, and to show its moderation amidst the signal successes recently gained by the army of Italy, in the defeats of the Austrian army and the reduction of Mantua, as it has shown to all Europe its firmness in everything that tends to support the dignity of the Republic and the glory of the French arms.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To M. the Cardinal Mattei.*

Ancona, 25 Pluviose, year 5 [February 13, 1797].

In the letter which you have taken the trouble to write to me, Monsieur le Cardinal, I have recognized that simplicity of manners which characterizes you. You will see by the printed paper annexed the reasons which have induced me to break the armistice concluded between the French Republic and his Holiness.

Nobody is more thoroughly convinced of the desire which the French Republic had to make peace than Cardinal Busca, as he confesses in his letter to M. Albani, which has been printed, and the original of which is in my possession. The court of Rome joined the enemies of France when the first powers in Europe were eager to recognize the Republic and to desire peace with it ; that court long lulled

itself with vain chimeras, and omitted nothing to consummate the destruction of this fine country. I will not listen to any proposal tending to put an end to hostilities between the French Republic and his Holiness till orders have been given for disbanding the regiments raised after the armistice ; secondly, till the command of the army of his Holiness has been taken by public notification from the general officers sent by the emperor. These conditions fulfilled, some hope is left to his Holiness of saving his dominions by placing more confidence in the generosity of the French Republic, and by entering sincerely and promptly into pacific negotiations.

I know that his Holiness has been deceived : I wish to give another proof to all Europe of the moderation of the Executive Directory of the French Republic, in granting him five days for sending a negociator furnished with full powers to repair to Foligno, where I shall be, and where I hope to have it in my power to contribute for my own part to give a signal proof of the consideration which I have for his Holiness.

Happen what will, Monsieur le Cardinal, I beg you to be persuaded of the distinguished esteem with which I am, &c.,  
BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Macerata, 27 Pluviose, year 5 [February 15, 1797].

Herewith you will find, citizens-directors, 1, the copy of a letter written to me by Cardinal Mattei ; 2, the copy of a note which has been handed to me by the Prince de Belmonte Pignatelli, sent by his court to me.

He has told me confidentially, and shown me articles of his instructions, also most confidentially and not officially, in which the king his master took such an interest in the affairs of Rome as to set in march a body of troops to support his remonstrances respecting Rome.

I answered him very confidentially that if I had not humbled the pride of the pope three months ago, it was because I had no doubt that the King of Naples would intermeddle in this affair, contrary to the law of nations and the tenour of the treaty, and that indeed I had not then the means of replying to him ; but that now I had disposable the 30,000 men who were before Mantua, and the 40,000



who were coming to me from the interior; that, if the king his master threw down the gauntlet to me, I would pick it up; that the Republic would give the King of Naples all the satisfaction compatible with his dignity and his interest. On resuming the official tone, he disavowed what had been said in confidence.

You will find herewith the measure which I have adopted at Ancona for the organization of the administration, the course which I have pursued here for the administration of the province, together with an order which I have issued in favour of refractory priests. This order is not contrary to law; it is conformable to our interests and to sound policy; for these priests are strongly attached to us and much less fanatical than those of Rome. They are accustomed to see priests excluded from governing, and that is a great deal; they are very poor; three-fourths of them weep when they see a Frenchman; besides, being hunted out here, they are obliged to seek refuge in France. As we do not meddle here in any way with religion, it is much better that they should stay where they are; if you approve this measure, and it is not contrary to general principles, I shall make those men very useful to me in Italy.

Ancona is a very good port: you go from it in twenty-four hours to Macedonia, and in ten days to Constantinople. My plan is to collect there all the Jews I can. I am getting the fortress put into the best state of defence. We must keep the port of Ancona at the general peace; it must continue French for ever: that will give us a great influence over the Ottoman Porte, and make us masters of the Adriatic Sea, as we are of the Mediterranean by means of Marseilles, the island of Corsica, and St. Pierre. With 1500 men for a garrison and from 2 to 300,000 livres to fortify a neighbouring hill, this town will be capable of sustaining a very long siege.

Loretto contained treasure to the amount of nearly 3,000,000 livres tournois; they have left us the worth of nearly one million out of the seven; I send you the Madonna with all the relics into the bargain. That chest shall be addressed direct to you, and you will make what use of it you think fit: the Madonna is of wood.

The province of Macerata, more generally known by the name of the March of Ancona, is one of the finest and beyond contradiction the richest in the dominions of the pope. Our

troops will be, I hope, this evening at Foligno, and pass the day to-morrow in forming a junction with the second battalion of the 63rd, which was at Leghorn, and which I sent for. What I purpose doing is this :

I will grant peace to the pope on condition of his ceding to the Republic in full property the legation of Bologna, the legation of Ferrara, the legation of Romagna, the duchy of Urbino, and the March of Ancona, and of his paying us : 1, the 3,000,000 worth of the treasure of Loretto ; 2, the 15,000,000 worth remaining due for the armistice ; he shall give us all the cavalry horses and all the horses of his artillery ; he shall dismiss Colli and all the Austrians, and give us the arms of all the new regiments raised since the armistice. If these terms are not accepted, I will go to Rome.

I prefer an accommodation to going to Rome : 1, because it will spare me a discussion which might prove very serious with the King of Naples ; 2, because, the pope and all the princes running away from Rome, I should never be able to extract from them what I demand ; 3, because Rome cannot long exist stripped of its finest provinces : a revolution will take place there of itself ; 4, lastly, the court of Rome, ceding to us all its rights to this country, that could not be considered at the general peace as a temporary success, since it will be a definitively settled thing ; and finally, it will give us the division which is here, disposable at once for the operations in the Friule, and afford me time, before entering upon the struggle with the Austrians, to conclude some secret article with the Senate of Venice.

You will find herewith the second letter just written to me by Cardinal Mattei.

Nothing new of much interest in the Tyrol, nor on the Piave, excepting skirmishes, the bulletin of which will be transmitted to you by the staff.

You will receive herewith an inventory of the artillery found in Mantua, Ancona, and other places.

I am still waiting for Villemazy with the greatest impatience. We want a man who has common sense in that place : all those that I have seen since the commencement of the campaign, are scarcely fit to be commissaries in a fortress.

Verninac has arrived at Naples. I shall answer him the moment the road is free, to point out to him what route he ought to follow.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Tolentino, 30 Pluviose, year 5 [February 18, 1797].

Our troops have taken possession of Umbria and the country of Perugia; we are masters also of the little province of Camerino.

Here I have found Cardinal Mattei, the pope's nephew, the Marquis Massimi, and Monsieur Galeppi, who are come with full powers from the pope to treat.

They write to me from Venice that Prince Charles has arrived at Trieste, and that the Austrian troops are marching from all quarters to reinforce the enemy's army.

I informed you in my last despatch that the twelve demi-brigades which you have sent me did not amount to 19,000 men. The minister of war has just written to General Kellermann to keep 2000 men, and to send back a regiment of cavalry to the army of the Rhine. Here then are 30,000 men you promised me melted down to 17,000—a very pretty reinforcement for the army of Italy! But this makes me too weak to be able to divide my army into two corps and to execute the plan of campaign which I had proposed to myself.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Tolentino, 1 Ventose, year 5 [February 19, 1797].

Herewith you will find, citizens-directors, the report of citizen Monge, whom I have sent to San Marino, with the speech which he delivered when the twelve colours taken from the pope, and five Austrian, the remainder of those taken in the last affairs, were brought.

General Bernadotte is arrived, and his division is collecting at Padua. The calculation which I made, rating the demi-brigades at 1500 men one with another turns out to be correct.

I solicit the rank of general of brigade for Adjutant-general Duphot, who has had in these different affairs five horses killed under him: he is one of our bravest officers.

The pope has ratified the treaty of peace concluded at Tolentino; as soon as I receive the original, I will despatch it to you.

The King of Sardinia has approved the treaty of alliance

offensive and defensive, concluded by General Clarke, who is reporting to you in very circumstantial letters the various steps which he took to arrive at negociations for peace. It has appeared to us that we could not at one and the same time commence a separate negociation for peace with Vienna, and listen to the proposal which would be made for the opening of a congress: so long as the court of Vienna has hopes of obtaining from us the opening of a congress, it will never hearken to separate proposals for peace.

We shall never induce the court of Vienna to enter into negociation with us but by declaring ourselves decidedly adverse to the opening of a congress, which, from the tardiness of its forms, could not spare the campaign which is about to open, and which a spirit of humanity and philosophy, unfortunately not shared by the emperor, makes you desirous of avoiding.

I am setting men to work at arming and provisioning Mantua, and employing others at the same time in the mines for its destruction. Our position in Italy appears to me highly satisfactory.

I have not been at Milan since the taking of Mantua, because the inhabitants of all Lombardy are awaiting my arrival, and hoping that I shall permit the meeting of their primary assemblies.

The moment for executing your orders relative to Venice is not yet arrived; all uncertainty respecting the issue of the battles which the two armies will soon have to fight must first be removed; I should wish too that the flotilla which the minister of the marine promises me had arrived in the Adriatic.

I have appointed citizen Meuron, who has rendered us services on the Lake of Garda, consul of the Republic at Ancona: I request you to confirm him.

I hope before a fortnight to have, besides La Brune cutter, which has arrived in the Adriatic, twenty privateers at Ancona, which will make us masters of the commerce of that sea.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To His Holiness Pope Pius VI.*

Head-quarters, Tolentino, 1 Ventose, year 5 [February 19, 1797].

I have to thank your Holiness for the obliging things contained in the letter which you took the trouble to write me.

The peace between the French Republic and your Holiness is just signed, and I congratulate myself on having had it in my power to contribute to your personal tranquillity.

I beg your Holiness to distrust persons who are in Rome, sold to the courts hostile to France, or who suffer themselves to be exclusively guided by the malignant passions which always lead to the downfall of States.

All Europe knows the pacific inclinations and the conciliatory virtues of your Holiness. The French Republic will be, I hope, one of the truest friends of Rome.

I send my aide-de-camp, chief of brigade, to express to your Holiness the perfect esteem and veneration which I have for your person, and I beg you to believe the desire that I feel to give you, on all occasions, proofs of the respect and veneration with which I have the honour to be, &c.,

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Joubert.*

Tolentino, 29 Pluviose, year 5 [February 17, 1797].

You must have received, citizen-general, the 11th demi-brigade and the 5th: the 26th light infantry must be by this time at Verona; it has orders to follow the 5th, because it ought to be in the same division as these latter brigades. I had thought that the head-quarters of this division should be at Borgo de Val Lugano; yet, if you conceive that they would be better placed at Levico or Pergine, I authorize you to give orders accordingly.

I have received your letter of the 21st Pluviose. I beg you to reflect and to pay more attention to localities: for I do not conceive that, your line of Lavis being forced, and your retreating movement executed in the night, you would not have an intermediate position as near as possible to this first, where you could halt the whole day, get your troops together, receive the stragglers or the corps which could not rejoin in the night; the following night continue your march if necessary, resume the line of Mori and Torbole, and there keep the enemy in check for several days; lastly, reach La Corona, the entrenched camp of Castel-Novo, and finally arrive beneath the walls of Mantua or Verona: to act otherwise would not be carrying on war, the art of which consists only in gaining time when you have inferior forces. To prevent the enemy from attacking in the first instance Torbole and Mori, no expedient appeared to me more effec-

tive than to throw a bridge over the Adige and to entrench the head of it: this bridge ought to be situated between Roveredo and Trent. By this means the enemy could not make any attempt upon Mori and Torbole, even after having forced General Rey, who ought always to execute his retreat upon Torbole.

I beg you to give me a positive answer to this question: Is there a good line from Torbole to Mori? It would serve by the lake and by the Adige, and I had ordered: 1, that all necessary works should be made on that line; 2, that there should be constructed in the most favourable place a redoubt, with cuts of roads, so that it should form the same position as the Chiusa and Rivoli, excepting that, the enemy not being on the same bank as Mori, there would not be occasion for so large a force to defend that point as for the plateau of Rivoli.

I beg you to read again the instructions which I transmitted to you at the moment of your entering Trent, and to make strictly the preparations there directed, as they belong to a general system of warfare for the campaign on which we are about to enter, relying entirely upon you and upon the commandant of engineers, to whom I have given orders to proceed to Trent, concerning the positions to be held, and the application of the general ideas contained in my instructions.

My principle for the defence of the Tyrol is, the moment you are obliged to evacuate Trent, rally in advance of Roveredo, occupying, with the whole of Rey's division, the heights of Mori; when rallied there for an entire day, cross the Adige, and place the three divisions between the Adige, Mori, and Torbole, only placing a few pieces of cannon and a few detachments at the narrowest spots between Mori and Rivoli, to prevent the enemy from having it in his power to march upon Ala, and even to construct there, at the most favourable point, a good redoubt, taking care to make cuts on all sides, and opposite to which there must be a bridge, with a very well entrenched head. Whoever is master of one bank of the Adige and has a bridge is master of both banks. If afterwards, in consequence of events which may happen to the other divisions of the army, the occupation of the line of Torbole and Mori should become useless, then Mantua, Peschiera, or any other fortress whatever, offers a protection to the division.

The line of Rivoli cannot then be of further service to me, unless it be as line of passage for gaining a few days' time: this line is too far distant from the gorges of the Brenta for it to be possible that the corps d'armée could ever be succoured by a flank movement upon Trent: whereas that of Mori, with a bridge enabling it to pass to the other side, assists the divisions, which, by a retrograde movement, would file through the gorges of the Brenta, to bear down upon the flanks of the enemy at Trent. This is sufficient, I think, to make you sensible of the importance of the position of Mori: art must second nature there. If it should happen that you could be forced in the line of Torbole within less than ten days after being forced at Lavis, the campaign would have failed.

In a few days, I shall have returned to the army, where, I am aware, my presence is becoming necessary. The army is within three marches of Rome: I am treating with that priestly crew: for this time his Holiness will again save his capital, by ceding to us his finest provinces and money, and thus we are enabled to execute the great task of the next campaign.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 10 Ventose, year 5 [February 28, 1797].

We have great pleasure, citizen-general, in being able to confirm to you that the succours from the Rhine destined for you will amount to nearly 30,000. The order to retain 2000 infantry and a regiment of horse has been countermanded, and General Kellermann has merely kept back temporarily and directed upon Avignon a battalion indispensable for the maintenance of order which was disturbed. This battalion will resume its route, as soon as that which is on its march to replace it shall have arrived.

General Bernadotte reports that the six demi-brigades which he is bringing to you were 13,482 strong at his departure; the six other demi-brigades being presumed to be of the same force, and the greater number of the men left behind joining their corps every day separately through the attention of General Kellermann, these reinforcements, added to the four regiments of horse, will fulfil our first intentions.

The minister of war has given orders for the dépôts of

six regiments to join, which will give upwards of 800 men of all arms, horse soldiers not mounted, that you have applied for. To take advantage of the resources for remounting, which you have it in your power to procure, it might be advisable to select from this time out of the infantry men fit for the different arms of the cavalry, and to let them receive in the depôts the first lessons of instruction. All the regiments in the interior and on the Rhine are in the like want of men and horses.

From this statement, citizen-general, you will judge, as well as we, that the reinforcements drawn from the armies of the Rhine are not only suitable for compensating the losses of that which you command, but that they will enable you to divide it into two strong corps, and to give to your operations the development of which the enemy is already in such dread.

It appears important to us to cause search to be made in Mantua for the discovery of useful and valuable articles which the enemy may have concealed. We have just received the colours taken in that place: the public joy burst forth at that ceremony so honourable to the army of Italy; we have seen with warm satisfaction the brave General Augereau, who delivered them to us.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Brescia, March 7, 1797 [27 Ventose, year 5].

The event which has happened at Bergamo, since your answer to my last letter, in which you are pleased to say such obliging things to me, would have determined me to set out, if I had not thought that my two fellow-citizens sent to the French camp might concert with you to contrive it so, that, without any violation of the neutrality, the republic of Venice should seek to recover a city, the majority of whose inhabitants, according to all the reports that I have procured, retain a strong attachment to the Venetian government.

I have, moreover, the honour to assure you that no person has been imprisoned upon pretext of conspiracy; and it would be most extraordinary that the government which has given so many proofs of friendship to the French should be



ready to persecute those who show themselves their friends. It is now nearly nine months that I have been at Brescia without any one having been prosecuted in any way whatever. I have observed things with attention, and I have reported them faithfully in my last letter.

Since the event at Bergamo, I have made fewer troops march that way than I had orders to send on to Verona.

What I have been able to perceive is that, in such circumstances, a nothing is sufficient to excite disturbance in a town, and that fear is capable of producing there the most mischievous effects: for this reason, I have directed an amnesty to be proclaimed, which has changed sadness into joy. I know the human heart and the passions which must agitate it, and I strive in consequence to conduct myself prudently; but why, I say it frankly, should one make so many objections against allowing thirty, sixty, or even a hundred, soldiers to pass from one place to another; and why, on such a slight account, annoy a government which has given so many proofs of its good faith?

All these reasons make me very desirous to see you, and I should before this have sought to explain myself on this matter *viva voce*, with my usual frankness and sincerity, if I had not feared that my departure might occasion some movement, which I carefully endeavour to prevent: on which account I have requested General Chambarlhac to let strong French patrols traverse the town, having on my part increased ours.

I take leave to repeat the expression of my earnest desire to see the Lombard troops pass through any other place than this: the inhabitants of this country, hospitable towards the French troops, are not so towards others.

I beg you, if your important engagements permit, to answer my letter, and conclude with the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

FRANCISCO BATAGLIA.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Trivigiano, 29 Ventose, year 5 [March 9, 1797].

On my arrival at Trivigiano, I found that town plundered by the soldiers of Serrurier's division; mine have behaved no better, and have completely ruined the poor inhabitants: the chief of brigade Auvray reports to me that sol-

diers forming part of the advanced guard, and some of the 4th, entered the houses in spite of the armed force, and carried their wickedness so far as to set fire to one of them. I have issued an order for preventing such excesses ; but I think that an order from you is necessary at the moment when we are about to enter the conquered country, and when it is expedient to gain the affections of the people.

The soldiers, indulging in pillage, have paid no regard to their officers : a volunteer of the 69th took aim at the chief of battalion Arnaud, who was endeavouring to put a stop to the outrages : this man was arrested, but suffered to escape.

I send you a copy of the order which I have given.

I inform you that our scouts have been to the distance of nearly three miles and have not met with any enemy ; the peasants told them that they had evacuated last night.

The 4th demi-brigade offer 1000 livres to compensate the owner of the house that was burned : I have commended this act of humanity, worthy of our brave soldiers ; but I await your orders respecting the disposal of that sum.

GUIEUX.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Gradisca, 29 Ventose, year 5 [March 9, 1797].

Agreeably to your orders, general, I made my division advance between Mariane and Gradisca. Having drawn it up in order of battle, I directed General Friant to proceed with the 30th demi-brigade to the Salvador gate ; the 88th was to form the reserve. I ordered General Mireur to march to the Nova gate with twelve companies of grenadiers, and General Murat, with the 15th demi-brigade and a squadron of hussars, to the Laqua gate : this general was to pass the river Isonzo with a corps of troops, and to cut off the retreat of the garrison of Gradisca. The rest of my division, in order of battle on the plain, composed of the 55th and 61st, commanded by General Muilley, the 1st regiment of hussars, and the 14th of dragoons, under the command of Adjutant-general Sarrasin, were to protect the attack of Gradisca, by giving battle to the troops which Prince Charles might have sent from Goritzia.

Orders being thus given, the attacking generals advanced at the head of their columns with that bravery which is sometimes designated fury.

Four thousand men, forming the garrison of Gradisca, were drawn up on the ramparts of the town; the fire of their small arms and their cannon poured down death every moment upon our soldiers without abating their intrepidity: their daring, on the contrary, increased by obstacles, made them defy all difficulties. Emboldened by the generals who directed them, they called loudly for ladders to scale the ramparts and axes to break open the gates; I ordered those things to be brought as speedily as possible. I was about to give the signal, when principles of humanity made me pause, and I summoned M. d'Augustinetz, colonel of the regiment of Splenitz, commandant of the fortress, to surrender it immediately, upon pain of being put to the sword with all his troops. You will find herewith, general, a copy of the summons.

In reply, the colonel desired to march out with the honours of war, upon condition that the garrison should retire into Austria. The disposition of my troops was such that I could not accede to this. I therefore required that the enemy should be prisoners of war, allowing the officers to retire on their parole not to serve against the Republic and its allies till they should be exchanged. I granted but a quarter of an hour: my terms were accepted: two battalions of Splenitz and two of another regiment marched out, at two in the afternoon, by the Goritzia gate leading to Palma, and afterwards laid down their arms. I ordered them to be marched off for Palma.

If I had to recommend to you, general, all the persons who have distinguished themselves, I should have enough to do. Without pretending to sit in judgment on my fellow-labourers, it is impossible to pass over in silence the daring bravery of General Murat, of Adjutant-general Mireur, and of General Friant; it required their talents and their valour to decide the enemy; they were everywhere, cheering the wounded, upholding the courage of the soldiers to await death with fortitude. The enemy vainly attempted to relieve the garrison by descending the left bank of the Isonzo. The gallant Murat, to whom I had sent a battalion of the 55th, forced him to retreat precipitately. I recommend to you, general, citizen Julien, commandant of my artillery: his activity and his zeal have rendered me great services; he has created means, he has done honour to his arm. I beg you also not to forget that the chief of

brigade of engineers Campredon never quitted me during nearly the whole action. I recommend to your paternal care citizen Maurice and the two brothers Conroux, young men who have continued to distinguish themselves, and who belong to a brave and respectable officer. I conclude, general, though I have many things to tell you, with doing justice to young Lemarrois, your aide-de-camp: he made himself remarkable for his contempt of danger, and, though very young, displayed extraordinary coolness and presence of mind. General Murat's aide-de-camp charged this morning with the 1st regiment of hussars; that brave regiment took about twenty prisoners.

I have had a great number of men killed and wounded, and among them many officers: some soldiers were unfortunately drowned in crossing the Isonzo, but only five or six. We have taken eight colours and seven pieces of cannon.

Citizen Birion, General Friant's aide-de-camp, had a horse killed under him; that officer, and citizen Denis, the same general's officer of correspondence, distinguished themselves by their bravery. Several soldiers were wounded by stones when about to attempt to scale the ramparts.

BERNADOTTE.

---

*To M. Bataglia, Provéditeur-General of the Republic of Venice at Verona.*

Head-quarters, Bassano, 20 Ventose, year 5 [March 10, 1797].

I have been painfully affected on learning that the public tranquillity is disturbed at Brescia. I hope that, by means of the wisdom of the measures that you will take, there will be no bloodshed. You know that, in the present disposition of minds in Europe, persecutions would but authorize the discontented against the government.

In most of the towns of the State of Venice, there are persons who are every moment showing their partiality for the Austrians, who never cease to curse and show themselves exceedingly ill-disposed towards the French. Some, but in small number, appear to prefer the manners and affability of the French to the rudeness of the Germans. It would be unjust to punish the latter, and to make a crime of the partiality which is not deemed culpable in favour of the Germans.

The Senate of Venice cannot have the slightest uneasiness, as it must be thoroughly persuaded of the honour of the French government, and of the desire which we feel to live in friendship with your republic; but I should not like all those who are not declared enemies of the French army, or who have in the course of this campaign rendered us any service, to be shut up, on pretext of conspiracy, under the leads of the palace of St. Mark.

Desirous of being able to contribute to the re-establishment of tranquillity and to the removal of every sort of mistrust between the two republics, I beg you, sir, to let me know at what place I could have the honour to see you, as well as to believe the sentiments of esteem and consideration, &c.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Rome, 20 Ventose, year 5 [March 10, 1797].

M. the Marquis de Massimi, one of the plenipotentiaries of the pope who signed the treaty of Tolentino, is sent to you by his Holiness, a letter from whom he will deliver to you. I have given him a passport to proceed to you, where he will be accredited, as I am here, by the mere quality of plenipotentiary having signed the peace. He has the entire confidence of the pope and of the cardinal secretary of State, and is sent by them: he is one of the most important personages in Rome. I believe that he will be sent, after the ratification of the legislative body, in quality of minister, to Paris; he is one of the first men of business in this country. This papal envoy has the following instructions:

1. To solicit of you in the name of the pope, in the most urgent manner, the re-establishment of the civil authority of his Holiness at Ancona, the pope taking upon himself the maintenance of the French garrison, while it shall continue in that city. The accompanying memorial in Italian, No. 1, relative to this subject, has been sent to me by the cardinal secretary of State, and contains motives worthy of attention. The Roman government alleges that if, on the one hand, the French Republic had not designed by the treaty to do as great prejudice to all the rest of the Ecclesiastical State as that which would result from the privation of the civil authority at Ancona; on the other hand, famine

and political disorganization throughout all the rest of the territory of the pope, as well as the total ruin of his finances, would be the immediate consequences of such a privation. The March of Ancona is an abundant country, and feeds all the other provinces of the Ecclesiastical State; but, if the free exportation of corn from the port of Ancona were allowed, the enticement of gain would draw from it all that now serves for the subsistence of the neighbouring countries. In like manner, if a uniform system is not followed in regard to imposts, the port of Ancona, being surrounded by open countries, everything might easily be extracted from it, and the finances of the pope would be deprived of all levies of imposts; lastly, if an authority independent of the pope were established at Ancona, considering its relations with the other provinces, there will be a State within the State, and political order will there be dreadfully deranged, or totally overturned.

2. The pope desires also to be allowed to resume possession from this moment of the civil government of the other districts, as Pescara, Macerata, &c., and that they may be evacuated by the French army. The new authorities establishing in these same districts, being in manifest contrast with the power of the pope, are incessantly taking measures which deprive the government of all its means, throw it into the greatest embarrassment, and totally derange the political and economical order of the Ecclesiastical State.

3. The municipalities of Ancona, Macerata, &c., are incessantly making the heaviest requisitions in all the towns of the provinces of the March, in horses, bullocks, cloths, shirts, shoes, &c., and even corn, ordering them, upon the severest penalties, to be conveyed to Ancona: this reduces the province to extreme distress, finding itself stripped of everything and on the point of being exposed to the most cruel dearth. As it is the nursing mother of the capital, and great fears are entertained for the city of Rome itself, a speedy remedy for so serious an inconvenience is demanded, in the confidence which is felt that, after the treaty of peace, the agents of the French government could not have in view the total ruin of this country.

All the requisitions are not for the daily subsistence of the French troops, and the contributions arising from them, if they have been imposed after the signature of the treaty, will here be carried to account with me for so much of the

payments made upon the contributions stipulated at Tolentino ; and, as nothing beyond that can be exacted after the peace, I could not, without injustice, refuse to admit such articles for so much in payment of the last contributions. Be pleased to acquaint me with your intentions on this subject.

4. A great number of ecclesiastics, wealthy persons, and religious houses, possessing estates in la Romagna, the duchy of Urbino, and the March of Ancona, are domiciliated in Rome or employed by the pontifical government. They flattered themselves that after the treaty of peace they should quietly enjoy their revenues : but commissaries of the French army have everywhere put the said estates under sequestration, and the proprietors are totally deprived of them. If their possessions were situated in France, they could enjoy them as subjects of a power in amity with the Republic ; if a new law and severities of new invention strip them of all their rights, we shall be execrated here ; whereas, if all is preserved, they will be under obligation to us, and all the great prelates of Rome will be, in some measure, dependent on us. This matter certainly needs to be systematized anew.

5. The cardinals, prelates, and others, who possess estates in the Milanese, and who are attached to the service of the pope, acting for a power now at peace with France, desire to be allowed to receive their revenues, agreeably to the laws generally followed on that subject : the sequestration has been put not only upon their ecclesiastical possessions, but also on their patrimonial revenues. Cardinal Busca, who is of the number, demands nothing for himself, if there are particular reasons against his person ; but I must say that, since the treaty of peace, he pays us the greatest attentions ; and as we know neither hatred nor a state of war in regard to individuals, he will, no doubt, be treated like the rest. I think that I have followed sound views in not showing any recollection of past misconduct and animosities : they are all effaced by the treaty, if it is faithfully executed. I have merely abstained from visiting Albani, cardinal-deacon of the sacred colleges, who is much hurt at it, and has caused insinuations to be made to me on the subject. But if I had had credentials for the pope, I should have called upon Cardinal Albani as upon the others : for visits of this kind are not paid to the person but to the place, and as soon as

one is at peace with the sovereign, one must render what is customary to his ministers. In this manner, we should make all bend, and succeed in reconciling ourselves with all. The Chevalier Azara grows warm and embroils himself in personalities : it seems to me that it ought to be our policy to be at war with nobody.

6. M. the Marquis Massimi is commissioned to attend also to what relates to the prisoners to be restored to the pope : I have forewarned him that he would find that subject in disorder. He will arrange with you about it.

7. I send you a copy of the note in which the cardinal secretary of state informs me that, in the disbanding of the regiments, some old ones are to be discharged, in order to preserve the regiment of Colonna, which I believe to be in the pay of the constable, and I have already sent you the other note in which he acquaints me with the suppression of the armaments. This subject is scarcely worthy of attention. The whole army left to the pope will be far from numerous, bad soldiers, and destitute of everything requisite for war : this government never intended to employ its troops otherwise than as sbirri to curb its own subjects. It is not, therefore, an article on which I shall expatiate : still, I must submit it to your consideration, that, if you think otherwise, I may make a point of following your orders.

General Colli is dismissing eight German servants whom he brought with him under the idea that he should act a great part here. He lives obscurely in Rome, but it is intended that he shall be placed at the head of the army of his Holiness, for the sake of giving him an appointment, and because there is no person here capable of regulating what concerns the troops. It is proposed to obtain your consent to his having the same post given to him that was held by General Caprara.

8. I have sent you a memorial by the general of the papal posts, on the subject of the communications to be re-established by couriers between the Ecclesiastical State and our conquered countries. This matter is of importance to commerce, and it needs to be concerted with care. I shall only remark that it is the intention of the Roman government to make the ordinary courier from Pezaro, who formerly went through Forli, pass in future through Ancona.

When we have nearly extracted, by bit and bit, as much as we possibly can of the 30,000,000 imposed, without



reckoning all the losses that the war will have cost the Ecclesiastical State, we shall have drained everything, and it is possible to gain our point without exciting agitation or irritation, which may degenerate into fury; we must afterwards continue good friends, or at least in a certain harmony. Permit me, then, to request you, citizen-general-in-chief, to listen with attention to M. the Marquis Massimi, and to manage so that whatever you may judge to be useful and just may be ordained and settled according to your sound ideas, and not given up to the fiery spirits of hot-headed men.

M. the Marquis del Vasto has been to see me, and we are become wonderful friends. The court of Naples appears to be satisfied with the peace of Rome; it seems to be at length persuaded how great an interest it has in being at peace with us. It will pay the 8,000,000. The imposing situation of the army of Italy, which keeps continually augmenting, cannot fail thoroughly to ensure the state of peace of Lower Italy; but you must be aware that if the pope duly pays what is imposed on him, his means will be exhausted, and we shall have extracted so much that it will be but fair to please him afterwards, and to spare him for our ulterior advantage, which, in point of commerce, may be considerable.

CACAULT.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Brescia, 21 Ventose, year 5 [March 11, 1797].

The city of Brescia contains a great number of persons who are enemies to good order, and who, affecting attachment for the French nation, obtain appointments, that they may get into their hands papers, of which they would make a disgraceful use if they accomplished their object. Hitherto, adhering to my instructions, I have merely watched these ill-affected persons; but now things are carried to such a length that it is necessary to take measures to withstand an approaching movement. To this end I shall collect in the city the scattered cavalry, and send to Verona for a detachment of infantry. I have a twofold object in acquainting you with this affair; in the first place, to observe, in regard to the number of troops, that it is possible that their number may be exaggerated; and in the next to beg you to

T 2

order six or eight small pieces of artillery to be taken down from this fort, the want of them having been felt since they have all been conveyed thither.

Another point, too important for me to omit to mention it, is, that the French troops passing through this place behave perfectly well. A few slight acts of indiscipline only are to be complained of.

If you think proper to take reinforcements from among the Lombard troops, I beg you not to let them pass through Brescia, well knowing that the soldiers who compose them do not resemble the French: they might go to Cocaglio, from Cocaglio to Bera, and thence push forward; but the greatest favour that you could do us would be to make them join the army by way of Cremona.

In serving with zeal the views of my government, I think that I am doing a good office to the French army, which derives more advantages from the tranquillity of the Venetian State than could accrue to it from disturbances, and from the disorganization to which that State might be exposed.

I rely upon your honour, and on the offers which you have made in your last letter, to second the efforts that I am making to perform my duty.

I beg you to be persuaded of the sentiments of esteem, &c.,  
BATAGLIA.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Foligno, 22 Ventose, year 5 [March 12, 1797].

The first payment which ought to be made to the Republic by the court of Rome, agreeably to article 10 of the treaty of peace, is not yet discharged. Ten millions have arrived. I have ordered them to be conveyed to Tolentino, where they are guarded by troops and officers in whom I have confidence. I shall send them off for Bologna, escorted by the same troops. The five millions which are to complete the first payment will arrive here in two days, according to what the minister Cacault writes to me. I shall immediately evacuate this country, according to the terms of article 14 of the treaty.

A few saddle-horses are arriving from time to time, and I take care to have them distributed among the various detachments of dismounted cavalry which are in the States

of the pope. As fast as they are mounted, I make them file away for the Romagna, to facilitate the means of feeding their horses, and at the same time to bring them nearer to the army, to which I shall send them as soon as their horses are recruited and in a fit state for service.

All is quiet in this province and in that of Macerata; I cannot say as much for the legation of Urbino, where the disturbances are only beginning to be quelled. I have marched troops thither to overawe the ignorant and fanatic population. I have prevailed upon a prelate enjoying high consideration to go thither to enlighten them, and I presume that his efforts will not be fruitless, and that he will spare me the pain of seeing blood spilt.

VICTOR.

---

*Instructions for the Conduct to be pursued in the Tyrol.*

Sacile, 25 Ventose, year 5 [March 15, 1797].

1. To confirm by a proclamation all the existing laws and magistrates.
2. To order, by a proclamation, that the public exercise of religion be continued as usual.
3. To court the priests assiduously, and strive to form a party among the monks, taking care to distinguish duly the theologians and men of science who may exist among them.
4. To speak well of the emperor, but say all that is bad of his ministers and advisers.
5. To issue an order that all the Tyrolese who have been in the service of the emperor shall return home, and to assure them of the protection and safeguard of the Republic.
6. The moment you are master of Brixen and the whole country on this side of the high mountains, to establish there a commission of government, to which you will give the name and the organization consecrated in the country, which you will charge with the levy of all the taxes that were collected for the account of the emperor, and which it shall pay, upon its responsibility, into the chest of the army.
7. Not to take either the *monts de piété* or the chests belonging to the towns, but only the chests and magazines belonging to the emperor; lastly, to show great amenity, and seek to conciliate the inhabitants.
8. To add to these measures that of carrying the dis-

arming strictly into effect ; to take hostages in such places as it may be thought necessary ; and to lay impositions in form of contributions upon villages which misbehave themselves, or where soldiers of ours have been assassinated.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Turin, March 16, 1797 [26 Ventose, year 5].

You have seen, general, by the two letters which I have had the honour to write to you, dated the 1st and the 7th instant, and by that of M. the Chevalier Priocca, the frank and honourable manner in which his majesty the king my master has acted in approving the treaty signed at Bologna, in despatching, twelve hours after my arrival, his approbation to Paris, and then ordering the prompt execution of article 5, the condition of which had, in fact, been already completely fulfilled on the 13th instant (with the exception of the six pieces of cannon, which will go off this very evening for Novara), when a most unexpected event forced his majesty to suspend all ulterior movements, and plunged him, as well as M. Priocca and myself, into the greatest perplexity as to the causes of so sudden a change, as you will judge yourself, general, by the account which I shall give you, and by the paper that accompanies my letter.

General Clarke, who had been here since the evening of the 9th instant, awaiting, like us, without doubting for a moment the approbation of the treaty of Bologna by the Executive Directory, informed us on the 13th that he had received a courier from Paris, and that the Directory, without having received his despatches or yours, and apparently upon the mere communication of the treaty made to it by M. the Count Balbi, had almost totally disapproved it, and sent him new instructions and new full powers. This event, of itself most extraordinary and surprising, became an absolute enigma for us, when we saw by the new draft of the treaty delivered by General Clarke to the Chevalier Priocca that it was indeed totally altered, as you will see by the copy which I have the honour to transmit to you, with a note of observations which I have made upon it in haste.

But this is not all : the new full powers which General Clarke has received are not only without date, but they

merely authorize him to negotiate, not to conclude or to sign; so that the treaty can never take place but in Paris, which will necessarily produce considerable delay; while the draft itself of the treaty requires that 5000 infantry and a regiment of cavalry shall be ready by the 1st of April; that is to say, in a fortnight, reckoning from the present date.

If, general, you add to these circumstances the very disagreeable one, that the persons implicated in the late conspiracy, whom you were pleased to offer the Chevalier Priocca to have apprehended, and who were afterwards actually apprehended by your orders at Milan, were instantly released, and are now quietly walking about at large, you cannot be astonished that his majesty is exceedingly surprised and afflicted at conduct so extraordinary, and the more unexpected, as you certainly must admit that we have shown on our side all possible honour and frankness, as well as the utmost activity in transmitting the approval of the king to Paris, and in fulfilling the conditions.

The profound esteem which his majesty entertains for your person and your way of thinking, has induced him to order me to inform you in detail of all this, since, besides the importance that you should be timely forewarned of the cause which suspends the ulterior march of the troops forming the complement of the contingent, he has no doubt that you would co-operate efficaciously in an adjustment equally desired by both powers, but which, nevertheless, ought to be founded on equitable bases.

As for me, general, you know how anxiously I desire the conclusion of this affair; the same is the case with the Chevalier Priocca; and while impatiently awaiting your answer on so important and so extraordinary a matter, I have the honour to subscribe myself your wholly devoted,

The Marquis de St. MARSAN,  
Aide-de-camp of the King of Sardinia.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Conegliano, March 16, 1797 [26 Ventose, year 5].

Having been taken prisoner a few days since by the troops under the command of M. the General Massena, urgent necessity to attend to my private affairs in Germany obliges me to beg you, M. le General, to grant me permis-

sion to return thither, upon pledging my word of honour not to serve against the French troops till the period of an exchange mutually agreed upon.

I flatter myself, Monsieur le General, that you will not refuse me this gratification, hitherto extended to all the Austrian general officers who have been in the same predicament as myself.

If I were not so convinced as I am of your indulgence to officers prisoners of war, I should hesitate, Monsieur le General, to solicit you to extend your kindness to the condition of seventeen Austrian officers taken in the same action as myself; but my just confidence is not afraid of committing an indiscretion in requesting the same favour for those gentlemen. I have the honour to be, &c.,

LUSIGNAN.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Venice, 27 Ventose, year 5 [March 17, 1797].

I have received the letter which you did me the favour to write to me on the 22nd, and your intentions shall be completely fulfilled on the arrival of La Brune frigate.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a note which the Senate has sent me this morning. This government is in the greatest consternation: yesterday evening it despatched a courier to Paris, and M. Pezaro is commissioned to bring you himself the remonstrances of his government.

The public rumour here is, that the Bergamascans and Brescians are ready to rise. If the fact of which they complain is the execution of your orders, it is not for me to seek to fathom their motives; if otherwise, I consider the report made to the Senate as very equivocal, and I am taking steps to obtain accurate information on the subject.

At any rate, the republic of Venice is drawing near its end: the government has no springs left, the people are sunk into contempt, and there needs but a spark to kindle the conflagration. They are not fond of us, but the word liberty, which we pronounce with enthusiasm, resounds everywhere, and to no purpose the old aristocrats proclaim their old habits; they only accelerate the moment of their fall.

M. Pezaro is attached to his country and to the form of

its government : setting aside that, you will find him, general, always ready to do for you whatever you require, that will neither compromise him, nor what he calls his subjects, nor their tranquillity. Such I have found him ever since I have had to treat with him. He will explain to you the need they have here of succours, and in so doing he will tell you the truth ; for if you cannot aid the Venetians with a little money and cattle, they cannot go on.

LALLEMENT.

*Note annexed.*

This is what I have been able to collect. The Bergamascons and the Brescians have long been dissatisfied with their government ; the entry of the French into Lombardy has suggested to them the idea of withdrawing themselves from it. Still, the uncertainty of events held them back ; our victories and the reduction of Mantua have encouraged them, and they have been less careful to conceal their sentiments. M. Ottolini, anti-French, and a base instrument of the tyranny of the State inquisitors, has begun to annoy them. On the slightest pretext of opinions favourable to our principles, apprehensions, imprisonments, even disappearances, public reprimands for innocent expressions, have exasperated all minds. A secret revolutionary committee has been formed, and three deputies have been sent to Milan, to solicit succours and protection from Lombardy. It is said that the commandant of the province replied that he could not assist them openly, that they had better consult the general wish of their fellow-citizens, and act for themselves, with the understanding that they should be protected, if circumstances required it.

The deputies, on their return to Bergamo, held several meetings there. Ottolini discovered them : he disguised his valet-de-chambre as a peasant, and sent him as a courier to Venice to carry to the inquisitors a numerous list of the alleged revolvers, including all the principal persons of the city. Having received intimation of this measure, they denounced it to the French commandant as a new treason of Ottolini's : four hussars were sent in pursuit of the courier and took his despatches from him ; they were read to the committee. The proscription list excited vehement indignation, and made men speak out : some were for putting Ottolini to death, others for sending him in chains to Milan ;

the most moderate finally prevailed: an intimation was given him to leave the city, and the committee seized the administration. It is not said what active part the French government has taken in these resolutions; we are merely told that, ignorant of the effect of this explosion, and even having reason to suspect that it might be directed against us, it has taken military measures of safety, which perhaps have authorized part of Ottolini's reports.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Gorice, 4 Germinal, year 5 [March 24, 1797].

M. Pezaro, grand sage of the republic of Venice, has been sent hither, accompanied by another sage of the terra firma; he is come relative to the events at Brescia and Bergamo. The people of those two towns have disarmed the Venetian garrison, and driven out the proveditors of the republic of Venice. The germs of insurrection are extending to all heads in that republic. You will find herewith a letter, written to me previously by M. Battaglia, proveditor of the republic of Venice, and the answer which I sent him. My conduct towards M. Pezaro was very delicate: it is not at a moment when Palma-Nova is not yet provisioned and armed, when we have need of all the succours of the Friule, and of all the good will of the Venetian government for provisioning ourselves in the defiles of Germany, that we ought to pick a quarrel. Neither was it requisite that they should send 4 or 5000 men and crush those persons who are attached to us at Brescia and Bergamo, though I do not approve their conduct, and believe that their insurrection is, at the moment, extremely prejudicial to us; but the party hostile to France in these different towns is so embittered against us, that, if it were to gain the upper hand, we must be at war with the whole population.

I told M. Pezaro that the Executive Directory had not forgotten that the republic of Venice was the ancient ally of France; that we had a sincere desire to protect it with all our might. I merely begged that bloodshed might be spared, and that they would not make it a crime in Venetian citizens to have more partiality for the French army than for the imperial army; that we did not support the insurgents, but that, on the contrary, I should favour such



steps as the government might take ; but I thought that, as they had sent a courier to the Executive Directory, it would be well to await his return, for I believed that the mere intervention of France in these matters might conciliate minds without needing to recur to arms. We parted good friends ; he appeared to me to be much pleased. The grand point in all this is to gain time. I beg you to give me detailed instructions for my guidance.

The towns of Ancona, the duchy of Urbino, and the province of Macerata, beset me with deputations, begging that they may not return under the papal authority. The revolution is indeed gaining all heads in Italy ; but it would take a long time before the people of this country could become warriors and present a serious spectacle.

You will find herewith a copy of the constitution of the Cispadane republic.

The Lombards are very impatient ; they wish their liberty to be declared, and to be permitted also to frame a constitution for themselves : they pay, at the moment, 1500 Poles and 2000 men of the Lombard legion. Both these corps are beginning to be tolerably organized.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 3 Germinal, year 5 [March 23, 1796].

The Executive Directory sends you herewith, citizen-general, a copy of a confidential letter from the ambassador of the Republic in Spain. It deserves particular attention, and we request you to communicate such reflections as it shall suggest.

REWBELL, President.

*Copy of the Letter of the Ambassador of the Republic in Spain to the Directory.*

Aranjuez, 21 Ventose, year 5 [March 6, 1797].

I heard say, the day before yesterday, that the King of Spain was sending to the pope a legation of three prelates, who are the Archbishop of Toledo, grand-inquisitor, the Archbishop of Seville, and a bishop named Musquis, confessor to the queen. In fact, yesterday the Prince of the Peace confirmed this intelligence, and told me that he had no doubt I was aware of the real motive of the legation. I

took advantage of this overture, and said that if he was informed of the cabal formed against him, and of which those prelates were the most dangerous accomplices, nay, even the leaders, I must believe that he was causing them to be sent to Rome merely to get rid of them. The prince confessed that this was precisely his reason ; he added that the Inquisition was secretly stirring against him since the alliance made with us ; and that, to parry these blows, it was of infinite importance to him to remove at once the grand-inquisitor and his principal adherents, and he hoped to profit by their absence from the court.

I knew nothing of these intrigues of the Inquisition, but I was not ignorant of the existence of a horrible plot against the Prince of the Peace, and, reasoning confidentially with him, I exhorted him to take great care of himself: I intimated that I thought he was not sufficiently upon his guard, and told him I was sure that his enemies had gained auditors even in the chamber of the queen. I could have given him some particulars on that head, and even have repeated a disagreeable expression for him, which, I was assured, the queen had made use of; but it was so delicate that I durst not venture, though perhaps I might have done so in an overflow of confidence. For this time, I thought it best to go no further than to advise him to keep a more watchful eye, and to redouble his circumspection over himself.

I think, citizens Directors, that the prime minister is strongly attached to his country and his sovereign ; but I think also that it would be difficult to find another so deeply impressed as he is with the interest that Spain has in keeping herself in close connexion with the Republic. If the Prince of the Peace were overturned, another, were it merely to run counter to the operations of his predecessor, would probably not maintain the good harmony which prevails between the two States, to such a degree as that, cemented by an alliance.

I have no doubt that it is highly important to the welfare of the two nations that the Prince of the Peace should continue firm in his place: agreeably to this idea, I shall not fail to warn him whenever I learn that intrigues tending to remove him are making too much progress.

The views of this minister are that the See of Rome should be transferred to Sardinia: he desired me to impart his idea to you, and also his acknowledgment respecting the mission of the three prelates; but he desired that I would do it

directly and confidentially : I hope that you will not take it amiss if I comply with his desire.

Before I conclude, I must say something concerning the three missionary prelates, all three openly declared enemies to the French : the Archbishop of Toledo, stupid and fanatic, malicious and dangerous, in proportion to his deficiency in good sense ; the queen's confessor is reputed to be a clever man, but unscrupulous in everything ; the Archbishop of Seville is said to possess still greater ability, but to be crafty and ambitious : he has the look and the manner of an adroit courtier, a profession which long experience has rendered familiar to him. The two latter have an eye to the hat : the first has long had it. It is asserted that a report circulated here in these last days that the pope has had an attack of apoplexy affords him a gleam of hope of obtaining the tiara.

General PERIGNON.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 6 Germinal, year 5 [March 26, 1797].

The opinion which you have already expressed, citizen-general, respecting Mantua, is confirmed since that place has been in our power, and we are now thoroughly convinced that it ought to be demolished : political and military motives influence our determination to that effect. By razing the fortifications of that place, we shall more seriously alarm the emperor about the recovery of his sway in Lombardy, and perhaps force him to listen to proposals of peace ; the provisional governments established in the conquered countries will thereby acquire a consistency which will add to his fears : on the other hand, we take from the hostile army the aim to which all its efforts must otherwise be directed, that of re-occupying that place, and obliging us again to waste our strength before its walls.

The kind of warfare in which we are engaged, and the nature of the republican troops, moreover, establish our superiority in offensive movements, and ought to induce us to prefer field operations to those of siege. The difficulty of completely provisioning and arming a place of such extent would be a fresh obstacle for us. Had these considerations been applied to Mayence, when it was in our hands, the war

would have assumed a different aspect upon the Rhine, whatever the success that we might have obtained there.

We authorize you, therefore, citizen-general, or rather we request you, to direct the demolition of the works of Mantua to be proceeded with, and to send off for the interior the artillery and other military effects which that measure will render useless in Italy: part of them you can sell to the provisional governments which are formed there and to other States.

The directions which we here give you, citizen-general, are not so imperative but that you may suspend their execution, if you find, in so doing, greater advantages, and such as we cannot appreciate with the same precision at the distance at which we are from the theatre of war.

REWBELL, President.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 6 Germinal, year 5 [March 26, 1796].

You will find herewith, citizen-general, a report which has been presented to us by the minister of the interior relative to the situation of Corsica. That island being under your command, it is necessary that you should have a precise knowledge of the measures which citizen Miot has taken, and of the means which he points out for re-establishing there the firm and prosperous rule of the constitution. The account which you have given on this subject to the minister of war, and which he has transmitted to us, is certainly sufficient to dispel all uneasiness, and to assure us of the external safety and the internal tranquillity of those two departments. We, therefore, merely remind you of their wants and the interest excited by their position on their release from the English sway.

REWBELL, President.

*Copy of a Report presented to the Executive Directory on the 4th Germinal, year 5.*

On the 30th Ventose, I received by an extraordinary courier despatches from citizen Miot, commissioner of the Executive Directory in Corsica. These despatches are dated the 5th, 6th, 10th, and 13th Ventose.

The whole of them furnish particulars respecting the situation of Corsica and his arrival in that island; his conduct

and operations relative to his mission ; the present state of things, and what he requires.

He arrived there, he says, without other means than those which he could derive from his own resources. The instructions of the Directory, judicious in all points of view, did not leave him sufficient latitude to complete the organization with which he was charged. He expected more extensive instructions ; he reckoned upon a more regular correspondence, which should direct his proceedings and authorize him to employ more means. Disappointed in his expectation, left entirely to himself, receiving for three months no answer to his letters, no succours, either in money, provisions, or men, he, nevertheless, concealed his distress : but, in so difficult a situation, he could do no more than follow what the wants of the country pointed out.

There was no military force : he felt that it was necessary to substitute in its stead the power of the constituted authorities, to re-establish the course of justice, to confirm the various parts of the administration, and to set the springs of the machine in motion.

Complete success has attended his measures : administrations, tribunals, have all gradually been organized, and the power of the established authorities has no where been called in question.

The returned refugees raised loud remonstrances against the spoliations and injuries which they had sustained in their property during the time of the English sway. To repress the indignation and the vengeance of these men, and to prevent new convulsions, he has, by a proclamation, invited all the inhabitants of Corsica, to put an end by conciliation to all these irritating discussions. And, in consequence, one section of the civil tribunal, composed of five members, has devoted itself exclusively to the functions of arbitration ; and this measure has proved completely successful.

Some movements had taken place in the department of Liamone, the most restless portion of the island ; they have been quelled : prudent ordinances have been issued by him, commanding the disarming of some and the apprehension of others. At length, he says, the machine is made up, in the best manner that the difficult circumstances in which he has found himself, from the want of almost all the means of money and military force, would admit of.

He declares that he has exceeded his powers ; that he has

perhaps loaded himself with an immense responsibility ; but he has preferred that burden to the unpleasant situation of remaining a stupid spectator of disorders impossible to be repressed, and thus favouring the plans of the malevolent, by justifying their perfidious insinuations by his inaction ; and, moreover, he purposes to give an explanation of the motives by which he has been guided.

On the complaints of a very great number of persons who demanded the reimbursement of a forced contribution imposed by citizens Bonelli and Cauro, sent to Corsica in Brumaire by the general-in-chief, to annoy the English and hasten the insurrection of the island : without investigating the application of the 300,000 francs so raised, he has thought it his duty to adhere to the principles of our laws, which permit no authority to levy arbitrary impositions, and issued an ordinance enjoining the central administration to verify the payment of those sums and to authorize the receipts for them to be taken in discharge of the impositions due by those persons.

But if the measures of prudence which have been adopted, if the ascendancy of a pure morality, have hitherto preserved tranquillity in the departments of Liamone and Golo, the period of the primary assemblies, during which, he says, all other power expires, may prove stormy, and it is to be feared that troubles will arise.

This moment he foresaw, when applying so early as the 4th Nivose for instructions peculiarly adapted to Corsica : he received none. Time passed away : he made inquiries in all quarters, as well concerning the holding of these assemblies as concerning those who ought to be admitted to or excluded from them ; but, by a most extraordinary fatality, that correspondence which all the other departments have with the legislative body by the transmission of the *Bulletin des Loix*, Corsica has been deprived of for these five months. In this critical situation, however, he neglected nothing that could be done for averting storms.

He had thought it rather imprudent, at the time of his arrival, to cause certain dangerous persons to be apprehended : now, that part of the motives which restrained him have ceased to exist, he has ordered them to be secured, that they may not have it in their power to exercise their influence in the approaching assemblies.

He will report upon the measures which he has adopted

to make up for the insufficiency of the means placed at his disposal for the purpose of silencing the just claims for indemnity, of ensuring the existence of the gendarmerie, of moveable columns, and of the marine, for the month ; but he declares that he can go no further.

After having thus done all that is in his power, citizen Miot says that he considers his mission as terminated at the moment of the primary assemblies, when, it appears to him, the presence of a commissioner of the government would be useless and dangerous, and he announces that he shall put an end to it by a proclamation, in which he shall give an historical relation of his mission, showing what pains the government has taken to re-attach the inhabitants of Corsica to the Republic, expatiating on its paternal kindness, and exhorting them to prove themselves worthy of it.

On quitting the post which he has held, citizen Miot will leave, he says, Corsica quiet, in general French by inclination and by recollection, ready to conform to the constitutional system, when properly guided, when, above all, it shall be preserved from the party spirit, which is the greatest bane of the country.

What it now expects from the government is the aid of education and communications, of printing-presses and of roads, and as speedily as possible those of French troops and a French commandant, the selection of whom demands the greatest attention, for he ought to possess firmness, prudence, and impartiality.

Gentili has gained universal approbation ; but he is a Corsican, and cannot excite such general confidence as a Frenchman.

The first indispensable measure, immediately on the arrival of the French troops, must be to forbid the carrying of arms by the national guard, unless when on duty, to interdict it to all young men not entered in the civic register, and to enact penalties against the wearing and the use of the stiletto.

Citizen Miot makes no secret of it that not only the tranquillity of the country, but of the island itself, may depend on the presence of French troops ; that English vessels appear frequently off the coast and approach within cannon-shot ; that these appearances foster the hopes of the partisans of the English and produce the most mischievous effects ; that our communications with that portion of the Republic cannot be more precarious ; that very recently some unfor-

tunate persons returning from France to their country were taken by the English, as well as several transports with Corsican recruits destined for the army of Italy. And he deplores these circumstances the more, because the English, he says, have no other port in the Mediterranean, and the force which they keep up there consists of only two frigates and a brig.

The complaints made by citizen Miot of not having received any answer from the government since his arrival in the island causes me to presume that the letters which I have written to him, particularly on the 18th Nivose, may have been intercepted; at least, that they have been delayed by the dangers attending the voyage thither.

I have made up a second despatch to citizen Miot, and I hope that it will reach him. I give that commissioner the praise which his conduct justly deserves. I have answered the various questions which he has addressed to me; I have encouraged and requested him to continue in Corsica till the Directory has communicated its intentions to him.

You will recollect the message sent to the Council of the Five Hundred on the meeting of the primary and electoral assemblies in that island. On the receipt of citizen Miot's last letters, I wrote to the commission charged with that report, and pointed out to it the necessity for a speedy solution.

I have demanded of the minister of justice the laws and ordinances which commissioner Miot applies for: he has just sent them to me, and I shall forward them by the extraordinary courier who has brought his despatches. I shall charge him also with my answers, and only await the orders of the Directory for his departure.

The Minister of the Interior, BENEZECH.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 6 Germinal, year 5 [March 26, 1797].

The noble of the republic of Venice to the French Republic, citizen-general, has sent to the minister of foreign affairs a note relative to the occurrences at Bergamo on the 22nd Ventose last.

The Executive Directory transmits to you a copy of that note, and requests you to communicate what you may know respecting the facts to which it relates.

REWBELL, President.



*Copy of a Note from the Noble of the Republic of Venice sent to the French Republic to Citizen Charles Delacroix, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, 3 Germinal, year 5 [March 23, 1797].

After the reiterated and unequivocal protestations of friendship which the Directory has always made to the republic of Venice; after having manifested under all circumstances the strongest intentions to preserve the good harmony which subsists between the two powers, the government of Venice could not expect that a French agent would follow principles diametrically opposite to them.

You will, no doubt, be surprised, citizen-minister, to learn that on the 12th of this month (22 Ventose last) citizen Lefray, commanding the French troops in Bergamo, having sent for the deputies appointed for provisioning the city, compelled them to sign an act, the subject of which is an alleged desire of the people of Bergamo for liberty, and threatened to use force if they refused. After this step, the said commandant put the said act into execution and summoned the Venetian governor to leave the town in the space of an hour; and he was obliged to submit, for he would have been immediately sent off bound to Milan, if he had resisted.

The undersigned noble of the republic of Venice has, in consequence, received orders from his government to communicate to you so vexatious an event, and earnestly solicit you to make it known to the Executive Directory as soon as possible.

So arbitrary a step on the part of the said commandant, supported by the armed force, is, no doubt, totally contrary to the sentiments of honour and frankness which the French Republic has always manifested towards the government of Venice, to the solemn proclamations which the French generals have made in its name, and lastly to the persuasion which the Executive Directory and the General-in-chief Bonaparte have always testified respecting the sincerity of the intentions of the same government.

The republic of Venice is therefore thoroughly convinced that, as what has passed at Bergamo must be the work of the commandant Lefray alone, the Executive Directory will be pleased to disavow formally the invasion made upon its sovereignty, and no doubt censure the conduct of the said

U 2

commandant, to the effect that the city of Bergamo may be restored to the same order in which it previously was.

There is, citizen-minister, an uprightness of principle which the French Republic has always manifested, there is justice, which forms the firmest and most respectable basis of every government to do speedy right, in an affair of such consequence, to the just remonstrances which the undersigned noble loses no time in making on the part of the republic of Venice, which has always observed the strictest neutrality, and which, especially in this war, has given the most unequivocal testimonies of its friendship for the French government and of the most rigid hospitality to its armies.

Accept, citizen-minister, the assurance which the undersigned noble has the honour to repeat to you, of his high consideration and his most profound respect.

QUIRINI.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 11 Germinal, year 5 [March 31, 1796].

The brilliant commencement of the campaign which you have just opened, citizen-general, reminds us of that which in the last was an omen of the constant successes of the army of Italy, and the political circumstances in which we are give increased value to those which it has just gained: you have happily seized the favourable moment for beginning the operations, and you have thus anticipated, as we had expressed a wish, the junction of all reinforcements which the enemy was waiting for, in order to take himself the offensive and endeavour to effect a union of all his forces.

The courage of the troops which you command seems to increase with the importance of the events, and we remark with great interest the effect of your solicitude to cherish an ever increasing emulation of zeal and valour in the ranks. Be pleased to express our satisfaction to the corps which have acted, and to the officers who have distinguished themselves.

Prince Charles, disconcerted by the rapidity of your march, as much as by the skill of your movements, will probably not persist in defending Trieste. The speedy surrender of the garrison of Gradisca must make him apprehend the same fate for the one which he might throw into that seaport, and we may, therefore, presume that it is now in our power.

Adhering to the declaration which we made last year to the emperor, we must now proceed to its execution : order, in consequence, citizen-general, as soon as you have entered Trieste, the demolition of all the public establishments and the destruction of its port. This measure, coupled with the destruction of the works of Mantua, will be a strong warning to the cabinet of Vienna to enter into negociation for peace, and military interest moreover points it out to us as advantageous.

We conceive that the new territory occupied by the army furnishes sufficient supplies for its wants, and that the contributions of which it is susceptible will render disposable a considerable part of the sums stipulated in the treaty with the pope : we repeat this observation in behalf of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, which the public treasury cannot yet succour with sufficient efficacy.

The rapidity of your progress adds to the urgency of the passage of the Rhine : the army of the Sambre and Meuse is ready to act ; that of the Rhine and Moselle not yet. To obviate this inconvenience, we propose that the left of the latter should prolong itself to Mayence, in order that the former may debouch upon the right bank with all its forces and occupy the enemy with advantage, while General Moreau can effect his passage and penetrate into the heart of Germany. General Hoche will then attack the fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein and Mayence, after they have in concert made themselves masters of a decided offensive.

We request you to give us the particulars of the movements which have taken place in several Venetian towns.

REWBELL, President.

PS. We have this instant received the courier whom you despatched from Goriza.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 13 Germinal, year 5 [April 2, 1797].

The envoys of the Lombard and Cispadane republics are urging us, citizen-general, to decide upon their political fate ; but circumstances are still such that we cannot deviate from the principles which have hitherto guided us in regard to provisional governments. To recognise them as powers would be depriving ourselves of the rights conferred by war

in conquered countries ; it would be, moreover, robbing ourselves of the means of establishing favourable compensations at the conclusion of the peace, and running a risk of violating the guarantee which we had granted, which is incompatible with the honour of the French government.

But by reserving to ourselves these advantages, citizen-general, we leave the Italian republics at liberty to constitute themselves agreeably to their wish, and to govern themselves without any other interference on our part than what the safety or welfare of the army imperatively requires.

We request you, citizen-general, to take these views for the basis of your relations with the different States which they concern.

REWBELL, President.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Trieste, 18 Germinal, year 5 [ April 7, 1797].

I send you herewith an extract of a letter written to me by citizen Lallemand, respecting the movements of Venice. We have a great quantity of clothing there, and there is a great deal more to be conveyed thither ; for the Tressans are draining themselves for the contribution in kind. This destination cannot be changed without an order from you. I shall not leave this for Clagenfurt till the 21st instant. The first of the cavalry will sleep to-night at Goritz ; the 15th chasseurs will arrive there to-morrow ; the 1st will be on the 22nd at Clagenfurt, as well as myself.

DUGUA.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Judenburg, 19 Germinal, year 5 [April 8, 1797].

I have had the honour to send you the letter which I have written to Prince Charles, and his answer.

You will find herewith,

1. Copy of the letter which he has since written me, dated the 6th of April ;
2. The note transmitted to me by M. M. Generals Bellegarde and Meerveldt ;
3. The reply which I made to them ;
4. A second letter from Prince Charles ; and, lastly, the conditions of the suspension of arms which we have con-

cluded for five days. You will there observe that by the line of demarcation we find ourselves to have occupied Gratz, Bruck, and Rotenmann, which we do not yet occupy.

Otherwise, it was my intention to give the army two or three days' rest; this suspension therefore deranges the military operations very little.

Those generals immediately returned to Vienna, and the plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor must have arrived at the head-quarters with full powers for a separate peace, before the expiration of the suspension of arms, which I made great difficulty about granting them, but which they judged to be indispensable.

I told them that a preliminary clause to any negociation for peace must be the cession as far as the Rhine; they desired an explanation respecting Italy, which I refused: on their part they declared that if his majesty the emperor was to lose all, he would leave Vienna, and expose himself to all chances; I observed to them that, when I expressed myself in a definitive manner respecting the boundary of the Rhine, and said nothing about Italy, it was to intimate that discussion on that essential clause would be admitted.

It seemed to me that they did not approve Thugut's principles, and that the emperor himself began to perceive this.

Our armies have not yet passed the Rhine, and we are already within twenty leagues of Vienna. The army of Italy is then exposed single-handed to the efforts of one of the mightiest powers in Europe.

The Venetians are arming all their peasants, bringing into the field all their priests, furiously working all the springs of their old government, to crush Bergamo and Brescia. The Venetian government has at this moment 20,000 armed men in my rear.

Even in the States of the pope, considerable bodies of peasants are descending the mountains, and threaten to overrun all Romagna.

The different populations of Italy, united by the spirit of liberty, and agitated in various ways by the most active passions, need to be watched and curbed.

You will find herewith a statement of the troops that I have with me, and of those which I have in Italy.

Everything leads me to think that the time for peace is arrived, and that we ought to make it at a moment

when we can dictate the conditions, provided that they be reasonable.

If the emperor cedes to us what belongs to him on the left bank of the Rhine, as a prince of the house of Austria, and if, as head of the empire, he recognises the Rhine as the boundary of the Republic; if he cedes to the Cispadane republic the duchy of Modena and Carrara, if he gives us Mayence in its present state, in exchange for Mantua, I think that we shall have made a much more advantageous peace than that sketched out in the instructions of General Clarke. We shall, it is true, restore all Lombardy and all the countries that we occupy at this moment; but shall we not have drawn from our successes all the advantage possible, when we shall have the Rhine for boundary, and have created in the heart of Italy a republic of two million inhabitants, which will be close to us by Carrara, give us the commerce of the Po and the Adriatic, and aggrandize itself in proportion as the pope declines?

I have just despatched a courier to General Clarke at Turin, desiring him to repair hither with the utmost expedition: he is the bearer of your instructions and has full powers to finish this negotiation; I hope that he will arrive in time, so that not a moment may be lost, which is everything in negotiations of this nature.

If, contrary to my expectation, the negotiation should come to nothing, I should find myself at a loss what course to pursue; I should seek, nevertheless, to draw the enemy into an engagement, to beat him, to oblige the emperor to leave Vienna: after which I should be forced to return to Italy, if the armies of the Rhine continue inactive as they are at present.

Whatever course I may be obliged to take, I hope to deserve your approbation. Ever since the commencement of the campaign, I have found myself passing at every step into a new position, and I have always had the happiness to see the conduct that I have pursued correspond with your intentions.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Leoben, 27 Germinal, year 5 [April 16, 1797].

General Meerveldt called upon me at Leoben, on the 24th, at nine in the morning: after perusing his full

powers to treat for peace, we agreed upon the prolongation of the suspension of arms to the evening of the 20th of April (8th Floreal next). These full powers were for him and for M. the Marquis de Gallo, minister of Naples at Vienna: at first, I refused to admit him as plenipotentiary of the emperor, being, in my eyes, invested with the quality of ambassador of a friendly power, which is incompatible with the other. M. Gallo arrived himself on the 25th. I did not think it right to persist in this opposition, because it would have caused great delay, and he appeared to possess the full confidence of the emperor; lastly, because the Austrians and Hungarians are highly irritated to see foreigners play the principal part in an affair of such importance, and because, if we break, it will be a very considerable means of exciting discontent against the government of Vienna. The first operation proposed was a reciprocal promise not to divulge anything that was said: it was drawn up, but as those gentlemen are extremely tenacious of etiquette, they wanted always to place the emperor before the Republic, and I plumply refused.

We came to the article of recognition. I told them that the French Republic did not desire to be recognised; that it is in Europe what the sun is above the horizon: so much the worse for those who will not see and will not profit by it.

They told me that, if even the negotiations should be broken off, the emperor, from this day forward, recognised the French Republic, on condition that it should preserve the same etiquette with his majesty the emperor as the late King of France did. I replied that, as we were quite indifferent to all matters of etiquette, we should not be averse to the adoption of that article. After that we talked a great deal, in all senses and all manners.

On the 26th, M. Gallo came to me at eight in the morning; he told me that he wished to neutralize a place where we might continue our conferences regularly. The place selected was a garden, having a pavilion in the middle; we declared it neuter, a farce to which I thought it better to lend myself, out of delicacy towards the puerile vanity of those people. This so-called neutral point is surrounded on three sides by the French army, and amidst the bivouac of our divisions; it would have been all right and proper, had it been between the two armies. On arriving upon neutral

ground, we commenced the negociations. The result of them is as follows :

1. The cession of Belgium, and the recognition of the boundary of the Republic, conformably to the decree of the Convention ; but they demand compensations, which they naturally wish for in Italy.

2. They demand the restitution of the Milanese ; so that they wanted, in consequence of the first article, the Milanese and some portion of the States of Venice or of the Legations : if I would have consented to this proposal, they had the power to sign immediately. This arrangement did not appear possible to me.

His majesty the emperor has declared that he wished for no compensation in Germany. I offered them for the first article, the restitution of the Milanese and Lombardy, which they declined : so that we finished with three plans, which they have despatched by an extraordinary courier to Vienna, and to which they will have an answer in two or three days.

#### FIRST PLAN.

Art. 1. The cession of Belgium ; the constitutional boundaries of France.

2. On the conclusion of peace with the empire, all that relates to the country occupied by France, as far as the Rhine, shall be settled.

3. The two powers shall arrange together for giving to the emperor all that part of the Venetian territory comprised between the Mincio, the Po, and the Austrian dominions.

4. The country of Brescia, comprised between the Oglio and the Mincio, shall be given to the Duke of Modena.

5. The Bergamasco and all the provinces of the Venetian States comprised between the Oglio and the Milanese, as well as the Milanese, shall form a republic : Modena, Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, shall form a republic.

6. The city of Venice shall continue to be independent, as well as the Archipelago.

#### SECOND PLAN.

Articles 1 and 2 the same as in the preceding.

3. The evacuation of the Milanese and of Lombardy.



## THIRD PLAN.

The first two articles as in the preceding.

3. The renunciation by his majesty the emperor of all his rights to the Milanese and to Lombardy.

4. France shall engage to give his majesty the emperor compensations proportionate to the Milanese and to the duchy of Modena, which shall be the subject of a negotiation, and of which he shall be in possession within three months at latest.

If one of the three plans is accepted at Vienna, the preliminaries of peace will be signed on the 20th of April [8 Floreal]; otherwise, seeing that the armies of the Rhine have not yet made any movement, I should propose a pure and simple armistice, for the three armies, for three months, during which negotiations for peace should be opened. During this time, we should fortify Clagenfurt and Gratz, and make all the munitions of war come from that quarter; the army would organize itself completely, and you would have time to transfer to it 40,000 men from the armies of the Rhine: by which means you would have an extremely considerable army, the mere sight of which would force the emperor to make greater sacrifices.

If nothing of all this is accepted, we shall fight, and if the army of the Sambre and Meuse is made to march on the 20th, it may, in the first days of next month, have struck hard blows, and find itself on the Rednitz. The best generals and the best troops are before me. When you enter heartily upon a campaign, there is nothing that stops you, and never, since history has recorded military operations, has a river proved a real obstacle. If Moreau is determined to pass the Rhine, he will pass it, and if he had passed it already, we should be in a condition to dictate terms of peace in an imperative manner, and without incurring any risk; but he who is fearful of losing his glory is sure to lose it. I have crossed the Julian and the Noric Alps upon ice three feet deep; I passed my artillery by roads which carriages had never travelled, and every body believed the thing to be impossible. If I had had nothing in view but the repose of the army and my personal interest, I should have stopped short beyond the Isonzo. I flung myself into Germany to extricate the armies of the Rhine and to prevent the enemy from taking the offensive there.

I am at the gates of Vienna, and that insolent and haughty court has its plenipotentiaries at my head-quarters. The armies of the Rhine cannot have any blood in their veins : if they leave me alone, then I shall return to Italy. Entire Europe shall judge of the different conduct of the two armies : they will then have the whole force of the emperor on their hands ; they will be overwhelmed, and it will be their own fault.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Leoben, 27 Germinal, year 5 [April 16, 1797].

In consequence of the suspension of arms which I sent you by my last courier, the division of General Serrurier has occupied Gratz, a town containing 40,000 inhabitants, and reputed to be one of the most considerable in the emperor's dominions.

Generals Joubert, Delmas, and Baraguay d'Hilliers, have had several actions at Balzano and Mühlbach, from which they have invariably come off conquerors. They have succeeded in traversing the Tyrol, making in the different combats 8000 prisoners, and forming a junction with the main army by the valley of the Drave. Thus the whole army is now collected. Our line extends from the valley of the Drave, on the side of the Spital, to Rotenmann, along the Muhr, Bruck, Gratz, and nearly to Fiume.

You will find herewith a note of the officers who have particularly distinguished themselves in the affairs in the Tyrol, and to whom I have given promotion.

You will find also the organization that I have given to Styria and Carniola, a proclamation of General Bernadotte's, and a charge of the Bishop of Laybach's.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Leoben, 27 Germinal, year 5 [April 16, 1797].

I send you by Adjutant-general Leclerc highly interesting despatches relative to the situation of the army and the negotiations commenced ; he will give you *viva voce* all the particulars that I may have forgotten. In passing through Germany, he will have opportunities of seeing the

different movements of the enemy's troops, and informing Generals Hoche and Moreau of them on his arrival upon the Rhine. I beg you to send him back to me immediately. All the officers whom I send to Paris stay there too long: they spend their money, and ruin themselves with pleasures.

I send you by a captain of hussars, eighty years [*quatre vingts*<sup>1</sup> ans] in the service, several colours taken from the enemy.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Head-quarters, Leoben, April 17, 1797 [28 Germinal, year 5].

General Massena, commanding the advanced guard of the French army, has sent word by his adjutant-general to my advanced posts that he had received orders from the general-in-chief to demand permission to occupy Leoben this very day, and, in case of refusal, to possess himself of it by force. This demand has surprised me the more, as I was expecting every moment an answer to the proposal which the two generals, sent on my behalf to-day to the head-quarters, shall have made you. Wishing to avoid useless bloodshed, at a moment when a negotiation for a reciprocal arrangement was in contemplation, I gave orders to the generals commanding the advanced posts to retire on the approach of yours. I expect from your honour, Monsieur the General-in-chief, that, till the return of the two general officers who are still with you, you will give the most positive orders that all things remain in the same state as they are at the present moment.

Be persuaded, Monsieur le General, of my most distinguished consideration for you.

Prince CHARLES, Field-marshal.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Leoben, 30 Germinal, year 5 [April 19, 1797].

I sent you by Adjutant-general Leclerc several plans of arrangements which had been forwarded to Vienna, and concerning which the plenipotentiaries were waiting for instructions. Meanwhile, M. de Vincent, aide-de-camp of his Majesty the Emperor, arrived, and the plenipotentiaries

<sup>1</sup> Surely a mistake for *vingt-quatre*—twenty-four.

came back to me to resume the course of the negociation : in two days we came to an agreement, and we have signed preliminaries of peace, the articles of which you will find herewith.

All that has been declared a department by the law of the Convention is to belong to the Republic.

The Lombard republic is not only confirmed but increased by the whole of the Bergamasco and the Cremasco, which are already united to it at this moment by the insurrection of those two countries. That part of the Mantuan situated on the right bank of the Oglio and the Po is also incorporated with it ; the duchy of Modena and Reggio, which by the principality of Massa and Carrara extends to the Mediterranean, and by the part of the Mantuan borders on the Po and the Milanese, is likewise comprised in it. Thus we shall have in the heart of Italy a republic with which we shall communicate by the States of Genoa and the sea, which will give us, in future wars in Italy, an assured correspondence. The King of Sardinia will henceforward be entirely at our discretion.

The fortress of Pizzighitone, which, in fact, is now stronger than Mantua, the fortress of Bergamo, and that of Crema, which will be repaired, will secure the new republic from the incursions of the emperor, and always afford us time to arrive there. Towards Modena, there are also several positions, which could easily be fortified, and for which purpose part of the immense artillery that we have at this moment in Italy might be employed.

As for the renunciation of our rights to the provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, in exchange for the States of Venice, they will still be in our power. When the emperor and we, in concert, shall have succeeded in making the Senate consent to this exchange, it is evident that the republic of Venice will find itself influenced by the Lombard republic and at our disposal. If this exchange is not effected, and the emperor enters into possession of part of the States of Venice, and the Senate refuses to accept a compensation which is inconvenient and inadequate, the three legations will still continue in our power, and we shall unite Bologna and Ferrara with the Lombard republic.

The government of Venice is the most absurd and the most tyrannical of governments ; it is, moreover, beyond doubt that it intended to take advantage of the moment

when we were in the heart of Germany to slaughter us. Our Republic has not more rancorous enemies. Its influence is considerably diminished, and that is all to our advantage: this besides connects the emperor and France, and will oblige that prince, during the early period of our peace, to do everything that can be agreeable to us. This common interest which we have with the emperor puts the balance into our hands; we find ourselves placed by it between Prussia and the house of Austria, having important interests to arrange with both. Besides, we must not disguise it from ourselves, that, though our military position is brilliant, we have not dictated the conditions. The court had left Vienna; Prince Charles and his army were falling back upon that on the Rhine; the people of Hungary and of all parts of the hereditary States were rising *en masse*, and, even at this moment, their head is already on our flanks. The Rhine was not passed; the emperor was only awaiting that moment to quit Vienna and to put himself at the head of his army. If they had been stupid enough to wait for me, I should have beaten them; but they would have continued to fall back before us, formed a junction with part of their forces on the Rhine, and overwhelmed me. Then retreat would have been difficult, and the loss of the army of Italy might have brought ruin upon the Republic: therefore it was that I had resolved to levy a contribution in the suburbs of Vienna, and not go a step further. I find that I have not 4000 cavalry, and instead of the 40,000 men that I applied to you for, not 20,000 have arrived.

Had I, at the commencement of the campaign, been bent on going to Turin, I should never have crossed the Po; had I been bent on going to Rome, I should have lost Milan; had I been bent on going to Vienna, I should, perhaps, have ruined the Republic. The true plan of campaign for destroying the emperor was that which I have followed, but with 6000 cavalry and 20,000 more infantry: or if, with the forces which I have, the Rhine had been passed, at the time that I was passing the Tagliamento, as I had expected, when two couriers, one on the heels of the other, brought me orders to open the campaign. The moment I foresaw that negotiations would be seriously opened, I despatched a courier to General Clarke, who, more specially charged with your instructions on so essential an object, would have acquitted himself better than myself; but when, after waiting

ten days, I found that he did not arrive, and that the moment was beginning to pass off, I was obliged to give up all scruples, and I signed. You have given me full power over all diplomatic operations; and, in the position of things, preliminaries of peace, even with the emperor, have become a military operation. This will be a monument of glory for the French Republic, and an infallible omen that it can in two campaigns subdue the continent of Europe, if it organizes its armies with force, and especially the arm of the cavalry.

I have not levied a single contribution in Germany; there, not a single complaint is made against us. I shall pursue the same course on evacuating, and, without being a prophet, I am certain that the time will come when we shall benefit by this discreet conduct: its seeds will shoot up all over Hungary, and it will prove more fatal to the throne of Vienna than the victories which have shed lustre on the war of liberty.

In three days, I shall send you the emperor's ratification; I shall then place my army in the whole Venetian country, where I shall feed and keep it till you have transmitted your orders to me. As for myself, I ask for rest. I have justified the confidence with which you have invested me; never have I considered myself in all my operations, and I have now dashed upon Vienna, after acquiring more glory than one needs to be happy, and leaving behind me the superb plains of Italy, as I did at the commencement of the last campaign, in quest of bread for my army, which the Republic was no longer able to feed.

Calumny will strive in vain to saddle me with perfidious designs: my civil career will be like my military career, one and simple. Yet you must be aware that I ought to leave Italy; and I earnestly request you to send, with the ratification of the preliminaries of peace, orders relative to the first direction to be given to the affairs of Italy, and leave for me to return to France.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Trieste, 11 Floreal, year 5 [April 30, 1797].

I left Gratz two days since, after conferring with M. de Gallo, who, having returned from Vienna, showed me the

preliminaries of the peace which we have made ratified by the emperor in the usual form.

He told me, 1. That the emperor would dismiss the emigrants and the corps of Condé, which should no longer be in his pay.

2. That the emperor was desirous of treating for his separate peace, as soon as possible, and in Italy. We have chosen Brescia as the place for the conferences.

3. That the peace of the empire might be negociated at Constance, or any other city of that kind.

4. That the allies would be invited to the peace of the empire only and not to the separate peace.

5. That the emperor had already given powers to treat for the definitive peace ; and thereupon, M. Gallo inquired of me whether General Clarke had powers. I told him that it was necessary, before we could stir a step, to await your orders.

6. Lastly, that the court of Vienna is sincere, and desires to connect its system of policy in every way with that of France, and that the Executive Directory would find with the emperor a sincere and straightforward cabinet. The minister of England at Vienna is extremely angry with M. Thugut ; it appears that the English assume a very high tone, and tax the emperor with treachery.

BONAPARTE.

---

*The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.*

Paris, 15 Floreal, year 5 [May 4, 1797].

We address to you, citizen-general, the ratification of the preliminaries of peace which you have signed with the plenipotentiaries of the emperor ; and we shall now direct our attention to the congress which is to meet at Berne, to hasten the conclusion of the definitive treaty. Our moderation will be remarked in Europe, amidst the successes of the three French armies which occupy Germany ; but the peace will be the more durable for it, and we are satisfied with the discreteness of your negotiation.

In making the army fall back, agreeably to the clauses of the preliminary treaty, you will no doubt observe all the precautions required by the unhealthiness of the climate in the plains of Italy. Place the troops in positions where they can await the issue of the congress without being

VOL. II.

X

weakened by disease, or enervated by the relaxation of discipline. While treating honourably for peace, we must preserve all our advantages, and thereby prevent the enemy from forming exaggerated pretensions.

We earnestly desire, citizen-general, your return to France: we are impatient to see you again, and to give you all the testimonies due to a general who has done honour to the Republic, and who will have a great name in the history of the war of liberty. It is painful to us to thwart your longing for repose and private life, after obtaining all the successes which the career of arms can bestow; but your presence with the army appears to us to be still necessary: that alone can consolidate the new order of things which is about to be established in Italy. The internal organization of the Lombard republic, the creation of its military establishment, the dispositions required for its independence with regard to the neighbouring powers, and to its internal safety, cannot belong to any but yourself. Since the creation of that free state is one of the principal fruits of our victories, and in an especial manner the work of the army of Italy, you will feel particularly interested in ensuring its prosperity, its power, and its duration.

Another motive which should prolong for a time your stay in those countries is the *éclat* which the Venetian government has given to its hatred against France. Take towards it all the measures of safety authorized by the insurrection which has just broken out: go, if needful, to Venice, and acquaint us with your dispositions, that we may inform the legislative body of the necessity under which you have found yourself to act in a hostile manner towards that perfidious power.

LETOURNEUR, President.



## PART SEVENTH.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF CAMPO  
FORMIO,

FROM 14TH MAY TO 17TH OCTOBER, 1797 [25 FLOREAL, YEAR 5,  
TO 26 VENDEMIAIRE, YEAR 6].

*To Monsieur Major-general Count de Meerveldt, Minister of  
his Majesty the Emperor.*

Milan, 25 Floreal, year 5 [May 14, 1797].

I have the honour to inform you, Monsieur le General, that I have this instant received from the Executive Directory of the French Republic the ratification of the preliminaries which we signed at Leoben.

I will repair to the town which you shall be pleased to specify, in order to proceed to the exchanges.

I request you to desire the courier whom you shall send me, to pass through Treviso, where he will apply to General Gauthier, who will inform him of the place where I shall be.

I have likewise the honour to communicate to you, as I have had the honour to inform Monsieur the Marquis de Gallo, by sending my aide-de-camp, that the Executive Directory of the French Republic has been pleased to furnish General Clarke and myself with its full powers for treating of the definitive peace: I beg of you to acquaint his Majesty the Emperor, that the plenipotentiaries whom he shall be pleased to send may meet as speedily as possible in the city of Brescia, as we had agreed, or in any other that may appear more suitable.

I beg of you to be pleased to give orders to Trieste to hasten the payment of the remainder of the contribution, that I may be enabled to evacuate it as we agreed upon.

The evacuation of Clagenfurt has been delayed, owing to the tardiness of the administration of that town in furnishing the carriages necessary for the conveyance of the military effects.

I request you to give orders on this subject also, and to believe the sentiments of esteem and consideration with which I am, &c.

BONAPARTE.

x 2

*To the Generals Bonaparte and Clarke.*

Paris, 7 Prairial, year 5 [May 26, 1797].

I have the honour to send you, citizens-generals, extracts from correspondence which may interest you relative to the important negociation with which you are charged. You will there see that almost all the great houses of Germany are desirous that arrangements suitable to the Republic should be made respecting the boundary of the Rhine; that the cession of the left bank will not encounter any serious obstacle on their part, provided that they are indemnified by equivalent secularizations on the other side of the river.

As for Prussia, she appears to be somewhat ashamed of the part she has acted in claiming the integrity of the Germanic empire, while she is bound to us by a secret convention, which presupposes the cession to the Republic of the whole left bank, on condition of an indemnity for her, and another for the stadtholder, likewise to be assigned on the right bank of the Rhine. From the communication which I make to you, citizens-generals, you will deduce such inferences as it suggests, and you will know how to render them useful to the Republic.

CH. DELACROIX.

*To the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Montebello, 7 Prairial, year 5 [May 26, 1797].

I have received, citizen-minister, all the letters which you have written to me. As I am writing to-day to the Directory on the subject of the negociations, I need not repeat the same details to you. I think it very essential that you should send me the description which you have had made of the countries between the Meuse and the Rhine: I beg you also to send me the secret treaties concluded with the King of Prussia.

I think that it behoves us to keep the island of Corfu: we shall find ourselves in possession of Elba, along with the inheritance of the pope, who is dying; the King of Naples has even already proposed arrangements to me; but his majesty wanted nothing less than the March of Ancona. We must beware, however, of granting such a fine accession

to a prince so ill-intentioned and so evidently our bitterest enemy.

I thank you, citizen-minister, for the promotion of my brother to the ministry of Rome.

BONAPARTE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 22 Prairial, year 5 [June 10, 1797].

On considering, citizen-general, the serious inconveniences which would result from the return of emigrants to the territory of the Republic, and the attempts which they would undoubtedly all make to get back, if they were to lose their resources abroad, we have thought that the disbanding of Condé's corps would be dangerous. So far from requiring it, it is on the contrary desirable that the emperor should make a comfortable provision for the emigrants, to attach them to a foreign soil, provided that it be at a certain distance from our frontiers. This subject will no doubt be a delicate one to treat of, for it is necessary to avoid the appearance of sacrificing the principles of a just proscription and of national hatred against those perfidious French; and the idea should at the same time be instilled into the mind of the imperial plenipotentiary that it is to the internal strength of the government that they owe the cessation of our persecution of them. The generosity inherent in the character of the nation offers, moreover, a plausible reason for this conduct, and a ground for interesting the delicacy of the emperor in behalf of that class of men who are burdensome to all empires.

If it were otherwise, Monsieur de Gallo would insist more strongly on the dissolution of the Polish corps, and the uneasiness which they excite in Germany apprizes us of the importance of upholding them. Accordingly, we invite our plenipotentiaries to evade all the proposals that may be made to them on this last article, and to keep the negotiation in conformity with the views here expressed regarding the first.

CARNOT.

*To Generals Bonaparte and Clarke.*

Paris, 22 Prairial, year 5 [June 10, 1797].

I have the honour to send you, citizens-generals, some

more papers which may be useful to you in the important negociation with which you are charged, viz. :—

1. An extract from a despatch from citizen Parandier, agent of the Republic in the north-east of Germany, in which he explains the sentiments of Prince Henry of Prussia respecting the boundary of the Rhine.

2. A memorial on the most advantageous fixation of our boundary towards the Ruhr, on the supposition that we should not obtain the boundary of the Rhine, with a map.

You will see how important it is for us to have the Ruhr for boundary as far as Bolduc, below Juliers, and then follow a line which should include Venloo and the district belonging to the King of Prussia on the left bank of the Meuse.

3. An extract of another memoir on the boundaries of the department of the Ourthe, in case those of the Republic should not go to the Rhine.

4. An extract, rather unnecessary, but interesting enough, on the rights which France retains to the districts of the empire situated on this side of the Rhine.

I beg you to acknowledge the receipt of these papers, and to send me back those belonging to No. 2, which are the originals, as soon as you have done with them.

CH. DELACROIX.

*The Executive Directory to Generals Bonaparte and Clarke.*

Paris, 22 Prairial, year 5 [June 10, 1797].

You will find herewith, citizens-generals, a memoir by General Lapeyrouse, pointing out changes advantageous to be made in the present boundaries between the Republic and Piedmont. We authorize you to make use of it.

The accompanying report of the minister of the finances relative to a mode of liquidating the debts which burden the *ci-devant* Netherlands, deserves your attention to its contents.

CARNOT, President.

*To General Clarke.*

Paris, 22 Prairial, year 5 [June 10, 1797].

I had answered beforehand, citizen-general, the letter which you addressed to me concerning the form to be observed in treaties with the emperor, in his quality of head

of the Germanic body. I have forwarded to you the decision of the Executive Directory, which authorizes no other etiquette than that which has at all times been observed between the kings of France and the emperors of Germany. To this decision, I have added the result of researches made in the archives of my department, from which it appears that the Emperor of Germany, in that quality, has always been named before the King of France, even in the copy of the treaties concluded with him which was delivered to him at the exchange of the ratifications, as his ambassadors had precedence before the ambassadors of France, who took it, in their turn, before the ministers of the other powers.

The Directory persists in its decision: it would, nevertheless, be gratified to see the emperor grant the alternative in all acts that may be considered as national, provided that it cost us none of the real advantages for which we have reason to hope from the treaty that you are negotiating.

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 5 [June 11, 1797].

I am ordered by the Directory to declare to you, citizen, that the General-in-chief Bonaparte and you have perfectly fulfilled the intentions of the Directory in declining, without the least reserve, the demand which Monsieur the Marquis de Gallo has presented in the name of the emperor and king, that he should be put in possession of the allodial estates which did belong to him in the departments now united to the territory of the Republic. This demand is totally adverse to the text and to the spirit of the preliminaries. If it could be complied with, this continued proprietorship on the part of the house of Austria would leave in the country so long subject to its sway lurking ideas of a restoration of its authority, which would not fail to excite ferments and disturbances.

The Directory is convinced that his Majesty the emperor and king will not insist further on a proposition inadmissible in every respect.

Lord Grenville has just transmitted a second official note; he applies for passports for a negociator. He offers to treat directly and without congress.

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 29 Prairial, year 5 [June 17, 1797].

I forward to you a note relative to the loans made at different periods by the house of Austria and mortgages on the late Netherlands. To this notice I add a statement of the amounts of these loans, furnished by citizen Vermaessen, merchant, of Antwerp, to whom I applied for it.

These documents will be of the greatest utility to you for the stipulations which must indispensably be made in the treaty with the court of Vienna, relative to the debts which that court has secured upon the late Netherlands.

CH. DELACROIX.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 29 Prairial, year 5 [June 17, 1797].

The central administration of the department of the Maritime Alps has addressed to me a memorial, an extract of which I subjoin.

Having considered the matter, the Executive Directory is of opinion that, under present circumstances, it might perhaps be easy to obviate the inconveniences of which that administration complains, and to procure at the same time for that department an increase of population and new advantages to the commerce and the industry of its inhabitants.

Excepting to the north, the canton of Perinaldo is completely surrounded by the territory of Genoa, and, in order to transport their industrial and territorial productions into the interior of the Republic, the inhabitants are obliged to borrow a passage from Genoa, which, from the duties demanded, doubles their expenses.

The way to remedy these inconveniences and to fulfil the wishes of the inhabitants of this department would be to obtain from the republic of Genoa the cession of the district from the Rava Barboni to the sea, following the course of the river Taglia, which would form the boundary of the department of the Maritime Alps towards Italy: it might even be extended to the frontiers of the country of Oneglia.

Besides a great extent of seacoast, this new acquisition would give us Vintimiglia, Bordighera, and San Remo,

three places advantageously situated for commerce, and containing a number of excellent seamen.

The Genoese, now become democratic, might find a just compensation in the acquisition of the imperial fiefs, the inhabitants of which have recently planted the tree of liberty.

The Executive Directory attaches great importance to the negociation for the Genoese territory situated between the Taglia and the department of the Maritime Alps, because, in fact, it is indispensably necessary for the inhabitants of that department, and of incalculable advantage to the commerce and industry of that portion of the Republic.

The Executive Directory expects from your patriotism and your sagacity, citizen-general, complete success in a negociation, the importance of which none can appreciate better than yourself, and which at the same time none possesses such means of terminating gloriously.

I send herewith a memoir, by General Lapeyrouse, on the importance of which it would be to the Republic, in a military point of view, to unite the valleys of Lucerna, Bardoneche, Oulx, and Prayelos, to the department of the High Alps. The King of Sardinia would not think of giving them up without an equivalent, and, in the present state of things, it would be difficult to find him one.

I have the honour to send also, for your information, a copy of a memorial on the advantages which the Republic might derive from Venetian Greece and the islands in the Adriatic.

The Directory is expecting the two additional articles to the secret convention with the Genoese. It has determined not to admit Monsieur Rivarola, whose powers emanated from the government which no longer exists. It will turn its attention to the ratification of the convention when you have transmitted to it the complete original.

Could you not take advantage of this suspension to facilitate the success of the little negociation which I propose to you?

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 5 [June 11, 1797].

We should be at no loss, general, for motives and examples to contest what M. the Marquis de Gallo now de-

mands : " That the private property belonging to the Archduchess Christina and to her nephew the Archduke Charles, situated in the united departments, be restored to them, and that they shall be at liberty to dispose of it."

If, however, the emperor's plenipotentiary insists upon this point in such a manner, that you perceive the impossibility of making him forego it, the Directory authorizes you not to refuse this concession, upon condition, however, that these estates, the value of which it will be necessary to learn before assenting to anything, shall be sold within the space of three years.

The Directory would even prefer that their immediate sale should be stipulated, and that the price should be assigned upon the contribution owing by Bavaria.

As to the payment of what might remain due to the archduke in the late Netherlands, in his quality of governor-general, the French government cannot be expected, on any account, to discharge the debts or the gratitude owing by Austria to those who have served her well ; and the Executive Directory, not a little surprised that such a proposition should have been put forward, supposes that it will be easily relinquished.

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 5 [June 11, 1797].

When, by your letters of the 14th and 15th Prairial, you informed me that, conformably with the orders of the Directory, and jointly with General Bonaparte, you had declared to the Marquis de Gallo that France, in receiving Belgium, did not mean to take upon herself the mortgage debts made upon that country since the beginning of this war, you had not then received the documents which I have since communicated to you.

They will have proved to you how far it would be interesting and expedient that these debts should be transferred generally, and without distinction of those which are to form the indemnity of the house of Austria, since those countries will come to her exempt themselves from any debt.

If, however, it should turn out to be impossible to obtain an absolute reversion, it is at least incontestable that the debts which are secured by mortgage at once upon the Ne-



therlands and the other hereditary States of the house of Austria, ought to be divided, and that a previous estimate, made by commissioners appointed for the purpose, ought to fix the sum to be borne by the one and that which ought to be thrown upon the other, in order that, if the Republic becomes guarantee of the first, the emperor may take upon himself the second, to the propositions of which he must consent by new contracts.

As for the loan made by England, and specially secured by mortgage on the Netherlands, on submitting to the Directory the insinuation of the Marquis de Gallo, I could not help showing how far it was to be feared that the discharge of that debt would be productive of difficulties for the peace with England; but the desire to bring the negotiation with the house of Austria to a speedy end, stronger than these considerations, has determined the Executive Directory to decide that it would take upon itself all the negotiations, with the documents necessary for effecting the discharge of the emperor for the mortgage debts secured on Belgium, owing to England. As for the loan made by the emperor in the town of Valenciennes, the Directory consents that you should not insist on its repayment, if you meet with too great difficulties.

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*The Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor to the Plenipotentiaries of France.*

Cesano, June 20, 1797 [2 Messidor, year 5].

Soon after the French army had entered the Milanese, there arrived at Venice a cargo of some thousand quintals of leaf tobacco from Salonichi, where it had been purchased on account of his imperial and royal Majesty, and paid for with his money, and was destined for the consumption of the Milanese, where that branch of the public revenue was not farmed but administered for the account of the sovereign.

Regardless of the manifest property of his imperial Majesty in this tobacco, deposited in a neutral country, the French administration of the Milanese thought fit to claim it, in order to dispose of it at pleasure. But, all the lawyers who have given their opinion on the subject having admitted the nullity of this pretension, and declared that it

must necessarily be rejected by all the tribunals, it has not been brought before them, though the said administration of the finances has made all possible efforts to that end.

The signature and ratification of the preliminaries of peace between his imperial Majesty and the French Republic forming a strong additional motive for the total relinquishment of this strange pretension, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Majesty learned with equal displeasure and surprise that M. Haller, administrator of the finances and contributions of Italy for the French Republic, has lately placed not only this tobacco under sequestration, but also the provisions in magazine at Venice for the consumption of the troops of his Majesty, and that he has even caused part of the tobacco in question to be shipped for Ferrara.

Proceedings of this kind being anything but calculated to re-establish the confidence so necessary between powers which have just formally and solemnly settled the bases of their peace, and the sincere and constant reconciliation of which is so desirable, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor lose no time in denouncing them to Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic, repeating the request already made on the 15th of this month, for the passports necessary for the removal from Venice of the effects belonging to his Majesty, and further begging them to stop and to repair as speedily as possible these hostile injuries done to the emperor's property—injuries which can in no way accord with the desire of a sincere reconciliation, and which must produce the strongest and most disagreeable sensation in the public of Venice, whom M. Haller has endeavoured to alarm thoroughly, by assuring them that hostilities between the two powers are on the eve of recommencing.

The undersigned, requesting messieurs the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to be pleased to give orders for preventing whatever might have the effect of retarding the perfect re-establishment of reciprocal confidence and good harmony, have the honour to renew the assurances of their highest consideration.

The Marquis DE GALLO.

The Count DE MEERVELDT, Major-General.

---

*The Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor to the Plenipotentiaries of France.*

The inhabitants of all the parts of Germany bordering on the Rhine which are still occupied by the French armies have had recourse to his Majesty the Emperor, in order to obtain, through his intercession, an alleviation of the excessive burdens with which they are loaded, upon pretext that they must furnish the French troops with subsistence.

Besides the requisitions of all kinds, levied arbitrarily and without any regard to the faculties of countries, which are obliged to furnish them in a proportion far superior to the real wants of the French armies, there continue to be raised heavy contributions, for levying which recourse is had to confiscations, seizure of hostages, and imprisonments: in short, no attention is paid to the ratification of the preliminaries of peace, or to the cessation of hostilities which has been solemnly promised; and those provinces are reduced to a more deplorable condition than they were in even during the most disastrous war.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor are charged, in consequence, to request Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to be pleased to acquaint the Directory with the just complaints and remonstrances of the provinces of Germany occupied by the French armies, that it may be pleased to give the necessary orders for them not to be treated arbitrarily and hostilely till the conclusion of the definitive peace, and that they be not required to furnish the French armies with more than the necessary articles of subsistence, nor in greater quantity than shall be absolutely in their power.

The undersigned, putting just confidence in the sentiment of equity and humanity of Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic, flatter themselves that they will cheerfully employ their good offices for the prompt success of this application, to which they have only to add the reiterated assurances of their highest consideration.

Cesant, June 21, 1797.

The Marquis DE GALLO.  
The Count DE MEERVELDT.

---

*The Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor to the Plenipotentiaries of France.*

The government of Trieste has informed the imperial and royal court, under date of the 28th and 30th of May last, that, on the evacuation of that city by the French troops, Monsieur General Bernadotte left there Monsieur Captain Brechet, late commandant of the place, as consul of France, *ad interim*, and the latter, to announce his public character, has caused the arms of France to be placed over his house.

Though the custom generally received among all powers demands that establishments of this nature should be preceded by the essentially required formality of the immediate sanction of the sovereign of the place, and that such nominations should not be made till after the definitive conclusion of peace, still his imperial and royal Majesty, lending a hand with pleasure to whatever can contribute to strengthen and consolidate friendship and good harmony between the two powers, will cheerfully authorize the government of Trieste to recognise at the present time Monsieur the Captain Brechet in the quality of consul of the French Republic, but on the just condition that his Majesty shall first be assured of meeting with similar dispositions on the part of the French government, for causing the consuls or vice-consuls whom the imperial and royal court shall think fit to appoint from this time for the different commercial places of France, to be received and to enjoy reciprocally all the prerogatives attached to their offices.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor have, in consequence, the honour to request Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to be pleased to learn and to communicate to them the intentions of the French Republic on this point, in conformity with which the government of Trieste shall forthwith receive the necessary orders touching the recognition of Monsieur Captain Brechet in quality of consul.

Meanwhile, the undersigned have the honour to repeat to Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic the assurances of their highest consideration.

Cesano, June 21st, 1797.

The Marquis DE GALLO.

The Count DE MEERVELDT, Major-General.

*The Plenipotentiaries of France to the Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor.*

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of the French Republic have forwarded to their government the note delivered by Monsieur the Marquis de Gallo at the exchange of the ratifications of the preliminaries of Leoben. They have the honour to communicate to their excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King the answer made to them by the Executive Directory of the French Republic.

It authorizes the French plenipotentiaries to declare that the intention of the Executive Directory is to conform strictly, in all circumstances, to the tenour of the second article of the preliminaries of Leoben, relative to etiquette, from which it has not deviated in the act of ratification of the preliminaries delivered by the General-in-chief Bonaparte, since those preliminaries merely fix the preparatory bases of the negociations relative to the separate peace of his imperial Majesty in his quality of King of Hungary and Bohemia.

The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic request their excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, to accept the assurance of their high consideration.

Montebello, 3 Messidor, year 5 of the French Republic.

BONAPARTE and H. CLARKE.

---

*The French Plenipotentiaries to the Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor.*

The government of the Batavian Republic having claimed, through the medium of its minister at Paris, the interposition of the Executive Directory of the French Republic with his Majesty the Emperor and King, in behalf of citizen Pernet, secretary of the Batavian minister to Monsieur the Duke of Wurtemberg, detained prisoner, and for whom the Batavian minister Van Haestein has received orders to cause steps to be taken at Vienna, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the French Republic are charged, on the part of the Executive Directory, to request of Messieurs the

plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty that citizen Pernet be set at liberty as speedily as possible.

The undersigned esteem themselves happy in having to present to his Majesty the Emperor and King this occasion of gratifying his inclination to do good, and they have no doubt of the success of an application in which the Executive Directory of the French Republic takes a particular interest.

They have the honour to salute Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King.

Montebello, 3 Messidor, year 5 of the French Republic.

BONAPARTE and H. CLARKE.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 8 Messidor, year 5 [June 26, 1797].

Citizen Colombat, charged for a long time at Vienna with the education of the son of Prince Colloredo, was thrown into prison a few days after the death of the Emperor Leopold, and, after eight months of anxiety and suspense, he was condemned to confinement as a prisoner of State till the peace.

The moment for his release ought to have arrived, and the intention of the Executive Directory is that you should claim this citizen. The accompanying letter relative to him, addressed on the 18th Prairial, year 3, by citizen Barthélemy to the commission of foreign affairs, will prove to you, citizen-general, all the interest which this prisoner deserves, for his talents, his attainments, the knowledge which he has acquired of the affairs of Austria, the materials which he has collected for history, and, above all, his love for his country.

You will appreciate, citizen-general, all these different kinds of merit, and you will conceive that you are rendering a fresh service to the Republic in breaking the fetters of an enlightened and virtuous citizen.

CH. DELACROIX.

*The Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor to the Plenipotentiaries of France.*

The answer which the citizens plenipotentiaries of the

French Republic have been pleased to give, dated the 3rd of Messidor, to the note which the undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King had the honour to address to them on the 19th of June, relative to the term of two congresses for the conclusion of peace between the two powers, could not but excite their deepest sensibility, as well on account of the constant refusal of their demand, founded on articles 4 and 5 of the patent preliminaries of Leoben, as for the complaints which accompanied it against the conduct of the court of Vienna, whose honour and frankness, known to all Europe, have been manifested in the course of the present negociation, in such a manner as to deserve the confidence of the French Republic.

Ever since the signature of the preliminaries, the minister of his Majesty the Emperor and King has not ceased to protest in his name, that, intent on fulfilling his engagements towards the French Republic, he expected and claimed an equal reciprocity, and that, in consequence of this principle, he could not desist from his demand that two congresses should be held, as well for the peace of the Germanic empire, as for that of his hereditary crowns, to which his allies should be invited. The difficulties which could not but be foreseen in the length to which the meeting and the discussions of the congress would lead, and the urgency of obviating the least delay to the realization of the preliminary articles, induced the respective plenipotentiaries to agree at Leoben and at Gratz to profit by the interview, which they were to have in a city of Italy, on occasion of the exchange of the ratifications, to treat there separately of the most pressing matters that concerned the interests of the two powers in Italy, and there to prepare and smooth the others, which were to be definitively settled at the congress. Never was it intended in consequence that this separate negociation and the results which it might produce should annul the holding of the congress.

Accordingly, as soon as the plenipotentiaries of the two powers met at Montebello for the objects in question, the plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor and King constantly insisted on the demand of convoking the congress and fixing the period for it. The steady opposition of the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to the meeting of that which is specified in the fourth article, and

other considerations, have determined the plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor and King to admit provisionally of another course, upon the reserve agreed on; to await the orders of his imperial and royal Majesty, since the nature of his powers and his instructions, communicated and read to the French citizens plenipotentiaries, did not permit them to decide definitively upon such a subject till they were formally authorized.

The court of Vienna having replied immediately that the holding of two congresses, according to the strict sense of the preliminaries, was indispensable, and that his Majesty the Emperor and King had already apprized his allies of the invitation that would be given them, his plenipotentiary had the honour to communicate at once the answer of his imperial and royal Majesty to the French plenipotentiaries, and it was in consequence of this declaration that the undersigned had the honour to address jointly to the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic the note of the 19th instant. Their invariable refusal to the meeting of the congress, especially of that specified by article 4, has been the real cause of the delay which the business of the peace has thus far met with: to which must be added that, in the conferences begun at Montebello on the 24th of May, they put forward the difficulties of demands and proposals totally contrary to or destructive of the stipulations of the 18th of April: which certainly does not throw upon the court of Vienna the delay and the changes to which the negociation has been subject.

It is evident from this that his Majesty the Emperor and King, ever honourable, ever consistent in his principles and in his conduct, has done no more than solicit the conclusion of peace according to the form and the engagements contracted towards his allies by the preliminaries; and so far from affording cause in this matter for suspicions injurious to his dignity and contrary to his paternal solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, he gives all Europe a cheering proof of integrity and of fidelity to his engagements, and demonstrates to his allies that, if he did not forget them in the preliminary stipulations of Leoben, still less could he consummate the salutary work of peace without inviting them to it to treat for their interests.

It cannot admit of doubt that the holding of a congress, though limited to the meeting of those respective allies only



who were recognized and declared as such on the 18th of April, must necessarily be slower in its progress than if it were composed of the plenipotentiaries of the two powers alone ; but what his Majesty is most especially concerned about is, that the unalterable integrity of his character should be screened from all reproach. He regrets, it is true, the delay of five or six weeks which the definitive conclusion of peace may suffer from the meeting of the allies ; but this delay cannot be imputed to him, being the immediate consequence of the geographical distance of these powers and of the determinations settled by the preliminaries.

If, contrary to all probability and expectation, this delay could lead to events capable of inducing the French Republic to deem itself dispensed, as the French citizens plenipotentiaries seem to intimate, from fulfilling the engagements solemnly contracted towards his Majesty the Emperor and King, in regard to indemnities which, by the secret articles, it has engaged to furnish and guarantee to him ; the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King are obliged to declare, in the name of his imperial and royal Majesty, that, in this case, he should not feel bound to fulfil the conditional engagements which he has contracted, on his part, at Leoben, towards the French Republic.

For the rest, the position which the French army occupies in Italy, and the unbounded confidence of his Majesty the Emperor and King in the honour with which the Executive Directory and the citizen general-in-chief will fulfil their engagement towards his imperial and royal Majesty, leave him no uneasiness on that subject.

All difficulty, moreover, would be removed if the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic had thought fit to accede to the proposal which the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King put forward, to adopt by common consent the arrangements specified at the end of the sixth article of the secret preliminaries, and which might be so combined as that peace and reciprocal interests should be secured against all events.

As it is not known to the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty if the official communication which the French citizens plenipotentiaries have been pleased to make to them concerning the holding of a congress at Lille for a separate peace between France and England, will produce a change in the manner in which the court of Vienna has

engaged to treat ; the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty can only reply to what the French citizens plenipotentiaries advance on that subject, by the assurance, that the strong desire of his Majesty the Emperor and King to conclude peace will assuredly induce him to grasp at everything that is likely to accelerate the progress of the negotiations.

The undersigned cheerfully accept the invitation to continue the negotiations commenced for the purpose of smoothing the difficulties which might retard in congress the work of the definitive treaty of peace. But to give more sequence and activity to the negotiation, and to enable themselves to receive more speedily the instructions of his Majesty the Emperor and King by drawing nearer to his residence, they request the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to be pleased to establish the seat of the negotiation at Udine, repeating to the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic the most formal and the most positive assurances of the firm desire of his Majesty the Emperor and King to terminate as speedily as possible the salutary work of peace. The undersigned have the honour to confirm to them the sentiments of the highest consideration.

Cesano, near Milan, June 28, 1797.

The Marquis DE GALLO,  
The Count DE MEERVELDT.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Paris, 14 Messidor, year 5 [July 2, 1797].

I have received, citizen-general, your despatches, Nos. 55, 56, 57, and 58. As they relate to the same subjects as those of General Bonaparte to the Executive Directory, it has charged me to reply to the latter, and to request you to consider the letter which I address to him as common to both.

I earnestly wish that the court of Vienna, satisfied on the point of etiquette, may at length pursue the frank and rapid course to which you urge it.

It seems to me that it would be rather premature to hire a house at Rastadt, when nothing is yet settled respecting the congress.

I send herewith the papers relative to the recognition of the Batavian Republic by his Prussian majesty ; they

will make you acquainted with his present dispositions towards the Republic. It appears to me more evident than ever that all the princes of Germany who are likely to gain anything by the secularizations are disposed to second us for the boundary of the Rhine.

The Duke of Deuxponts, as heir of the Palatine house, solicits an eventual convention for the indemnities which would be due to him in this supposition.

CH. DELACROIX.

*Extract from the Registers of the Executive Directory, of the 14th Messidor, year 5 [July 2, 1797].*

The minister for foreign affairs is charged to intimate to Generals Bonaparte and Clarke to take care to stipulate in the treaty, if, as it is to be hoped, it should eventually be concluded, that the troops of the French Republic shall not evacuate Italy till after the definitive conclusion of the continental peace; that they are authorized to send one of themselves or a third person to Vienna, not to treat for peace, but to endeavour to remove all the obstacles that oppose the progress of the negociations which will continue to be prosecuted in Italy; that the central commune ought to be chosen not only within reach of the provinces which at present compose the new Republic, but also of those which may be added to them; that, as for jealousies between the great communes, the representative system is well calculated to allay them, since all the parts of the State have, from the elective system, the same influence on the legislation and the government.

CARNOT.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 23 Messidor, year 5 [July 11, 1797].

I arrived yesterday at Udine, after a journey of sixty-three hours. I have found here Messieurs de Gallo and de Meerveldt; the latter had returned from Goritzia on the preceding day. M. de Gallo had purposed to go to Vienna, but he lost two days at Verona waiting for M. de Meerveldt, who had travelled by Porto-Legnago, and they did not meet till he reached Udine.

At the moment of my arrival in this town, M. de Gallo

appeared disposed to go to Vienna, as he had intimated when we were at Montebello. In the morning, he persisted in the same idea; at four o'clock, he told me that he should set out this evening, or at night; at five, M. de Meerveldt, who was of opinion that M. de Gallo should go to Vienna, informed me that he had determined to stay. It is to be presumed that, on mature reflection, he thought that, how extensive soever may be the instructions which he expects to receive from M. de Thugut, they will not be sufficiently so to dispense M. de Gallo from going to Vienna to fetch a supplement to his instructions.

When I tell you, general, that Messieurs de Gallo and de Meerveldt continue waiting for their instructions, you will be aware that M. Baptiste is not yet arrived: he is expected every moment.

The only intelligence which the Austrian plenipotentiaries had received from Vienna was contained in a letter from M. Baptiste to M. de Gallo, which this secretary of legation had addressed to him from Vienna, unknown to the Emperor's minister, from what was said to me. This despatch, without containing anything positive, had excited more hope than fear.

If you come to Udine for the anniversary of the 14th of July, it is to be hoped that you will find M. Baptiste here, and that we shall at length be again able to give activity to the negotiations.

It is superfluous to tell you, citizen-general, that, in the short space of time which I have passed here, I have repeated to satiety the arguments which we used at Montebello. Here, as there, they have convinced the Austrian plenipotentiaries, but this personal conviction is useless to us, since they can act only in conformity with instructions which allow them no latitude, and in which misplaced and absolutely futile considerations have hitherto superseded the true interests of the French Republic and those of the Emperor.

H. CLARKE.

---

*To Generals Bonaparte and Clarke.*

Paris, 23 Messidor, year 5 [July 13, 1797].

You know, citizens-generals, that an important part of the possessions of the Prince of Nassau-Saarbruck, the county of Saarwerden and its dependencies, has been united

to the territory of the Republic, and that, on the other hand, the revenues of the principality of Saarbruck have been put under sequestration. The present prince has remonstrated against both these dispositions, the first of which is inviolable, while the second appears not to be susceptible of modification at this moment.

Nevertheless, it is not the intention of the Executive Directory to refuse the Prince of Nassau-Saarbruck the justice that may be due to him.

It has considered his present position under two points of view. Under the first, it conceives that strict justice requires that the definitive treaty with the emperor and that with the empire comprehend the stipulation of the indemnity that is to be granted to the Prince of Nassau-Saarbruck, for that part of his domains which is already incorporated with the French territory. Under the second, it considers that it would be advantageous that the principality of Saarbruck and other possessions of the prince bordering on our territory should likewise be incorporated with it on condition of a new indemnity.

In calling your attention to this subject of major importance, I must add that, as to the nature, quality, and quantity of the indemnity which it will be necessary in either case to ensure to the Prince of Nassau-Saarbruck, you have only to consult the general instructions which you have received respecting the princes of Germany heretofore having possessions in the interior of France, and those whose territories have been already incorporated by our laws and our treaties.

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 26 Messidor, year 5 [July 14, 1797].

M. de Gallo set out this morning at half past one for Vienna. His impatience and uneasiness on account of the inexplicable absence of his secretary of legation have at length decided him to this journey, which is partly undertaken also for arranging various matters concerning the court of Naples. He received yesterday full powers to treat for an exchange of possessions of the king in the Mediterranean, and likewise of his rights and pretensions to the State of the Church, for one or more Venetian islands in the Adriatic.

M. de Gallo carries with him letters to the empress from her mother, in which she desires her to persuade the emperor to conclude speedily with the French Republic: the sentiments of the court of Naples on this point are not equivocal. I have read a letter from M. Acton to M. de Gallo, in which he expresses his astonishment and dissatisfaction at the tardiness of the court of Vienna. M. de Gallo resolved to deliver these letters himself, to obtain the effect which he hopes from them upon the determination of his imperial Majesty. If he meets M. Baptiste by the way, he will examine the despatches which he is bringing, and, in case they should afford a hope of a speedy conclusion, he will return hither immediately. If, on the contrary, the instructions of his court are still insufficient and dilatory, he will go on to Vienna, and will send M. de Meerveldt his opinion and his signature for the transactions that may take place during his absence. For the rest, he reckons upon staying no longer than twenty-four hours at farthest at Vienna.

Our *fête* has been fine and brilliant. All passed off in the best order, and the military manœuvres were extremely well executed.

H. CLARKE.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 28 Messidor, year 5 [July 16, 1797].

I thank you, general, for having sent me a courier and your proclamation.

It appears evident to me that Thugut does not wish for peace: however, we shall know more about it to-morrow. I await with the greatest impatience your arrival at Udine, where I shall remain till then. If you do not like Udine, we can go to Passeriano.

M. de Gallo, who sees that we shall not come to an accommodation, talks already of going again to Vienna,<sup>1</sup> in order to finish the sooner.

H. CLARKE.

---

<sup>1</sup> Between this and the preceding letter there is a manifest inconsistency, which is not to be accounted for. We are told that the Marquis de Gallo set out very early on the morning of the 14th of July for Vienna; so that he could not possibly have reached that capital on the 16th; since we shall find hereafter that letters took six days to travel that distance.

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 30 Messidor, year 5 [July 18, 1797].

General Clarke has communicated to me, citizen-general, the claim made by the plenipotentiaries of Austria to a great quantity of tobacco seized at Venice by the French administration.

I see by the answer which you have given to these plenipotentiaries that, before deciding definitively upon the demand, you have thought it right to have inquiries made at Venice.

The Executive Directory, before which I have laid this matter, has decided that property of his imperial and royal Majesty sequestrated even in neutral countries, must remain under sequestration, notwithstanding the signature of the preliminaries, to be restored to him if peace is concluded, or to be turned to the profit of the Republic, if hostilities recommence.

This prudential measure can in no wise offend the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty, and they cannot think it strange that this general disposition should be applied to the quantity of tobacco which they claim.

CH. DELACROIX.

---

*The Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor to the Plenipotentiaries of France.*

The undersigned have taken care to transmit for communication to his Majesty the Emperor the note which the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic were pleased to deliver to them, dated the 3rd Messidor, in answer to that of the 19th of June, by which the undersigned, insisting on the strict fulfilment of articles 4 and 5 of the preliminaries of Leoben, demanded the holding of two congresses, as there stipulated.

As the note of the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic contained no clear and precise solution of the proposed question, the undersigned are charged, by express orders from his Majesty, to repeat their inquiries on this subject, and to request the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to be pleased to explain categorically the intention of the French government on a point which ought to be the less contested since it is expressed in the clearest and most for-

mal manner in the precise articles of the preliminaries ratified on both sides.

The undersigned avail themselves at the same time of this occasion to acquaint the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic that his Majesty the Emperor, while approving their answer of the 28th of June, has ordered them to observe that there is no where to be found in the preliminaries of Leoben what the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic assert to be specified there—that the definitive peace is to be concluded in three months at farthest. In article 4 of the preliminaries it is said that “plenipotentiaries shall be sent as soon as possible to Berne, to treat for and conclude there, in the space of three months, or sooner if possible, the definitive peace between the two powers.” On reflecting maturely upon the meaning of this article, it must be admitted that the three months in question cannot be held to have begun till the moment when, the plenipotentiaries of the powers having met, the opening of the congress shall take place. It is the more difficult to reject this interpretation, as an impossibility would result from that which the plenipotentiaries of the Republic wish to give to this article. In fact, it purports that the respective allies shall be invited to the congress, and that their plenipotentiaries shall be present at it: now, it is not doubtful that the allies could not be invited till after the exchange of the ratifications, which was not to take place till a month after the signature; so that if even the French plenipotentiaries had not raised new difficulties respecting the congress, there would be only two months left for sending couriers of invitation to Petersburg, London, and Madrid, for the appointment by these courts of their plenipotentiaries, for furnishing them with the necessary instructions, for then assembling them at Berne from the extremities of Europe, and lastly, for ensuring time to the congress, in which are to be discussed and settled all the interests relative to the general peace, or at least to that between Austria and France—and all this to be successively executed and completed in two months! And how would it be if the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic should really have it in view to invite the Turks also, as they intimated at the meeting of the 24th of May? Would it be possible that the plenipotentiaries of the Grand Signor, subject besides on all the frontiers of Christendom to a quarantine of four or five weeks at least, coming from



Constantinople to Berne, could arrive there in time to concur in the congress and afterwards in the conclusion of the peace—all in two months from the exchange of the ratifications ?

In submitting these reflections to the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic, the undersigned flatter themselves with confidence that they will no longer oppose the holding of two congresses, and they invite them most earnestly to concert with them as speedily as possible upon all that relates to this convocation, in order to procure without delay, for the two nations and for humanity in general, the advantage of the salutary work which is there to be effected.

In this expectation, they have the honour to repeat to the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic the assurances of their highest consideration.

Udine, July 18, 1797.

The Marquis DE GALLO,  
The Count DE MEERVELDT, Major-General.

---

*The Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor to the French  
Plenipotentiaries.*

His imperial and royal Majesty having learned with extreme regret the multiplied infringements made upon the clear and precise tenour of the preliminaries of peace, signed on the 18th of April at Leoben, has ordered his plenipotentiaries to specify the facts which have taken place in contravention of these preliminaries on the part of the French Republic, and to demand due reparation for them.

Agreeably to this order, the undersigned have the honour to transmit herewith to the citizens plenipotentiaries a detailed enumeration of the grievances in question, which his Majesty would fain attribute to resolutions and proceedings, the effects of which, disagreeable and prejudicial to him, were not at first seen in their proper point of view, and by no means to a premeditated design to overthrow and annul all that has been stipulated to his advantage at Leoben.

Beseeching and requiring the French citizens plenipotentiaries to concert amicably with them for the speedy arrangement of all the difficulties which still oppose the perfect re-establishment of confidence and good harmony between the two powers, the undersigned declare, in the

name and by order of his Majesty, that he persists in his firm and invariable resolution to conform, on his part, with the most scrupulous fidelity, to the stipulations of the 18th of April, but that his Majesty, claiming from the honour of the French Republic a perfect reciprocity in the punctual fulfilment of the engagements mutually contracted, has charged his undersigned plenipotentiaries solemnly to protest in his name against all that has been done since the signature of the preliminary articles, patent and secret, in contravention to their tenour, as well as against all that may be undertaken in violation of these articles in the sequel, until the definitive treaty of peace, the conclusion of which, conformably to the established bases, his Majesty most cordially desires, shall remove for ever all subjects of misunderstanding and dispute between him and the French Republic.

The undersigned have the honour to be with the highest consideration, &c.

Udine, July 18, 1797.

The Marquis DE GALLO,

The Count DE MEERVELDT, Major-General.

---

*The Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor to the French  
Plenipotentiaries.*

The subversion of the government of Venice effected by the armies and the agents of the French Republic after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, and the violent shock which this unforeseen change has given to the equilibrium of Italy and to the tranquillity of the bordering provinces of his imperial and royal Majesty, have not failed to excite his particular attention.

Notwithstanding article 5 of the secret preliminaries, according to which the measures to be taken concerning the Venetians were to have been concerted by common accord, and notwithstanding article 3 of the patent preliminaries, by which the two powers engaged to contribute to the utmost of their ability to the internal tranquillity of their States, there has been hastily established, without the *knowledge* and without the participation of his Majesty, a democratic government at Venice, which makes the dissemination and encouragement of anti-monarchical principles in the neighbouring Austrian provinces its especial business, and which, from its first institution, has taken the liberty in its public

papers grossly to insult his Majesty. Though Venice is an absolute dependency of the French forces, yet there are tolerated in that city so-called schools of public instruction, in which men, while preaching up perversity, calumniate and outrage all sovereigns, and particularly his imperial Majesty. No notice is taken of the manifestoes which the municipalities publish to excite the provinces of the *terra firma* to league with them against the sovereign who is to govern them, and no opposition is made to the mission of emissaries to Paris and other places, to solicit France to oppose the execution of the articles of the treaty of Leoben.

In short, such is the indifference shown to the intrigues and efforts employed by the Venetians against the honour and interests of his Majesty, that they fancy themselves authorized to commit the most culpable excesses against his officers. The circumstances related in the two accompanying papers prove to what lengths they may dare to proceed, if suitable means for repressing them are not resorted to without delay.

It would be in vain to throw the blame of what is past and of what is still passing at Venice upon the spontaneous will of the people. It is a matter of public notoriety that nothing is done or can be done there but by the orders, or at least with the permission and consent, express or tacit, of the French generals, who possess a superabundant power for remedying and obviating all these excesses and disorders.

It is therefore of the citizen general-in-chief that the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty must claim the faith of treaties and the redress of the infractions which have been made in them.

It is evident that the emperor cannot consent that Venice should continue to be the centre of audacious agitators chiefly engaged in spreading commotion in the neighbouring Austrian provinces. His Majesty, therefore, cannot but insist on the re-establishment of the former government at Venice, or that forms approaching as nearly as possible to the old ones be given to it with his concurrence and intervention, unless the French citizens plenipotentiaries devise some other expedient capable of ensuring the tranquillity of the bordering provinces of his Majesty's dominions.

The still more recent democratisation of the government of Genoa, consolidated by the treaty of the 6th of June between the French and Genoese republics, is a new subject of

displeasure for his Majesty, who, in his quality of lord paramount of the imperial fiefs situated in the territory of Genoa, could not consent to the injuries which this change will inflict on his rights and those of the Empire. They have been formally recognized by the French Republic, which is not ignorant, and which has admitted, that nothing can be determined respecting the state of those fiefs without the consent of the emperor, since, in one of its recent treaties with Genoa, it was stipulated that France should interpose her good offices, in order to obtain the cession to the Genoese in full property and sovereignty of the imperial fiefs situated in the territory of Genoa.

How then is this new encroachment of the rights of his Majesty and the Empire to be reconciled with article 5 of the preliminaries, by which it has been stipulated that all hostility between France and the Germanic empire should cease.

The undersigned request the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to be pleased to concert with them the means of putting an end to these grievances, in conformity with the engagements made by the preliminaries of the peace, and they have the honour to repeat the assurances of their highest consideration.

Udine, July 18, 1797.

The Marquis DE GALLO,  
The Count DE MEERVELDT, Major-General.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 2 Thermidor, year 5 [July 20, 1797].

I send back to you, general, the courier whom you despatched from Milan on the 29th Messidor.

It appears certain to me that M. Thugut does not wish for peace, and this out of pure complaisance for England, who no doubt knows how to acknowledge the services which he renders her in a way that suits this minister. I have had much conversation with M. de Gallo, and it appeared to me that I had convinced him of the insincerity of his imperial Majesty's minister.

M. de Gallo is determined to go to Vienna; I have not opposed it because it is agreed that in the mean time the negotiations may go on with M. de Meerveldt just as if M. de Gallo were present.

I am quite of your opinion relative to shutting up the agitating clubs: but the Directory is so strong, from the opinion of the armies and that of the republicans, that I have no doubt it will succeed in reducing the malevolent to silence. I shall spare you my reasonings on all this, because you are much nearer to Paris, and all I could tell you would be stale trash.

Though one may complain of the heat here, as well as at Milan, still I am impatient for your coming; that is indispensable. We have had a slight commotion, the subject of which is scarcely worth mentioning to you, and which has made an impression upon my mind solely because the Austrian plenipotentiaries have taken it up. They complained of some expressions used by Adjutant-general Solignac; but I ascertained that he was not in the wrong. I presume that General Bernadotte will tell you about all this; for my part, I reserve myself to chat with you on your arrival. I long for the moment when we may take in concert some efficacious measure for hastening matters. It is impossible to put up with these disastrous delays much longer.

H. CLARKE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 3 Thermidor, year 5 [July 21, 1797].

I forward to you herewith several notes sent to me yesterday evening by M. de Meerveldt. All of them relate to the affairs of Italy, and are couched in a style that cannot fail to appear strange to you. As your yesterday's letter leads me to hope that I shall soon see you here, I defer till then the answer that it will be proper to make to these notes.

H. CLARKE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 3 Thermidor, year 5 [July 21, 1797].

I am persuaded, general, that all the notes which I am sending you will appear very extraordinary. I did not expect to receive them; I expected it the less as M. de Gallo had given me to understand that they would not be presented: yesterday evening Count de Meerveldt's aide-de-camp brought me all these papers. I thought that it would be useless to answer them immediately, as you are coming:

if you think proper to transmit them to the Directory; I beg you to take the trouble to write a letter to accompany them.

I am waiting for you with the more impatience because I think that it would be useful if a strong note, coming from both of us, were to arrive at Vienna while Gallo is in that capital. If I am not mistaken, he is as much convinced as I am of the double part which Thugut appears to be playing.

I know but imperfectly and only through you what is passing in France, having received no newspaper since those of the 13th Messidor.

Many thanks for the copy which you have sent me of your letter to the Directory. I think the royalists will become more discreet, when they are acquainted with the constitutional and republican spirit of the armies.

I think we ought not to be in too great a hurry to sanction the union of Ferrara and Bologna with the Cisalpine, though the mean term which you have adopted is certainly the best and the most conformable to principles.

You made mention of copies of two of your letters to the Directory: I have received but one.

To believe the verbal declaration of Messieurs Meerveldt and de Gallo, it appears that Lafayette is not allowed to leave Olmütz, because they are required previously to give a contradiction on their part to the ill treatment which they have suffered, or such particulars as would lead to the punishment of the authors of those accounts. You will appreciate, general, this proceeding, which appears to me to crown the odious conduct pursued towards them.

H. CLARKE.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Milan, 4 Thermidor, year 5 [July 22, 1797].

I am of opinion that you should reply quite simply to the note of the emperor's plenipotentiaries, that the convention signed at Leoben has provided for all contingencies; that we refer wholly to its contents; that it is extraordinary that a question already decided should be again brought forward after the lapse of two months; that it is therefore evident that they are only seeking pretexts for spinning out matters and gaining time.

BONAPARTE.

*To General Clarke.*

Milan, 5 Thermidor, year 5 [July 23, 1797].

I was just ready to start, when your courier arrived. Gallo and Baptiste being no longer at Udine, Meerveldt having no power, and every line of their note characterizing their bad faith, I see no utility in my travelling to Udine, when the new government of this country, the affairs of Piedmont, and that of the Grisons, render my presence at Milan more serviceable.

You will find herewith a copy of the letter that I am sending to the Executive Directory.

I think that we have no answer to give to a note which is destitute of sense: the only reply should be to inform his Majesty the Emperor that, if the negociations are not terminated by the 18th of August, we shall consider the preliminaries as null; but, in the present position of the Republic, I think that neither you nor I can take upon us this operation.

I have ordered a bridge to be thrown over the Isonzo and têtes de pont constructed; I am marching a Cisalpine legion to Palma-Nova, and augmenting General Victor's division to 3000 men.

If the Republic were in an ordinary situation, and the negociations at Lille did not make it an imperative law not to take anything upon ourselves, I confess to you that, on the receipt of your letter, I would have marched all my divisions, and that in a fortnight I would have been before Vienna; but, under the present circumstances, it is for the government alone to take that course which its wisdom and the state of things may prescribe to it.

I should wish that you would ask for a passport for your secretary of legation and send him to Vienna: he could carry a letter to M. de Gallo; he might see M. Thugut, and bring back positive intelligence respecting the state of things in that quarter. You would not fail to recommend to him to make notes of everything he should see by the way, whether troops or new field-works.

I shall despatch my aide-de-camp Marmont to Vienna: he shall pass through the Tyrol, and so he will have no passport from M. de Meerveldt. The object of his mission will be to observe the different works constructing at Vienna, the military state of minds, the real state of their troops.

VOL. II.

Z

Omit nothing to obtain from M. de Meerveldt a passport for your secretary.

The moment any plenipotentiary arrives with full powers and a sincere desire to commence the negociations, I will set off, and soon be at Udine.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Paris, 6 Thermidor, year 5 [July 23, 1797].

I transmit to you, general, as mere information, an extract from a letter which has been addressed to me on the necessity of arranging with the Piedmontese government, in order to procure for the department of the Maritime Alps some accessions of territory which would facilitate the communications with Piedmont and the means of increasing the commercial prosperity of that State with the French Republic. You have occasion perhaps to turn these ideas to useful account.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.<sup>1</sup>

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 6 Thermidor, year 5 [July 23, 1797].

I have received this morning the letter which you have charged Bourrienne to write me: I have learned, not without regret, that you appear decided to defer your departure. Circumstances, nevertheless, render your presence here more necessary from day to day; and you must have seen, from the nature and tone of the last notes which I have transmitted to you, that it is urgent to take a step which shall put an end to the languor into which the negociation has fallen, and force the court of Vienna to manifest its real intentions more clearly. Should more important business detain you for some time longer, I beg you to acquaint me, in detail, with your opinion on the answer to be given to the Austrian plenipotentiaries, and also on the nature of the explanations which it is time to solicit. A knowledge of your ideas and the modifications which they might produce

<sup>1</sup> Talleyrand had just been appointed to succeed Delacroix as minister for foreign affairs. This was the first introduction of that supple politician to public office, to which he continued to cling during life through all successive vicissitudes of France and her government.



in mine would then enable me to act in your absence, and thus the progress of business would not be interrupted by new delays.

I must observe to you, besides, that I am but summarily acquainted with the observations of the Directory on the great note which we delivered at Montebello to the plenipotentiaries of his imperial Majesty.

I have not received any letter from the government since the 14th Thermidor, and the packet which you forwarded to me by the courier who left on the 13th contained only some insignificant letters for my aide-de-camp.

Croisier arrived here yesterday evening.

H. CLARKE.

---

*General Clarke to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.*

Far as the French plenipotentiaries are from mixing up private interests with the discussion of the general and more important subjects to which they are desirous to confine their attention, the order of the Executive Directory of the French Republic, and the need to obtain, in the present state of its relations with his imperial and royal Majesty, a proof of the amicable intentions of the court of Vienna, oblige the undersigned to request their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King to transmit to the Austrian government the application which the undersigned addresses to them respecting the captivity of the French citizen Colombat, who was entrusted for a long time with the education of the sons of the Prince de Colloredo. He was thrown into prison a few days after the death of the Emperor Leopold, and after eight months' suspense condemned to be confined as a prisoner of state till the peace. I should suppose that, since the signature of the preliminaries, there can be no obstacles in the way of his release.

General Clarke has the honour to assure Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty that the Executive Directory will learn the cessation of the confinement of this citizen with so much the greater pleasure, since, if the request made by the undersigned is granted, it will be the first that has been so favoured by the Austrian government since the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben.

z 2

The undersigned repeats to Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his imperial Majesty the assurances of his perfect and highest consideration.

Udine, 7 Thermidor, year 5 [July 24, 1797].

H. CLARKE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 8 Thermidor, year 5 [July 25, 1797].

I received this morning the letter which you wrote me on the 5th Thermidor: some of the articles appeared to me susceptible of being read to M. the Count de Meerveldt and of contributing to the success of the negociation. You desired me to send my secretary of legation to Vienna: M. de Meerveldt could not grant me the passport for which I applied, unless upon condition that I should send him as courier to M. de Gallo.

Perret set off this evening. I gave him, as you desired, a letter for that plenipotentiary, a copy of which I send you; I thought it right to insert in it the passages of your despatch which I had read to M. de Meerveldt: the latter even wished me to do so. I thence concluded that Messieurs the Austrians, knowing that your words are backed by an army of more than 80,000 men, pay particular attention to what you say. I hope that citizen Perret's arrival at Vienna will renew the negociation in a manner suitable for us. I am somewhat vexed that you have left the Directory to decide on the continuance of the negociations or their rupture: I fear that this situation will be extremely delicate for it at a moment when it is assailed, as it appears to be, by factions desirous to annihilate the republican government. If it pronounces in favour of war, a general outcry will be raised against it; and, if the factions which surround it force it to a weak step, there is no doubt that this step will redouble the disastrous obstinacy of the court of Vienna. I had rather, citizen-general, that we had made up our minds, both of us, to take a strong measure, which would have forced the Austrian minister to unfold his intentions and to put an end to that wearisome uncertainty in which he has so long kept us.

People would not have failed, I am aware, in case our proceedings had caused the breaking out afresh of the war, upon which Austria would have been bent beforehand, to

place to the account of an ambition which they would have imputed to you, the renewal of the hostilities which we are commissioned to put an end to by a solid peace. But all thinking beings would have recollected that never could war have been continued with greater advantage for your personal glory than when you limited it to that of having conducted the army of Italy to the gates of Vienna. There are still some means of arriving at peace.

The letter which I have written to M. de Gallo and the pains which citizen Perret will take at Vienna, will give them all the force which they ought to have: still, I regret exceedingly that you did not come to Udine before the departure of M. de Gallo; and your presence in this town, if your affairs admit of it, might perhaps, by accelerating the return of that plenipotentiary, hasten the earnestly desired definitive peace with the emperor, called for so long by all the French.

H. CLARKE.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Milan, 10 Thermidor, year 5 [July 27, 1797].

A note must be sent, citizen-general, to the Duke of Bavaria and to the other princes who owe money to the armies of the Rhine in consequence of the armistice, to require them to complete their payment.

Each of these princes must be told that they have to pay, within eight days, at Basle, into the hands of the chargé d'affaires of France, such a sum that two millions may be paid as speedily as possible.

Notice must be given them that, if the said sums are not paid, the French armies will re-enter the territories of those princes, and be obliged to treat them as irreconcilable enemies, who have already violated the most sacred treaties and engagements. These notes must be sent by extraordinary couriers to Munich and other places.

BONAPARTE.

---

*The Plenipotentiaries of France to the Plenipotentiaries of the Emperor.*

The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic have received the five notes dated the 18th of July, 1797, which

have been addressed to them by their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King after the delivery of that of the same day relative to the holding of two congresses. They continue to see with pain that the cabinet of Vienna seizes all pretexts for raising obstacles and opposing the conclusion of peace: they cannot disguise from themselves that even appearances are no longer kept up. The tone which pervades the notes sent to the French plenipotentiaries; the numerous protestations which they contain; the extraordinary nature of the demands made in them; the various marches of the Austrian troops—in short, everything announces war. The resumption of hostilities on the part of Austria seems to be deferred by it solely to gain time, and to take sufficient for fascinating the eyes of Europe by protestations of a desire for peace, at the moment when the cabinet of Vienna appears to harbour intentions absolutely contrary to those protestations.

How can the sincerity of that cabinet be believed, since, when it appears to insist so strongly on the execution of the preliminaries of Leoben, it violates them itself in the most evident manner? Thus, though it has sought to give to those preliminaries an interpretation which the French plenipotentiaries refuse to admit, and which cannot have any other object but to put off still further the conclusion of peace, it is not the less certain that it was agreed that the definitive peace should be concluded in the space of three months dating from their signature; and this principal article of the preliminaries, the execution of which is desired by all Europe, is manifestly violated.

Since that time, four months have already elapsed; it is three since the undersigned communicated to the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King the full powers which they had received from the Executive Directory of the French Republic to conclude and sign the definitive peace; while the cabinet of Vienna, far from imitating this conduct, has constantly made a point of suffering the discussions between the respective negotiators to turn only on subjects but distantly relating to the principal object of the negotiation.

Is not the article of the preliminaries by which his Majesty was to consent to a separate peace again violated by the manifestation exhibited in the preceding notes of their Excellencies Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries of the

desire of his Majesty the Emperor and King to treat only in common with his former allies ?

But what it is impossible not to consider as a manifest violation of the first article of the secret preliminaries is the protest made by their Excellencies Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries against the independence of Lombardy, since that article literally says, " His Majesty the Emperor renounces [and not will renounce] that part of his dominions in Italy situated beyond the right bank of the Oglio and the right bank of the Po."

His Majesty the Emperor was not to occupy the Venetian territory till the definitive peace, and yet he takes possession of Dalmatia and Istria, that is to say, the finest provinces of the republic of Venice ; he drives out the garrisons, establishes his government there, and the cabinet of Vienna complains of the change of government of Venice !

His Majesty the Emperor does not conceal his impatience to take possession of the territories of that republic ; he wants them all : he excepts neither the mouths of the Adige and the Brenta, nor the city of Venice itself, and yet the cabinet of Vienna declares that it is animated by a warm solicitude for that ancient republic !

The French army occupies, it is true, the States of Venice, as it did before the preliminaries ; it occupies, moreover, the city of Venice ; but it remains there only as an auxiliary ; its troops interfere in no way in public affairs ; and, if some subordinate agents of his Majesty the Emperor have been insulted, it must no doubt be attributable solely to resentment on the part of the Venetians of the violence committed by the imperial army in entering Istria and Dalmatia : the plenipotentiaries could do no more than interpose their mediation between his Majesty the Emperor and King and the republic of Venice ; they have done it.

It is, nevertheless, in consequence of the preliminaries, on which the cabinet of Vienna insists only when it has explained them in a manner prejudicial to France and sometimes to the emperor himself, that five Austrian provinces have been restored to his Majesty ; that the important port of Trieste, and with it the faculty of resuming its trade, has been given up to him.

As for the change of government at Venice and Genoa, the French Republic has taken no part in it : it has interfered only on the application of the people, and to prevent

the excesses which usually attend the cradle of revolutions.

It is, therefore, to the governments of these two States that the plenipotentiaries of his imperial Majesty must address themselves relative to all that concerns them : and how could the French plenipotentiaries help being struck by the apparent insincerity of the cabinet of Vienna, when it appears affected by a change which has taken place at Venice, and which greatly facilitates the execution of the preliminaries ? Does not this conduct seem to furnish proof of a formal design of the cabinet of Vienna not to execute them ?

As for the affair of the Duke of Modena, it concerns in no way the French government : it is an affair between him and his subjects.

His Majesty the Emperor, on the mere promise of concluding a separate peace, has obtained restitution of five provinces and the removal of the French army from his capital ; now, though this peace is not yet concluded, notwithstanding the text of the preliminaries, the cabinet of Vienna wants to have five or six fortresses and a great part of Italy, and it is by making promises again that it thinks to obtain them ! But after seeing so many obstacles raised which it would have been easy to obviate ; after the extreme tardiness of the cabinet of Vienna, and its prolonged refusals to adopt a course conducive to the interests of the two powers, have so considerably increased the difficulties which oppose the peace ; the undersigned, finding themselves obliged to collect the wishes of the cabinet of Vienna in regard to this peace rather from facts than from protestations, which have hitherto produced nothing but what is illusory, owe it to the Republic, which has honoured them with its confidence, not to depart in the least, with a view to do something agreeable to his imperial Majesty, from the strict sense of the preliminaries, according to which his Majesty is not to enter the Venetian States till the definitive peace.

If his Majesty thinks it to his interest to occupy those States immediately, let him make peace without delay ; but, if the cabinet of Vienna is determined to continue to prevent its conclusion, the interest of the French Republic requires that the provinces of Venice and the fortresses should be in the hands of its army.

Painful as it would be to the French plenipotentiaries to

see negotiations begun so long ago terminate in war, they owe it to the honour of their nation to inquire if Austria wishes for it, and to declare that the French Republic is rather disposed to wage war than to suffer itself to be tricked by subtleties or demands unfavourable at once to both powers, and singularly contrasting with the good faith which the French plenipotentiaries never ceased to manifest throughout the whole course of the first negociation.

But in this state of things the undersigned hope that Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries will exert all their efforts to prevail upon the cabinet of Vienna to adopt a course more conducive to mutual interests, and a system tending immediately to peace which the undersigned continue to offer to conclude.

The French plenipotentiaries might reply by counter-protestations to the notes which have been addressed to them by their Excellencies the Austrian plenipotentiaries ; they might recapitulate in historical memorials the efforts which they have not ceased to make for bringing about the conclusion of the definitive peace : but they abstain from those means, because it is their intention to avoid every thing that would be likely to disturb still more that harmony which it is so essential to establish in the negociations with which they are charged. They are well aware that the peace which it is urgent to conclude, in order to be solid and durable, ought to be based on mutual interests ; and the whole of the preliminaries of Leoben must have testified to his Majesty the Emperor and King that the intention of the French Republic never was to deprive the house of Austria of a power equal to that which it possessed before the war : the compensations which it is to receive afford a proof of this. It is to be found also in the course which the French negociators have never ceased to follow ; and whenever they have demanded advantages for the French Republic, they have always proposed equivalents for the house of Austria. If the cabinet of Vienna were to imitate this example, the two powers would soon see peace succeed the calamities produced by war : the Executive Directory of the French Republic has always wished that peace might be equally advantageous to Austria and France, and in particular that it should remove all possibility of a future war between them both in Italy and in Germany, by fixing the boundaries in such a manner that neither of the two powers

should be, in time of peace, in a situation in any way offensive or alarming to the other. Not to keep within this reasonable circle, to make peace depend on the addition to the population of a few thousands, which add nothing to the power of a great nation, is to forget all the evil under which suffering humanity is groaning, is to demand a war which cannot have a beneficial aim for either of the two nations.

To conclude, the undersigned have the honour to request Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King not to employ, when speaking of democratic governments and nations, terms which might be offensive to the government represented by the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic.

It has never been the case that the undersigned, in speaking of the ministers of kings and their courts, have made use of any epithet which could be offensive to them.

The citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic request their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King to accept the reiterated assurance of their high consideration.

Udine, 10 Thermidor, year 5 of the French  
Republic, one and indivisible.

BONAPARTE and CLARKE.

---

*Note of the Plenipotentiaries of the French Republic.*

If the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic have been surprised to see the troops of his imperial and royal Majesty take possession, contrary to the tenour of the preliminaries of Leoben, and before the definitive conclusion, of Istria and Dalmatia, they cannot help observing that their astonishment was extreme on learning that these same troops had also taken possession of the republic of Ragusa. They protest strongly against the destruction of the said republic, and hope that his Majesty the Emperor, actuated by the sentiments of justice which characterize him, will feel how impossible it is that the other powers, and particularly the French Republic and the Ottoman Porte, can see with indifference the occupation of a neutral and independent State, which has never interfered in any way in the present war; and they doubt not that their Excellencies



Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries will contribute with all their power to induce his Majesty to give the most speedy orders for his troops to withdraw from the territory of the republic of Ragusa.

The undersigned repeat to their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty the assurance of their high consideration.

Udine, 10 Thermidor, year 5.

BONAPARTE and H. CLARKE.

*The Marquis de Gallo to General Clarke, dated Vienna,  
July 26, 1797.*

[Having given an account of some commissions relative to the purchase of several German books, M. de Gallo adds :—]

I hope to bring you them [the books] on my return ; I flatter myself that this will be soon, and that I shall have the satisfaction of convincing you, by the fact, of what I have assured you so many times, that his Majesty the Emperor and his cabinet desire nothing more than to see peace between the two powers established as speedily as possible, in a solid and unalterable manner. I expect in a few days the new instructions and powers with which I am to be furnished, that we may have it in our power to complete very soon definitively that salutary work.

I have always told you, general, that peace depended entirely on yourselves : it is in your hands ; it will be concluded in a few days, if you will but adopt the same views of future conciliation, justice, and stability, as govern the wishes and determinations of his imperial Majesty.

But manage so, I beseech you, that, in these transactions, nothing may happen that can increase those jealousies which unfortunately have too long prevailed, so much to the prejudice of the interests and the repose of the two nations. Manage to induce one to check (for one can do it) the progress of certain events which make things worse from day to day, and which might destroy or cool those happy dispositions, of which I assure you in this letter to my greatest satisfaction.

If M. the General Bonaparte is with you, I beg you to be pleased to present our compliments to him, as well as to his respectable family and to General Berthier.

DE GALLO.

---

*To the Marquis de Gallo.*

Udine, 14 Thermidor, year 5 [August 1, 1797].

I have received the letter which you did me the honour to write me, and the "Almanach de Gotha" which accompanied it; I thank you for both; I thank M. Baptiste also for his obliging note. I am most impatient to see you arrive at Udine; delays ruin the best affairs. I hail with joy the assurance which you give me, that his Majesty the Emperor and his cabinet desire nothing more than to see peace established as speedily as possible between the two powers. In order to be solid and unalterable, it is requisite that the definitive peace of his imperial Majesty should regulate all the great interests, present and future, of Austria and France.

Return soon, M. le Marquis, but return with power to conclude, and latitude enough to remove all difficulties: your zeal for his Majesty deserves that confidence.

There are events which happen contrary to the intention of those who are supposed sometimes very unjustly to be the authors of them: doubt not for a moment of my zeal for removing any obstacles likely to retard peace.

General Bonaparte will come to Udine the moment he is informed of your arrival in this town.

I have only time to embrace you with all my heart.

H. CLARKE.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Udine, July 28, 1797 [10 Thermidor, year 5].

The general commanding the imperial and royal army in Carinthia and Carniola, having received advice of the removal of the sequestration which had been laid upon the provisions in store at Venice for that army, immediately made the necessary arrangements for taking away a certain quantity for the consumption of his troops; but the imperial commissary charged with the transport of them met with the same difficulties as before the removal of the seques-

tration, the citizen-general of division Baraguay d'Hilliers, commanding at Venice, having alleged that he was not yet authorized to deliver the passports necessary for that purpose.

The undersigned plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor and King has, in consequence, the honour to repeat to Citizen Clarke, general of division and plenipotentiary of the French Republic, the application previously made that the magazines in question may, without further delay, be placed at the free disposal of their legitimate owner.

The undersigned takes this opportunity to reiterate to the citizen French plenipotentiary the assurance of his high consideration.

Udine, July 28, 1797.

The Count de MEERVELDT, Major-general.

---

*Note of the French Plenipotentiaries.*

The citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic have taken into consideration the note relative to the holding of two congresses, dated Udine, the 18th of July, 1797, which was transmitted to them by their excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty, and have called to mind the various demands and allegations relative to the subject of it. After referring to their note of the 3rd Messidor, and particularly for what relates to the demand made by their Excellencies Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries themselves, both at Leoben and at Gratz, for treating of the definitive and separate peace of his imperial and royal Majesty in a town of Italy, the undersigned conceive that the convention signed at Montebello has provided for everything, and they have the honour to declare to their Excellencies Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries, that they refer entirely to its contents.

The undersigned are the more disposed to insist on this point, as they cannot see without surprise and a feeling of pain a question decided two months ago again brought forward at the present moment; and they frankly confess that this conduct tends to confirm them in the persuasion, that the court of Vienna is merely seeking prettexts to protract the negociation and to gain time.

The best way to prove a desire for peace is to conclude it immediately, as the undersigned have never ceased to offer and still offer to do, and without sacrificing the interests of the two powers to foreign considerations.

The undersigned assure their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his imperial Majesty of their perfect consideration.

Udine, 10 Thermidor, year 5.

BONAPARTE and CLARKE.

---

*Count de Meerveldt to General Clarke.*

The mail of letters from Austria and Trieste, addressed as usual to the Vienna post-office established at Venice, in conformity with ancient conventions, was stopped on the 29th of June, just as it was entering Venice, by sbirri, who took it away, telling the drivers that they had orders to carry it to the municipality.

The direction of the Vienna post-office at Venice, to which the municipality sent this mail, after making all the search that it thought proper, having ascertained that two-thirds of the letters from Vienna had been opened, and several even suppressed, immediately claimed the authority of the citizen general of division Baraguay d'Hilliers, commanding at Venice, against this violation of the right of nations; but that general declared that this affair was not of military competence. The same direction would then have applied on the subject to the minister of the French Republic at Venice, but could not gain access to him, in order to obtain through his intervention reparation for this outrage, and the safety necessary for the free course of that post. The undersigned plenipotentiary of his imperial and royal Majesty has the honour to address himself on the same subject to citizen general of division Clarke, plenipotentiary of the French Republic, to be pleased to cause the municipality of Venice, which is notoriously and manifestly in absolute dependence on the French forces stationed in that city, to be obliged to make due and fitting reparation for the violence which it has dared to commit, in contempt of the law of nations, in ordering the mail of the Vienna post-office to be stopped and ransacked, and to abstain in future from all such outrages, upon pain of per-

sonal responsibility on the part of all those who shall be guilty of them.

To ensure, meanwhile, the uninterrupted course of this post, and particularly of the mail from Vienna, which will pass to-day through Udine for Venice, the undersigned moreover begs the French citizen-plenipotentiary to be pleased to give orders for the necessary measures and dispositions, that the mail in question be escorted on its arrival at Mestre by an armed force sufficient to preserve it from all violence both on the lagoon, in Venice itself, and especially in the Vienna post-office in that city, which the undersigned has the honour to recommend particularly, with its director and his other *employés*, to the support and protection of the French forces, to which all Venice is incontestably subordinate at this moment.

The honour of the citizen-plenipotentiary of the French Republic leaves no room to doubt that he will acknowledge the justice of the proposed measures and the expediency of adopting them without delay. The undersigned flatters himself that he will be pleased to honour him as soon as possible with some satisfactory explanation thereupon; and meanwhile he desires to renew the assurance of his high consideration.

Udine, the 31st July, 1797.

MEERVELDT, Major-general.

*General Clarke in reply to the preceding.*

General Clarke has received the note which M. le Comte addressed to him on the 31st of July, 1797, on the subject of the Venice mail: he will forward it to the general-in-chief of the French army in Italy.

General Clarke has the honour to transmit to his excellency M. the Count de Meerveldt,

1. A requisition to the commandant of the French troops at Mestre, for the purpose of obtaining an escort for the safety of the mail leaving Udine to-day for Venice.

2. A letter to the general of division Baraguay d'Hilliers, recommending the said mail and the *employés* of the Austrian post-office in that city.

I request M. the Count de Meerveldt to accept the assurance of my high consideration.

CLARKE.

*Requisition for Escort.*

The undersigned plenipotentiary of the French Republic for the peace with Austria requires the citizen commanding the French troops at Mestre, upon the formal demand of his Excellency M. the Count de Meerveldt, plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor and King, to be pleased to let the mail of letters from Austria and Trieste, leaving Udine to-day for Venice, be escorted by an armed force sufficient to preserve it from all violence either on the lagoon or in Venice itself, till the moment when it shall be delivered to and deposited with General Baraguay d'Hilliers, or in his absence with the French officer commanding in Venice.

Udine, 14 Thermidor, year 5.

H. CLARKE.

*To General Clarke.*

Vienna, July 31, 1797 [13 Thermidor, year 5].

I saw your secretary arrive with very great pleasure, because the sentiments which I have for himself, and those with which the title of belonging to you inspire me, concurred to render the surprise an agreeable one. The letter which you have sent to me by him, M. le General, has not inspired me with the same sentiments, except in as far as relates to the confidence and the friendly expressions which you are pleased to bestow upon me in it, and of which I shall always be very proud. I thought it right to submit the contents of it to his Majesty the Emperor and to M. de Thugut, and I cannot disguise from you that his Majesty could not see without great pain the ill construction which you put upon his intentions, and that, by imputing to him views which cannot accord with the honour and love of peace which characterize his Majesty in the eyes of Europe, persons seek to persuade the Executive Directory that it is the Emperor who prolongs the negociations, and delays the enjoyment of the fruit of them, for which all mankind are ardently longing. Now, I appeal to the judgment of any impartial man, I appeal to your justice, M. le General, and I venture to ask you if it is possible to attribute the little success which has attended the negociations thus far to any other cause than the refusal constantly manifested to execute the preliminaries, and particularly article 4, and like-

wise to the infractions made in them, one after another, by which the ministers of his Majesty have been provoked to remonstrances, which they have introduced into their notes, solely because it was impossible for them to obtain the least satisfaction. Could his Majesty expect, after his honourable and consistent conduct, that he should be represented to the Executive Directory as desirous to defer the peace, and wishing to make a handle of the present negotiation for views utterly foreign to his honour and his policy?

I hope, M. le General, that you have by this time received the letter which I had the honour to write you under date of the 26th of July. You will there have seen how you have misjudged the intentions of the Emperor by the new proof which I have announced to you of the earnest desire that his Majesty continues to cherish for the speedy conclusion of peace, and that he has removed all obstacles by his determination to treat definitively and separately at Udine, as soon as he can consent to it without prejudice to his dignity and to his engagements. To this end he has granted us the necessary full powers, so that if, as his imperial Majesty would fain flatter himself, the Executive Directory is actuated by the same conciliatory sentiments; if it wishes for a solid and durable peace, which, while ensuring for ever the internal tranquillity of the two States, shall dispose them to knit more and more closely the bonds which shall constitute the happiness of the two nations—we shall have finished, M. le General, the salutary work to which we are called in twice twenty-four hours. The moment when I shall have it in my power to rejoin you cannot be deferred beyond a few days, and I shall see it arrive with sincere pleasure, because, knowing your humanity, I am sure that you will neglect nothing to accelerate an epoch so earnestly desired.

I refer you for the rest to what M. Perret will communicate to you verbally respecting the conversations which he has had with M. the Baron de Thugut and with myself, and I beg you to accept the sentiments of perfect esteem and high consideration which I have vowed to you and with which, &c.

DE GALLO.

PS. I think it essential, M. le General, to inform you confidentially that, though his imperial Majesty is determined to let the definitive peace be negotiated at Udine,

VOL. II.

A A

and has been pleased to grant us, to this effect, sufficient powers, still he reserves to himself the right which is conferred on him by article 4 of the preliminaries, to convoke the congress, in case, contrary to his expectation, he should see, after a reasonable time, that the conferences at Udine fail to produce the desired issue: on which subject I shall enter into a more detailed and more precise explanation, as soon as, jointly with M. the Count de Meerveldt, I shall have the honour to converse with you officially concerning that matter.

DE GALLO.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 5 [August 1, 1797].

The Directory has read with all the attention that it deserves the letter which you have written to it from Milan, dated the 5th Thermidor. It ordered me yesterday, the 13th, to make a general report to it upon the negotiations in Italy from the preliminaries of Leoben to the present moment: I shall present it to-morrow, the 15th. From this general view of things it will form its determination. It orders me also to request you for the present to continue these negotiations, whatever disgust they may cause you, without, however, neglecting any of the precautions which circumstances may require.

The prudence which you have hitherto shown in all your operations leads it to believe that you will be sensible of the necessity of these precautions and all the importance to be given to your preparations, that, if a rupture must take place, it may not be, in any case, the Directory, which is sincerely desirous of peace, that can be accused of it; and, on the other hand, that the Emperor may not be apprised of our intentions soon enough to be able to prevent their effects.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 5 [August 1, 1797].

Upon renewed applications addressed to the Directory, citizen-general, concerning the prisoners at Olmütz, the



Directory reminds you of the wish that it has expressed to you to see their captivity put an end to as soon as possible.

It doubts not that you sympathize in the interest which their unhappy situation excites.

The President of the Executive Directory, CARNOT.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 14 Thermidor, year 5 [August 1, 1797].

You will find herewith :

1. A note from M. de Meerveldt relative to the violation of letters of the Vienna mail to Venice by the municipality of the latter city ;

2. My answer to that note ;

3. My requisition to the French commandant at Mestre to furnish an escort to Venice for the Vienna mail for that city, which is to pass to-day through Udine ;

4. Lastly, my letter to General Baraguay d'Hilliers commanding the French troops at Venice.

I conceived, citizen-general, that I could not well refuse the demand of an escort for the mail from Vienna, in the first place, because that demand appeared to me extremely reasonable ; and in the second, because I thought that it might not be amiss to do something agreeable to the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor, when I was not compromising in any way the interests and the dignity of the French Republic ; and, if I have taken measures without previously consulting you, it is because M. de Meerveldt, fearing lest the same outrages as those which he complains of might be practised upon the Vienna mail, passing to-day through Udine on its way to Venice, the affair admitted of no delay.

H. CLARKE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 15 Thermidor, year 5 [August 2, 1797].

I have received the three letters which you have addressed to me from Milan, on the 8th, and that written to me from the same city on the 11th Thermidor. The multiplicity of business to which I have been obliged to attend has prevented me from answering them sooner.

A A 2

I have replied to the long note of Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries very nearly in the same words that you desired me to do ; that answer you will find herewith, No. 1.

I have likewise deviated very little from the outline which you had sketched, as you will see by the copy, No. 2, in answer to the five other notes of the 18th of July, signed by Messieurs de Gallo and de Meerveldt. You will perceive, however, that I have softened some of your expressions, and that I have inserted of my own motion the whole of the last paragraph but one, which has a conciliatory aim. I was determined to this, because, at the moment when I was about to present the note, there came a letter to me from M. de Gallo, an extract of which you will find under No. 3 : the intelligence conveyed in that letter has been verbally confirmed to me by the Count de Meerveldt.

I have added to the two preceding notes that of which you will find a copy under No. 4, and which relates to Ragusa.

M. de Mack having come to Goritz to make some inspections, M. the Count de Meerveldt set out yesterday evening for that town ; he will return to-day or to-morrow at latest. I saw that plenipotentiary before his departure ; he assured me that he had a letter from you delivered to him at the time of his first journey from Trieste to Milan, in which you intimate to the Austrians that they were at liberty to enter Istria and Dalmatia : he then expressed astonishment at the remonstrances contained in our notes relative to those two countries ; he told me that, if your letter were in the hands of M. Thugut, he would not fail to turn it into a weapon against us ; but that he (M. de Meerveldt) had no intention to send that letter to the minister, being desirous to avoid everything that could tend to aggravate animosities.

I informed you, citizen-general, that my secretary of legation, Perret, had set out in the evening of the 8th Thermidor for Vienna ; I have not yet heard from him : he was to go by way of La Ponteba and Tarvis. As you seem to wish more particularly for information respecting Clagenfurt and Gratz, I have determined to send citizen Romeuf also to Vienna ; I have given him a letter of recommendation to M. de Thugut, and answered the last from M. de Gallo, as you will see by the copy No. 5.

I have written in cipher to Perret all that you desired to me to intimate to him : I have told him to neglect nothing for thoroughly discussing all the objects of the negociation with which we are charged with M. the Baron de Thugut, that M. de Gallo may not return to Udine with imperfect powers and insufficient instructions.

It has not yet been possible for me to deliver to M. de Meerveldt the note relative to the sums due in virtue of the treaty of armistice by some princes and States of Germany. I keep your two couriers for the purpose of sending them to Munich and elsewhere ; I send you one of mine, whom I beg you to send back to me immediately.

If you have any particulars of the insurrection in Piedmont, you will oblige me by communicating them, as also what you may have learned concerning the conferences at Lille.

M. de Meerveldt, apprehensive lest Cisalpine troops may come to garrison Udine, declared to me verbally yesterday that, in this case, he could not remain there : I removed his fears, merely telling him that it was possible you might send some Cisalpine detachment to Palma-Nova for the works of the place.

I request you, citizen-general, to communicate to me the letters of the Directory since the 14th Thermidor.

From that date no extraordinary courier coming to Italy has brought me letters, either official or private, nor yet the newspapers that are usually sent to me. It would be very hard for me to remain thus constantly without communication with the government as well as with my friends and my wife.

H. CLARKE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 15 Thermidor, year 5 [August 2, 1797].

On turning over my correspondence, I perceive that I have omitted to send you copies of two notes, dated the 1st and the 7th instant, and transmitted by me to Messieurs the Austrian plenipotentiaries. What determined me to present the second note, the object of which we thought it right to defer when we were at Montebello, was the necessity of reminding the court of Vienna, as I have done, that, since

the signature of the preliminaries, it has not granted any of the requests which we have made to it by order of the Directory.

H. CLARKE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 15 Thermidor, year 5 [August 2, 1797].

You will find herewith,

1. Copy of a note transmitted to me, on the 28th of July, 1797, by M. the Count de Meerveldt: it relates to the provisions of the Austrians at Venice;
2. Copy of another note which I addressed to M. de Meerveldt in answer to the preceding;
3. Copy of a letter brought me by post from the minister for foreign affairs, dated 30th Messidor last: it relates to the subject of the two preceding notes.

M. the Count de Meerveldt insisted verbally so strongly on the restitution to the Emperor of the magazines at Venice—the flour in them is spoiled, by the by—that, notwithstanding the letter of citizen Charles Lacroix which I send you, I think it would be more politic to give up the provisions in question to the Austrians, in order to obtain something from them; I think too that it is useful to grant them something: we wish for peace, and, to attain it, we must indispensably employ means of conciliation, and banish that acrimony which has hitherto prevailed in the negotiations. It would, besides, be well to deprive the minister Thugut, who is strongly suspected not to be desirous of peace, of every pretext for calumniating our intentions to his master. The value of the stores so perseveringly claimed is very moderate, as I am informed by citizens Villemazy and Haller: so it will not cost us much to grant the repeated demand of M. de Meerveldt. If you are of this opinion, I beg you to give orders in consequence: we are the stronger, and methinks it is for us to be generous.

H. CLARKE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

. Paris, 16 Thermidor, year 5 [August 3, 1797].

The ambassador of his Catholic Majesty complains in the name of his court, citizen-general, of the ill treatment expe-

rienced by the Spanish Jesuits established at Bologna from the new government of that city, notwithstanding the orders issued by the French generals that due respect be shown to those religious.

I shall write to M. Del Campo, that I have communicated to you, citizen-general, the complaint addressed to me, persuaded that, for the satisfaction of his Catholic Majesty, you will immediately renew the orders which you have already given for securing the tranquillity of the persons in question.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 17 Thermidor, year 5 [August 4, 1797].

My secretary of legation, citizen Perret, arrived last night, after making a short stay at Vienna. M. de Gallo was to set out twenty-four hours after him; so that your presence becomes indispensable at Udine; and I think it essential, in order not to retard the negociation, that you should leave Milan as soon as you receive this letter.

In a despatch which M. de Gallo has sent me by citizen Perret, that plenipotentiary refers to the private letter which he wrote me on the 26th of July, intimating that his Majesty has removed all obstacles by his determination to treat for peace definitively and separately at Udine: he adds that his Majesty has granted, for this purpose, the necessary full powers.

Citizen Perret had a conversation of some hours with M. the Baron de Thugut, but, though all the points of the negociation with which we are charged were successively under discussion, the latter abstained from speaking out upon any of them, always referring to what the plenipotentiaries of his imperial Majesty would do or say.

Perret returned by way of Goritz.

It appears that M. Degelmann is to be associated with Messieurs de Meerveldt and Gallo, which cannot but be favourable.

H. CLARKE.

PS. When I was on the point of presenting the notes relative to Bavaria to M. the Count de Meerveldt, and I talked to him of the necessity for granting me passports for Munich and other places, that I might send off couriers to them, that plenipotentiary begged me above all things to await the arrival

of M. de Gallo. One of the difficulties which present themselves in this affair is that, the princes with whom we have treated having done so without the consent of the Germanic empire, these treaties have been considered by the Emperor as invalid, and cancelled in consequence.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 18 Thermidor, year 5 [August 5, 1797].

I purpose to write to you more at length to-day than I did by the last courier, and to enter into some detail upon the present state of the negociations in Italy, in reply to your despatch of the 10th instant.

The Directory sees with extreme pain the turn which they are taking, and the more so, as it can scarcely doubt that there exists a connection between the change which has suddenly taken place in the intentions of the Emperor and what is passing in the interior of the Republic; still it would not upon any account have the renewal of hostilities to proceed from it, or that the house of Austria or the enemies in the interior should be able, with any appearance of foundation, to throw upon it the blame of having desired the continuance of the war: it is solicitous that all faults should be on the Emperor's side—absolutely all—and when the measure shall be full, if war does break out, it will be but the more terrible. So far as that it is decidedly desirous of peace.

While the Directory wishes to put faith in the negociation as if it was already concluded, and to do the Emperor the honour of considering him as honourable and faithful to his word as he incessantly protests that he is, it desires that you would continue to act in your twofold capacity of negotiator and general; that is to say that, by all the means compatible with the honour of the Republic, you would bring the negociation to a happy issue, and at the same time make such preparations as not to be taken unawares, if, contrary to the wishes of the Directory, war must begin again.

While the communications are open and the two powers have facilities for explaining themselves, the interest of humanity requires that all means be employed to bring back men who have evidently been misled: the interest of the Republic requires it also.

Insist then, citizen-general, with the Austrian negociators

on the accomplishment of what seemed to be at first the intentions of the Emperor, and on what he sent you word soon after the signature of the preliminaries, that he was desirous to treat for a separate peace as soon as possible in Italy. The Directory is quite aware where the impediment lies; it appreciates the reasons of the Emperor for acting only according to what is written; but if it is true, on the one hand, that the Republic has promised by article 4 of the preliminaries to negotiate in a congress at Berne, it is equally true that, if that congress has not taken place, the fault rests solely with the Emperor, who has shown a strong desire to treat in Italy, and that the Directory has merely complied with that desire.

The literal fulfilment of this article, which Austria now claims, has not taken place, because she did not wish it, not because the Directory ever refused to comply with it. It is by this argument, which appears to me a very strong one, that you will perhaps gain the essential point, which is that the negotiation be prosecuted in Italy. The Emperor has repeatedly renounced the clause of that article 4, by demanding quite recently that the seat of the negotiation should be transferred to Udine: why did he not demand its removal to Berne? All this is peremptory; and if the Emperor does not choose to negotiate further either at Montebello or at Udine, he shows clearly that he does not want to negotiate at all; for it was himself who demanded to negotiate in Italy, and particularly at Udine.

As for the term of three months fixed for the conclusion of the negotiation, and the objection made to you that this term commences only from the opening of the congress at Berne, it is evident that it was the intention of the contracting parties that this term should really begin running from the negotiation of the preliminaries of Leoben; in the first place, because the other intention is not clearly expressed, which it ought to have been by a minister so experienced as M. de Thugut; and, in the second place, the Emperor plainly shows that he has taken that clause in the same sense as we, and that it is only for this reason, and because he fears that this term will expire, that he has twice earnestly desired to conclude speedily and in Italy. That objection, therefore, falls to the ground for these two reasons.

There is another, which subsequent circumstances have raised. The respective allies are to be called to the negoti-

ation, if they accede to the invitation which will be sent to them. Has the Emperor given them this invitation? Clearly not; since his allies came soon afterwards, desiring to treat with us for a separate peace, and continue to negotiate at Lille; the non-invitation of the Emperor authorizes ours: he was the first to violate that clause, and now it can no longer be executed in reality, since the negotiation with England is begun and cannot be broken off on our part without exposing us to the censure of Europe; for people would not fail to say, if we break off the negotiation of Lille, that we wish not for a negotiation at Berne, but for war.

You will make, general, what use you think proper of these arguments; the Directory leaves that to your discretion: you are on the spot, and can judge better of the state of things: it leaves you, therefore, at liberty to adopt these reasonings and to support them, or to reject them and advance others better adapted to circumstances.

The Directory is very glad that you have not sent your letter to the Emperor: it was apprehensive that it would have carried you too far, and that it was not conformable to the temporizing system which the Emperor seems to have adopted, and which circumstances prescribe to you on your part, in order that, in any case, the rupture may not be imputable to the Directory.

After you have adduced these reasons, or such as circumstances shall suggest to you, await the answer of the court of Vienna, and meanwhile prepare yourself alike to negotiate and not to be taken by surprise if the negotiations should be broken off.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Milan, 20 Thermidor, year 5 [August 7, 1797].

The moment, citizen-general, that I have tidings of the arrival of M. the Marquis de Gallo and M. de Degelmann, and that, having examined their powers, you assure me that they have the faculty necessary for negotiating, I will repair with all speed to Udine. I beg you to send me by the courier Perret's notes on the state of Vienna and the imperial army, of Gratz and Clagenfurt.

I expect every moment a courier from Paris.

BONAPARTE.



*To the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Milan, 22 Thermidor, year 5 [August 9, 1797].

I have the honour to transmit to you, citizen minister, a copy of a letter which I have just received from General Clarke at Udine. I shall set out for Udine the moment I learn the arrival of M. de Gallo with his full powers.

I have received the letter which you did me the honour to write me on the 14th of Thermidor. I am expecting every moment that you will let me know the course which the Directory will take, desiring peace speedily: I have no doubt that it will be necessary to take some steps to alarm the court of Vienna, otherwise they will continue to temporize, because they expect everything from their secret intrigues in the interior.

BONAPARTE.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 28 Thermidor, year 5 [August 15, 1797].

I received, the day before yesterday, a letter from M. de Gallo, in which he informs me that he was on the point of setting out for Udine when citizen Romeuf arrived.

The particular object of the journey of this citizen, and especially the tenour of the notes brought by the officer who accompanied him, seemed to require him [M. de Gallo] to stay a few days longer at Vienna: this circumstance, however, does not seem to have produced any other effect than the postponement of the opening of the negociations. M. de Meerveldt has communicated to me a passage of the letter which M. de Gallo wrote him by the same courier, and in which he fixed his departure at two or three days: the two letters are of the 6th August, and have been six days on the road. Yesterday evening, M. de Meerveldt received a second, of the 9th, according to which M. de Gallo was to set out on the 10th or the 12th at furthest; I hope, in consequence, that he will be here to-morrow evening. I shall take care to despatch a courier to you immediately after the communication of the powers with which he is furnished, and which he has already assured M. de Meerveldt that he will be satisfied with.

H. CLARKE.

PS. I was just going to send off this letter, when M. de

Meerveldt called upon me. He told me that he had intelligence of an order addressed by General Berthier, in the form of a circular, to all the generals commanding in the *terra firma*, and relating to the levy of Venetian battalions. This proceeding on your part appears to him a formal act of hostility, and he told me that he should not hesitate to depart immediately, if his conciliatory sentiments did not get the better of what is due to his character; but that he should send a courier to inform the Emperor of the fact. He seemed to me to have no doubt that this circumstance, which he regards as a violation of the preliminaries, will induce his imperial Majesty to recall him.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 1 Fructidor, year 5 [August 18, 1797].

I lose no time in acquainting you that M. de Gallo has at last arrived here at two o'clock this morning. M. de Degelmann is expected this evening, or to-morrow at latest; his delicate health, which does not permit him to travel at night, prevented his reaching this place as soon as M. de Gallo, though he left Vienna before him. M. de Gallo called upon me in the afternoon; he has confirmed to me what I have already told you several times, that his imperial Majesty has determined that his definitive and separate peace with the French Republic shall be negotiated and concluded at Udine. Desiring that you will convince yourself that the powers with which he is furnished are in regular and due form, I begged him to send me a copy of them which should be forwarded to you; he told me that he could not comply with this application, because, the powers being common to the three plenipotentiaries, he had no right to communicate them singly. I went to his house, in consequence, to examine them. I found them as extensive and as regular as they can be. They give to the three plenipotentiaries, and even to each of them, in case one or two should be absent, the faculty of negotiating and concluding alone and separately. I have reason to hope now, citizen-general, that you will no longer delay your journey to Udine, where you are expected with impatience.

H. CLARKE.

---

*To General Clarke.*

Milan, 4 Fructidor, year 5 [August 21, 1797].

I shall set out to-morrow, citizen-general, and proceed to the country near Godroïpo: if it is the intention of the plenipotentiaries to lodge in the country, I will direct General Victor to take the necessary pains to find suitable quarters in the environs. If they prefer staying at Udine, the conferences may then be held alternately at Udine and in the country.

Peace with Portugal is signed. I beg you to send the courier to me through Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, and Verona, that I may be informed if the third plenipotentiary is arrived; for, as I have a great deal to do in my divisions, I should not like to get there before M. Degelmann. It would be very disagreeable to me to stay five or six days in the country doing nothing.

BONAPARTE.

*To Generals Bonaparte and Clarke.*

Paris, 2 Fructidor, year 5 [August 19, 1797].

You must have seen, citizens-generals, the last overtures of M. de Thugut in his letter of the 31st of July, which I addressed to you some days since, and the intentions of the Directory in my answer. You have opportunity to judge of everything; nothing escapes your discernment that can be either means or obstacle, and you are furnished with ample powers, the confirmation of which the Directory renews; they will serve you to take advantage of the dispositions manifested by the Emperor: the Directory, on its part, must inform you of its intentions. It continues to desire peace, and this continued desire causes it to wish that, whatever be the issue of the negociation, the faults shall be on the Emperor's side.

In this view, it has determined to urge you to resume the negotiations on the general basis of the preliminaries of Leoben; but it desires that you would evade the stipulations which are evidently unfavourable to us; and as those preliminaries are already no longer followed, as you observe in the last note which you have transmitted to the minister plenipotentiary of the emperor, there is room to hope that it will not be impossible for you, according to the circum-

stances in which you may find yourselves, still to derive advantage from them.

To this end, I place before you the various objects which ought to occupy you in preference at the moment of concluding.

The principal of these objects is to exclude the Emperor from Italy, and to insist that he shall extend himself in Germany. You have no difficulty to conceive the interest we have in this ; we reduce his maritime power ; we bring him into contact with his old rival, the King of Prussia ; and we keep him aloof from the frontiers of the republic, our ally, which, destitute of military forces, and situated between the States of the grand-duke of Tuscany and those of the Emperor, would soon be influenced or subjugated by the house of Austria.

Among the arguments which you might employ, and which your shrewdness might suggest to you for inducing the Emperor to fall into our views, I will point out some which appear to me to be very forcible. The Emperor must find but little security in ranging under his dominion populations filled with the spirit of liberty, and neighbours of a democratic republic, to which some of them will already have belonged. It will be impossible for him to govern them on the footing of his other subjects ; he will be obliged to grant them privileges, and, even with these means, his rule would not promise to be tranquil. This acquisition, therefore, would be little better than none, as he appears already to perceive in the memorials transmitted to you by his order on the 18th of July : in the second place, the vicinity of his territories to those of the Italian republic, in the preservation of which France takes so strong an interest, must necessarily produce commotions and give rise to new wars between the two powers.

If, then, the Emperor is desirous to conclude a solid peace and shut the door to all motives for rupture, he ought not to insist on the possession of these provinces, and he must necessarily expect that, on the first war, these populations will shake off his yoke and incorporate themselves with the French and Italian republics. A possession so unquiet and so precarious would, therefore, in no case, be worth the indemnities which the Republic could offer him in Germany, in a country where the people are accustomed to his rule and love it, and where, far distant from the frontiers of

France and those of her close allies, he might hope, one may say, never to be attacked by her.

If the house of Austria thought these arguments conclusive, there would be three proposals to make.

The first, that it should renounce the whole *terra firma* of Venice, and be content with Venetian Dalmatia and Istria, of which it has already taken possession, and which it is not to be hoped that it will ever consent to evacuate. You could lay stress on the indulgence with which the Republic has permitted it to occupy thus early those provinces, which were not to devolve to it till the peace.

The archbishopric of Salzburg and the bishopric of Passau would be an ample compensation for the Venetian *terra firma*, properly so called. There might even be added the provostship of Berchtolsgraden, and the Upper Palatinate as far as the Nab, as well as the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, if it would consent to renounce all indemnity in Italy, and even Venetian Istria and Dalmatia.

It is in this system of secularizations, to which recourse must be had sooner or later, and to which Prussia, Hesse, Wurtemberg, and Baden have already assented, that the Emperor will find at once a more ample indemnity and a more convenient rounding to his hereditary States than in the Italian provinces, agitated by the principles of democracy, and which besides would be perpetual subjects of war for his house.

If, notwithstanding all these good reasons, this first proposal miscarries, you might make a second, by which the Emperor should renounce all that has been promised him on the left of the Adige. In this manner, Mantua, Brescia, and the Polesine of Rovigo should be united with the Italian republic, and the compensation in Germany limited to the bishopric of Passau alone, without the city.

A point of infinite importance to the Directory is that Mantua should not fall again into the hands of the Emperor, and on this head you will recollect, no doubt, the instructions transmitted to you by my predecessor on the 15th of Prairial last. It is there said that, if it were possible to procure Mantua, Brescia, as far as the Adige, for the Italian republic, the Directory would consent that Venice should belong to the Emperor, but it would require that the little town of Chioggia, situated in the lagoons at the mouth of the Adige, should be reserved by that republic, in order.

to secure to it an outlet for the exportation of its commodities. In this case, the Directory would care but little about the formal cession of Venice, especially as that city is so much in the Emperor's power that it would be impossible that he should not gain possession of it shortly, and that he could always starve it whenever he pleased.

But none of these three plans is more advantageous to us than the first. It is therefore to obtain the adoption of this that we ought to make the greatest efforts, by insisting upon the motives alleged above, which ought to determine the Emperor to extend himself in preference in Germany.

In the case of these three alternatives, and especially in that of the last two, the Italian republic would need to be strongly organized, especially in a military point of view: it is requisite that the treaty should ensure to it not only independence but also consistence.

It will have for neighbours the Emperor, the King of Sardinia, and the Grand-duke of Tuscany. This critical situation necessitates a strong military force in regard both to troops and fortresses. As for the first, they are of little account, even including the Polish legions: you make them amount to no more than six or eight thousand men in one of your despatches. The only method of remedying this inconvenience is to teach war to people who are reputed to be warlike, and to keep French troops among them, in imitation of what was done by the committee of public welfare in Holland. The number of troops left in the Italian republic ought therefore to be as large as possible.

In regard to fortresses, that republic is almost wholly destitute, while the Emperor has, in virtue of the preliminaries, Palma-Nova, Peschiera, Mantua, Porto Legnago, and the castles of Verona, Osopo, and Brescia. This danger is such, that it becomes indispensable to devise means for not restoring to the Emperor all these fortresses, and to obtain the acceptance of one of the three proposals specified above.

Meanwhile, the evacuation of these fortresses, as also of the whole left bank of the Oglio and the Po, which is promised to the Emperor, ought to be delayed as much as possible; it is said in the instructions of the 17th Floreal that this evacuation shall be subordinate to that which the Emperor will make of the territory as far as the Lech and the

Rednitz, and of the fortresses of Manheim, Mentz, and Ehrenbreitstein.

The Directory confirms this capital condition, and desires moreover that the troops of the Republic may not evacuate Italy till after the continental peace: of course, agreeably to that determination, you will demand as long a time as possible for this evacuation.

If, as it is to be wished, Venice should not serve for an article of exchange against Mantua, as it is said in the instructions of the 15th Prairial, and we should obtain the right of the Adige or the whole *terra firma*, for indemnities in Germany, that city may subsist separately under the form of a democratic republic, retaining the *terra firma* and its islands, or be united to the Cisalpine republic: the latter course appears the most advantageous. If Venice remains independent, the old oligarchs, who are no friends to France or to the principles of liberty, and who will always retain some influence, will do all they can to subject it to the Emperor; whereas they will be efficaciously curbed and watched if they belong to a central government seated at Milan or elsewhere, and having no other motives than hatred or fear against the Emperor. The Italian republic, gaining, moreover, by this union a considerable extent of coast upon the Adriatic, will be enabled to concur with us in balancing the commercial influence which the Emperor would acquire in the Mediterranean and the Archipelago. In this case, and especially if the Emperor should have Dalmatia and Istria, the islands in the Gulf of Venice, those of Greece belonging to her, and the Venetian towns in Albania, would fall to the Cisalpine republic, or be ceded to France. At any rate, Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, and Cerigo, must be retained by the French Republic.

It is likewise of importance to prevent the Emperor from keeping Ragusa, of which he has taken possession without any sort of right. To this end, an article of the definitive treaty must ensure the independence of that little republic, and the Emperor must give it up immediately.

Having gone through the articles relative to Italy, I proceed to those which concern Germany.

The Emperor treats with the Republic as King of Hungary and Bohemia, and in his quality of Emperor of Germany: in the first of these relations he must cede all that belongs to him on the left bank of the Rhine. This session

includes the county of Falkenstein, the Frickthal, and the territories and rights which the house of Austria possesses on the left of the Rhine above Basle. The Directory refers, on this head, to the various instructions given to General Clarke, particularly those of the 3rd and 30th Floreal, by which it demands, moreover, the islands of the Rhine dependent on the Brisgau and Old Breisach.

As head of the Germanic empire, the Emperor must first consent that all territory ceded or to be ceded to the French Republic on the left bank of the Rhine, be for ever withdrawn from the supremacy of the empire. It is absurd, upon pretext of maintaining the integrity of the empire, to attack the rights of the Republic to Liege, Stavelot, and Malmedy : as if that integrity were not a chimera, after the shocks that it has sustained from all the treaties already concluded with the German princes, and from the acknowledgment which the Emperor himself has solemnly made of the boundaries of the Republic.

You will be aware, then, that this point must be strongly insisted upon, and no tergiversation or reserve permitted. The Emperor must likewise renounce all rights of paramountship, claimed and frequently exercised by the Emperor and empire over different States of Italy, and consent that the so-called imperial fiefs in the territory of Genoa be delivered up to that republic and placed at its disposal.

The Directory is not acquainted with the amount of the mortgages upon the Netherlands. You must use all the means in your power to ascertain this, and reject, if the contrary is not solemnly agreed upon, all those contracted during the war.

The indemnities to the Stadtholder and Duke of Modena still remain to be fixed : both must be found on the left bank of the Rhine and at the expense of the Ecclesiastical possessions. That is the principle upon which you must labour to gain the consent of the Emperor.

The Duke of Modena can have no further claim to the Romagna, which was at first assigned to him, since it is at present united to the Italian republic. As it is almost settled that the Emperor shall cede the Brisgau to him, this point does not appear likely to be contested.

As for the Stadtholder, you are informed by a letter from my predecessor, of the 15th Prairial last, that the Directory



would see with pleasure the King of England expelled from Germany, and Hanover would serve for an indemnity to that prince: but not only would that measure meet with great difficulties on the part of the Emperor, but it would have the inconvenience of placing the Stadtholder too near to the Batavian republic.

It were much to be wished that the Emperor would consent to transfer the Austrian Brisgau to the Stadtholder. The most efficacious expedient for making this scheme palatable to him would be to secularize, in favour of the Duke of Modena, some ecclesiastical principality; with reversion to the Archduke Ferdinand, the Emperor's uncle. This principality might be found in Suabia. The Emperor ought to be better pleased to establish his house in Germany than in Italy; he cannot but be aware that this establishment will be more solid; that, if he consents with a good grace to the cession of the Brisgau, the indemnity of the Duke of Modena might be the more considerable on that account.

For the rest, the Directory desires that, in what I am here writing, you would see only various combinations more or less favourable to the Republic, in which you will seek suggestions and not orders: it has entire confidence in you, and relies upon your wisdom as upon your glory. Your energetic answer of the 10th Thermidor to the five notes of the Emperor's ministers would alone prove to him, if proof were needed, how well founded that confidence is.

It consents, therefore, that you negotiate on the basis of the preliminaries of Leoben, but with precaution, and only in as far as, upon due consideration of each point, it shall be proved to you that it is not possible to obtain greater advantage.

In case there should be granted to the Emperor all that the preliminaries give him in Italy, you will assuredly be aware of the expediency of not giving him any indemnity in Germany, and of making him renounce any claims that he may have upon Bavaria and upon some of the new secularizations.

Lastly, the Directory recommends to you to keep incessantly in view the necessity for strengthening the Italian republic; the advantage of thrusting back the Emperor as far as possible into Germany; of securing his influence for the negotiation with the empire; of not leaving Mantua at his disposal; and of discarding, in the circumstances, all idea of

B B 2

a congress. The motives for such recommendations must be strongly felt by you ; but, once more, they are suggestions, nothing else.

As Venetian Istria and Dalmatia must, according to all appearance, be left to the Emperor, and lead to new commercial relations, you will stipulate in an article that a treaty of commerce shall be made, by which France shall enjoy the advantages of the most favoured nations. The details shall be sent at the same time with this treaty.

You will demand with energy, and manage to obtain, the release of all persons confined for political opinions, and victims of their love for the French and for liberty.

Lastly, you will demand, as reparation and indemnification, for citizens Maret and Semonville, ambassadors of the French Republic, carried off by armed force from a neutral territory in 1793, by order of the Archduke Ferdinand, plundered, bound, dragged across Germany from dungeon to dungeon, and, by the most revolting violation of the right of nations, confined in prison for thirty months, themselves and their suite, the sum of 354,440 francs, at which not the reparations but the indemnifications alone which they had right to claim were fixed by order of the Directory of the 23rd Floreal, year 4: moreover, for the citoyenne Mongerout, widow of citizen Mongerout, formerly *maréchal-de-camp*, who, being sent on an extraordinary mission to Naples, was seized by order of the same archduke and perished in the dungeons of Mantua, after having been unworthily plundered, the sum of 50,000 francs ; and lastly, for the family of Lamarre, secretary of legation at Constantinople, and of Taistre, engineer, interpreter attached to the embassy in that capital, both of whom were apprehended by the same authority and died in prison, such an indemnification as you may fix.

This letter annuls in no respect the preceding instructions, unless on points where it is directly contrary to them. For the rest, it does not clog any of your combinations, but leaves you at perfect liberty to act according to your prudence.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 2 Fructidor, year 5 [August 19, 1797].

The day before yesterday, the 30th Thermidor, I received, citizen-general, with the letter which you addressed to me,

your answer to the five notes of the Emperor's ministers. I found it, like every thing that comes from you, energetic, noble, precise, and luminous. Thus it is that it befits Bonaparte to speak; thus it is that you command respect for the Republic even by your writings. I communicated it immediately to the Directory, upon which it made the same impression, as it desires me to inform you.

I have no doubt that the more conciliatory dispositions, manifested by the Baron de Thugut in the letter which I have already sent you, are, in a great measure, the result of your answer. Your firmness has no doubt daunted his pretensions. For the rest, you well know how to appreciate his new language.

I address to-day to you and General Clarke a letter, the contents of which the Directory begs you to bear in mind during the negociation.

I repeat to you, they are but views, of which you will make the best use you can, and not shackles.

In short, the Directory leaves you a clear field for the peace: it is longed for by all the French, and, made by you, it will excite their enthusiasm.

I cannot tell you, citizen-general, to what a degree my love for the public welfare blends with my confidence in your abilities, my respect for your glory, and my attachment for your person.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 6 Fructidor. year 5 [August 23, 1797].

It would be extremely possible that the Emperor, while taking a tender interest in the integrity of the empire, and refusing any indemnification which could be prejudicial to that integrity, might, notwithstanding all his fair protestations, remain master of Bavaria after the signature of the peace. As it is highly important that he should not seek his indemnification without us, and he cannot dispense with that which we are willing to offer him in Germany, it is requisite that it should be put out of his power to retain by force any countries whatever of the empire at the conclusion of the war. To this end, I propose to you, as an essential article to be inserted in the definitive treaty, that, immue-

diately after the signature, and within a given time, the Emperor shall evacuate the towns and fortresses belonging to electors, or to princes or states of the empire, such namely as Ingolstadt, Ulm, Manheim, Mentz, Ehrenbreitstein, or any other places which he may have occupied.

You will easily conceive, general, of what importance it is that this evacuation should be consummated at the moment when the peace of the empire will be entered upon. The Emperor, if he were master of the fortresses, would also be master of the peace that Europe will make, and would dictate the conditions to us.

It is absolutely necessary, therefore, to get this article inserted, as well to quiet the princes of the Germanic body, as to ensure to ourselves the advantage in the negotiations for peace with the empire, and lastly not to place the Emperor in a situation to disdain the indemnities that we have to offer him. When he finds himself bound by such an article, he will be more at our mercy, and treat with a better grace and with more sincerity.

The Directory entirely approves of the occupation of Zante, Corfu, and Cephalonia. You will see, by one of my preceding despatches, that on this point the Directory and yourself perfectly agree, and that it had likewise thought that it might be well to occupy Cerigo.

For the rest, nothing is more important for us than to place ourselves on a good footing in Albania, Greece, Macedonia, and other provinces of the Turkish empire in Europe, and even in all those bordering on the Mediterranean, particularly Egypt, which may some day be of great utility to us. The Directory, in approving the intercourse which you have established with the Pacha Ibrahim and the Albanian nation, begs that you would make the French people known to the rest of the Turkish provinces, in a manner which may turn, sooner or later, to their advantage and ours, and to the disadvantage of our common enemies.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Udine, 7 Fructidor, year 5 [August 24, 1797].

Citizen Louis Bonaparte, your aide-de-camp, arrived this morning: I learned with real satisfaction your departure

from Milan. Immediately after the receipt of your despatch, I called upon the Marquis de Gallo, to acquaint him with your intention of fixing yourself at Passeriano, to inquire if it would be convenient for the Austrian plenipotentiaries to take up their quarters in the country, and to propose to them, in the contrary case, to hold the conferences by turns there and at Udine. M. de Gallo brought me this evening the answer of his colleagues and his own. They prefer staying at Udine, where they have been fixed for some time, and in a manner which seems to suit them. They think that, the conferences having been transferred thither by an act which has been approved by the court of Vienna, they have no right to change the place of them without a particular authorization. They appear even to imagine that this step would hurt the dignity of their government.

You have directed General Victor to inquire whether I intend to reside at Passeriano during the negotiations; I have replied in the affirmative. I am of opinion, in fact, that our separation could but occasion fresh delays in so important a business for the French Republic as peace with the Emperor; and I think it useful to take all opportunities of being near you. I should certainly have preferred that you should have fixed your abode at Udine for the first moments, at least: I am certain that this determination would have been very gratifying to the Austrian plenipotentiaries and produced a very good effect.

In case you persist in the resolution to live at Passeriano, I beg you to let me know it the moment you arrive, that I may come to you there.

H. CLARKE.

---

*First Meeting of the Congress for Peace, 15th Fructidor, year 5 (August 31, 1797).*

Their Excellencies the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, M. the Marquis de Gallo, M. the Major-general Count de Meerveldt, and M. the Baron de Degelmann, and the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic, General Bonaparte and General of division Clarke, having met at Udine, their respective full powers were verified, found regular, and collated copies were signed and exchanged on either side.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*Second Meeting of the 16th Fructidor, year 5 (September 1, 1797).*

On the opening of the conference, the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King declared—

That, in the hope that negociations in Italy would lead much more speedily to the removal of all difficulties, his Majesty had been pleased to furnish his plenipotentiaries with the powers presented and exchanged yesterday, for treating, concluding, and signing, if there should be occasion, at Udine, his definitive peace with the French Republic; but in case the present negociations should unfortunately not answer the desired end, his Majesty reserved to himself, in the most express manner, the assembling of the respective plenipotentiaries at Berne, specified in Article 4 of the preliminaries.

In reply, the French plenipotentiaries declared—

They could not admit the reserve which Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King had just presented, as well because it was contrary to the instructions transmitted to them by the Executive Directory of the French Republic as because it appeared to them contrary to the full powers granted by the court of Vienna.

In fact, it is expressed in these full powers that his Majesty the Emperor and King sends to Udine, in consequence of the preliminaries of Leoben, plenipotentiaries to conclude his definitive peace with the French Republic; and in article 4 of the preliminaries it is said that the respective plenipotentiaries are to meet at Berne: thus then the congress of Udine is in reality no other than the congress of Berne. The French plenipotentiaries declare to Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King that the instructions which they have received from their government authorize them to reject formally any clause tending to give to the negociations at Udine a different character from that which is given them by the text of the full powers of the court of Vienna.

Their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King and the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic, after having amply discussed the above subjects and sought in vain to come to an agreement, considering that the declarations made on both sides are not inherent in the tenour of their respective full

powers, and seeing the importance of not breaking off negotiations in which the two powers are alike interested, agree to continue them in conformity with the faculty which is given to them by the text of their full powers.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*Third Meeting of the 17th Fructidor, year 5 (September 3, 1797).*

At the opening of the conference, Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King demanded of the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic the suspension and suppression of the changes made in the former order of things in that part of the Venetian *terra firma* which is to belong to his Majesty the Emperor and King, according to the text of the preliminaries.

The French plenipotentiaries replied that they would consider of that demand.

The same plenipotentiaries then spoke in the following manner :

The French Republic has sacrificed all the advantages which it might have derived from its position at the time of the preliminaries of Leoben to the consideration of seeing the separate peace with his Majesty the Emperor and King fully enable it to turn its forces against its other enemies, in order to accelerate in like manner the moment of a speedy and separate peace with them.

As, by the interpretation which the court of Vienna has given to several articles of the preliminaries, nearly five months have elapsed without a definitive peace being concluded, the Republic is deprived of the only advantages offered to it by the preliminaries.

In consequence, the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic have the honour to declare to their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King that if, on the 10th Vendemiaire, year 6 (October 1, 1797), a definitive peace is not concluded between his imperial and royal Majesty and the French Republic, the French plenipotentiaries are no longer authorized to negotiate on the basis of the preliminaries, but only on the basis of the respective position of the two powers.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and

King replied that his Majesty did not pretend to judge of the motives which had inclined France to reconciliation with Austria ; that he, for his part, was induced to it solely by the consideration of the welfare of his people ;

That the court of Vienna, so far from delaying the conclusion of the definitive peace, had never ceased urging the execution of the preliminaries, laying particular stress on article 4 of the preliminaries, which prescribes the holding of the congress of Berne, as the natural means of arriving at it ;

That his Majesty the Emperor and King has always understood the clause of article 4 of the preliminaries, which fixes the space of three months for the term in which the negotiations must be finished, as dating from the opening of the congress.

In consequence of these observations, the plenipotentiaries of his imperial Majesty find themselves obliged to protest formally against the term of the 1st of October next, to which the citizens plenipotentiaries of the French Republic pretend to restrict the validity of the preliminaries, as the basis of the negociation for peace.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*Fourth Meeting of the 18th Fructidor, year 5 (September 4, 1797).*

At the opening of the conference, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the respective plenipotentiaries declared that the preliminaries concluded at Leoben on the 18th of April last, duly ratified on both sides, should serve as the basis for the definitive peace to be concluded between the two powers.

In consequence of this determination, they proceeded to the reading of the preliminaries.

The first three articles were adopted without alteration.

As the nature of the contents of article 4 rendered it unfit to be inserted in the definitive treaty, they passed on to article 5.

On this reading of the fifth article, the French plenipotentiaries inquired of their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor when and where was to be held the congress formed of the respective plenipotentiaries for the peace of the Empire, and they expressed a wish that the congress should take place at Rastadt agree-



ably to what was fixed in the convention of Montebello, dated the 5th Prairial, year 5 (the 24th of May last), and that it should assemble there immediately after the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace between his Majesty the Emperor and King and the French Republic.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King replied that, as they were at Udine to treat of peace with France for his Majesty the Emperor, solely in his quality of King of Hungary and Bohemia, from which the peace of that power with the Empire is distinct, they had no positive knowledge of the time or place where the conferences for the pacification of the Empire are to be held.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

*Extract from the Register of the Ordinances of the Executive Directory, 18 Fructidor, year 5.*

The Executive Directory, having heard the report of the minister for foreign affairs, decrees as follows:—

Citizen Bonaparte, general-in-chief of the army of Italy, is authorized to negotiate, conclude, and sign, with the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, a definitive treaty of peace between the French Republic and his said Majesty. The Directory gives him, to this effect, the necessary full powers. He will conform to the instructions that have been given him, and will report on the progress and issue of the negotiations.

This decree shall not be printed for the present.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

*Fifth Session of the 20th Fructidor, year 5 (September 6, 1797).*

The conference was opened at two o'clock in the afternoon; article 6 of the patent preliminaries was read, and the French plenipotentiaries then demanded that article 6 should be developed in the definitive treaty, either by a general form or a nominative explanation, so as to comprehend the communes and countries undermentioned united to the French Republic by its laws, namely—

[Here follows a long enumeration of districts, towns, and villages, situated on the left bank of the Rhine, compre-

hending the Austrian Netherlands and former possessions of several German princes.]

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King replied :

The acknowledgment of the limits decreed by the laws of the French Republic mentioned in article 6 of the preliminaries could not and can not refer to anything further than the Netherlands ceded by his Majesty to France. In the first place, the Emperor can and could dispose of his own property only, having no right to decide respecting other parts of the Germanic territory, which it belongs to the Empire alone to dispose of by a general deliberation, over which his Majesty in his quality of King of Hungary and Bohemia has no other influence than that of his vote as a co-estate.

Besides, the manner in which article 6 is worded clearly proves that what is there said concerning the acknowledgment of the French limits refers to the Belgian provinces alone ; for, if the intention had been to exact or to grant a general acknowledgment, which consequently must have extended even to the French limits bordering on Spain, on Savoy, on the county of Nice, &c., an express article would undoubtedly have been drawn up ; and it is not to be presumed that, if any French limits whatever in the different parts of Europe had been meant, the two contracting parties would have had the design to introduce the stipulation of such a general recognition into the midst of an article in which all that precedes and follows clearly has reference to the Netherlands alone.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*Seventh Meeting of the 23rd Fructidor, year 5  
(September 9, 1797).*

The conference was opened at three o'clock in the afternoon. The plenipotentiaries proceeded to the reading of the secret preliminary articles.

On article 1, the French plenipotentiaries observed—

That in all the articles relating to cessions of countries, the boundaries ought to be specified in the definitive articles of peace in great detail and in a precise manner.

For example, in the definitive treaty, in speaking of article 1 of the secret preliminaries, by which his Majesty the

Emperor is to take possession of Istria and Dalmatia, care must be taken to specify that the islands of the Adriatic are not included, though the Emperor has taken possession of them.

The Bocca di Cattaro belonging to the province of Albania, the French plenipotentiaries refuse to believe that his Majesty the Emperor has ordered possession to be taken of it, as it has been publicly reported.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King replied that, the notorious dependencies of a country being always sub-understood when the country itself is disposed of, they consider the islands and appurtenances of Istria and Dalmatia as comprised in the stipulation contained in the preliminaries relative to those two provinces of which they have ever formed a part.

Respecting article 4, the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty said—

That, from the time at which the preliminaries were signed, that article could only have reference to the republic of Venice as it was on the 18th of April, 1797, (29 Germinal, year 5) the date of the preliminaries of Leoben: the plenipotentiaries have to claim the strict execution of what has been stipulated relative to the three legations, and consequently the re-establishment of the former government, or at least the institution of such a government that Venice, according to the clear and unequivocal meaning of the preliminaries, may possess the three legations in the same manner as the old republic possessed its provinces of the terra firma in time past;

That the re-establishment of the former government of Venice, or the determination of a new system for the republic, cannot take place without the concurrence and intervention of his Majesty, who, from the geographical situation of his dominions, is too much interested in it that the safety and tranquillity of his own provinces be not endangered by the system of government introduced at Venice: that, for the rest, it would not be difficult to concert more particularly between commissioners of the two powers the principal forms of the new system, assimilating them as much as possible to those of the late government, though it is not absolutely necessary to re-establish the Stateinquisitors, or some other old institutions, the abuse of which may have specially excited the complaints of the public.

The French plenipotentiaries replied that they could not deviate in any manner from the text of the preliminaries, in which there is no mention of any form of government to be given to Venice; that still less could they do so, as its new government was legitimate, since it had been formed in consequence of the will of the people; that it was legitimate, since the great council, in abdicating, had transferred to it all the rights which it could itself possess. They added that it is contrary to the principles which the French Republic professes to contribute in any way to cramp the action of the will of a people that has been independent for several centuries, during which it has frequently changed, without those changes having ever affected their independence.

In execution of article 5, the French plenipotentiaries propose that in the next meeting the respective plenipotentiaries direct their attention to the arrangements proper to be made with the republic of Venice.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King replied that they referred to what they had already said touching the epoch of the 18th of April, 1797, (29 Germinal, year 5) which ought, according to them, to fix the idea of the republic of Venice in the political relation to which this article can alone have reference; they observe that they are not authorized to acknowledge the forms according to which Venice is at present governed.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*To the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Passeriano, 27 Fructidor, year 5 [September 13, 1797].

M. de Gallo called upon me yesterday: he told me that M. the General Meerveldt set out that morning for Vienna, to decide that court to give us forthwith a categorical answer, and to upset Thugut, or force him, in spite of his teeth, to make peace, and that he had written to this effect to the Empress, and devised their little court intrigue.

We agreed that if the Emperor, in execution of article 4 of the preliminaries, recognized our constitutional limits, which are very nearly those of the Rhine, if he would sincerely exert all his efforts to put us in possession of Mayence, we, in our turn, would put him in possession of Venice and the bank of the Adige; but that he should not have possession of Palma-Nova, Osopo, &c., till we should be on the

ramparts of Mayence. For the ten or twelve days that we shall have to wait for the answer from Vienna, the negotiations will be nearly at a stand.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 30 Fructidor, year 5 [September 16, 1797].

The Cisalpine directory has already claimed your interference for obtaining the repayment of moneys owing by the house of Austria to *ci-devant* Lombardy.

It appears that these debts amount to some hundred millions: such is the expression of citizen Visconti. You are aware how important the acknowledgment of so considerable a debt must be to the new republic.

The Executive Directory would be gratified if it were possible to bring forward in the negotiations the claims of the Cisalpine republic, and to support them efficaciously.

I request you, citizen-general, to act in this matter as you shall think proper.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

---

*To General Bonaparte.*

Paris, 30 Fructidor, year 5 [September 16, 1797].

I have received your despatches of the 17th and 20th Fructidor, and am charged to reply to them as follows:—

On the Rhine, anything you wish can be done; but the sending of troops to Italy cannot take place at the time you desire. All that the Directory can do on that head is to send you two or three thousand *horse* soldiers, drawn from the dépôts of the armies of Sambre and Meuse, and Rhine and Moselle, if you have wherewithal to mount and equip them in Italy; and then, you must be aware, they will be very long before they arrive.

Neither must you reckon upon the 10,000 Piedmontese for whom you apply. The Directory does not find itself in a situation to ratify the treaty with the King of Sardinia.

It is the Cisalpine republic that must supply you with the reinforcement that you want. It is thence that you must draw it. Endeavour to obtain the 4000 Genoese you speak of, and even apply for a greater number if you see any likelihood of obtaining them. In short, if quiet is main-

tained in the South, you will soon be enabled to recall the column which you had orders to send thither. The unanimity of the nation on the events of the 18th Fructidor induces a belief that the Directory can do without it.

I see, by your despatch of the 20th, that the Austrian plenipotentiaries have made you very strange propositions. They demand the Romagna, the Ferrarese, Mantua, Peschiera, Venice, and the whole Venetian State. Tell them, in answer to these extraordinary communications, and signify to them, as the ultimatum of the Directory, that, in Italy, the Emperor shall keep Trieste, and gain Istria and Dalmatia; that he shall renounce Mantua, Venice, the Venetian *terra firma*, and Friule, and that he shall evacuate Ragusa.

The French Republic intends to keep nothing on the continent of Italy.

As for the islands, the arrangements which will be made on that point with the Cisalpine republic do not concern the Emperor.

The Emperor may indemnify himself by the archbishopric of Salzburg and the bishopric of Passau. He will seek in Germany the indemnity for the Duke of Modena and the Prince of Orange. France will consent to these arrangements. She is resolved to maintain the boundary of the Rhine. The Emperor will issue on this head, both as emperor and as prince of the empire, a declaration expressive of his consent, and leaving no room for equivocation. He will evacuate Ingolstadt, Manheim, Mentz, Ehrenbreitstein, Ulm, and Königstein.

Such, citizen-general, would be the ultimatum of the Directory, if you are able to support these propositions; if not, you will specify to the government what you can obtain by negotiation. You will have *carte blanche*. But I cannot tell you how earnestly the Directory desires, and how much it is to the interest of the Republic that you should get the above articles adopted. The Emperor ought to be kept entirely out of Italy: his indemnities must consist of secularized ecclesiastical territories in Germany, and we ought to take all precautions that he may not obstruct us in regard to peace with the empire. It is to this point that the proposed arrangements tend. If the Emperor refuses this reasonable arrangement, if you find yourself strong enough, and feel assured that the negotiation cannot be brought to a

successful issue, then you will pursue the plan for expelling the house of Austria from Italy. The Directory is now in a situation to propose a peace, based not on hastily concluded preliminaries, but on the natural conformities and permanent boundaries of the two powers.

The Republic is strengthened in the interior; and the government, in quelling the faction that favoured Austria, finds itself master of the resources necessary for giving to the nation a stable and glorious peace, such a peace, in short, as the sound and enlightened portion of the French people expects. It is equally prosperous abroad: I am directed to inform you that it is negotiating a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with Prussia; that this negotiation is prosecuted warmly, and that the result which we expect from it is likely to be of such a nature as to alarm the Austrian power. It has, moreover, opened a negotiation with Russia for a treaty of peace, which may possibly be brought to a speedy issue. Thus the Emperor is on the point of having an ally the fewer and an enemy the more.

For the rest, these conditions are not such as the Emperor has any right to complain of. He loses Belgium and Lombardy, which have been conquered from him; and he obtains Istria and Dalmatia, over which he has not even the rights of war. Are Ostend and Nieuport to be compared with port Rose, port Quieto, or the harbour of Pola? Was not the whole navy of Venice supplied with timber by Istria? Are not the Dalmatians the best sailors in the world? And does not history attest that the empire of the Adriatic has ever belonged to the power which possessed Istria and Dalmatia?

I have told you already, citizen-general, that our arrangements with the Cisalpine republic have nothing to do with peace with the Emperor; that the latter ought not to interfere in them in any way, nor even to be informed of them. When the time comes for treating with that republic, you must take for your model our treaty with the Batavian republic, for what concerns the troops to be kept there.

The Directory will send you particular and detailed instructions for establishing our relations with the Cisalpine republic: and it is then that you will stipulate for the cession to the French Republic of the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Cerigo, and Tine, and then you will think, perhaps, that it will be important to secure the towns of

Butrinto, Preveza, Larta, and Vonitza. Will not that be curbing the ambition of Austria, and securing Greece from being invaded by the court of Vienna?

You will very soon receive a letter from me by an express who is known to you.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

*To the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Passeriano, 3rd complementary day, year 5  
[September 19, 1797].

The plenipotentiaries of the Emperor have received a courier from Vienna: they called upon us, and wished to insert in the protocol some observations on the congress which is to held at Rastadt for the peace with the empire; they desired that this congress might be held immediately, and that the negociations there might go on simultaneously with those at Udine. The bad faith of Thugut is equal to the stupidity of his negociators.

I represented to them that this was bringing forward again the congress of Berne by a new name; I showed them the answer which we should make to their note, and concluded with telling them that the Executive Directory was indignant at the ridiculous underhand dealings of the cabinet of Vienna; that they ought to recollect that this peace had been granted by the conqueror to the conquered; and, if they had found at Leoben a refuge in our moderation, it was high time for them to remember the humble and suppliant posture which they then assumed; that, by dwelling upon matters of form, and things in themselves foreign to the great result of the negociation, they would oblige me to say that Fortune had declared that henceforward not only was the tone of superiority ridiculous, but even the tone of equality unsuitable; that, if they had been unwilling to acknowledge the French Republic at Leoben, they had been obliged to acknowledge the Italian republic. "Take care," said I, "that Europe does not see the republic of Vienna." All this induced them to forego their declaration for the congress of Rastadt. You readily perceive what a clumsy snare Thugut expected to lead us into, in wishing to urge us to a congress, while our arrangements are not finished with the Emperor, and thereby to place us in a delicate posi-



tion with several German princes with whom we have signed treaties.

We have declared to them that, if the Emperor convokes the congress of the Empire before we have come to a settlement, he would oblige us to declare, by a counter-note to several princes, that it was without our consent, and then his imperial Majesty would find that he had made a blunder.

BONAPARTE.

---

*To the Executive Directory.*

Passeriano, 5th complementary day, year 5  
[September 21, 1797].

The powers which I have for the peace of Europe are collective with General Clarke: to be regular, you ought to send me fresh ones.

If I accepted at the time the union of several functions in my person, it was because I wished to respond to your confidence, and I thought that the circumstances of the country made it my duty.

Now I think that you ought to separate them. I request—

1. That you appoint plenipotentiaries for the congress at Udine, not including myself.

2. That you appoint a commission of three members, selected from among the best writers on the common law, for organizing the Italian republic. The constitution which we have given it is not adapted to it; it requires great alterations, which the religion, the manners of the people, and their local situation, recommend.

3. I will devote my attention more exclusively to my army: it needs all my care.

Consider this letter, I request you, citizens directors, as a fresh proof of the ardent desire I have for the national glory.

BONAPARTE.

---

*Note of the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.*

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King have the honour to observe to citizen Bonaparte, general-in-chief and plenipotentiary of the French Republic,

C C 2

that, his Majesty being incompetent to enter into discussion on the particular arrangements made between different States of the Empire and the commanders of the army of the Republic, or other French authorities, he cannot take cognizance of claims which his Serene Bavaro-Palatine electoral Highness may have contracted in this way, which, besides, have no connection with the object of the general armistice of the Empire stipulated by article 5 of the preliminaries of peace.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King have the honour to assure the citizen plenipotentiary of the French Republic of their high consideration.

[The signatures follow.]

---

*To the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.*

The undersigned plenipotentiary of the French Republic has the honour to acquaint their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, with the pain that he has felt on learning that the troops of his Majesty the Emperor have just taken possession of the province of Albania, commonly called Bocca di Cattaro.

By article 1 of the secret preliminaries, his Majesty the Emperor was to enter, at the definitive peace, into possession of Venetian Dalmatia and Istria. When the troops of his Majesty occupied these provinces, that was a violation of the forms but not of the substance of the preliminaries.

But the occupation of Venetian Albania, called Bocca di Cattaro, by the troops of his Majesty the Emperor is a real violation, and contrary to the letter as well as to the nature of the preliminaries. The undersigned French plenipotentiary cannot therefore but consider the occupation by them of the Bocca di Cattaro as an act of hostility.

The knowledge which he has of the intentions that animate their Excellencies Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King forbids him to doubt that they will take expeditious measures, to the effect that orders may be given to the troops of his Majesty the Emperor to evacuate the Bocca di Cattaro, the occupation of which by them is contrary to good faith and to treaties. The French plenipotentiary assures their Excellencies Messieurs the ple-

nipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King of his high consideration.

Passeriano, 2 Vendemiaire, year 6.

BONAPARTE, General-in-Chief,  
Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.

*To the Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Passeriano, 2 Vendemiaire, year 6 [September 23, 1797].

You will find herewith, citizen minister—

1. The copy of a letter written to the Duke of Bavaria and the circle of Suabia, with a mission given to General Desaix.

2. The copy of three notes transmitted to the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor: one, to acquaint them with the recall of General Clarke; the two others relative to the occupation of the Bocca di Cattaro by the Austrian troops, and to the application which we are making to the Duke of Bavaria and the circle of Suabia for their contributions.

Messieurs the plenipotentiaries expect M. de Meerveldt's return from Vienna to-morrow or next day; things will then take a decided turn.

BONAPARTE.

*To Citizen Merlin, Member of the Directory.*

Passeriano, 2 Vendemiaire, year 6 [September 25, 1797].

I have learned, citizen-director, with the greatest pleasure, the news of your appointment to the post which you occupy.<sup>1</sup>

It would be impossible to find a man who has constantly rendered more services to liberty; for my part, I congratulate you upon it.

BONAPARTE.

<sup>1</sup> The arbitrary proceeding of the Directory, called, from the date of its occurrence, the 18th of Fructidor, directed ostensibly against persons who were believed to be well disposed to the restoration of royalty in France, is said to have been encouraged, if not contrived, by Bonaparte. Many of the most eminent public men were involved in this prescription, and among the rest the two directors, Carnot and Barthelemy. We have seen in what terms the general corresponded with the former, who escaped by flight; the latter, doomed like many others to transportation to Cayenne, contrived also to escape, when on the way to Rochefort. Their places as Directors were filled by Merlin of Douai, and François de Neufchateau.

*To the French Plenipotentiary.*

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King have the honour to observe to the citizen-general-in-chief, plenipotentiary of the French Republic, relative to the note concerning the Bocca di Cattaro, which he did them the honour to address to them, that the Bocca di Cattaro has at all times, under the republic of Venice, constituted part of the government of the province of Dalmatia: the inhabitants of that country speak the same language; and if, in the preliminaries of Leoben, no express mention was made of the Bocca di Cattaro, it was because it was not possible to express there, separately and nominatively, each of the constituent parts, appurtenances, and dependencies of the cessions, compensations, and acquisitions, reciprocally stipulated therein. Upon the whole, the remonstrances against the rights of his Majesty to the Bocca di Cattaro must cause the greater surprise, as, on the part of the court of Vienna, no notice has hitherto been taken of the occupation by the French troops of the Venetian islands of the Levant, of far greater importance, and which appears not to be justified by any well-founded motive, or by even a distant connection with the preliminaries.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King have the honour to assure the citizen-general-in-chief, plenipotentiary of the French Republic, of their high consideration.

Udine, September 25, 1797.

[The signatures follow.]

---

*Eighth Meeting of 6th Vendemiaire, year 6 (September 27, 1797).*

On the opening of the conference, at half-past four, the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King demanded of the plenipotentiary of the French Republic a categorical explanation of the meaning of the declaration inserted in the protocol of the 3rd of September, (17 Fructidor) relative to the fixing of the term of the 1st October, after which the preliminaries could no longer serve for basis to the definitive treaty. These plenipotentiaries observed that to annul in this manner the act which has put an end to hostilities was to throw back the two powers into the state in

which they were before it was signed ; they cannot, therefore, admit the right which the plenipotentiary of the French Republic wants to exercise—that of annulling an act solemnly ratified by both parties, which their court has never contravened in any way, which it has constantly declared and still declares itself ready to execute in all its points, and which cannot be either less sacred or less obligatory than the definitive treaty itself would be.

After this demand, the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, referring to the protocol of the meeting of the 4th of September, (18 Fructidor) relative to article 5 of the patent preliminaries, said that, though, on the present occasion of negotiations at Udine, they were not furnished with any instructions relative to the pacification of the Empire, which was totally distinct from the peace of his Majesty as King of Hungary and Bohemia, they were not the less willing to render public account of the overtures made by the plenipotentiaries of the Republic in the conference of the 4th of September, (18 Fructidor) touching the congress to be held at Rastadt for the peace of the Empire ; that they ought to have considered as an answer to the solicitations made previously and at different times by the plenipotentiaries of his imperial Majesty for the determination of this object, that, as whatever tends to the re-establishment of the general tranquillity cannot fail to be infinitely agreeable to his Majesty, he will cause the proposal of the plenipotentiaries of the Republic for fixing the congress for the pacification of the Empire to be communicated without delay to the diet of Ratisbon, through the usual channel of the chancellery of the Empire, in order that the plenipotentiaries and deputies appointed by the Empire may repair thither without delay, and that the conferences may be begun there as speedily as possible ; for, the peace of the Empire being by its nature and according to the preliminaries a totally different thing from that of his Majesty, there is no well-founded motive for making the time of the opening of the congress of Rastadt dependent on the progress of the negotiations of Udine, to the prejudice of the most speedy restoration of public tranquillity, especially as the provisional act of Montebello, dated May 24th, (5 Prairial) signed *sub acti spe rati*, could not be quoted, because that act could not acquire validity but by the approbation and ratification which it was impossible for his Majesty to give it.

The French plenipotentiary deferred till the next meeting his answer to the demand of Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, as also to their subsequent declaration.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*Ninth Meeting of the 7th Vendemiaire, year 6 (September 28, 1797).*

At the opening of the conference, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the French plenipotentiary communicated to the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King the ordinance of the Executive Directory of the French Republic dated 18th Fructidor, which recalls General Clarke and commissions the General-in-chief Bonaparte alone to continue the negotiations. This communication was made in exchange of the delivery of the powers of M. the Count de Cobenzel which had taken place at the preceding meeting.

The plenipotentiary of the French Republic then spoke in the following manner, in answer to the declaration made yesterday by Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, relative to the convocation of a congress at Rastadt for the conclusion of peace between the Germanic empire and the French Republic :—

“The plenipotentiary of the French Republic demanded of the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King that the congress of the Empire for peace with France should be held at Rastadt. He learns with pleasure from the declaration made yesterday by Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, that his Majesty adopts the choice of Rastadt.

“The French plenipotentiary had demanded that this congress should be held after peace should be concluded with his Majesty the Emperor and the French Republic. The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor intimate in yesterday's protocol that his Majesty has already convoked the congress of Rastadt. The French plenipotentiary protests against the said convocation, as his Majesty ought not to have made it without the previous concert of both parties.

“The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor add, that his Majesty has convoked the congress of Rastadt to

be held as speedily as possible. His Majesty could not fix, without previous concert with the French Republic, the epoch at which the congress of Rastadt should be held; the less could he do this, since the French Republic had demanded that the said congress should not meet till after the particular peace with his Majesty the Emperor.

"It is not besides at a moment when the troops of his Majesty the Emperor, as King of Hungary and Bohemia, occupy all the strong places of the Empire that the Republic could go with a power, which by its nature is independent, to a congress which ought to be exempt from all foreign influence."

Relative to the demand made by Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, at the opening of the conference of yesterday, the plenipotentiary expressed himself in these terms:—

"The French plenipotentiary has seen with pain that the congress is not agreed upon the import and signification of the most essential articles of the preliminaries of Leoben. No better had the two contracting parties agreed respecting the nature of the peace which they were to conclude.

"The preliminaries were founded on the renunciation of the coalition by his Majesty the Emperor; the cabinet of Vienna has nevertheless appeared, throughout the whole course of the subsequent negotiations, unable to forget the cause of its old allies.

"If it took six months to convince his Majesty the Emperor that his peace ought to be separate, it will, no doubt, take six more to agree upon the signification of the preliminaries. Meanwhile, the French Republic has sacrificed all its advantages to the desire to see a speedy peace unite the two nations. For it, the greatest would be the peace of Europe, which would be the infallible consequence. The false principles adopted by the cabinet of Vienna have put off the peace.

"But the preliminaries, after six months' discussion, present more difficulties than on the first day. The preliminaries, made in haste, according to the assertion of Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor, contain contradictory articles, and other articles, which, being no longer applicable to the present situation of Europe, cannot now serve for a basis to the negociation. The French

Republic then thought it right to allow his Majesty the Emperor a month to make up his mind to accept the preliminaries as they are, and in the natural and grammatical signification of the different articles, or to begin a fresh negotiation, and to take for basis the position and relation of the two States. The month is on the point of expiring. A new plenipotentiary of his Majesty is come to the congress, and one of the old plenipotentiaries is returning from Vienna. The negotiation ought therefore to take a rapid turn, which will put an end to the uncertainty in which we find ourselves.

“Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty demand a categorical explanation of the meaning of the declaration inserted in the protocol of the 3rd of September (17th Fructidor), relative to the fixing of the 1st of October as the term after which the preliminaries could no longer serve for basis to the definitive treaty. But this explanation it is for Messieurs the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor to give. Will they take for the basis of the negotiation the preliminaries, or, as one might be led to think from the totally different contexture of the full powers given to M. the Count de Cobenzel, is his Majesty resolved to take the relative position of the two States for the basis of the negotiations.

“In the first case, the French plenipotentiary demands that the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor nominate in the course of the day, in execution of article 5 of the secret preliminaries, the plenipotentiary who is to concert with the French plenipotentiary and the plenipotentiary of the republic of Venice. This operation is the most urgent as the most essential, since it is impossible to discuss the conditions of peace before settling the arrangements which place at the disposal of either power the different territories, the acquisition of which forms the principal clauses of the preliminaries.

“This done, the French plenipotentiary demands that the congress proceed to the discussion of article 6; for the interpretation which the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor have given to it is evidently ironical. The three days which are left till the 1st of October are more than sufficient for the discussion of article 6.

“If the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty, for any reasons whatever, should reject both these proposals, it would be



clear that the preliminaries would be annulled by themselves ; that the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor would not continue the discussion of the preliminaries, unless to pursue the same dilatory system, which for six months past the cabinet of Vienna appears to have been following.

“ We are well aware that this policy of the cabinet of Vienna is accordant with its interests. In fact, while the discussions are going on, the military situation of his Majesty the Emperor is improving ; his armies are repairing the losses of a disastrous war. In the dominions of his Majesty the Emperor, every place rings with the din of arms ; his troops are encamped on the extreme frontier, and in condition for war ; the five provinces which the French army has evacuated, agreeably to the preliminaries, now serve to recruit and to feed the army of his Majesty the Emperor ; batteries are constructing, field-entrenchments making in all the positions susceptible of them : how different this conduct from that of the French Republic, which has sent part of its troops into peace cantonments !

“ Thus the very means that have been acquired by the preliminaries are employed to set those preliminaries aside.

“ But if all Europe already perceives in the hostile preparations of his Majesty the Emperor the far from pacific intentions of the cabinet of Vienna ; if it is already astonished that the French Republic should suffer any longer the slow and tortuous course taken by a negociation which it expected to see concluded in a fortnight ; it deems it a duty incumbent on the Executive Directory of the French Republic to ask his Majesty the Emperor, Are you for peace or war ?

“ The whole world knows that we are desirous of peace, for we desired it when our troops were at Leoben and beyond the Rhine ; we desired it when we could have done what we pleased.

“ For the rest, whatever course the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor may adopt, the Executive Directory of the French Republic will not make war till it shall be forced to do so by the impossibility of adjusting matters and by the exaggerated pretensions of his Majesty the Emperor, and, in this case, the French plenipotentiary is authorized to make such arrangements with the plenipo-

tentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor, both for the army of Italy and for the other armies, as shall appear to them expedient.”

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*Tenth Meeting of the 8th Vendemiaire, year 6 (September 29, 1797).*

On the opening of the conference at half-past four, the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King, referring to the declaration made at yesterday's conference by the plenipotentiary of the French Republic, touching the convocation of the congress for the peace of the Empire, replied in the following manner:—

When his Majesty the Emperor convoked this congress, it was in consequence of the demand for it which had been made to his plenipotentiaries by the plenipotentiary of the French Republic at the meeting of the 4th of September (18 Fructidor): the nature of the measures to be taken for assembling with the constitutional forms the deputies of princes and States remote from geographical situation, induced his Majesty to give occasion for the said convocation as soon as France had manifested a wish for it.

In this proceeding of his Majesty it is impossible to mistake a marked solicitude to accelerate the definitive peace between the Empire and France, still more to suspect him falsely of a design to neglect wilfully whatever interest France may have a right to claim in this determination.

If the consideration of the convenience of his government has determined the citizen plenipotentiary of the French Republic to deny the validity of the convocation of the said congress, the court of Vienna has nevertheless the satisfaction of having given a manifest testimony of its wish to put an end for the Empire to the calamities which it is suffering from the war. It is this sentiment, coupled with reasons relating to the forms of the Germanic constitution, that alone instigated him to the proceeding in question.

The troops of his Majesty are necessary in the Empire so long as those of France continue nearly in the heart of Germany. His Majesty will never object to draw his forces towards his hereditary States in the same proportion as the French troops shall evacuate Germany and return to their country.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and

King, summing up the subject of the second declaration of the plenipotentiary of the French Republic, inserted in the protocol of yesterday, spoke as follows:—

The delay which has taken place thus far in the progress of the negotiation cannot in any way be attributed to the court of Vienna. Article 4 of the patent preliminaries stipulated the convocation of a congress at Berne, with the admission of the ministers of the allied courts.

This stipulation was neither less sacred nor less obligatory than all the other articles of the preliminaries; it was included in the ratification. Consequently, his Majesty had a right to claim the execution of it, and the French Republic had no right to refuse it: if, ever since the first claims were made, one had assented to this just demand, the negotiation would have suffered no delay, and the definitive peace might long ago have been signed.

It is not then to the court of Vienna that the delays which have hitherto impeded the negotiations are to be attributed; his Majesty has given, on the contrary, a new and very signal proof of the spirit of conciliation which animates him, in desisting from so just a demand, and consenting, notwithstanding the engagements contracted with him, to treat for a definitive peace at Udine.

Never have the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor found contradictory articles in the stipulation of the preliminaries. Article 5 of the patent act stipulates in the most evident manner the basis of the integrity of the Germanic empire; article 6 relates solely to the renunciation of all the rights of his Majesty to the Belgic provinces, and it is in relation to this hereditary property alone that his Majesty could recognize and has recognized, without the participation of the Empire, the limits decreed by the laws of the French Republic; which is the more evident, inasmuch as this stipulation had place only on three conditions specified immediately afterwards, which can apply solely to the Belgic provinces: consequently, the contradiction exists nowhere but in the unfounded extension attempted to be given to the natural and grammatical signification of that recognition of the limits decreed by the French Republic.

Article 5 of the secret preliminary act is the only one the execution of which is become impossible from changes in which his Majesty has had no hand. He recognized the old republic of Venice; he was in correspondence and in treaty

with it: this is not the case with the government which has been substituted there. His Majesty has, therefore, a right to require of those who have contributed to these changes the proposal of means for remedying the inconveniences arising from them for the objects of the present negotiation.

The Emperor cannot recognize the right which the French Republic would fain assume to annul, by the term which it fixes for the validity of the preliminaries, the bases agreed on for the definitive treaty of peace. Nothing between the two powers can be done but by common accord; whatever might be ordained by one of them only would be either law or an arbitrary proceeding. Austria admits neither the one nor the other; she protests against the term of the 1st of October as against the spirit and the letter of the preliminaries of Leoben; and she declares that she shall regard the articles after that term is past, as she has hitherto done, as the basis upon which the definitive arrangements between her and France must be incontestably founded.

The signification attributed by the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty to article 6 of the patent preliminaries is literal, justified by the context of that article and conformable to the intention which his Majesty must be supposed to have had at the time of the signature of the preliminaries. A different interpretation would perhaps bear the character not of irony but of a trick played on good faith by the extension given to terms the meaning of which cannot be mistaken.

If his Majesty takes necessary precautions, and such as hitherto have never varied, to be in a posture of defence, he has but too strong motives for those precautions in the position of the French army and in the little success that has attended his efforts to arrive at the conclusion of peace upon the footing of engagements already contracted. His Majesty desires it most ardently; he is ready to execute all that he has promised, and he has never ceased to be so.

The plenipotentiaries of his Majesty are not acquainted with any situation in which a power can do whatever it pleases. If the French Republic had determined to exact other conditions than those introduced into the preliminaries, his Majesty would not have assented to them, and the two States would have continued to run the risks of the war in which they were engaged: but, that act once concluded and ratified, the pretensions of his Majesty, so far from being

exaggerated, are limited to the execution of what has been solemnly agreed upon.

For the rest, the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King are authorized to receive what the plenipotentiary of the French Republic shall be pleased to propose to them respecting the time during which the armies of Italy and the Rhine have to remain in their present attitude.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 8 Vendemiaire, year 6 [September 29, 1797].

I have received, citizen-general, your two despatches, with the letter for the Directory, of the 3rd complementary day, as also the despatch of General Clarke, of the first complementary day.

I have laid the whole before the Directory, which desires me to reply that it refers to its ultimatum contained in my letter of the 29th Fructidor.

I repeat then, citizen-general, that the conditions of peace which the Directory will grant to the Emperor are the following:—

The Emperor shall keep Trieste and gain Venetian Istria and Dalmatia; the river Isonzo shall form the boundary: he shall renounce Mantua, Venice, the Terra Firma, the Venetian Friule. The French Republic will keep nothing on the continent of Italy; but the islands of Corfu, Cephallonia, Zante, Cerigo, Tine, &c., shall belong to France, and likewise Butrinto, Preveza, Larta, and Vonizza, which form part of Venetian Albania. The Emperor shall have the islands which border Dalmatia as far as Ragusa; Ragusa shall be evacuated and retain its independence; the Emperor may indemnify himself in Germany by the archbishopric of Salzburg and the bishopric of Passau, or by some other means, on the right bank of the Rhine: the Emperor shall, therefore, cede the little portions of territory which he possesses there, and shall make, both as emperor and as archduke of Austria and prince of the empire, a declaration respecting the boundary, expressing the most formal consent possible, and leaving no room for any equivocation; finally, he will evacuate Ingolstadt, Ulm, Mannheim, Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, Königstein.

With respect to Malta, I refer to my letter of the 6th

Vendemiaire, which contains the most positive intentions of the Directory on that subject.

Such are the last diplomatic instructions which the Directory has to forward to you ; they are irrevocable, and it considers war as inevitable if the Emperor does not submit to these conditions.

The Directory neglects nothing to put you in a condition to wage it with the success to which you have accustomed it ; it is taking the strongest measures to make the requisitionaries join, and it will endeavour to detach 6000 men from the army of the Rhine. It is sending you a regiment of light horse, which is on the road, and will try to send you another regiment of the same arm. The cavalry dépôts in the interior will be sent to you, but these are without horses. All means will be employed to forward infantry to you. In a few days, you will probably be able to recall the 5000 men who are on march for the interior. The course that you shall point out relative to the armistice on the Rhine shall be adopted.

Besides all these measures, on the strict execution of which you may depend, the Directory will second by negotiation the military arrangements which circumstances compel it to make. It will induce friendly cabinets to make joint efforts with you. You recollect what I have said respecting Prussia : it will endeavour to detach the others from the court of Vienna by all the means which policy can suggest.

On your part, citizen-general, as the existence of the Italian republics will be at stake, draw all possible resources from those States, and make all the levies you can in them, especially in the Venetian territories.

Demonstrate to the Venetians that their interest is the point in question here ; that it is solely on their account, to ensure liberty to them and to withdraw them from the house of Austria, that we continue the war, and that they must consequently make the utmost efforts in men, horses, and money. Make use of the Cisalpines to obtain Piedmontese troops, conformably to what I wrote to you in my private letter of the 29th Fructidor, for the Directory persists in not ratifying the treaty with the King of Sardinia.

If the Emperor refuses our conditions, the war upon which you will enter will produce the greatest events. Employ without scruple your mightiest auxiliary, the principles of

liberty, and any other means which your prudence shall suggest, provided that they have for their result to render provinces independent and to wrest them from the house of Austria. This is the most efficacious kind of hostilities. Let your march into Germany produce there an outburst of independence, and make the house of Austria repent its obstinacy in not subscribing to our conditions and in losing for ever the fairest portion of its hereditary States.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

*To the General-in-Chief.*

Paris, 17 Vendemiaire, year 6 [October 8, 1797].

I hasten to inform you, citizen-general, that the Directory has received your despatches of the 5th and the 7th Vendemiaire, and in respect to them it refers to what I wrote to you in my despatch of the 8th of this month, to which the Directory has nothing to add.

Yesterday, the Directory, agreeably to your desire, sent the treaty with the King of Sardinia for the ratification of the councils. As the ratification by the councils may take some days, and you may be pressed, I have prevailed upon M. de Balbi to write to his court to consider the ratification of the legislative body as obtained, and to act in consequence.

For the rest, I send you three letters, which it will be well to forward by successive opportunities to Malta, with a view to facilitate the expedition which you have planned. Citizen Barras wishes you to send one of his cousins, whose talents and qualifications might, he thinks, contribute to the success of the enterprise: if you think you could employ him, he could set out immediately.

The Directory has given orders for Augereau to hold himself in readiness on the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

<sup>1</sup> Bonaparte, dreading the odium of a direct interference in the violent proceedings contemplated by the majority of the Directors against the royalist conspirators, as they were called, had sent General Augereau to Paris, where he commanded the troops employed in the execution of their arbitrary decrees on the 18th of Fructidor. He was afterwards appointed to the command of the army of the Rhine, vacant in consequence of the death of General Hoche.

*To the Executive Directory.*

Passeriano, 19 Vendemiaire, year 6 [October 10, 1797].

The negotiations for peace are at length on the point of concluding. The definitive peace will be signed to-night, or the negotiation broken off.

Here are the principal conditions :

1. We shall have on the Rhine the boundary marked on the accompanying map, that is to say, the Nethe as far as Kerpen, and beyond that to Juliers, Venloo ;

2. Mayence and its fortifications, entire and just as it is ;

3. The islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, &c., and Venetian Albania.

4. The Cisalpine shall be composed of Lombardy, the Bergamasco, the Cremasco, the Brescian, Mantua, Peschiera, with the fortifications, as far as the right bank of the Adige and the Po, of the Modenese, the Ferrarese, the Bolognese, the Romagna ;

That makes very nearly three million five or six hundred thousand inhabitants.

5. Genoa shall have the imperial fiefs ;

6. The Emperor shall have Dalmatia and Istria, the territories of Venice as far as the Adige and the Po, the city of Venice.

7. The Prince of Orange, agreeably to the secret treaty with Prussia, shall obtain an indemnity. The Duke of Modena shall be indemnified by the Brisgau, and Austria shall take in lieu Salzburg and the part of Bavaria situated between the river Inn, the river Salza, and the bishopric of Salzburg, containing fifty thousand inhabitants.

8. We shall not cede the countries which the Emperor is to occupy till three weeks after the exchange of the ratifications, and when he shall have evacuated Mannheim, Ingolstadt, Ulm, Ehrenbreitstein, and the whole empire ;

9. France will have the best part of what belonged to the republic of Venice and the boundary of the Rhine. She will gain in this quarter a population of four millions ;

10. The Cisalpine Republic will have very fine military boundaries, since it will possess Mantua, Peschiera, Ferrara ;

11. Liberty therefore gains : the Cisalpine Republic, three millions five hundred thousand inhabitants ; new boundary of France, four millions : total, seven million five hundred thousand inhabitants ;



12. The house of Austria will gain one million nine hundred thousand inhabitants ;

It will lose, in Lombardy, one million five hundred thousand ; in Modena, three hundred thousand ; in Belgium, two million five hundred thousand : total, four million three hundred thousand inhabitants ;

Its loss therefore will be very considerable.

I have availed myself of the powers which you have given me and the confidence with which you have invested me to conclude the said peace ; I have been induced to do so,

1. By the advanced season, contrary to offensive warfare, especially in this quarter, where one would be obliged to recross the Alps and to enter very cold countries ;

2. The weakness of my army, which nevertheless has all the forces of the Emperor against it ;

3. The death of Hoche, and the bad plan of operations adopted ;

4. The distance of the armies of the Rhine from the hereditary States of the house of Austria ;

5. The nullity of the Italians. I have with me at most only fifteen hundred Italians, collected from among the blackguards in the great towns ;

6. The rupture which has just taken place with England ;

7. The impossibility, owing to the non-ratification of the treaty of alliance with the King of Sardinia, of availing myself of the Sardinian troops, and the necessity for increasing the garrisons of Piedmont and Lombardy by 6000 French troops ;

8. The desire for peace felt by the whole Republic, a desire which manifests itself even in the soldiers who would have to fight, but who will have still greater pleasure in revisiting their homes from which they have been absent for many years, and their estrangement from which would be serviceable only for establishing military government ;

9. The impropriety of exposing certain advantages and French blood for people, unworthy, caring little about liberty, and who, from character, habit, and religion, hate us profoundly.

The city of Venice contains, it is true, 300 patriots : their interests shall be stipulated in the treaty, and they shall be well received in the Cisalpine. The destiny of a few hundred men is not worth the sacrifice of 20,000 French ;

10. Lastly, the war with England will open to us a field

D D 2

of activity, more extensive, more essential, more glorious. The people of England are of more worth than the Venetian people, and their liberation will for ever consolidate the liberty and happiness of France ; or, if we force that government to peace, our commerce, the advantages which we shall procure for it in the two worlds, will be a great step towards the consolidation of liberty and public prosperity.

If I am mistaken in all these calculations, my heart is pure, my intentions are upright : I have silenced the interest of my glory, of my vanity, of my ambition ; I have kept in view the country and the government alone ; I have answered in a manner worthy of myself the unlimited confidence which the Directory has been pleased to grant me for these two years.

I think that I have done what every member of the Directory would have done in my place.

I have merited by my services the approbation of the government and of the nation ; I have received repeated marks of its esteem. *I have now no more to do but to mingle again with the crowd, to grasp once more the plough of Cincinnatus, and to set an example of respect for magistrates and aversion for military rule, which has destroyed so many republics and ruined several States.*

Be assured of my devotedness and my desire to do everything for the liberty of the country.

BONAPARTE.

---

*Secret Articles of the Treaty of Campo Formo.*

Art. I. His Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, consents that the limits of the French Republic shall extend to the line specified below, and engages to use his good offices at the time of the peace with the Germanic empire, in order that the French Republic may obtain that line, viz. :—

The left bank of the Rhine from the frontier of Switzerland below Basle to the conflux of the Nette above Andernach, including the tête de pont of Manheim on the left bank of the Rhine, and the city and fortress of Mayence ; both banks of the Nette, from its mouth to its source, near Bruch ; thence a line passing by Lanscherade and Borlaw to Kerpen, and from that town to Ludensdorf, Blankenheim, Marmagen, Sötenick, Call, Gemünd, comprehending the arrondissements and districts of those communes ; then

both banks of the Olff to its entrance into the Roer, including Heimbach, Nidecken, Duren, and Juliers, with their arrondissements, as far as Linnich; thence a line passing by Roffern, Erkelens, Dalen, Lilar, Papelermol, Latelfort, Radernberg, Haversloech (if it is in the direction of that line) An der Hayden, Kaldkirchen, Wambach, Herringen, and Grotray, with the town of Venloo and its arrondissement.

And if, notwithstanding the good offices of his Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Germanic Empire shall not consent to the acquisition by the French Republic of the boundary line specified above, his Majesty the Emperor and King formally engages to furnish the army of the Empire with no more than his contingent, which shall not be employed in the fortresses; and no injury shall thereby accrue to the peace and friendship which have just been established between his Majesty and the French Republic.

II. His Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, will likewise employ his good offices at the time of the pacification with the Germanic empire:

1. That the navigation of the Rhine may be free for the French Republic and the States of the Empire situated on the right bank of that river from Huninguen to its entry into the territory of the Batavian republic;

2. That the possessor of the German part of the Rhine opposite to the mouth of the Moselle shall never have a right, upon any pretext whatever, to oppose the free navigation and passage of boats, barges, and other craft, from the mouth of that river;

3. That the French Republic shall have the free navigation of the Meuse, and that the tolls and other dues which may have been established from Venloo to its entry into the Batavian territory, be suppressed.

III. His imperial and royal Majesty renounces for himself and his successors, in favour of the French Republic, the sovereignty and property of the county of Falkenstein and its dependencies.

IV. The countries which his Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, is to possess by virtue of article 6 of the patent definitive treaty, shall serve as compensation for the countries which he has renounced by the third and seventh articles, patent, of the said treaty and by the preceding article.

This renunciation shall have no value till the troops of his imperial and royal Majesty shall occupy the countries which he acquires by article 6 above-mentioned.

V. The French Republic will employ its good offices that his Majesty the Emperor may acquire in Germany the archbishopric of Salzburg and part of the circle of Bavaria, situated between the archbishopric of Salzburg, the river Inn, the Salza, and Tyrol, including the town of Wasserburg, on the right bank of the Inn, with an arrondissement having a radius of three thousand fathoms.

VI. His imperial and royal Majesty will cede, at the peace of the Empire, to the French Republic the sovereignty and property of the Frickthal, and of all that belongs to the house of Austria on the left bank of the Rhine, between Senzach and Basle, on condition that at the said peace his Majesty shall obtain a proportionate compensation in Germany more convenient for him.

The French Republic will unite the said countries to the Helvetic republic, according to such arrangements as they shall make between themselves, without prejudice to his Majesty the Emperor and King, or to the Empire.

VII. It is agreed, moreover, between the two contracting powers, that if, at the time of the approaching pacification of the Germanic empire, the French Republic makes an acquisition in Germany, his Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, shall likewise obtain an equivalent, and reciprocally, if his imperial and royal Majesty makes an acquisition of this kind, the French Republic shall obtain a similar equivalent.

VIII. A territorial indemnity shall be given to the Prince of Nassau-Dietz, late Stadtholder of Holland.

This territorial indemnity shall not be taken in the vicinity of the Austrian possessions, nor in that of the Batavian republic.

IX. The French Republic has no objection to restore to the King of Prussia his possessions on the left bank of the Rhine: in consequence, there will be no question of any new acquisition for the King of Prussia, which the two contracting powers mutually guarantee.

X. If the King of Prussia consents to cede to the French Republic and to the Batavian republic small portions of his territory situated on the left bank of the Meuse as well as the enclosed district of Sevenaer, and other possessions to-

wards the Issel, his Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, will employ his good offices to render the said cessions practicable, and to cause them to be adopted by the Germanic empire.

The execution of the present article shall not have power to destroy the effect of the preceding article.

XI. His Majesty the Emperor does not oppose the use which the French Republic has made of the imperial fiefs in favour of the Ligurian republic.

The Emperor will join his good offices to those of the French Republic to induce the Germanic empire to renounce the rights of paramountship which it may have in Italy, and especially over the countries which form part of the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, such as the Luniguina and all those situated between Tuscany, the territory of Parma, the Ligurian republic, and that of Lucca, and the late Modenese, which countries shall form part of the Cisalpine republic.

XII. His Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and the French Republic shall unite their good offices at the time of the pacification of the Germanic empire, that the different princes and States of the said empire, who shall sustain any losses of territory and rights in consequence of the stipulations of the present treaty of peace, or lastly, in consequence of the treaty to be concluded with the Germanic empire, and particularly the electors of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, the Elector Palatine of Bavaria, the Duke of Wurtemberg and Teck, the Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Deuxponte, the Landgraves of Hesse Cassel and Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau-Saarbrück, Salm-Kirburg, Löwenstein-Wertheim, Wied-Runkel, and the Count de la Leyen, obtain suitable indemnities in Germany, which shall be regulated in common accord with the French Republic.

XIII. The troops of his Majesty the Emperor shall evacuate, twenty days after the exchange of the ratifications of the said treaty, the cities and fortresses of Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, Mannheim, Königstein, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, as well as all the territory belonging to the Germanic empire, excepting his hereditary States.

XIV. The troops of the French Republic shall in like manner evacuate, twenty days after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, that part of the Venetian

States which his Majesty the Emperor is to occupy, and especially the fortresses of Palma Nova, Ozopo, Porto-Legnago, and the castles of Verona.

XV. No part of the artillery which was in Mayence and in the fortresses above mentioned at the moment of their occupation by the Austrian and French troops shall be withdrawn, nor shall any exchange be made in the present state of their fortifications.

XVI. The two contracting powers promise each other mutually in the most obligatory manner to keep the present articles most profoundly secret. They shall not have a right to publish the patent articles till the ratification has been given by both governments.

XVII. The present secret articles shall have the same force as if they were inserted word for word in the patent treaty of peace signed this day.

They shall be ratified at the same time by the two contracting parties, and the acts of ratification, in due form, shall be exchanged at Rastadt.

Done and signed at Campo Formio, the 17th of October, 1797—26 Vendemiaire, year 6 of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*Additional and Secret Convention.*

His Majesty the Emperor and King and the French Republic, desirous to provide against everything that might retard the execution of the treaty of peace concluded this day, agree—

Art. I. His Majesty the Emperor and the Executive Directory of the French Republic will appoint on either side one of their generals to go to the plenipotentiaries who shall be charged to effect the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

Each of these generals must be furnished with necessary powers for making the troops of his nation execute the movement of evacuation prescribed by the articles.

It will be necessary for both these generals to be of such rank as to be able to give orders to the generals commanding the armies of his Majesty the Emperor and of the

French Republic, who will have to effect the said movement of evacuation.

II. The two generals above mentioned shall exchange, in presence of the plenipotentiaries designated in Art. I., the powers with which they shall have been invested in conformity with the same article.

Mention shall be made of this in the minutes of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

III. The two generals shall settle between them, in presence of the above said plenipotentiaries, all the details relative to the execution of the articles.

IV. The French troops shall evacuate, after the occupation of Mayence by those of their nation, the part of the empire on the right bank of the Rhine above that place, which they occupy, with the exception of the fort of Kehl. They shall retain their present positions on the right bank of the Mayn and of the Nidda, without having a right to cross those rivers during the whole time that the armistice with the Germanic empire shall last.

V. The intention of the French Republic being not to evacuate the countries and fortresses which his Majesty the Emperor is to possess in Italy till the French Republic shall be assured of the occupation of Mayence by the French troops, the two generals shall concert together to this effect, and they shall likewise remove all the obstacles that might oppose the occupation of Venice and the lagoons by the troops of his Majesty the Emperor and King; and after they have concerted together, they shall take all the diplomatic steps necessary for accomplishing the two objects: they will combine, in consequence, the movements that must be prescribed to the armies of the two powers and executed by them.

VI. The two generals shall be individually responsible, in the face of Europe and on their honour, for the strict execution of the measures which they shall take, and of the orders which they shall give.

VII. The present convention shall be annulled by the two generals, and in presence of each other, after the perfect execution of all the articles.

Done and signed at Campo Formio, near Udine, the 17th October, 1797—26 Vendemiaire, year 6 of the French Republic, one and indivisible.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

---

*To the General-in-Chief.*


The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor, King of Bohemia and Hungary, for the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of Campo Formio, have the honour to request the citizen general-in-chief Bonaparte, plenipotentiary of the French Republic, to be pleased to give the necessary orders, that the villages and possessions of his Majesty the Emperor and King, specified in the annexed note, forming part of his hereditary States, and occupied by the troops of the French Republic on the right bank of the Rhine, be evacuated and excepted in future from all contributions and deliveries whatever not paid since the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor and King eagerly seize this occasion to renew to the citizen general-in-chief Bonaparte the assurances of their high consideration.

Rastadt, November 27, 1797.

[Subjoined are the signatures.]

END OF VOL. II.



FREDERICK SHOBERL, JUNIOR,  
PRINTER TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ALBERT,  
51, ROBERT STREET, HAYMARKET, LONDON.



vol. 1. 2.      61.12  
18.40

